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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine developments and changes in human 
rights in Saudi Arabia. Elements of human rights practices in Saudi Arabia, 
particularly those related to women, have been the subject of considerable international 
comment and criticism. In a response to various forms of internal and external 
influence, Saudi Arabia has moved, particularly since the mid 1990s, towards more 
active involvement in the international human rights institutional and legal 
arrangements by its voluntary accession to international human rights conventions and 
its growing cooperation with, and engagement in, the UN human rights system. 
Formally accepting internationally-recognized human rights standards and establishing 
domestic institutions and introducing laws dealing with human rights appear to 
constitute constructive steps towards compliance with, and further socialization into, 
internationally-recognized human rights standards. Questions arise as to what extent 
and why the Kingdom has changed its pattern of dealing with human rights issues.
Given the importance and centrality of the UN human rights system, increasing 
external criticism of Saudi human rights practices, and the expanding debate about the 
relationship between Islamic principles and human rights, particularly in respect to 
women, this thesis explores the question of the extent to which developments towards 
human rights in Saudi Arabia could be attributed to the influence of the UN human 
rights system. This study examines how the Kingdom has been participating in, and 
responding and reacting to influences coming through the UN human rights system. In 
addition to exploring several theoretical issues and establishing a theoretical 
framework for the thesis, other significant internal and external factors influencing 
human rights in the Kingdom are addressed in order to assess the specific relationship 
between developments towards human rights in Saudi Arabia and the UN human rights 
system.
The treatment of women in Saudi Arabia, and in the Muslim world generally, 
has recently emerged as one of the most central and controversial human rights issues 
at domestic and international levels. Following a thorough examination of this issue as 
a case study, only a weak correlation was established between the direct influence of 
UN women’s rights mechanisms and the recent developments concerning women in 
Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, this thesis acknowledges the major role of the UN human 
rights system in providing the necessary conditions for empowering and legitimizing 
all other forms of influence by codifying human rights principles through universally 
accepted declarations and legally binding conventions.
GLOSSARY
Abaya: black robe worn by women in public places.
Ahlul halli wal aqd: the influential people in the community, but the literal meaning
is the people who bind and loose, meaning decision makers in 
society.
Aiylah: means family.
Al-wala ’a wa al-bara ’a: an Islamic principle that lays emphasis on the universal
loyalty among Muslims and the absolute renunciation by
Anzimah: 
Aqil:
Asabiyah:
Muslims of non-Muslims, 
laws, regulations 
reason, intellect or sense.
refers to solidarity among members of a given social group such 
as a tribe, which has created a socially favourable mechanism 
based on nepotism and personal relations, commonly known as 
wastah.
Asl: 
Awrah 
Bay’ah\ 
Bida ’h: 
Da'wah:
the honour that stems from nobility of origin, 
private parts of the body, 
an oath of allegiance, 
undesirable innovations.
the word comes from the verb Da'aa, meaning to call for or to 
invite.
Deen 
Dhimmi: 
Diwan:
religion or faith 
a non-Muslim.
the word diwan means council. For example, the Royal Diwan 
is a central department of the monarchy which includes 
numerous advisors and senior public servants.
Fatwa: 
Fiqh: 
Fitnah:
a religious edict or opinion, 
jurisprudence.
in political context, it means internal strife (civil war). In social 
settings, it means seduction.
Hanbali: the Hanbali jurisprudence (fiqh) is one of the four major schools 
(madhhabs) within Sunni Islam, which is predominant among 
the ulama in Saudi Arabia. This school was started by the 
students of Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal (died 855).
Hijab: 
Hudood: 
Huqooq: 
Ijma: 
Ijtihad:
women veiling.
fixed penalties in the shari ’ah.
Rights.
consensus.
formulating an independent interpretive opinion using both 
reason and knowledge of Islamic sources.
Ikhtilaf.
Ikhtilat
Imamah:
differences.
mixing between women and men. 
leadership.
Jalb al maslahah wa daf’a al mafsadah: an Islamic traditional approach, which
Jihad:
literally means ‘bringing interests and preventing potential 
negative impacts’, authorizing the ulama to issue fatwas and the 
ruler to initiate regulations in the public interest in accordance 
with the surrounding circumstances.
originally means the exertion of efforts to do/make something, 
but it has become associated with war against non-Muslim.
Khadiri: descendent of slaves or non-Arab.
Khalifah:
Khilafah:
Khilafah:
Khurafat:
Madhhab:
Mahr am 
Majlis Al-Shura: 
Majlis:
Maslaha:
Qabili:
Qarabah:
Qiwamah:
Sahwah Al-Islamiyah 
Sahwah 
Salafiyah:
Shari’ah:
Sunnah or hadith:
Tawheed:
Ulama:
Ummah: 
Wahhabism:
Wajibat: 
FPa//e al-amr
Zakat
caliph, successor, 
caliphate, succession.
the Arabic term involves the connotations of successor as well
as the meaning of representation.
superstitions.
sect or school of jurisprudence.
male relative with whom marriage is prohibited.
the consultative council.
audience chamber.
the concept of public interest.
belong to purely free Arab family or tribe.
it means closeness in both space and social relations.
means guardianship.
the Islamic awakening movement; the neo-Islamists, 
awakening.
the Salafiyah creed basically calls for imitating the earliest 
Muslims in every aspect of life. The literal meaning of Al-Salaf 
is predecessors, referring to the first generation and ulama in 
early Islamic centuries. Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab’s 
movement is considered the starting point of the salafi approach 
of the modem era.
literally means ‘path’, but in usage it means ‘Islamic laws’. It 
constitutes various norms of all human actions based on the 
ulama's understanding of the Qur ’an and Sunnah. Most parts of 
the shari ’ah (or Islamic laws) were formed during the eighth 
and the ninth centuries.
refers to the traditions or deeds and sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad.
oneness of God.
(sing. A ’lim) means those who possess knowledge in the Islamic 
shard ah, particularly the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 
the Muslim nation or community.
religious-political movement in the Arabian Peninsula whose 
ideological basis was established by Muhammed Ibn 
Abdulwahhab (1703-1792). The movement advocated the 
return to a pure, undistorted Islam, 
obligations.
the guardian who is often the father or the husband for a women 
or the ruler for Muslim community.
a state tax formally to be handed to poor members in the Muslim 
community.
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or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
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Discrimination.
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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1INTRODUCTION
The study of human rights is complex for various reasons, particularly because 
of its inter-cultural and inter-disciplinary nature. Issues of human rights have attracted 
the attention of scholars, politicians and a wide range of interested individuals from 
within different cultures and countries. Following World War II and the adoption of 
the UDHR in the late 1940s, a particular set of human rights norms has been 
increasingly seen as a legitimate issue in international law and international relations. 
The UN human rights system has played a major role in the codification of human 
rights principles. Human rights issues have gained further international momentum 
following the end of the Cold War and with the mounting exchange of ideas, 
information and goods in the era of globalization. There has been an increasing 
number of indications that international pressures and influences designed to influence 
human rights practices worldwide have been substantively on the rise, particularly in 
relation to the treatment of women. For instance, the UN scries of world conferences 
on women that started in the mid 1970s, the adoption of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, and 
the establishment of the post of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR) in 1993 are signs that reflect determination by the international 
community of states to intensify the activities of the UN human rights system.
At the same time, there has been mounting international attention concerning 
the situation of human rights in the Muslim world. With popular revivalist trends of 
Islamic thoughts sweeping many Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, debate 
surrounding the compatibility and congruence of principles of the shari’ah (Islamic 
law) with the internationally-recognized human rights standards has gained increased 
significance in various domestic and international settings. Human rights practices 
related to women have been at the heart of this debate, gaining greater attention 
following the global focus on the treatment of Afghani women during the Taliban 
regime (1996-2001).
Human rights practices in Saudi Arabia, particularly as they relate to women, 
have been the subject of considerable specific comment and criticism, not only 
externally by states and governmental and non-governmental organizations, but also 
internally by some Saudi activists. States and NGOs alike have been using diverse 
mechanisms, including those available through the UN human rights system, to 
attempt to influence human rights practices in the Kingdom, which are seen as being in
2violation of the internationally-recognized human rights standards. The UN human 
rights system, through its various bodies and mechanisms, carries out significant 
promotional and declaratory activities that influence positively the socialization of and 
learning about human rights in countries around the world, including Saudi Arabia.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as a member of the international community 
and a founding member of some international and regional organizations, has been 
exposed to, and affected by, events, measures, changes and developments taking place 
in the international arena. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, Saudi Arabia 
has participated in drafting and deliberating upon international resolutions and in their 
subsequent adoption, and in formulating declarations and conventions that constitute 
what are now known generally as international human rights standards. However, 
Saudi Arabia’s engagement in UN human rights activities has increased notably since 
the early 1990s. The 1990s has seen unprecedented steps taken by Saudi Arabia 
towards greater engagement in. the UN human rights system, such as attending the 
annual sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), committing to 
participate in, and cooperate with, the UN human rights mechanisms, and responding 
to inquiries made by instrumentalities of the UN human rights system. Furthermore, 
out of the six principal UN human rights treaties, between 1996 to 2000 Saudi Arabia 
ratified four treaties; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). Such ratifications came in response to various forms of 
internal and external influence, pressure and criticism of the Kingdom’s human rights 
practices. Saudi Arabia also has shown an interest in engaging further in the activities 
of the UN human rights system by nominating itself for membership in the UNCHR. 
Since winning a seat among states members of the UNHRC in the 2000 election, Saudi 
Arabia was able to retain its seat in the 2003 and 2006 elections. The engagement of 
Saudi Arabia in the UN human rights system represents a formal gesture of recognition 
and could be seen as evidence of its willingness to accept accountability by the 
international human rights regime.
Domestically, since the establishment of Saudi Arabia in September 1932, the 
framework of human rights has changed. Saudi Arabia has experienced an increasing 
pace of modernization and development in every aspect of life. Conditions 
surrounding Saudi Arabia’s society have since been transformed into sophisticated 
levels of modernity and development in many domains, and human rights institutions,
3laws and practices are, to a certain degree, no exception. Particularly since the early 
1990s, Saudi Arabia has taken several steps that could contribute to an increase in 
protecting and promoting human rights. Such steps include the introduction of new 
laws, policies and procedures and the creation of governmental and nongovernmental 
bodies. Following Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW in 2000 and the events of 11 
September 2001, the issue of women’s rights has received greater attention from the 
Saudi government and the public alike. Official statements and public debates on the 
need to enlarge the role of women in public life and to protect their rights have 
intensified, with some practical steps taken towards this direction by the government.
The central question in this thesis is to what extent such developments are 
linked with Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the UN human rights system and, 
especially, with its accession to CEDAW. As Saudi Arabia has changed its pattern of 
engagement with the UN human rights system in the last decade or so, and in the light 
of recent developments in human rights in general and women’s rights in particular, it 
is interesting to investigate the relationship between changes in the situation of human, 
particularly women’s, rights in Saudi Arabia and the influence of the UN human rights 
system in effecting those changes.
Within the literature on human rights, considerable attention has been given to 
the issue of human rights in Islam, with some recognition of differences among the 
different schools of Islamic thought. However, human rights in Saudi Arabia have not 
been studied in a systematic, critical and comprehensive way. Moreover, the literature 
on human rights is relatively rich in studies of the overall impact of the UN human 
rights system at the domestic level in general, but the engagement of Saudi Arabia in, 
and its interaction with, the UN human rights system has not been exclusively and 
systematically examined. This thesis, thus, makes a contribution to the academic 
literature on human rights in Saudi Arabia, particularly women’s rights, and on the 
influence of the UN human rights system. It attempts to expand the understanding of 
the diffusion of, and compliance with, universal human rights norms in a county like 
Saudi Arabia. Among other things, it should contribute to addressing the question 
about the extent to which Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the international human 
rights arrangements can stimulate change in human rights practices in the Kingdom. 
An hypothesized linkage between Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN human 
rights system and developments of human rights in the Kingdom is tested. This aims 
to provide answers on how Saudi Arabia has reacted and responded to influences by 
the UN human rights system and on the correlation between developments in human 
rights, focusing on women’s rights in the Kingdom and the impact on these
4developments of the UN human rights system. Moreover, this study offers an 
enhanced understanding of the process of change in human rights norms in a 
politically and religiously conservative country such as Saudi Arabia. Theoretical 
issues related to the process of change in human rights norms are examined to establish 
a theoretical framework for the thesis, including the diffusion of norms internationally, 
compliance with internationally-recognized human rights norms, and universality 
versus cultural relativity of human rights.
This thesis brings together three interconnected themes: the situation of human 
rights in Saudi Arabia in general, the influence of the UN human rights system; and the 
place of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. The subject of human rights, however, is 
remarkably broad and, rather than exploring all aspects of human rights in Saudi 
Arabia, it is useful for the purpose of this study to look in detail at one specific aspect 
of human rights in that country. The status and the rights of women in Saudi Arabia 
constitute central, but controversial, questions at both domestic and international 
levels. This issue has consequently been selected as a case study in order to pinpoint 
more specifically the extent of correlation between developments towards human 
rights in Saudi Arabia and the influence of the UN human rights system on these 
developments.
Hypothetically, the greater the engagement in the UN human rights system, the 
greater should be the compliance with international human rights norms. An 
integrating theme of this thesis, therefore, is an examination of the two components of 
the hypothesis, which would contribute to explaining, understanding and predicting 
changes in human rights in Saudi Arabia. There are three levels of analysis at which 
human rights in Saudi Arabia are examined: (a) internationally-recognized human 
rights standards, (b) Islamic human rights values, and (c) Saudi traditions and customs. 
The isolation of the independent variable (the UN human rights system) is generally 
not possible because of the interdependent nature of human rights and the overlapping 
nature and relativity of both external and internal factors affecting the development of 
human rights. However, an attempt is made to assess the causal effect of the 
independent variable by attempting to distinguish the role of other variables. The 
theoretical examination of issues, such as norms diffusion or compliance, internal and 
external factors affecting human rights in Saudi Arabia and the exploration of the 
Kingdom’s engagement in the UN human rights system, is designed to contribute 
fundamentally to answering the central question.
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter provides an initial 
informative foundation to, and overall background about, the situation of human rights
5in Saudi Arabia. In four sections, this chapter discusses major elements in the political 
and social environment in Saudi Arabia in the first section and explores laws and 
institutions related to the protection and promotion of human rights in the second. The 
third section describes the current situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia drawing 
from various sources, including Saudi official documents, Saudi media, and reports by 
international human rights NGOs. The final section sheds light briefly on the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UN human rights system.
Chapters two and three address the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Chapter two covers theories relevant to the nature, emergence and diffusion of human 
rights norms, questions of sovereignty versus intervention, the international human 
rights regime, and the question of compliance. This chapter notably focuses on 
examining the argument that the diffusion of internationally-recognized human rights, 
and states’ compliance with those norms, particularly where they are related to societal 
dynamics such as women’s rights, could be better understood in the context of a 
process of socialization, which involves various mechanisms and methods including 
learning, cooperation, persuasion and shaming.
When critically studying human rights in Saudi Arabia, the scholarly 
arguments and political debates over the issues of universality and relativity of human 
rights have to be taken into account. Given the importance of this issue, the third 
chapter is devoted to this fundamental theoretical question. It examines the thesis’s 
argument that internationally-recognized human rights have been universally accepted 
at the formal level, whereas their acceptance across cultures has been arguably limited 
to the core of human rights. It also investigates those arguments promoted mostly by 
developing countries in which the universality and indivisibility of human rights have 
been questioned. As perspectives of Muslim ulama, including Wahhabi ulama, on the 
issues of human rights and on the political system in Islam are related to the question 
of cultural relativity, such views will be part of the theoretical discussion in this 
chapter.
In order to understand the role of the UN human rights system in influencing 
human rights norms in Saudi Arabia, major internal and external factors influencing 
human rights in the Kingdom are examined. Chapter four explores four essential 
elements affecting the internal circumstances in Saudi Arabia. Exploring the domestic 
structure of institutions in the state and society and interaction between the two is 
crucial to an understanding of the process of development and change in the 
application of human rights. The second issue is to discuss cultural congruence 
between universal human rights norms and domestic beliefs and values in Saudi
6Arabia, as the level of impact of international norms essentially depends on their level 
of variation from domestic values.
The state’s adoption of new policies, which may affect positively or negatively 
the situation of human rights, has by and large been associated with experiences 
arising from crises or major domestic events. Therefore, the influence of four crises or 
events that took place during the last five decades are examined, namely the crisis of 
internal power struggle combined with external threat in the 1960s, the siege at the 
Grand Mosque of Makkah in 1979, the Gulf War Crisis in 1990, and the 11 September 
2001 attacks and the war on terrorism inside and outside of the Kingdom. In the last 
few years, the influence of public opinion in Saudi Arabia has been on the rise. Also, 
Saudi Arabia’s response to the UN human rights system influences and its obligations 
arising from becoming part of the international legal arrangements is to an extent 
related to how the Saudi people perceive human rights norms. Accordingly, the last 
section of chapter four examines two issues concerning the influence and change of 
domestic public opinion. It examines changes in the role of public opinion in Saudi 
Arabia and explores briefly factors affecting its formation. Second, as identifying the 
perspectives of a segment of Saudi society on some relevant issues could provide an 
important contribution to examining the thesis’s central question and offer essential 
signs of changes in values related human rights, the second part of this section 
summarizes the overall results of a survey, which was conducted for this thesis in early 
2006, whilst the details of the survey’s design, methodology and statistical analysis are 
contained in Appendices I and II.
Similarly important, international-level factors affecting human rights in Saudi 
Arabia are examined in order to understand the dynamic of human rights changes in 
the Kingdom. Apart from the UN human rights system, discussed in subsequent 
chapters, chapter five examines four forms of international influence. Given the 
importance of Saudi Arabia’s stability to the world economy and the Kingdom’s 
strategic ties with powerful states, it is crucial to discuss the role of foreign states in 
influencing, either directly or indirectly, domestic policies in the Kingdom. Again, 
international human rights NGOs have been putting pressure on states, urging them to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, the role of international 
human rights NGOs in influencing developments of human rights in the Kingdom is 
examined, as those NGOs have been paying greater attention to the situation of human 
rights in Saudi Arabia in recent years. Various material and immaterial aspects that 
come with globalization, modernization and development play a role in affecting 
various domestic trends including the internalization of the internationally-recognized
7human rights norms. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss how such aspects have 
affected the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia. Finally, as governments have 
an interest in gaining legitimacy and respect from international audiences and 
international media, the fourth issue in this chapter explores the role of international 
media and public opinion as they affect human rights in the Kingdom.
Chapter six involves an historical analysis and exploration of Saudi Arabia’s 
interaction with, and its position in relation to issues discussed within, the UN human 
rights system since 1948. Such analysis aims at an understanding of how Saudi 
Arabia’s engagement in the UN human rights system has affected the situation of 
human rights in general and women’s rights in particular. Saudi Arabia’s interaction 
with the UN human rights system will be divided into two distinguishable phases: 
phase one (from the late 1940s to the early 1990s) involves the Kingdom’s activities in 
the process of debating and adopting the principal international human rights 
documents; phase two (from the early 1990s until 2005) examines various aspects of 
Saudi Arabia’s engagement with human rights issues, as the Kingdom becomes a 
signatory to the internationally binding human rights treaties and interacts with the 
UNCHR, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and 
the UNCHR Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups on various subjects.
As indicated earlier, the issue of women’s rights was selected as a case study. 
Chapter seven, the first part of the case study, examines developments in the role and 
the rights of women in Saudi Arabia. It examines factors, other than the UN human 
rights system, that have influenced the situation of Saudi women, including the role of 
Islamic beliefs and domestic traditional and tribal influence. Also, it explores the 
status of women in Saudi Arabia, including their right to education, their right to work 
and the political climate that has influenced developments in their rights. The eighth 
chapter, the second part of the case study, examines in detail Saudi Arabia’s 
interaction with the UN human rights system in the area of women’s rights. It 
subsequently identifies the extent to which women’s rights in the Kingdom have been 
influenced, or are capable of being influenced, by the UN human rights system. The 
objective of the case study is to highlight the extent of any correlation between 
developments in the rights and the role of Saudi women and the influences exerted by 
the UN human rights system.
8CHAPTER ONE
HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA: A BACKGROUND
Introduction:
Political practices and social values, including those norms related to human 
rights, are often a reflection of the local political, social, cultural and religious realities 
in a given society. In Saudi Arabia, Islam is the professed and stressed ideology of the 
state and its primary source of legitimacy. The alliance between Al-Sa’ud, the royal 
family, and the ulama has been the cornerstone of the continuity of the rule of Al- 
Sa’ud. This marriage between tribal and religious thinking is crucial to any 
explanation of political or social phenomena in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Islamic 
beliefs and domestic traditions, including those related to tribal customs, familial ties 
and patriarchal values, are essential elements for examining human rights in Saudi 
Arabia.
While some issues will be fully investigated later in subsequent chapters, this 
chapter provides background to some aspects of human rights in Saudi Arabia and lays 
foundations for the following chapters. First, the social and political environment has 
shaped norms of human rights. The Saudi government has been constantly declaring 
and affirming that the Qur’an and the Sunnah (traditions or deeds and sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad) are the country’s constitution and the sources of all legislation, 
which was clearly stated in the 1992 Basic Law of Governance. However, Saudi 
society is not a product of Islam alone, but of an Islam mixed with traditions stemmed 
from values linked to tribalism, familial ties and asabiyah (group solidarity) within the 
context of qarabah (closeness). The concept of human rights is rooted in the people’s 
social, cultural and religious norms, which have been established over centuries. 
However, these have been subject to change especially during the last fifty years. It is 
useful, then, to outline the basis of the Saudis’ conceptualization of human rights by 
presenting an overall background of political realities and social values in the 
Kingdom.
In Saudi Arabia, judicial and security institutions are the prominent 
governmental bodies in charge of, among other things, protecting the rights and 
integrity of individuals. In addition, there are other governmental bodies responsible 
for the fulfilment of subsistence rights, or human rights needs. Recently, Saudi Arabia
9has passed laws and established institutions to secure more protection and promotion 
of human rights. Therefore, the second issue in this chapter is to present a brief 
description of the Saudi laws and institutions pertaining to the protection and 
promotion of human rights.
Thirdly, it is imperative to identify the current situation of human rights in 
Saudi Arabia. Based on human rights monitoring reports3 and other sources,4 the 
situation of human rights, along with concerns about human rights violations raised 
against Saudi Arabia, is summarized. While many international human rights 
organizations repeatedly reported widespread human rights violations, it is known that 
Saudi Arabia restricted access to investigate any claim of such violations. It is 
therefore important to rely on different sources to present, objectively and fairly, the 
situation of human rights there, including official and unofficial Saudi sources.
Finally, as a member of the international community, Saudi Arabia has 
articulated its position on the issue of human rights. It is useful to identify Saudi 
Arabia’s stance in relation to the major international human rights instruments and to 
the UN human rights system at large. Demonstrating the country’s position provides a 
connection between its engagement in the UN human rights system and changes and 
developments in human rights in the Kingdom.
1- Political And Social Environment:
The religion of Islam is one of the most important elements in the social and 
political environment in Saudi Arabia. Islam has proclaimed the concept of absolute 
justice with all the associated norms relating to the rights of the individual and the 
community, focusing on principles and values that support respect for the humanity 
and dignity of human beings and the right to a decent life free from any act of 
aggression against the person, his/her honour or home. The shari'ah proclaims the 
unity of origin of human beings, that they all belong to a single family united in its 
worship of Allah, and that they are descended from Adam and are equal in terms of 
human dignity without distinction as to race, colour, sex, political opinion or social 
status.
The understanding of the religion of Islam in Saudi Arabia is associated with 
Wahhabism.5 The first Saudi state arose in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth 
century on the basis of the Wahhabi movement. Prior to the establishment of the first 
Saudi state, most provinces in the Arabian Peninsula were independently ruled by 
different tribal leaders. The first ruler from the Al-Sa’ud family was Muhammad Ibn
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Sa’ud (1689-1766), who concluded an agreement in 1744 with Sheikh Muhammad Ibn 
Abdulwahhab (1703-1791), an eminent religious leader and renowned reformer. The 
agreement stated that together they would work to establish a state run according to the 
pure Islamic faith, as many Muslims, in Wahhabis’ opinion, had deviated from the 
principles of monotheism defined in the Islamic sources.6 The resulting Saudi state 
was based on this alliance. The Al-Sa’ud rulers during the first (1744-1818) and 
second (1838-1870) Saudi states were able to impose control over the Arabian 
Peninsula and beyond. Despite the success achieved in the first and second Saudi 
states, both failed to establish an organized and stable state capable of facing external 
and internal challenges. A new third stage of the Saudi state started when King 
Abdulaziz Al-Sa’ud (1876-1953) recaptured the city of Riyadh in 1902. Following 
this recapture, King Abdulaziz was able to present himself as a leader who brought a 
unification that could help spread the message of Islam. From 1902 to 1926, he 
extended his authority over most of the Arabian Peninsula, utilizing Islam as the 
unifying force to consolidate his rule.7
Accordingly, the legitimacy of the Saudi state comes essentially from its 
alliance with the ulama. The ideology of the Wahhabi movement does not connote a 
new form of Islam. It is simply a movement to alter, forcefully if necessary, the 
wrongful practices that contradict Islam in Wahhabis’ interpretation. It focuses on 
purifying the religion of Islam by maintaining principles of the unity of God 
(tawheed), combating superstitions (khurafat) and undesirable innovations (bida).
As will be explained in chapter three, the Hanbali jurisprudence ifiqh) is one of 
the four major schools (madhhabs) within Sunni Islam, which is predominant among 
the ulama in Saudi Arabia. The Hanbali School has accepted the emergence of the 
hereditary monarchical system in exchange for the ruler’s guarantee to uphold the 
tenets of Islam. While Wahhabism promotes protecting the interests of the feudal- 
tribal nobility with its slogans advocating stability of the state and dictating that 
ordinary people should obey the authorities, the secret of this movement’s social 
appeal is its ability to adopt means for greater social justice, higher moral standards 
and, more importantly, better levels of security and stability. In interpreting what this 
means, one needs to consider that Islamic teachings adopted by Wahhabism not only 
encourage some Arab values related to the less fortunate individuals in society, such as 
norms of generosity and hospitality, but also call for the observation of principles that 
provide more equality among individuals, as seen in the system of zakat and 
egalitarianism among individuals of different races and tribes. Moreover, Wahhabism 
paved the way for the creation of a central controlling authority, which had positive
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influences on making laws enforceable and improving the security and safety of 
individuals and their properties in various communities in the Arabian Peninsula. 
However, the prime importance of Wahhabism lay in politics rather than in the social 
sphere.8 The most important aspect of Wahhabi teaching in relation to politics is the 
emphasis it puts on obedience to the ruler, which coincides with tribal thinking about 
respecting seniority and leadership. In a tribal society, especially in the interior region 
of Saudi Arabia where lack of security was a bitter reality, the people there still greatly 
value stability and security. By the same token, the Saudi state stresses the fact that 
there was no security at all prior to its control over the Arabian Peninsula.9 Such 
realities are fundamental to understanding developments related to human rights.
Despite changes in the equation between the two major domestic powers, the 
alliance between the ulama and the state remains important in the present-day Saudi 
Arabia. This relationship, though, is not always harmonious and conflict with zealous 
Wahhabi groups is part of Saudi Arabia’s politics. Tension and armed conflict with 
fundamentalist Wahhabism have long shaped Saudi politics, as will be elaborated in 
chapter four. The most important incidents are the battle of As-sbalah when King 
Abdulaziz defeated the Ikhwan movement in 1926, and the siege of the Grand Mosque 
in Makkah in 1979 in which hundreds of people were killed. However, the Saudi state 
still has the ability to control Wahhabism through confrontation and politics, while 
accommodating it into the political system, creating thus an official Wahhabism that is 
sanctioned and utilized by the state.10 While there are fears that Wahhabi 
fundamentalists might one day shake the public image of Saudi Arabia as the only 
Islamic country to achieve a successful marriage between tradition and modernity,11 to 
date Saudi Arabia’s leadership has arguably maintained a balance between modernity 
and religiosity.
The ulama play a vital and focal role in the political and social environment in 
Saudi Arabia. As frequently declared by Saudi officials, the constitution of the 
Kingdom is based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Therefore, the ulama is authorized 
to interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah through legal opinions (fatwas) on all matters 
including political questions to provide, inter alia, religious sanction of the acts of the 
government. With the lack of formal legislative authority, all royal decrees and 
ministerial regulations theoretically must be in conformity with the shari ’ah, which 
gives the official and non-official ulama rights to express their views on legislative 
issues, despite limitations on such rights in practice. The role of the ulama is not 
limited to legislatively-oriented spheres; they also control the judicial system, exercise 
a monopoly on religious and social morals and enjoy strong influence over the
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education system. The ulama constitute an important part of the elite and have 
considerable prestige socially and politically.
While the ulama appear to exercise major roles in Saudi Arabia’s life, the 
government has been to a considerable extent skilful in making the religious 
establishment compatible with changes associated with modernity and development. 
This flexibility of the Wahhabi ulama, according to James Piscatori, comes from the 
Hanbali School’s view that “an innovation is permissible unless there is a clear textual 
prohibition for it.” 12 However, Piscatori’s argument is open to question, given that the 
ulama, especially those who are not part of the official ulama, have issued fatwas 
banning some practices without citing a clear textual prohibition. The government 
treats the ulama with a great deal of respect, and the government’s wealth has been 
successfully utilized in a carrot-and-stick policy towards the ulama, which may explain 
their flexibility. More significantly, the obsession with maintaining the stability and 
security of the state noted earlier and the deep belief that obedience is due to the ruler 
could explain much of the ulama’s flexibility and their approval of, or at times silence 
about, the government’s initiatives related to development and modernization. Within 
this context, it is worth noting that ulama with wide knowledge of Islam are more 
likely to be open-minded to change than those who are more basic in their 
enthusiastism towards Islam.
During the first and the second Saudi states, the ulama played a central role in 
shaping the policies of the state, but in Saudi Arabia today there are several power 
centres beside the ulama. As will be explained in chapter four, the monarch’s position 
has grown stronger compared to the ulama during the last fifty years. Various reasons 
have contributed to weakening the role of the ulama, including the increasing number 
of technocrats and highly educated graduates from Western universities.
Nevertheless, the local politics of the state and the social behaviour of the 
Saudis are strongly connected to the religion of Islam. The fact that Saudi Arabia 
occupies the heartland of Islam has attached another important element to socio- 
politics in the Kingdom. While this connection with the religion continues to shape 
today’s Saudi Arabia, there are other components that explain aspects of Saudi politics 
and social norms. It is important to understand Saudi Arabia within not only the 
context of Islam and the ulama but also the concept of traditions and customs relevant 
to familial ties and tribal values. The concept of asabiyah refers to solidarity among 
members of a given social group, such as a family, tribe or race, through which power 
can be achieved and sustained and interests can be served. 14 Familial ties and its
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association with asabiyah within the context of qarabah significantly explain aspects 
of the social and political behaviour in Saudi Arabia. 15
Familial or tribal groups are defined by common patrilineal descent that unites 
individuals in increasingly larger segments. The lineage-group is the unit that shares 
joint responsibility for avenging wrongs its members may suffer and, conversely, 
paying compensation to anyone whom its members have aggrieved. Although the rise 
of the centralized state has undercut tribal autonomy, contemporary tribal leaders still 
play a pivotal role among the tribal community and in relations between individuals 
and the central government. Since clans or tribes are very large in terms of their 
members and extremely fragmented in terms of their place, tribal affiliations have 
become weak in contemporary Saudi Arabia. 16 For Saudis in general, the family is the 
primary basis of identity that reflects the status of the individual. Although the literal 
translation of the word (aiylah) means family, the Arabic connotation indicates, beside 
the genealogical bond, relation based on protection, interdependence, support and 
accountability. The extended family is the most important social institution in Saudi 
Arabia, and loyalty to it probably exceeds even loyalty to the state. 18 Loyalty to the 
state is still largely not a matter of nationality; it is rather a matter of loyalty to Al- 
Sa’ud based on marriage ties and/or personal interests and to Al-Sa’ud as the focus of 
the Islamic nation. Most tribes were affiliated with the Al-Sa’ud family through 
marriage ties. 19 Consequently, despite increasing levels of paces towards 
modernization over the last fifty years, the family system is still probably the most 
stabilizing force. It is indeed difficult to visualize politics in Saudi Arabia without the 
paramount importance of the role of familial ties.
Asabiyah and familial ties have produced a system of favouritism based on 
patronage and personal relations, commonly known as wastah. Under this informal 
system, individuals are socially obligated or beneficially motivated to provide favours 
to their family members, friends and their associates, or others, to achieve their goals 
even if institutional or governmental rules have to be overridden. Although wastah 
may involve only lawful acts, it has generally promoted an environment in which acts 
flourish that are regarded as corrupt in the West and among many Saudis as well.20 
These acts have been encouraged by the traditional prerogative system of asabiyah and 
wastah traditions and, more importantly, by an absence of accountability. Critics view 
the culture of corruption in the Kingdom, especially in business deals, as endemic and
91multifaceted.
In addition to the asabiyah and wastah informal system, Saudi politics operate 
with considerations of social stratification that are linked to population familial, tribal
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and regional diversity. Despite the likelihood of overlap occurring among tribal, 
familial and regional ties, familial and tribal considerations always comes first. At the 
top of the social ladder is the qabiliyah (purely free Arab) families that could claim 
purity of descent from one of two eponymous Arab ancestors, Adnan or Qahtan, and 
could therefore claim to possess asl (the honour that stemmed from nobility of origin). 
Qabiliyh families considered themselves distinct from and superior not only to 
khadiriyah (descendants of slaves or non-Arab), non-tribal families, but also to 
qabiliyh families that had intermarried with khadiriyah families. Regionally, Najd (the 
central province) is the centre of political power and its leading tribal families are at 
the top of the political and social order. The population of Hijaz (the western 
province) is more cosmopolitan than Najd, with fewer tribal affiliations. The Hijazi 
leading families are distinguished by their wealth, life-style and diverse backgrounds.
Although the population is characterized by a degree of diversity and social 
stratification, the Saudis enjoy also a high degree of homogeneity and share common 
values. This homogeneity is reflected in a common Arabic language and in adherence 
to Sunni Wahhabi Islam, which has been fostered within the political culture promoted 
by the Saudi monarchy. Moreover, the cultural homogeneity of the Kingdom rests 
upon shared values and attitudes regarding relations within the family and the relations 
of the family with the rest of society. Such relationships are essential to comprehend 
people’s perception on concepts concerned with human rights or women’s rights.
Families, as institutions that are politically and socially influential in Saudi 
Arabia, tend to be patriarchal. The father in a small family or the leader in a large 
family or tribe is traditionally an authoritarian figure at the top of an hierarchy based 
on age and sex. The domination of men over public spheres and the continuing 
dependence of women on men perpetuate both the family and the society as a 
patriarchy. However, women in Saudi Arabia by law are entitled to full use of their 
own property and have economic independence. Also, a woman upon marriage does 
not take her husband’s family name, reflecting both her essential independence from 
the husband’s control and the strength of familial bonds. In terms of sex relations, 
Saudi family dynamics are still traditional and contrast with practices based on 
contemporary Western social values.
According to some analysts, public sex segregation, restricted mobility and 
limited job opportunities are seemingly not matters of concern among the majority of 
Saudi women. As argued throughout the thesis, however, significant change in what 
is considered to be acceptable behaviour for women looks only to be a matter of time, 
taking into consideration the way the society has responded to the introduction of
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women’s education in the early 1960s. Urbanization, education and modernization 
have had profound effects not only on women but also upon society as a whole. 
Despite the limitations imposed by sex-segregation values, and in spite of the small 
proportion of women in the work force relative to men, (as explained in chapter seven) 
the number of working women and the range of places in which they are allowed to 
work are growing.
The interaction between Islamic beliefs, traditional values and tribal customs 
has produced a Saudi style of social values and political structure, which incorporates 
principles of human dignity and human rights. This interaction has also created circles 
of power in which the royal family and its allies, mostly linked by marriage, are at the 
apex of Saudi society. The power centres include the ulama, the highbred families, 
commercial families, professional elite of technocrats, military men and, lastly, 
ordinary citizens. With an absence of clear formal political or social structures, this 
grouping is merely schematic, noting that these centres often overlap.23 In spite of the 
obvious tribal or familial dimension in Saudi politics, the personal status of any 
individual may, in some cases, play a large role in determining his position within the 
circles of power. A person’s loyalty, intelligence, charisma, knowledge and wealth are 
also components in the equation of power. In contemporary Saudi Arabia, new status 
categories based on education and wealth have started to enlarge: they are beginning to 
undermine the importance of tribal affiliation and are having a homogenizing effect 
that may further integrate society.
Saudi Arabia has acquired far greater influence in the contemporary world than 
might initially have been expected when the third Saudi state was established early in 
the twentieth century. The importance of Saudi Arabia comes primarily from being 
the world’s largest oil producer with roughly 25 percent of the world’s known oil 
reserves and also from its export of conservative form of Islam, which gives internal 
issues in the Kingdom an international dimension. Wealth has fuelled the 
transformation of Saudi Arabia from a pastoral and agricultural society to a rapidly 
urbanizing one, with associated political and social effects. The Saudi society is, 
indeed, unique in terms of witnessing a radical physical change in one generation. 
Development and modernization in all aspects of life have influenced the political and 
social environment and contributed to an increased openness in the society, which has 
engendered changes to traditional customs and values, including those related to 
human and women’s rights. Nonetheless, it should be noted that many centuries of 
traditional tribal culture, in a closed, conservative and religious society like Saudi 
Arabia, cannot be radically transformed in a few decades.24 The process of change in
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values and customs is expected to extend over a lengthy period of time, which explains 
resistance to some unfamiliar norms.
2- Laws and Institutions and Human Rights:
The Kingdom has since 1992 had a written constitution that stipulates the 
general aspects of the Saudi political system including its relationship to the 
maintenance of human rights. The Basic Law of Governance states that the 
Kingdom’s constitution is the Qur’an and the Sunnah and explains that its system of 
government is based on justice, consultation and equality. With the exception o f the 
partial municipal elections, which will be discussed later, Saudi Arabia has no elected 
representative institutions or political parties. The King, who also acts as Prime 
Minister, ensures the application o f the shari’ah and the state’s general policy and 
supervises the protection and defense of the nation. All key positions including the 
Crown Prince and members of the Council o f Ministers and Majlis Al-Shura 
(Consultative Council) are appointed by the King.
The Basic Law of Governance sets forth the general principles on which civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights are based. It stipulates, inter alia, that 
“the State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic shari ’ah” (Article 
26); “The State shall provide security for all citizens and residents on its territories. 
No one may be confined, arrested or imprisoned without reference to the Law” (Article 
36); “Dwellings are inviolate. Access is prohibited without their owners’ permission. 
No search may be made except in cases specified by the Law” (Article 37); “No one 
shall be punished for another’s crimes. No conviction or penalty shall be inflicted 
without reference to the Islamic shari’ah or the provision of the Law” (Article 38); 
“The privacy of telegraph and postal communications, and telephone and other means 
of communication shall be inviolate. There shall be no confiscation, delay, 
surveillance or eavesdropping, except in cases provided by the Law” (Article 40); 
“The judiciary is an independent authority. The decisions of judges shall not be 
subject to any authority other than the authority of the Islamic shari’ah” (Article 46); 
and “[a] 11 people, either citizens or residents in the Kingdom, are entitled to file suit on 
a basis o f equality” (Article 47). Although the Basic Law of Governance does not 
specify all concerns of human rights, it does recognize that the State has a duty to 
protect human rights. It covers a broad range of human rights, with focus on 
community concerns such as security, justice, privacy and social welfare. In other 
words, civil and political rights for both the Basic Law of Governance and the Saudi
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decision-makers are inferior to other rights. It is worth noting that the Basic Law of 
Governance does not elaborate on women’s rights or on the issue of equity between 
men and women.
The majlis (audience chamber) of the King and other influential officials such 
as ministers or provincial governors, serves as a channel for communication between 
the rulers and the ruled. The ability to contact officials is promoted by the government 
as a suitable type of freedom of expression and a form of practicing the right of 
participation in public affairs.25 Nevertheless, with the absence of organized political 
groups and independent NGOs, this traditional practice is a time-consuming custom 
that, while suitable for tribal environments, is no longer able to cope with the needs of 
modem government.
The reform measures of 1992 marked significant institutional developments 
towards the formalization of the government system and tentative steps to expand 
public participation in the decision-making process. Comprising the promulgation of 
the Basic Law of Governance, the formation of the Consultative Council and the 
restructure of the Kingdom’s regions [Law of the Provinces], this reform represented 
an unparalleled political development in the Kingdom. While such developments 
might be seen as empty reform without significant influence on the conduct of the 
government,26 their importance comes from the fact that these steps open the door for 
further political developments. Some Saudis claim that modest and slow political 
development is better than the experience of neighbouring republican governments
27where political and civil liberties are a mere faqade to dictatorship.
The long awaited institution of Majlis Al-Shura was not established until 1992, 
with 60 members, but its membership gradually expanded to reach 150 appointed male 
members in 2005. Before making appointments, the government typically takes into 
consideration tribal, regional and professional representation. The Majlis engages in 
debates on public policies and provides advice and recommendations to the 
government on various issues including human rights. Its functions have also 
gradually expanded, particularly since 2002, which will be detailed in chapter four. 
Some of its members argue that what comes first is to give the existing Majlis more 
power, rather than to elect its members. It is expected that electing its members 
would bring more ulama and tribal leaders into the Majlis, given the importance of 
religion, tribalism and familial ties in society. However, the continued absence of 
institutions independent of the government’s influence has allowed small groups of 
elites to maintain power beyond public accountability, as noted in chapter four.
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Judicial and security systems in the Kingdom have been a target of criticism by 
human rights activists, particularly by international human rights NGOs. While such 
criticism is not explicitly directed to the Islamically prescribed punishments (hudood),
9 Qit severely rebukes the “inherent structural defects in the criminal justice system”. 
After waves of international criticism directed towards judicial and security systems, 
and in response to domestic pressures and international influences, Saudi Arabia has 
recently taken measures to improve its mechanisms for promoting and protecting 
human rights within the judicial and security systems. These measures include passing 
laws and setting up permanent and ad hoc committees; an early example was the 
government’s decision in 1992 to establish the Board of Investigation and Public 
Prosecution with duties, among others, to inspect prisons, review prisoners’ files and 
to hear their complaints.
In March 2000, Saudi Arabia announced its intention to establish a national 
governmental body vested with authority to look into all human rights issues; allow the 
establishment of an independent non-governmental body to help to publicize and 
protect human rights, to affirm compliance with human rights regulations and to 
advocate the punishment of offenders; and designate human rights departments within 
three concerned ministries.30 This announcement to establish such mechanisms gave 
international human rights NGOs an opportunity to put more pressure on Saudi Arabia 
to fulfill its commitment to protect and promote human rights, including the creation of 
means to carry out that task. While it took few years to implement such steps, 
following the creation of three departments that deal with human rights, the National 
Human Rights Association (NHRA), an NGO, was formed in March 2004, with 40 
members including 10 women and the Human Rights Commission, a governmental 
institution, was established in September 2005. Although it is too early to evaluate 
their work and their influence on the situation of human rights, the creation of such 
institutions reflects the government’s willingness to respond to demands for more 
protection of human rights.
Laws in the Kingdom provide clauses under which the integrity of all persons
*5 1
has to be respected. In March 2000, the government announced the establishment of 
a committee to investigate allegations of torture.32 Also, three laws came into force in 
May 2002, namely the Code of Judicial Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and the Code of Practice for Lawyers, which represent an important step towards 
greater transparency in the administration of the justice system by specifying legal 
procedures and due-process rights. The Code of Criminal Procedure, inter alia, 
prohibits torture and other forms of ill-treatment (Article 2), states clearly that persons
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arrested or detained must be promptly informed of the charges against them (Article 
35) and acknowledges the right of criminal suspects to the assistance of lawyers during 
investigation proceedings and trial (Article 4). However, without an active network of 
human rights lawyers or effective civil rights associations, it remains to be seen how 
compliance with the new laws will be monitored and how violations of them will be 
addressed.
International treaties signed by Saudi Arabia, including human rights 
conventions, were promulgated by a Royal Decree, ordering their implementation by 
the appropriate authorities. They form, at least in theory, part of the domestic 
legislation,33 in which their provisions can be invoked before the courts and other 
judicial and administrative authorities, as specified in the Basic Law of Governance: 
“International treaties, conventions and privileges shall be promulgated and amended 
by Royal Decree” (Article 70).
The independence of the judiciary is clearly prescribed by the Basic Law of 
Governance and the Statutes of the Judiciary.34 In practice, judges enjoy mostly 
reasonable independence. The judicial system is composed of various forms and 
levels of courts and tribunals. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the Ministry 
of Justice administer and supervise most parts of the judicial system. The Court of 
Cassation, the General Courts and the Courts of Summary Jurisdiction constitute 
different levels of legal proceedings in the judicial system and exercise jurisdiction 
over most criminal and civil cases. However, some criminal and civil proceedings are 
held before specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Board of Grievances 
which hears cases in which the state is a party, as well as offences involving bribery, 
forgery, exploitation of official influence, abuse of authority or violations of human 
rights.35 With the high number of foreign workers in the kingdom and the alleged 
abuses of their rights, there are separate judicial mechanisms designated for settling 
disputes between workers and their employers, administered by the Ministry of 
Labour.36 For commercial disputes, the Ministry of Commerce operates judicial 
commissions to settle such matters. However, it has been reported that a study on the 
establishment of a court with jurisdiction in labour matters and a court with
37jurisdiction in commercial disputes is in its final stages.
The Directorate of Public Security is the main governmental institution for 
public security. This body has been blamed for human rights abuses of detainees. In 
indirect recognition that law-keeping agencies personnel possibly could have breached 
the law, Saudi officials announced in November 2002 the establishment of hotlines 
that would give the public opportunity to report abuse by police officers. Also,
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members of the Board of Investigation and Public Prosecution reportedly had made 
17,000 visits during 2001 to inspect prisons and detention centres.39
Another main security body is the General Directorate of Investigation (GDI), 
which looks after state security with unlimited authority to arrest and detain. Unlike 
normal prisons, the GDI detention centres are beyond inspection. It is believed that 
hundreds of the GDI’s members observe public figures, and the public at large, 
through physical monitoring and interception of communications. As a secretive 
apparatus responsible for the state security, the GDI allegedly routinely abuses the 
rights of detainees.
The purpose of the Organization for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention 
of Vice (OPVPV)40 theoretically is to prevent crimes and preserve morality. Members 
of the OPVPV typically patrol public places to oblige people to observe the strict 
standards of proper dress and behaviour, with the authority to detain persons. In the 
last few years, the government has restrained powers of OPVPV by introducing 
regulations that place their conduct within police control. The Interior Minister visited 
the OPVPV’s headquarter in November 2002 and called upon its members to respect 
the sanctity of private homes and refrain from activity that could be interpreted as 
harassing citizens. The Minister’s remarks have been emphasized in local newspapers 
and received full coverage.41
3- The Current Situation of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia:
In describing the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia, this section draws 
on data from numerous sources, including Saudi official documents and reports, the 
US State Department’s reports on human rights and on religious freedom, UN 
documents, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Saudi opposition groups. 
It should be noted that international human rights monitoring reports are based on 
universal human rights norms, as promoted by the UN human rights system and 
standardized by international human rights instruments. These reports lack the means 
of reliable monitoring and accuracy with regard to Saudi Arabia since human rights 
activists are not allowed to operate in, or enter, the Kingdom. Saudi, and sometimes 
non-Saudi, human rights activists who operate outside the Kingdom often have 
political motives to single out only negative practices to leave an impression of 
widespread human rights violations in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the new millennium is still an absolute 
monarchy in the sense that there are no formal, institutionalized checks on the King’s
21
authority and no elected representative institutions. In practice, however, the King’s 
ability to rule effectively depends on his sagacity in creating and maintaining a 
consensus among prominent figures in his large extended family and in practicing 
consultation with influential people (ahlul halli wal-aqd)42 before taking major 
decisions. While the structure of the political system gives the King exclusive power 
based on the traditions and customs of Saudi society, there are other circles of power 
which generally influence the decision-making process, as noted earlier.
According to international human rights reports,43 there is an absence of or, at 
the best, a severe limitation on, the enjoyment of political and civil rights in the 
Kingdom. From the Saudi government’s perspective, political and civil rights are 
respected in a way that suits current culture of Saudi society through consultation with 
carefully selected professionals. Nonetheless, various internal and external factors 
have urged the government to take steps to widen public participation in local affairs. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia witnessed in early 2005 for the first time a process of 
electing half of the members in municipal councils, marking a positive, if small, step in 
the field of civil and political rights.
Amnesty International reported that the Saudi judicial systems lack safeguards 
against arbitrary arrest, do not provide for access to a lawyer or to family, and that 
summary and secret trials take place. They also reported the use of confessions 
extracted under psychological pressure or physical torture.44 Within the area of 
respecting human integrity, international human rights reports constantly indicate that 
the Saudi authorities abuse detainees mainly to extract confessions. Described by 
international human rights NGOs as credible reports, torture under interrogation of 
political prisoners and criminal suspects and detention without charges are common 
practices of the security personnel. Those reports also criticized sentences handed 
over by the courts which entail corporal punishments such as floggings and 
amputations.
However, Saudi officials believe that the sanctions including corporal 
punishments are not forms of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which exclude pain or suffering arising from legal 
sanctions 43 Saudi officials also deny any systematic torture during interrogations and 
describe incidents of maltreatment or abuse of detainees as individual cases punishable 
under the law. For cases of unapproved abuses, there have been some instances in 
which torturers have been punished and victims compensated, with access provided to 
social welfare rehabilitation programmes.46
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Freedom of speech and press is limited in Saudi Arabia. The ‘open door 
policy’ by which every individual, citizen or non-citizen, has the right to access senior 
officials is regarded by the government as a culturally suitable form of freedom of 
expression. The government’s attitude towards public demands for political reform 
and respect for human rights has changed radically in recent years, and reflects a 
development in relaxing limitations on freedom of speech. Unlike its adverse reaction 
to petitions presented to the King in the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia has recently showed 
tolerance to such action, as will be discussed in chapter four.
Criticism of the political system or Islam or publication of what is considered 
to be morally repugnant, however, are completely prohibited and considered to be a 
threat to morality or the security of the state. Materials appearing in local newspapers, 
television and radio are subject to strict censorship. For the Internet, all websites that 
it deems sexual, politically sensitive or un-Islamic are blocked. However, the 
government has been continuing in recent years to relax restrictions, particularly 
regarding politically sensitive news. In 2001, the government approved a new press 
law establishing a journalists’ association. Access by citizens to outside sources of 
information is widely available mainly through satellite television channels and the 
Internet.
Following the tragic attacks of 11 September, Saudi Arabia received massive 
media attention, which has pushed the Kingdom to ease access to Western journalists 
to enter the country. For a long time, Saudi authorities did not respond to requests by 
international human rights NGOs to visit the Kingdom. Nevertheless, this 
longstanding situation was eventually reversed; delegations from Human Rights Watch 
visited the Kingdom twice: in January 2003 and in November 2006. As part of the 
visits program, the delegation held talks with senior officials about human rights 
practices and was allowed to visit prisons and juvenile centres.47
The rights of Saudi women still remain under the influence of the Kingdom’s 
patriarchal social and cultural traditions as well as of the conservative interpretation of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah. In the last few years, however, the Saudi authorities have 
taken a number of small, but significant, steps to further the opportunities available to 
women and to protect and promote their rights. The issue of women’s rights has lately 
been receiving unprecedented attention from internal and external actors, which will be 
fully examined as a case study of the thesis.
For mainly political or security reasons, the government strictly limits freedom 
of assembly and association. Public demonstrations and the establishment of political 
parties are banned. However, the establishment of professional and civil associations
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is permissible after approval by the government. There is a large number of licensed 
humanitarian organizations and social and professional societies. While such groups 
might be subject to monitoring by the government, they usually operate freely without 
direct interference.
Foreigners are allowed to work in the Kingdom only under the sponsorship of 
citizens or businesses. The law allows employers to hold the foreigners’ passports 
until they are due to leave the country. This system of sponsorship gives the 
employers full control of the movements of foreigners and may result in injustices 
occurring. Responding to criticism of the sponsorship system, the Ministry of the 
Interior announced in September 2002 that the relevant authorities are considering 
amendments to the present sponsorship system, particularly the permission for 
foreigners to keep their passports with them, although the issue must first be fully 
studied.48 In a related move, expatriates in Saudi Arabia are now allowed to travel 
within various regions of the Kingdom without any travel documents.
The establishment of labour unions or the staging of strikes is prohibited in 
Saudi Arabia. However, the Ministry of Labour endorsed in 2003 the establishment of 
labour committees for citizens in local companies and factories. The aim of these 
committees is to establish communication between employees and employers for the 
improvement of work standards in the workplace. The government has no role in 
selecting the committees’ members. In spite of the prohibition of strikes, foreign 
workers occasionally stage strikes to protest against delay in payments of their salaries 
or concerning work conditions, while those inciting the strike are subject to 
punishment and/or deportation.
As indicated earlier, observing Islamic teachings, as understood locally, 
remains critical for the Saudi political system. Therefore, the freedom to practice 
religious rituals publicly is limited to those of the Sunni Islam, and any public practices 
of other schools of Islam are shunned and discouraged. Religious minority sects and 
groups of Islam, such as the Shiite, Makarmah and Sufis, are subject to discrimination 
and harassment. Nevertheless, Saudi officials, despite some tensions with those 
groups from time to time, have been able to maintain good relationships with their 
leaders. Public religious activities for non-Muslims are entirely prohibited, although 
Saudi officials on many occasions have reaffirmed the right for non-Muslims to 
engage in private religious worship.
In the year 2001, Saudi Arabia received two delegations from the US 
concerning freedom of religion.49 Both delegations met with senior officials who 
expressed a desire to continue dialogue with the US on religious freedoms and
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affirmed that the Saudi government does not interfere in private non-Muslim 
worship.50 Since the first report in 1999, the US State Department’s International 
Religious Freedom Annual Report still found that ’’freedom of religion does not exist” 
in Saudi Arabia.51
There are more than six million foreigners working in the Kingdom, who 
comprised about 60-70 percent of the workforce.52 According to human rights NGOs’ 
reports, those workers are subject to human rights violations such as restricting their 
rights to movement, association or public worship, and inequitable access to justice. 
However, Saudi officials stress that regulations grant equal rights to citizens and 
foreigners, and foreigners enjoy no taxation on their income and no restrictions on 
transferring their incomes to their home countries.53 With such a large number of 
foreigners in the Kingdom, disputes between workers and employers, in the 
government view, are natural and unavoidable.54
In looking at the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia as reported by 
various sources, one notices that respect for political rights and civil liberties in the 
Kingdom fall far short of internationally-recognized human rights standards. 
However, criticism of economic, social and cultural rights has been less targeted in 
international human rights reports. The government provides free healthcare and 
education at all levels to citizens and non-citizens and makes efforts to ensure that 
every citizen has the right to a home by giving interest-free loans for building houses. 
Most citizens have gained and sustained their rights to an adequate standard of living. 
Services and infrastructure are generally at good levels in most cities.
In measuring the general situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia against 
internationally-recognized human rights standards, one concludes that a state of 
limited compliance is readily recognizable. In spite of some improvements and 
developments, particularly at the level of laws and institutions, standards are still less 
than what international human rights standards prescribe. Various socio-cultural 
grounds can be named for the continuity of limited compliance, including the form of 
Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia and the social norms and political practices prevailing 
in the Kingdom. The earlier description of the social and political environment 
provided general aspects that could help explain reasons behind this state of limited 
compliance. However, the following chapters, particularly those concerning 
exploration of the Islamic, Wahhabi and Saudi perspectives on human rights and the 
examination of internal and external factors, should offer a better understanding of the 
situation of human rights and causes of limited compliance and explain changes in 
human rights in Saudi Arabia.
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4- Saudi Arabia and the UN Human Rights System:
Identifying briefly Saudi Arabia’s position in relation to international human 
rights treaties and the UN human rights system at large assists in addressing and 
understanding the central question of the thesis. Saudi Arabia has been participant, as 
a UN member, in the formulation of what is known as international human rights 
standards. In the light of recent changes and developments in human rights in the 
Kingdom, this thesis is concerned with examining the extent to which Saudi Arabia 
has been responding to influences by the UN human rights system.
For Saudi Arabia, the protection of human rights is a universal goal, but it does 
not clearly accept all universally-recognized human rights. It views its interpretation 
of the shari ’ah as the only necessary guide to protect human rights. Nevertheless, the 
Kingdom has pledged to cooperate with, and participate in, international human rights 
activities, believing in the evolutionary nature of the concept of human rights as it 
varies according to cultures. To impose on individuals or societies rights that are alien 
to their beliefs or principles is regarded as absurd by Saudi officials.55 The view of the 
government, and perhaps a majority of Saudi people, is that revolutionary courses of 
action, which have been tried in many places in the world, have failed to provide real 
democracy or respect for human rights. Revolutions are seen as threats to stability and 
security, which valued by the Saudis, given their historical experience of insecurity. 
Taking into consideration various political, social and religious factors, there is a 
tendency to prefer the maintenance of the status quo, with tardy steps towards change. 
Also, the failure of democracy in neighbouring republican countries contributes to the 
belief among Saudis that gradual evolution is a better course.56 All of these aspects 
contribute to Saudi Arabia attitudes towards the human rights norms as embedded in 
the international human rights conventions and as promoted by the UN human rights 
system.
When the UN General Assembly (UNGA) called upon member-states to vote 
on the adoption of the UDHR in 1948, no state voted against the UDHR. However, 
Saudi Arabia, along with seven non-Muslim states, abstained. During the drafting 
process of the UDHR, Saudi Arabia’s representative to the UN was heavily involved in 
the debate and rejected some rights mentioned in the UDHR, including the principle of 
complete equality on the basis of sex and the right to change one’s religion, as 
discussed in chapter six. Unlike human rights conventions, the UDHR did not create
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binding and enforceable laws for the participating states, although rights mentioned in 
the UDHR are considered part of international customary law.
In looking at Saudi Arabia’s position in relation to the UNGA approval of the 
six major legally binding human rights conventions, the Kingdom showed its support 
for most of those conventions. With exception of the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), when Saudi Arabia 
abstained from the voting, the Kingdom was among those states that approved the 
other five international human rights conventions, notably among these were the two 
1966 covenants; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia refrained from signing and ratifying any of those 
conventions until the second half of the 1990s.
Since the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia has taken unprecedented steps towards 
participating in and engaging with the UN human rights system. It became responsive 
to inquiries by the special rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) and by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights.57 From 1995 to 1998, the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia had been 
considered under the confidential 1503 procedure, under which the Sub-Commission is 
authorized to investigate complaints that appear to reveal violations of human rights. 
As indicated in chapter six, the UNCHR decided to discontinue that consideration at its 
1998 session, following Saudi Arabia’s responses and explanations about its human 
rights practices. Also, since 2001, Saudi Arabia has been a state member in the 
UNCHR (and later in the newly created UN Human Rights Council) for three 
consecutive terms of three-years, as a part of its efforts to be involved in the activities 
of the UN human rights system.
The most significant step in Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the UN human 
rights system is seen in its accession to the legally binding human rights instruments. 
Becoming part of the international legal arrangements and accepting international 
scrutiny of its human rights practices is considered a major shift in Saudi Arabia’s 
position towards international human rights conventions. Out of the six principal UN 
human rights treaties, Saudi Arabia acceded to four treaties during the second half of 
the 1990s. It is now suitable to note briefly the essential features related to Saudi 
Arabia’s accession to those four instruments.
Saudi Arabia acceded to the International Convention on the Rights of Child 
(CRC) in January 1996, with a generalized reservation that Saudi Arabia is not bound 
by those articles that may conflict with the provisions of the shari’ah. In January
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2001, the Committee on the Rights of the Child examined the Kingdom’s initial report 
on compliance with its obligations under the CRC. Saudi Arabia’s report and also 
comments and debates at the committees’ meetings have essentially contributed to 
pinpointing Saudi Arabia’s position on norms embedded in international human rights 
conventions. In its concluding observations and comments, the CRC Committee 
welcomed a number of developments, but noted, inter alia, the narrow interpretation of 
Islamic texts by the Saudi authorities, expressed concerns about some practices and 
made a number of recommendations in order for the Kingdom to fulfdl its obligations 
under the CRC.58
Saudi Arabia acceded to CAT in September 1997, with two specific 
reservations declaring that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Committee as provided for in Article 20, dealing with inquiry 
procedures by the committee, and shall not be bound by the provisions of paragraph 
(1) of Article 30 concerning settling disputes over the interpretation or application of 
CAT through arbitration or by referring the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice. In May 2002, the Committee Against Torture considered the Kingdom’s 
initial report on compliance with its obligations under the CAT and made its comments 
and recommendations on this regard. As explained later in chapter six, the Committee 
welcomed positive aspects, including the competence of the Board of Grievances to 
hear allegations of violations of human rights, but expressed concerns over a number 
of subjects, particularly the sentencing and imposition of corporal punishments by 
judicial and administrative authorities.59
Saudi Arabia acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in September 1997, with a general reservation 
declaring that Saudi Arabia will implement the provisions of the Convention as long as 
they are not in conflict with precepts of the shari’ah and a specific reservation 
regarding Article 22 concerning the referral of disputes to the International Court of 
Justice. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reviewed the 
Kingdom’s initial and second reports in March 2003 and noted some positive aspects 
of reforms in the field of human rights and expressed some concerns and 
recommendations, which will be discussed in chapter six.
Saudi Arabia acceded to the CEDAW in September 2000, with a general 
reservation declaring that Saudi Arabia will implement the provisions of the 
Convention as long as they are not in conflict with precepts of the shari'ah, in addition 
to two specific reservations on Article 9 (2) and Article 29 (1). The initial report was
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due on October 2001, but it has not been submitted yet. (A full discussion of the issue 
of women’s rights will be presented in chapter seven and eight).
In addition to its ratification of those four major human rights conventions, 
Saudi Arabia has also ratified a total of 13 International Labour Organization 
Conventions, including Convention No. 29: Forced Labour, Convention No. 100: 
Equal Remuneration, Convention No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labour, and 
Convention No. I l l :  Discrimination.60 Those ILO treaties were designed to improve 
the conditions of the workplace and the rights of workers. However, discrimination 
against workers still occurs in both law and practice, despite steps taken to abide by 
international standards. In the last few years, Saudi Arabia revised its labour law and 
foreign workers’ sponsorship system, as a part of the requirements for joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), resulting in improved rights, particularly regarding 
the right of movement and access to justice.
Meanwhile, the Kingdom has taken certain actions in response to the influence 
of the UN human rights system. For example, pursuant to its obligations under the 
CAT, the Saudi government announced in March 2000 the establishment of a 
committee to investigate allegations of torture.61 Also, the newly adopted code of 
Criminal Procedure, which came into force in May 2002, addresses Saudi Arabia’s 
obligations under the CAT. The first official visit to Saudi Arabia by a UN special 
rapporteur took place in October 2002, in pursuance of an invitation first extended in 
2000. Dato Param Cumaraswamy, the UNCHR Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, met with senior officials and examined laws, 
policies and practices in the Kingdom’s administration of justice. By allowing the 
special rapporteur to visit the Kingdom and investigate some domestic policies, Saudi 
Arabia showed a tangible recognition of the UN human rights system, which is an 
essential stage of compliance, as will be explained later.
Conclusion:
As has been briefly illustrated in this chapter, the situation of human rights in 
Saudi Arabia is in a state of change and development, particularly at the level of laws 
and institutions. It is obvious that, since the second half of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia 
has taken steps to draw more closely to the international institutions and legal 
arrangements under the umbrella of the UN human rights system.
Following this fundamental background on human rights in Saudi Arabia and 
the discussion on the Kingdom’s relationship with the UN human rights system, the
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question posed in this thesis is not about the extent of Saudi Arabia’s engagement in, 
and cooperation with, the UN human rights system; it is rather whether changes and 
developments in human rights in Saudi Arabia correlate with becoming part of 
international human rights arrangements and interacting with the UN human rights 
system. Saudi Arabia has shown, especially in the last few years, signs of greater 
adherence to, and witnessed several developments towards compliance with, 
internationally-recognized human rights standards. However, it is debatable whether 
such developments came as a response to influences by the UN human rights system, 
or whether they are merely the result of other internal and external factors. Saudi 
Arabia’s participation and engagement in the UN human rights system necessarily lead 
to a form of reciprocal influences, although the focus of this thesis is on Saudi Arabia’s 
response to influences by the UN human rights system.
In order to examine the central question of the research, it is essential to 
establish theoretical frameworks for investigating that question. There are several 
relevant theoretical and conceptual questions to be addressed in the two following 
chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
(Part i)
Human Rights: Theories on Their Development and Effect
Introduction:
Human dignity has been the subject of philosophical debate among thinkers 
throughout history. Such debate introduced different perceptions about the nature and 
the basis of human rights. Therefore, this chapter, in its first section, briefly addresses 
the central theoretical issues concerning dominant concepts of contemporary human 
rights. Given that Saudi Arabia is part of the international community of states and 
subject to influences at the international level, the second section examines major 
theories that explain the diffusion of human rights norms internationally.
In this thesis, causes of compliance and non-compliance with international 
human rights norms are centrally important, as it focuses on the extent to which 
developments towards human rights norms in Saudi Arabia can be linked to influences 
of the UN human rights system and the extent to which human rights in Saudi Arabia 
are compatible with international human rights standards. Exploring the theory of 
compliance necessitates addressing the question of sovereignty and intervention in the 
modem international system, which is dealt with in section three. Sovereignty is one 
standard excuse used by states for rejecting international human rights standards. 
International influences to compel states to improve their human rights practices are a 
form of intervention, given that the issue of human rights has been viewed, until 
relatively recently, as an internal matter. Therefore, it is appropriate to explore 
theoretical discussion on changes to the concept of absolute sovereignty, including the 
new approach to the question of intervention for human protection purposes.
Regimes reflect the gradual constmction of norms and mles, which often 
become part of international law. The international community is increasingly 
organized into regimes, not only in the area of human rights, but also in other themes 
such as trade and environment. These regimes have assisted in undermining the notion 
of complete sovereignty; states behaviour has become the subject of scrutiny by 
international regimes. It also could be argued that conceding sovereignty and 
participating in a regime is an act of sovereignty. Assessing the role of international
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regimes, in section four, is thus necessary to comprehend the concept of sovereignty 
and the process of compliance.
A major emphasis of the thesis is to study how and why countries, like Saudi 
Arabia, move towards, or refrain from, compliance with the international human rights 
norms. As indicated in chapter one, Saudi Arabia acceded to some of the international 
human rights conventions, thereby subjecting the Kingdom’s human rights record to 
unprecedented public scrutiny by the monitoring mechanisms of those conventions. 
Thus, the relationship between developments of human rights in Saudi Arabia and the 
Kingdom’s obligations under those treaties calls for consideration of theoretical debate 
over the process of compliance. In section five, three areas within theories of 
compliance are explored, starting with identifying major models of compliance, 
discussing circumstances under which states may not comply with international human 
rights standards and, finally, presenting theoretical discussion on the role of 
international influences in inducing compliance and on domestic and international 
elements that determine the extent of that role.
1- Foundational Bases of Human Rights:
Despite extensive debate about the duties and rights of human beings, 
philosophical consensus is unreachable on the basis of those rights listed in the various 
international conventions or declarations. 1 Nevertheless, a political consensus has 
been reached on a list of human rights as enshrined in the UDHR and international 
human rights conventions.2 The main purpose of identifying a particular set of human 
rights norms is to protect any individual from injustice and oppression.3 Many people 
have been unsatisfied with the notion that what is right or good is simply what a 
particular society or ruling elite feels is right or good at any given time. Such unease 
has generated a quest for enduring moral imperatives that bind societies and their 
rulers over time and in different places. However, the problematical theoretical 
inquiry focuses on the argument that those rights defined in the UDHR are applicable 
to ‘any one’ because he/she is a human being and the rationale for what is accepted as 
durable moral, human norms. Theories of human rights provide different answers to 
such questions.
Religions have established moral imperatives that regulate relationships with 
the rulers and among individuals. Although the term ‘human rights’ is not found in 
traditional religions, theologies contain the basis for human rights. Acceptance by 
traditional religions of one God as the divine source of laws, duties and rights, gives
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rise to certain universal principles such as equality, justice and human dignity. With 
the development of the notion of human rights, religious scholars from various faiths 
have engaged in a process of reinterpretation of the holy texts in order to support the 
diverse principles of equality and justice that lie behind international human rights.4 
Accordingly, many theologians ground human rights in natural or divine bases,5 which 
is instrumental and crucial for their diffusion and acceptance. Nevertheless, it has 
been correctly argued that the legal development of human rights took place in a 
climate of secularism in spite of the dominant Christian tradition in Europe, as 
discussed later in chapter three. Traditional religions have challenged some aspects of 
the universal human rights, especially regarding the rights of women.6
The notion of natural law goes back to the writings of classical Greek 
philosophers and Roman thinkers, but was later developed when feudalism declined 
during the Age of Enlightenment in Europe and secular theories of natural law arose. 
Christian philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, placed enormous emphasis on the 
natural law both as a reference to certain indisputable rights and as a part of the divine 
law.7 The moral authority of natural rights as stemming from divine law was 
challenged by political philosophers who searched for new, secularly oriented, bases of 
natural rights. John Locke’s [1632-1704] notion of the social contract has greatly 
impacted modem natural rights theory, with its manifestation of individualism and 
universalism. The social contract notion was developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
[1712-1778], who viewed the social order as a sacred right that serves as the basis for 
other rights.8 Based on his moral philosophy, Immanuel Kant [1724-1804] argued that 
it is natural for the people to have rights and power.9 For Kant, the State and civil 
society should exist side by side in order to preserve private individuality.10 Kant in 
Perpetual Peace made the rights of man depend on republican government in which a 
separation occurs between the executive power and a legislative power controlled by 
the people.11 He anticipated global moral responsibility by which “a violation of rights 
in one place in the world is felt everywhere.” The French and the American 
revolutions were inspired by the theory of natural rights and influenced by its views of 
individualism, rationalism and universalism.
According to natural rights theory, all human beings equally have those rights 
simply because they are human, without distinction of any kind. It is based on the 
premise that there is a common identification with the whole of humanity, which gives 
human rights its universal characteristic. Philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment 
derived both the universalist and the individualist dimensions from their theory of the 
state of nature. Individualism is a principal feature of the theory of natural rights, in
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which individuals come before communities in determining morals, as discussed later 
in chapter three. It has been argued that the acceptability of the principles of human 
rights comes from their justificatory discourse as moral rights rather than from legal 
norms of positive moral practice. Thus, respect for human rights is demanded even if 
the legal system does not recognize them. 14 (Cultural relativity is dealt with in the next 
chapter).
In looking at the philosophical foundations of major human rights 
manifestations, including the French Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and 
the Citizen, the Bill of Rights of the US constitution and the UDHR, it is noticeable 
that those documents essentially express the European liberal, secular thought, 
reflecting its views of the laws of nature. The list of rights mentioned in such 
documents is at the heart of liberal concepts of the individual and the state. Human 
rights, though, may be exercised by individuals against the state, giving them morally a 
priority and superiority over society and the state. 15
While the contemporary understanding of universal human rights norms is 
evidently associated with the natural rights theory, the notion of authority under the 
natural rights theory has been a source of criticism. The assumption that natural law 
theory has the flexibility to accept new claims of rights based on contemporary 
conditions and understanding has also provided a source of criticism towards this 
theory. 16 Such flexibility arguably aligns human rights closer to the theory of 
positivism. Critics of the natural theory argued that diverse concepts of nature are 
unclear and controversial, and they could beget various sets of rights. The ulama in 
Saudi Arabia, for instance, argue that their views on women’s rights reflect the nature 
of women, as discussed later in chapter seven. Therefore, attempts have been made to
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frame the natural theory within minimum, core rights.
The theory of natural rights has not been left without other challenging 
theories. The positivist approach assumes that all authorities are derived from laws 
prescribed by the states and officials. 19 Legal positivism emphasizes the enactment of 
a system of law as the only source of laws of human rights, leaving no place for the 
moral philosophical basis of human rights. For positivism, the UDHR and the UN 
human rights treaties were a reflection of a positive set of rights, relying upon 
deliberate human invention and agreement. Positivism offers greater flexibility to 
meet changing needs by detaching human rights from divine revelations and from 
human reason extrapolating from nature. Critics stress that positivism emphasizes 
national sovereignty and questions the widely presumed moral, human basis of
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universal human rights.20 This approach stresses the role of the authoritative
21structures, procedures and implementation of laws in order to protect human rights.
Natural and social sciences were developed in a quest to acquire better 
understandings about peoples and their cultures and norms. In the context of human 
rights, the sociological approach builds upon theories and techniques used in modem 
social science in order to identify the empirical components of a human rights system, 
which affect the failures or the successes in the protection of human rights. A 
guiding principle for sociologists in approaching human rights is their emphasis upon 
interests, not only individualistic interests but also public and social ones. 
Significantly, historical experience and prudential justification could provide major 
elements for understanding the development of the modem human rights norms.
Various theories present different explanations on the basis of human rights. 
The theory of natural rights, implying that human beings possess natural dignity and 
rights, has been at the heart of propositions that international human rights norms are 
universally applicable to all individuals in all cultures. Regardless of their 
philosophical justification, it is useful to emphasize that human rights have emerged 
through long struggles and historical experiences and by reading rationally events of 
the past. While the foundations of human rights may be arguable, the need to have 
certain rights is paramount among individuals from various cultures. Accordingly, it is 
essential to explore arguments on the cultural applicability of the international human 
rights norms, which are fully investigated in the next chapter.
2- Diffusion of Human Rights Norms Internationally:
Saudi Arabia, as a member of the international society of states, is exposed to 
influence by various mechanisms used for the diffusion of human rights norms 
internationally. It is essential to establish a theoretical outline for examining 
developments towards human rights in Saudi Arabia through exploring major theories 
on the dynamics involving the proliferation of human rights norms among members of 
the international society of states.
Realist, liberal and constructivist thoughts present different answers to 
questions related to the emergence, codification and compliance with international 
human rights norms. For realists,24 the principal actors in international relations are 
states, and their behaviour is determined by the structure of international anarchy, 
supposing that international policy outcomes are determined by the distribution of 
material power capabilities among states. Realists put little weight on the theoretical
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importance of norms, assuming that norms themselves possess no power to affect state 
behaviour despite their existence in international life.25 This assumption leads realists 
to rebut norms (like human rights) and actors (like NGOs) as significant and 
independent forces in international relations. Because some states make the domestic 
conduct of other states a regular concern of their actions, realists think that principles 
such as human rights are a potential threat to the overall stability of the international 
system and advocate state sovereignty as a central organizing principle of international 
relations.
The realist stand is that international norms such as human rights gain 
acceptance when they are embraced and promoted by hegemonic or dominant groups 
of states. The substance of human rights issues is closely connected to the concerns of 
those states that possess a predominance of economic and military power.26 
Accordingly, it is observable that the recent spread of a certain set of human rights 
norms throughout the international system is promoted by dominant, powerful 
democracies. For realist theories, any change within the issue of human rights is a 
function of the extent to which more powerful states in the system are willing to 
enforce the principles and norms of the regime.27 Realists stress the distribution of 
inter-state bargaining power in the creation of the international human rights regime. 
Based on their views on the functions of the international system, coercive practices 
such as sanctions are an effective means of enforcement.
By contrast, liberalists argue that states are not the only actors in international 
affairs; institutions such as transnational corporations/organizations and the UN also 
play a role. They focus on economic interdependence as a key factor in international 
politics, but neoliberals also emphasize the spread of democracy, along with its view 
of human rights, as the key to world peace, based on the perception that democratic 
states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states.28 Liberals highlight the 
domestic sources of state preferences as the determinant of outcomes in international 
politics, assuming that human rights are fundamentally domestic and rarely have the 
same direct consequences for other states as trade policies.29 However, liberals see 
trade, for example, as encouraging acceptance of global human rights norms. It has 
been argued that states accept binding human rights treaties mainly as a means of 
political survival; regimes facing pressure for democratization are most likely to ratify 
human rights instruments to protect their political systems against its opponents.30
Liberal theory accepts a limited independent role for international institutions 
in promoting norms. Many norms began domestically and become international 
through the effects of ‘entrepreneurs’ of various kinds.31 It also takes a more
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traditional view of sovereign states negotiating to maximize their self-interests. The 
diffusion of human rights norms is expected to be stronger between liberal states, 
rather than between liberal and non-liberal states. The liberal perspective, though, 
assumes that the success of human rights norms is mainly a function of pre-existing 
and compatible domestic structures. Within a liberal context, the globalization of 
world markets, the rise of transnational networks and NGOs and the rapid spread of 
global communications technologies are undermining the power of states and shifting 
attention away from military security towards economic and social welfare.
Both realism and liberalism emphasize instrumental motives and material 
factors in determining states’ behaviour, giving lesser weight to factors like culture 
which has been perceived as only a local or national issue.32 Factors such as power, 
trade, general strategic cost/benefit calculations and coercive international bargaining 
are central considerations for a state when deciding whether or not to comply with 
international rules. While it cannot be denied that such factors capture an important 
part of the empirical reality, this thesis argues that other factors such as international 
socialization, learning and interaction are meaningful to any research based on long­
term analysis.
One of the main assumptions of a constructivist approach is that identities, 
norms and culture play important roles in world politics. The constructivist view sees 
states as social actors whose actions follow international or domestic rules. Identities 
and interests of states are not simply structurally determined, but are rather produced 
by interactions, institutions, norms and cultures. It is process, not structure, which 
determines the manner in which states interact. Constructivism claims that while 
states are the main units in international political theory, the structures of the states 
system are intersubjective rather than material, and the identities and interests of states 
are constructed by social structures.34
Constructivism should not necessarily be seen as an alternative to the realist 
and liberalist theories, but rather as placing emphasis on norms and identities. 
Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or 
trade, the constructivist approach emphasizes the impact of ideas, which can be 
diffused through various means. Instead of assuming that states simply seek to 
survive, constructivists consider both the interests and identities of states as malleable 
matters according to specific historical processes.35 However, the position of 
constructivists who focus on international human rights norms has not been clear on 
whether or not these norms are static and unchanging, which has generated some 
criticism towards the constructivist approach to human rights.36
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Unlike the other two leading theories (realism and liberalism), constructivists 
are more optimistic about achieving progress in diffusing human rights norms, though 
progress may take a long time in their view. For constructivists, norms such as human 
rights gain strength and potential wider acceptance because of their universal, moral 
and idealistic qualities, as they have the capability of being linked with basic ideas of 
human dignity shared in many cultures around the world. A fundamental inspiring 
force behind human rights norms is not rational adaptation or coercion, but rather
' i n
transnational socialization, which was termed as ‘the logic of appropriateness’.
The diffusion and internalization of human rights norms may be understood 
within a process of socialization that involves various stages.38 Constructivists have 
developed a detailed theoretical framework, known as the ‘spiral’ model, to 
demonstrate why and how states change their behaviour from non-compliance with 
human rights norms to compliance with, and internalization of, those norms.40 The 
spiral model involves five phases of socialization, starting with the stage of repression 
when a given state violates human rights norms and may remain, for usually a lengthy 
period of time, without criticism by international actors. A norm-violating state enters 
the second stage when it responds to criticism by denial and arguments on the basis of 
relativism or other norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention. As international 
pressures intensify by various actors, the non-complying state usually seeks to pacify 
international criticism by making nominal concessions and cosmetic changes, such as 
the release of prisoners, easing of restrictions or conducting inquiries concerning 
human rights abuses, by which the violating state acknowledges what has been denied 
previously.41 A state moves to the fourth stage when it formally recognizes 
international norms through accession to international human rights instruments and 
establishes domestic mechanisms for victims of human rights abuses. The final stage 
of socialization is when human rights norms become fully institutionalized and 
habitualized and enforceable by the rule of law, at which time international pressures 
become unnecessary.42 While this model is meaningful in comprehending the process 
of changes to norms on an international scale, it appears that such a theoretical model 
gives little importance to the interaction between external and internal factors in 
diffusing and internalizing international human rights norms.
The process of socialization and learning involves notions related to complex 
learning processes based on cognitive and social psychology, by which individuals are 
likely to adopt new norms whenever exposed to the prescriptions embodied in those 
norms.43 Literature in social psychology, political socialization and communication
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research on persuasion and argument offer more elaborate analysis and explanation on 
mechanisms of social interaction and social learning adopted by constructivists 44
Constructivists clearly suggest a longer-term perspective in linking norm- 
induced change in identities and institutions to changes in behavioural patterns.45 A 
suitable example of change in norms and institutions is slavery, which used to be 
internationally accepted socially and politically. Slavery, at least as an institution, has 
been eradicated after mobilization and struggle occurred over a long period of time. 
Allowing women to vote is a settled issue in many parts of the world today. Other 
institutions or practices, such as flogging or capital punishment, have been rigorously 
reduced in occurrence over time.46
In conclusion, constructivism, as a comprehensive approach that does not 
necessarily reject realist and liberalist explanations but emphasizes norms’ 
socialization has been regarded among the essential theoretical basis for examining 
and understanding developments towards human rights in Saudi Arabia. As argued 
throughout the thesis, changes regarding the status of women in Saudi society are 
better understood within a process of socialization, which involve multifaceted 
interactions between external and internal factors.
3- Sovereignty Versus Interventionism:
For the last three centuries, international relations have been organized around 
the two strongly correlated principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. The origin 
of the notion of sovereignty is based on the exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory. However, states have been accepting certain 
normative or procedural rules that affect their internal affairs, by which externally 
driven constraints on their sovereignty become legitimate. The norm of autonomy and 
non-intervention has been challenged by alternatives including internationally- 
prescribed human rights norms. Traditionally, debates over state sovereignty and 
intervention indicate that the support for one necessarily comes at the expense of the 
other.47
Since 1945, the number of treaties, conventions, declarations and statements 
has increased dramatically in many fields including human rights. Sovereign 
developed and newly independent developing states have structured major elements of 
the international human rights regime within two decades, whilst many territories and 
peoples were under colonial rule. The inclusion of the right to self-determination in 
the internationally-recognized human rights norms as a prerequisite for the realization
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of basic rights and freedoms, followed by an expansion of the international society of 
states, has notably contributed to the construction of a new meaning of sovereignty. 
Therefore, states are no longer able to maintain their traditional position concerning 
non-intervention, and inevitably and explicitly accept restrictions on their own 
sovereignty. Human rights treaties are clear examples of accepting external rules when 
states voluntarily choose to make commitments to follow certain practices involving 
treatment of their own citizens within their own territories.49 By signing conventions, 
domestic practices become subject to external scrutiny, which may result in external 
actors having some influence on the domestic authority structure.
Human rights conventions nominally regulate the ways in which states treat 
their own citizens, and such regulations may seem to involve unjustifiable 
intervention. Because protecting human rights is principally an internal issue, it was 
long excluded (except for outlawing slavery, some of the ILO’s conventions and the 
League of Nations’ limited efforts on minority rights) from being an issue affecting 
international relations until the late 1940s. Although the principle that all states are 
equally sovereign under international law was established as a cornerstone of the UN 
Charter,50 evolving international law has set many constraints on what states should, 
and should not, do in the field of human rights in particular.
By the end of the Cold War,51 the issue of intervention for human protection 
purposes became one of the most controversial and difficult questions among all 
international relations issues. Granting the international community responsibility to 
protect human beings from gross violations undermines the traditional notion of state 
sovereignty, especially when massacres, ethnic cleansing or genocide are happening or 
likely to happen. The connotation of the term ‘sovereignty’ has changed from 
implying absolute control of internal affairs by a state to exercising responsibility in 
both internal functions and external duties.52 Internally, state authorities in principle 
are responsible for protecting the lives of their citizens and promoting their welfare. 
Internationally, state authorities are accountable to the international community, not 
only to the UN mechanisms but also to international public opinion, for actions that 
violate their nationals’ human rights. The international community is witnessing a 
process of transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and 
international accountability,54 but it remains to be seen how far this process will go. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court is an example and indication of 
the growing tendency to consider respect for human rights as a central subject and 
responsibility of international relations.
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For many states and their political leaders, sovereignty and the norm of non­
intervention as enshrined in Articles 2.1 and 2.7 of the UN Charter are the best line of 
defence against any threat of intervention in their domestic practices. However, this 
post Cold-War approach to sovereignty and to the question of intervention for human 
protection purposes has been arguably supported by a wide variety of legal sources 
including Chapter VII of the UN Charter,55 the human rights provisions in the UN 
Charter, the UDHR and other human rights conventions, Genocide Conventions, the 
Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law and the statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
The UN position in relation to the issue of states sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention has been reflected in then Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s statements and 
reports. He made a remarkable comment in his statement at the UN General Assembly 
in 1999, when he called for a consensus on how to approach the question of 
intervention.56 As a UN Secretary-General who normally reflected widely accepted 
trends at the international level, Annan stressed on many occasions that state 
sovereignty is being “redefined by the forces of globalization and international 
cooperation.”57 Under this redefined sovereignty, protection of individuals’ human 
rights has been given priority over the protection of those who abuse them (states). 
Annan advocated an interventionism based on legitimate and universal principles, 
rather than a broad or unlimited interventionism.
It is worth noting that intervention (or protective action) is not limited to 
military action. Intervention can also take the form of influence through conditional 
support programmes, assistance to dissidents or potential opposition groups, actual or 
threatened political and economic sanctions, blockades, diplomatic or military threats 
and international criminal prosecution.59 The intervention (or prevention measures) 
basically may take either the form of positive assistance or the negative form of 
threatened or actual punishments whether politically, diplomatically, economically, 
legally or militarily. In a contemporary world, the utility of positive intervention 
through cooperation is growing simply because it is more likely to achieve longer-term 
protection for human rights.
Despite all developments surrounding the concepts of sovereignty and 
intervention, sovereignty still does matter, especially when it comes to human rights, 
which remain principally a national issue. Many governments in developing countries 
perceive the new interventionism as an instrument in the hands of the major powers to 
pursue their own national interests and seek global hegemonism. At the same time, 
powerful states are likely to avoid putting their interests or the stability of violating
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states at risk for merely protecting and promoting human rights. Therefore, military 
intervention usually involves various political and self-interest calculations, rather than 
moral purposes such as protecting human rights.
Despite ratifying various international treaties including human rights 
conventions, Saudi Arabia, like other governments, has occasionally used the principle 
of sovereignty to defend its position on domestic issues including human rights. 
International measures such as military intervention or economic sanctions to protect 
or promote human rights may not concern the Saudi government. Nevertheless, 
human rights in Saudi Arabia are susceptible to other forms of intervention and 
influence including those exerted by the international human rights regime.
4- International Human Rights Regime:
By the end of the second millennium, international relations had become a 
complex network of rules, norms, practices and institutions in various subjects. States 
are no longer the only players in the international arena, as regimes play a role in 
governing states’ behaviour in areas such as security, trade, environment and human 
rights. The international regimes are typically founded on international treaties or 
conventions that give the regimes their basic structural design and legal framework,60 
as is the case with the international human rights regime.
As earlier mentioned, states have accepted limitations on their original 
sovereignty arising from international arrangements, even if that involves changing 
their domestic laws. Although started beforehand, particularly among Western states, 
this trend has increasingly grown since the creation of the UN following the Second 
World War. The catastrophes of world wars, particularly the Holocaust, propelled the 
world, led by the Western nations, to become more conscious of the security, dignity 
and rights of human beings and for the need for collective action supporting this cause 
based on humanism and uni versah sm.61 In the preamble of the UDHR, a linkage was 
clearly made between disregarding human rights and barbarous acts, “which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind”, implying the importance to world peace of 
creating international human rights regime.
In the international human rights regime, there are widely accepted norms, 
principles and institutions. Currently, human rights declarations, conventions, treaties, 
bodies of principles and codes of conduct cover almost all conceivable aspects of the 
relationship between the individual and the state. The UDHR and the two Covenants 
contain outlines of the international human rights agenda and established the
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benchmark for state conduct. These documents have inspired the adoption of other 
international human rights conventions and the creation of laws at the national level. 
The UN, along with its wider family of bodies and agencies, constitutes a prominent 
part of the international human rights regime, which includes all activities of 
international pressure groups. Non-state actors, especially major human rights NGOs, 
have been playing an important role in influencing international affairs. While these 
groups and actors are connected to the UN, activities of the UN contributed effectively 
to creating, shaping and implementing the international human rights regime. The 
UN with its organs is unquestionably the principal institution for building, 
consolidating and using the authority internationally.
Protecting human rights is a fundamental objective of the activities of the 
international human rights regime. In theory, actions of the international human rights 
regime include enforcement, implementation, promotional and declaratory activities. 
However, the international human rights regime has been seen as a relatively strong 
declaratory and promotional regime, but with limited international implementation and 
absence of enforcement capacity.64 The immediate impact of UN activities on human 
rights is usually slight, with limitations on implementation and enforcement activities. 
Therefore, the significance of the international human rights regime lies in its long­
term process of socialization and the dispensing of legitimacy.65
In addition to creating human rights instruments, there is a wide range of 
factors, events and activities that have contributed to progressing the international 
human rights regime. During the Cold War era, the International Conference on 
Human Rights held in Tehran in 1968 was a major event in which the international 
community reviewed progress made since the adoption of the UDHR, affirming its 
faith in the principles of the UDHR and human rights instruments and urging all 
peoples and governments to dedicate themselves to the principles enshrined in the 
UDHR.66 Within the UN human rights system, there are numerous procedures and 
mechanisms designed to monitor states’ obligations under international human rights 
conventions and international law at large. The international human rights conventions 
also have their own reporting mechanisms to monitor and review parties’ compliance 
with their obligations under the conventions. In addition to reporting mechanisms to 
monitor and review parties’ compliance, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
resolution 1503 of 1970 authorizes the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights to investigate communications (complaints) that appear to 
reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights; the
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1503 procedure, however, is principally a promotional mechanism, involving some 
random and limited monitoring.
In the history of East-West relations, the question of human rights has been 
associated with the Helsinki Conference in 1975, particularly Principle VI on non­
intervention (introduced by the East) and Principle VII on human rights (introduced by 
the West). Unlike the 1968 Tehran Conference, the 1975 Helsinki Conference had 
stronger political intent and more important consequences. While Principle VII of the 
Helsinki Conference represented an explicit agreement by participating parties to 
respect human rights including political and civil rights, the non-intervention principle 
contained an agreed notion to refrain from any form of intervention. Despite the rival 
claims of Principle VI and Principle VII between East and West, both sides agreed that 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the principles governing 
relations between Helsinki participants. In looking at the developments of the 
international human rights regime during the 1970s, the Helsinki Conference was a 
major step in which human rights were included in a politically-based agreement 
between the two rival international camps.
Particularly since the late 1980s, the UN has increasingly turned to socializing, 
educating and inducing states to change their policies and adopt human rights 
standards as defined by the international human rights instruments. Multilateral, 
bilateral and nongovernmental human rights activities continued to increase slowly 
through the 1980s and rapidly during the 1990s. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
world order has transformed from a situation dominated by ideological and 
geopolitical struggle to a state in which democracy and human rights are declared by 
powerful states as a major pillar of their foreign relations. Thus, the international 
human rights regime has become an agent utilized by states to enhance their views, 
achieve more protection and respect for human rights and, in some cases, score 
political goals. The creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in the early 1990s set examples of the 
increasing role of the human rights regime in enhancing the realization and protection 
of human rights.
The activities of the international human rights regime are not limited to the 
UN human rights system. International human rights NGOs and the media exert a 
significant influence within the international human rights regime. As explained in the 
next section, human rights advocacy by NGOs have provided important contributions 
not only into the development of the international human rights regime but also in 
urging states to comply with the regime’s norms.
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Although standards set forth by the international human rights regime are 
generally not enforceable by inter-state action, the regime along with its institutions is 
designed to hold governments accountable for their internal activities.68 Other regimes 
often deal with transnational issues, whereas human rights involve examining the 
treatment by a state of its own citizens. Unlike other international regimes, the 
weakness of the international human rights regime also comes from the fact that 
human rights by and large involve moral, not material, interests. When moral interests 
are in conflict with material interests, states normally would prefer to serve their 
material interests. Furthermore, observing human rights standards often necessitates 
overriding religious, tribal and traditional values, which explains the presumed 
resistance, whether by states or peoples, of some internationally-promoted human 
rights standards in several non-Western countries. Another weakness comes from the 
nature of human rights, as being a profoundly national issue. The fear of causing 
political instability and harming economic interests may require or justify supporting 
and cooperating with oppressive regimes and overlooking their violations.69
In spite of its weakness as a change mechanism, the international human rights 
regime currently has achieved widely accepted substantive norms, internationalized 
standard-setting procedures and promotional, implementational and monitoring 
mechanisms, but very limited enforcement ability. Given the increased role of the 
international human rights regime, most states avoid (at least publicly) rejecting 
widely-accepted international human rights norms simply because they are unwilling 
and politically unable to maintain that their national human rights practices are beyond 
all international norms and procedures. The international human rights regime’s 
approach, which focuses on activities that socialize, educate and induce states to 
comply with international human rights standards, has put the emphasis upon the role 
of individual states and their legal and political systems. To empower the international 
human rights regime, areas such as trade and aid have been imported into the regime to 
enhance the respect for, and realization of, human rights. Nevertheless, importing 
trade or aid to the regime does not automatically ensure compliance with the norms of 
the international human rights regime.70
5- Compliance and Human Rights:
It is worth noting that while all those developments were happening at the 
international level, particularly regarding the human rights regime and the limits of 
sovereignty, domestic developments were often also moving in a positive direction.
48
Those international developments have not occurred in isolation, given factors such as 
globalization and information technologies. In the case of Saudi Arabia, global 
developments and international influence, as argued in chapter five, have impacted 
upon the way the Kingdom reacts to pressure to comply with internationally- 
recognized human rights norms.
As indicated earlier, pressures upon states to respect human rights have limited 
their sovereign prerogative and freedom to maneuver, even within their own territories 
and citizens. In this contemporary world system, governments would put their national 
and international legitimacy at risk if they do not at least declare respect for human 
rights. Saudi Arabia, like many countries, has chosen to participate in, and cooperate 
and partly comply with, the UN human rights system in order, among other reasons, to 
avoid being labelled as a human rights violator.
Governments’ decisions to observe international commitments, particularly 
international human rights norms, are usually taken under certain internal and external 
conditions. Political, economic or cultural/social factors may influence the actions of 
states, but it is debatable whether their commitment to human rights norms are driven 
more by internal or external causes. As explained later, there are different models of 
compliance with international law in general and human rights norms in particular. 
Also, it is an important ingredient of this section to identify generally causes in which 
compliance and continuing non-compliance with human rights norms can be 
explained. Those causes have both internal and external dimensions. International 
influence as a cause for compliance is among the major concerns of this thesis. 
Therefore, the final theoretical issue in this section focuses on the role of international 
influence in changing state behaviour.
A- Compliance Models:
The traditional approach to the theory of compliance is based on the theoretical 
framework of realism. It is centred on the enforcement model, utilizing coercive 
measures and imposing economic and/or military sanctions to force states to comply.72 
This approach is associated with the theory of complete sovereignty of the state. For 
human rights, voluntarily accepting international norms is likely to beget a lasting 
compliance with, rather than an imposition of, those norms. However, an enforcement 
model may prove to be more effective in situations of gross violations of human rights. 
Furthermore, such a model could be successful in bringing states to comply with 
international standards in areas such as trade or the environment. Unlike commercial 
or environmental matters, human rights are a fundamentally moral concern and
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profoundly an internal issue influenced by culture, which may contribute to explaining 
the reluctance at the international level to adopt the enforcement model.
The new approach to compliance theory, known as ‘the managerial model’, 
relies primarily on cooperation, persuasion and shaming. Publicizing violations 
arguably induces states to implement their obligations arising from joining 
international treaties. Based on a constructivist theory of social obligations, the 
international system is evolving as a sophisticated normative structure without 
mechanisms for enforcement, especially on moral, internal matters. A sense of 
obligation invites states towards compliance with norms which are not coercively 
mandated by outside powers. Obligations are not limited to those which are based on 
pure legality (such as rules of treaties), but they also include legally legitimate norms 
based on a sense of social obligation.74 Influenced by the international atmosphere, 
social obligations are likely to be initiated by domestic interest groups and then 
adopted by governments.
This new approach is based on an assumption that states have the propensity to 
comply with international obligations. This assumption is very obvious in the field of 
human rights, where most states increasingly try to avoid being labelled as human 
rights violators. When national human rights practices that violate international human 
rights standards become subject to international scrutiny, that can frequently embarrass 
the state in question.7 3 Naming and shaming is often an effectual measure to motivate 
states to comply with their obligations under international human rights instruments. 
A reputational compliance is based on the proposition that many rules of international 
law are adhered to by states not because they are enforceable but, rather, because a 
failure to honour a state’s commitment to those rules damages its reputation and may 
affect its national interest.76 This reputational impact is essential to understand why 
states have a propensity to comply with international law.
Unlike theorists who emphasize the role of sanctioning, material factors in 
stimulating compliance, constructivists subscribe to the concept of socialization and 
learning as central in promoting compliance in the area of human rights. Compliance 
decisions are based in the first place on social structures and interactions between 
external and internal factors. This process of socialization may take many years or 
even decades to reach full compliance. While taking into consideration political and 
social variations among states, the more intensive the process of socialization and 
learning and the more diverse the means utilized, the less time needed to get states to 
abide by the norms of the international human right regime. While the process of 
socialization and learning should lead to compliance in long-term strategy, it is
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questionable to assume that full compliance is solely the inevitable end result of 
learning and social interaction. Therefore, constructivists are criticized for their failure 
to yet develop multi-faceted theorem that include other factors.77 Whereas this thesis 
identifies socialization as one suitable theoretical basis for explaining positive 
developments towards compliance with internationally-recognized human rights in 
Saudi Arabia, that does not imply overlooking the possible limits of socialization, 
particularly in relation to interaction between external and internal factors, as indicated 
later.
Human rights conventions with formal reporting requirements do not 
necessarily change states practices simply as a result of their joining those 
conventions.78 What matters is not just the conventions’ provisions; it is essential to 
examine any state’s behaviour in order to assess whether human rights conventions 
alter its policies and all circumstances causing, or associated with, that change. The 
important question here is how to relate steps taken by Saudi Arabia towards 
compliance with influences exerted by the UN human rights system. The standards 
against which compliance is measured are important in determining the extent to 
which Saudi Arabia complies with its obligations under human rights conventions 
ratified by the Kingdom and under international human rights standards as a whole. 
Exploring the universalist and relativist arguments, in chapter three, is essential in 
pinpointing the extent of, and obstacles to, compliance. While this thesis uses in the 
first place the internationally- recognized human rights standards to measure Saudi 
Arabia’s compliance, it is quite relevant to present, in the following chapters, 
Islamically and culturally driven perspectives on human rights in order to assess their 
influence on compliance.
The accession of Saudi Arabia to human rights treaties, its endorsement of 
international human rights declarations and its willingness to cooperate with, and 
participate in, the UN human rights system represents a first, but important, stage of 
compliance. This engagement in the UN human rights system provides a formal 
gesture of recognition and offers evidence of its willingness to accept accountability by 
the international human rights regime. The second stage is Saudi Arabia’s procedural 
compliance with reporting and responding to demands by the UN human rights 
system. At the national level, this thesis investigates de jure and de facto compliance 
embodied in the implementation of international human rights standards into the 
domestic law and in the application of the law in practice, focusing on the rights and 
the status of women. It is perhaps axiomatic to assume that Saudi Arabia, like other 
countries, has the propensity to comply with international human rights obligations,
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but there are various factors that affect its full compliance. Accordingly, it is now 
appropriate to examine scholarly explanations on the causes of human rights 
violations.
B- Causes of Non-Compliance:
In general, there are a number of factors associated with the continuing non- 
compliance with human rights norms. Those factors are conveniently divided into 
three broad types: political, economic and ideological-cultural rationalizations, by 
which causes of systematic human rights abuses can be identified. Political reasons 
focus on issues such as regime type, civil society and armed conflict or civil war to 
understand human rights violations. For example, respect for political and civil rights 
and the strength of civil society are crucial to explain human rights violations and 
corruptions. Respect for those rights and an organized, independent civil society could 
play an essential role in curbing violations and corruption, bringing progress towards 
compliance. Despite the fact that democracies have used repression in times of crisis 
when challenges to authorities exist,79 studies on repression indicate that democratic 
political systems are much less likely to engage in repression than are non-democratic
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systems. As the structure of the political system of a given country contributes to 
obstructing or improving implementation and compliance, aspects of the political 
structures in Saudi Arabia are identified in chapter four to comprehend developments 
in human rights in the Kingdom towards compliance.
Economic conditions can be related to human rights violations. Multiple 
quantitative studies point out that poor countries are more likely to be repressive than 
rich countries. Whilst a strong correlation has been noticed between democracy and 
economic development and wealth,82 which eventually affects the level of compliance 
with internationally-recognized human rights norms, Saudi Arabia was classified as a 
‘deviant’ case in a cross-countries study of the relationship between wealth (per capita 
income) and democracy. There are some studies which connect particular types of 
economic systems to human rights violations by establishing a link with international 
economic issues such as free trade, globalization and transnational investment.
Cultural explanations are vitally crucial to any analysis of the occurrence of 
human rights violations. Among the most important causes of human rights violations 
are cultural traditions (given its overall importance in Saudi Arabia’s case, this is 
discussed in detail in the next chapter), which play a major role in accepting or 
rejecting human rights norms and in a number of cases affect the full compliance by a 
state. If internationally promoted ideas, beliefs and values fit with the pre-existing
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domestic social understanding, and when a broad range of the society endorses 
international human rights norms, it is likely to have a greater degree of compliance at 
the domestic level. As argued in the subsequent chapters, the religious doctrine and 
traditional cultural practices prevailing in Saudi Arabia would explain reasons behind 
the current situation of human rights in that country and clarify causes of its limited 
compliance with international human rights norms. Identifying the level of cultural 
congruence between Saudi traditions and internationally-recognized human rights 
standards, in chapter four, is crucial to comprehend developments towards compliance.
Ideologies, particularity authoritarian ideologies such as Nazism or Fascism, 
may attempt to justify violations of human rights. The psychological dimension 
explains aspects of human rights violations in which, for instance, individuals are 
brought up, or taught, to be discriminatory against certain groups. The psychological 
disposition of political leaders in authoritarian regimes can beget a willingness to take 
whatever actions are necessary for maintaining their prerogatives, including repressive 
actions. These ideological and psychological explanations of human rights violations 
are complementary to political and cultural explanations.
It is now appropriate to look at specific reasons explaining non-compliance 
with obligations arising from joining international treaties which may provide excuses 
and a refuge for their non-compliance. States may enter into a treaty in the first place 
in response to internal or external influences with, or without, a sincere intention to 
implement it. International treaties, mainly human rights treaties, tend to be worded 
without specificity, using general language for the purpose of reaching consensus on 
one hand and to accommodate any future issues related to the treaty subject on the 
other, keeping in mind that legal concepts of rights and wrongs can change over the 
passage of time. This zone of ambiguity occasionally opens the doors for justifying
85practices that seemingly contradict a state’s obligations under a given treaty.
The states’ right to make reservations on international treaties is a sanctuary for 
non-compliance, which may imply providing a level of relativity in implementing 
international rules, as indicated in the next chapter. Reservations, whether specific or 
general, add more dimensions to justify non-compliance. As indicated earlier, Saudi 
Arabia acceded to four major human rights conventions, with general reservations to 
most of them not to abide by provisions that contradict the shari’ah. Such 
reservations, as argued later, furnish Saudi Arabia with justifications for not complying 
with some provisions of these conventions.
In some cases, reservations aim at excluding the applicability of the core 
provisions of a treaty. Reservations that make the fulfillment of the treaty obligations
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generally conditional on national legislation, or other general and unspecified 
principles (such as the shari'ah), indicate a state’s unwillingness to give the respective
o  z:
treaty rules priority over its national and religious/traditional norms. Therefore, there 
is a growing tendency within the UN human rights organs and among human rights
87scholars to urge states to withdraw their reservations to human rights treaties.
Given that human rights conventions exemplify “an extreme case of the time
o o
lag between undertaking and performance,” as they generally, but not necessarily, 
involve changes in religious and traditional practices, a period of transitional 
arrangements is necessary to enable states to meet the obligations arising under those 
conventions. This temporal dimension has been an obstruction to full compliance with 
human rights norms by states that have nevertheless ratified human rights conventions. 
With the large number of states ratifying human rights treaties continuing their non- 
compliance, this temporal dimension should however not imply that international 
human rights instruments are inapplicable, aspirational mechanisms.
Many political, economic and cultural features of specific countries can 
positively or negatively influence non-compliance. Some countries, for instance, lack 
the financial resources and technical capacity to implement international treaties. In 
most developing countries, where financial, technical, scientific, administrative and/or 
bureaucratic assistance is a prerequisite to implementing international agreements, 
limitations on state capability to carry out its obligations under international treaties 
may possibly exist. While financial constraints are not applicable to Saudi Arabia, the 
Kingdom lacks some technical capacities to socially diffuse and then implement some 
aspects of human rights conventions. In many countries, the strength of domestic 
NGOs and the independence of civil society have a considerable impact in stimulating 
compliance. In addition to the central role of domestic NGOs, transnational NGOs can 
play a major role in affecting state behaviour to comply with international human 
rights norms, as explained in the next sub-section. Whereas the role of domestic 
NGOs and civil society in the case of Saudi Arabia is still limited despite some 
developments, domestic organizations in general frequently provide their transnational 
counterparts with a channel into the national political arena and justifications for 
involvement in local affairs.
C- International Influences as a Cause for Compliance:
This thesis’ main concern is to explore the extent to which a given country can 
be influenced by international human rights activism, particularly the UN human rights 
system. How far can international influence affect political change and policies that
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are related to the protection and promotion of human rights in a country like Saudi 
Arabia? The concept of international influence used here is not limited to the realist 
explanation of superpower pressure or to the liberalist interest-based notion, it rather 
includes all international factors/actors that may play a role in the process of 
adaptation, socialization and compliance with international human rights norms. 
While there are different forms of international influences, the focus in this thesis is on 
the multilateral influences exerted by the international human rights regime, namely 
influences by the UN human rights system, and to a lesser extent by the NGOs which 
participate in the deliberations of UN human rights bodies.
International NGOs can effectively publicize violations through reports, 
publicity campaigns and participation in UN human rights organs. International 
activism has richly contributed to the advancement of human rights globally. Unlike 
criticism by states or governmental organizations, which might be simply dismissed as 
being politically motivated, international NGOs usually have reasonable credibility 
and can bring significant pressure to bear on states to comply, usually through naming 
and shaming. International NGOs have provided unprecedented access to victims of 
abuse and oppression all over the world to attract international supporters to their 
cases.
There are conditions under which international influences can be more 
effective. The structural situation of the target state, such as its size or wealth, may 
affect its vulnerability and responsiveness to international influences. Also, sensitivity 
of the ruling elite to their reputation and desire for international prestige may shape the 
effect of international human rights influences.89 As authoritarian states are intolerant 
of local protestors and typically restrict freedoms of association and expression, the 
role of international influences becomes more important. International mobilization 
may trigger and stimulate domestic activists, despite restrictions, and provide them 
with material and moral support including access to international audiences.
International pressures and influences either coerce governments to accept 
human rights norms or persuade them to do so. Influences by powerful states can play 
a significant role in making other states commit to the implementation of international 
human rights norms. Democratic states usually promote norms abroad because they 
are consistent with their beliefs of what universal ideals are. Other states therefore 
accept, at least nominally at the beginning, binding international human rights norms 
because of various internal and external factors including the international promotional 
activities of those norms. In contemporary international human rights customary law, 
transnational human rights obligations imply that states may have commitments to
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promote human rights within the realm of their external activities, such as trade, aid, 
development and technical cooperation, participation in international organizations and 
security activities.90
It is doubtful that international influences alone can force governments to 
change their human rights policies. A persistent national struggle against human rights 
violations is certainly a major domestic basis for achieving respect for human rights. 
Although shaming activities by international actors undoubtedly play a major role in 
promoting compliance, overemphasizing this particular mechanism may prove to be 
empirically incorrect.91 Nevertheless, Darren Hawkins rightly argued that the role of 
international human rights activism should not be underestimated in making 
governments more likely to comply with international human rights rules and in 
stimulating national movements to press for political reforms and for the application of 
the rule of law.92 This thesis, however, maintains that interactions between external 
and internal factors are crucial for moving towards compliance, as both domestic and 
international actors often need and utilize each other in the struggle against violations.
In an intensively interdependent world, there is an increasing correlation 
between international influences and compliance. The world today is increasingly 
interconnected; the exchange of material objects and immaterial ideas among 
countries, cultures and individuals is increasingly more visible. The unprecedented 
accessibility to information in the era of information revolution and new 
communication technologies has made governments no longer able either to control 
the inflow of information or to control outflows of information on human rights 
violations occurring in their territories. The latter has heightened awareness by the 
international community of human rights violations wherever and whenever they may 
be occurring. Evidence in the human rights literature shows that the role of 
international actors is important in protecting and promoting human rights. The 
positive impact of international influences is easily viewed at some levels such as 
agenda setting or framing and spreading of norms. However, a major problem in 
empirically demonstrating the effectiveness of international influences is that any
QTchange in state practice can be attributed to a variety of external and internal causes.
As discussed earlier in section two, the constructivist theory of socialization 
puts great emphasis on international influences and pressures for inducing violating 
states into compliance with international human rights norms.94 The earlier illustrated 
‘spiral’ model relies on international pressures to explain a state’s shift from non- 
compliance with human rights norms to the internalization, institutionalization and 
habitualization of those norms. While acknowledging the significant role of
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international influences within the process of socialization, this thesis argues that the 
effectiveness of international influences is closely related to domestic factors, given 
that interaction does exist between local and international politics. As international 
human rights norms are generally not enforceable under the existing international 
human rights regime, international influences through socialization are meaningful 
tools in prompting states to respect human rights. International influences do not 
automatically guarantee full compliance with international human rights norms. 
Nonetheless, mechanisms used in a process of socialization and learning, such as 
shaming, naming and persuasion, are a readily available means for various 
international actors in most cases. Through such mechanisms, international actors 
could contribute to changing domestic policies in sovereign states without breaching 
the non-intervention principle. Steadily concentrated and continuous international 
influences are likely to make countries gradually move towards compliance with 
international human rights norms. As argued throughout the thesis, international 
influence is a significant enabling factor, but not sufficient cause, for compliance.
Conclusion:
Theories on the basis of human rights attempt to answer the question of how 
‘human’ and ‘right’ can be defined or what it means to be ‘human’. Most human 
rights theories recognize the need to identify a justification that can validate the moral 
principles of human rights. In looking at the diverging foundations for human rights, it 
is apparent that they mainly rely upon either divine revelation, human reason 
extrapolating from nature or deliberate human invention and agreement. This thesis 
accepts that the notion of modem human rights is derived mainly from the tradition of 
natural, rational law, acknowledging that universalism constitutes the cornerstone of 
internationally-recognized human rights norms.
The earlier discussion has provided a better understanding on the diffusion of 
human rights norms internationally. Realists, liberalists and constructivists have 
different explanations of the dynamics of international human rights; the thesis’s 
argument however maintains that the diffusion of human rights is best understood in a 
process of socialization and learning, which involves various forms of influence, 
persuasion and interaction. As argued in this thesis, the process of socialization is a 
suitable theoretical illustration of changes in human rights in Saudi Arabia.
As noted in section three, human rights remain principally a national issue 
despite developments on the meaning and limits of sovereignty and intervention.
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Although the principle of sovereignty still does matter, as it is used for defending 
domestic policies against intervention or external criticism, practices of human rights 
in Saudi Arabia are subject to some forms of intervention involving pressures and 
influence by different international actors including states, international NGOs and the 
UN human rights system.
International regimes in general play a significant role in modifying state 
behaviour “in their capacity as utility modifiers, enhancers of authority, learning 
facilitators, role defmers, and agents on internal realignments.” 95 While 
acknowledging the significance of regimes in modifying states behaviour, regime 
theory does not mean exclusion of other factors. The role of internal factors in shaping 
domestic policies and producing compliance is evidently recognizable, but the 
increasing complexity and interdependency of the modem world political system could 
support the view that external factors have gained increasing importance in influencing 
governments’ decisions on domestic issues. After taking into account all factors that 
explain changes in domestic politics, regime analysis is a useful tool for analyzing a 
state’s compliance. The previous brief exploration on the extent to which the human 
rights regime could affect human rights in any given country is fundamental to 
comprehending the regime’s role in influencing Saudi Arabia’s response to the UN 
human rights system, noting that the UN plays an essential role in the regime.
Theories of compliance and understanding various models of compliance have 
made a significant contribution in comprehending states’ shift from non-compliance to 
compliance. The earlier discussions have offered explanations of various 
circumstances that determine the diffusion and internalization of norms. As 
international influences could be regarded as a driving force for change, this thesis 
aims at examining the extent to which developments in Saudi Arabia’s human rights, 
particularly in women’s rights, have been associated with international influences and 
with the UN human rights system in particular. A major aspect of the argument is that 
international influences could play a significant role in inducing internalization of 
human rights norms, while taking into consideration the importance of the interactions 
between external and internal factors in shaping such processes. While the literature 
offers diverse theoretical explanations on the emergence, diffusion of, and compliance 
with, human rights norms as well as on sovereignty and international human rights 
regimes, this thesis adopts a position in which human rights are not only a simple, 
political phenomenon explained by theories of politics and international relations; they 
are also connected with other theoretical issues including cultures and traditions, as 
argued in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
(Partll)
Universality and Cultural Relativity of Human Rights
Introduction:
When critically studying human rights in a country like Saudi Arabia, the 
scholarly arguments and political debates over issues of universality and relativity of 
human rights have to be taken into account. The Saudi government, like many non- 
Westem governments, defends its position on human rights on the grounds of cultural 
relativity and social particularities of the Saudi people. Accordingly, this question 
constitutes a key theoretical issue for this thesis. This chapter primarily addresses 
arguments about the construction of universal human rights across cultures, focusing 
on how culture in the contemporary age is susceptible to change, and exploring the 
compatibility between internationally-recognized human rights and the Islamic, 
Wahhabi and Saudi traditions and how malleable those traditions are to change.
Despite the existence of internationally-recognized human rights norms, the 
interpretations and forms of implementation of those norms are still practically subject 
to cultural variation. Accordingly, the first section examines arguments for and against 
modem conceptions of universal human rights, including the debate on the dynamic 
nature of culture and the relationship between civil and political rights on the one hand 
and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Theoretical questions are not 
limited to scholarly debates within the literature of human rights, but also partially 
enter into the arguments at the UN over the subject. States in the Muslim world, as 
members of the UN, participated in the debates and played a part in the construction of 
universal human rights standards. The second section, thus, discusses how issues 
related to universality and relativity have been debated and perceived at the UN.
There is extensive literature about the political system and human rights in 
Islam. This literature presents different, and sometimes conflicting, views on these 
issues. Since the Kingdom relates its policies to the shari’ah, section three examines 
the major questions on aspects of the political system and human rights in Islam in 
order to comprehend how compatible Islamic texts are with international human rights 
standards. Principles of Islam, in its Wahhabi form, have been, for more than two
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centuries, a unifying force for founding and stabilizing Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
section four is devoted to exploring the political system and human rights from a 
Wahhabi perspective.
Despite Saudi Arabia’s commitment declared in several international forums to 
protect and promote human rights, the religion of Islam and local traditions are 
important components of Saudi Arabia’s perception of human rights. Saudi Arabia 
expressed its view on the universality of human rights through its statements and 
voting patterns in the UN. Therefore, the final section of this chapter discusses briefly 
the position of Saudi Arabia on the issue of the universality or cultural relativity of 
human rights.
1- Universality Versus Cultural Relativity: Theoretical Debate:
The central question in the debate is whether the norms of human rights are 
universal in their nature or constrained by cultural/religious/national backgrounds. A 
related question is whether by ‘universal’ human rights, we mean their universality in 
origin, nature, substance or concept, definition, interpretation or implementation. Such 
issues lead to a series of other questions including those related to whether civil and 
political rights take precedence over economic and social rights and whether cultural 
differences on conceptual issues such as the individual versus community and rights 
versus duties could undermine universal human rights. Moreover, a relevant question 
is how vulnerable culture is to change triggered by contact with other cultures.
In theory, at one end of the spectrum of the debate over universality versus 
relativity, there is a denial o f the relationship between human rights and culture, 
whereas the opposite end represents those who dismiss universal human rights as being 
a Western notion which is unrelated to the reality of non-Western cultures. 1 However, 
attempting to take a stand within that spectrum or trying to strike a precise balance 
between universality and relativity is a controversial and complex issue.
The basic view that human rights are primarily to protect individuals from 
oppression has been universally attractive across cultures and explains the spread of
'y
human rights globally. Despite a widening acceptance of the universality of rights 
listed in the UDHR and other human rights treaties, particularly among human rights 
advocates, the interpretation and application of those rights are subject to variation.
As discussed in chapter two, human rights as internationally-prescribed were 
originated in Western societies, reflecting the European liberal, secular thought, along 
with its views of the law of nature (the contribution of non-Westem states is discussed
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later). For universalists, human rights are perceived as self-evident universal norms, 
rooted in the concept of natural law and human dignity.3 Since human rights are 
applicable to all human beings simply because they are human, universalists suggest 
that human rights are capable of being objectively defined and applied to all societies 
on an identifiable scale.4 As noted in chapter two, the notion of natural rights that 
underlies universality has encountered various challenges, including on the ground that 
the concept of human nature could be influenced by cultural and social considerations. 
Conversely, relativists are suspicious of accepting universal human rights because 
what is known as universal human rights norms have arguably emerged from a single 
culture. Accordingly, the primary difference between relativist and universalist 
arguments is essentially connected with the underlying basis of human rights.
Modem human rights are largely influenced by evolved Western views and 
experiences of human dignity, moral values and the liberal political tradition of rights, 
namely the notion that the individual is the core of a society.5 This individualism has 
brought a sense of an inherent equality and rationality of individuals, whereas the pre­
modem societies were essentially hierarchical. Also, the notion of ‘rights’ to all 
human beings, as internationally understood, differs from the concept of ‘duties’ or 
‘obligations’ that exists in non-Westem cultures, including the Islamic tradition (as 
explained later in section three). Human rights, with their individualistic quality, are 
meant to protect individuals from abuses by the community or the state. In non- 
Westem traditions, the community, rather than the individual, is the core of the whole 
society. Such conceptual differences are essential in order to comprehend the 
argument for universality or relativity of human rights. Nonetheless, despite 
differences between Western and non-Westem cultures on the issue of individual 
versus community or right versus duty, changes have already started to affect 
community-based norms in different parts of the world. In Saudi Arabia, for example, 
factors such as modernization and economic prosperity have already contributed to 
changes in some traditional norms, as argued later.
Within this context, one of the most important questions related to the 
universality of human rights is to look at whether cultural values are malleable, 
particularly to change occurring due to interaction with other cultures. The statement 
of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) before the UNCHR in 1947 
characterized a strong relativist stand and reflected a position in which cultures were 
seen mainly as detached, static units.6 Since the early twentieth century, 
anthropologists have focused their argument on the relativity of moral standards in 
different societies, advocating that various social values and moral codes should be
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beyond the criticism of outsiders. They also seek to dismantle ethnocentrism, rejecting 
the idea that one culture is superior to another or a culture has the right to impose its 
views on another culture.7 This relativist argument might be in a response to the 
cultural evolutionists who put Western civilization at the highest stage, although 
universalists reject ethnocentrism as being universally immoral.8 Universalism is 
generally against the preservation of traditions that oppose basic human rights and 
strongly favoured modernity and liberalism.
In the 1940s, cultural flows among various nations in the world were limited,
which led anthropologists to reject the possibility o f new values being voluntarily
embraced universally. However, with the spread o f global phenomena (such as the
modem state system, capital market, modernization, physical and human development
and global revolutions in information and communication technologies), cultural
exchange has extraordinarily intensified. Consequently, anthropologists have moved
towards considering culture as a less static unit, more susceptible to change.9 Such
theoretical shift to constructionist analysis of culture constitutes a positive
development towards the universality of human rights, particularly the focus on human
development and its linkage to freedom, capabilities and knowledge, as indicated later.
The rapid changes in the contemporary world, resulting in high levels of cultural and
material exchange, led some anthropologists to abandon their position in relation to
cultural relativity. New trends within anthropological studies have reflected greater
doubt about rejecting human rights discourse in the name of cultural values.10 These
trends emphasized the employment of a dynamic approach to human rights, as
“people’s realities are culturally constructed”,11 and stressed the need to make cultural
relativitism an energizing, rather than restraining, mechanism and to investigate
• • 1 2strategies capable of tackling violations, which have been guarded by traditions.
In general, cultures resemble to an extent each other in their visions of human 
dignity, but relativists tend to emphasize differences and to present these differences as 
the essence o f a culture. With the general attractiveness of the notion of human rights 
to peoples from different cultures and the high levels of interaction between external 
and internal factors, challenges to traditional values related to human rights have 
increased. To deal with such challenges, relativists focused in the last two decades on 
building more awareness of the importance of cultural values within the overall 
international human rights framework. On one line o f their argument, relativists think 
this awareness serves to emphasize harmony among peoples of a diverse world and 
contributes to a better understanding of causes of continuous violations of ‘universal’ 
human rights in many parts of the world. By contrast, universalists believe that the
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focus on cultural relativity may lead to overlooking and/or legitimizing human rights 
violations and could challenge both domestic and international efforts to promote 
respect for human rights. 14
A major argument in the debate is the emphasis on economic, social and 
cultural rights over civil and political rights or vice versa. This argument attempts to 
challenge the universality and indivisibility (all human rights are equally important) of 
internationally-recognized human rights by giving precedence to one generation of 
human rights over the other. The Cold War debate over the hierarchy between civil 
and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights has continued in different 
forms within North-South and West-Islam frameworks. 15 While the adoption of two 
separate covenants is regarded as a categorical split, 16 trends mainly within the Third 
World promote the view that the realization of economic and social rights (or other 
rights within the so-called third generation of collective rights such as the right to 
development) is a basic requirement for the effective enjoyment of civil and political 
rights. 17 As explained in the next section, states of the South have utilized the right to 
development to challenge the universality and indivisibility of human rights. 
However, the denial of civil and political rights on grounds such as economic 
development is unacceptable, as the contradiction between the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights and the realization of economic and social rights is largely illusive. 
Human rights are fundamentally interrelated and interconnected such that the 
enjoyment or denial of one right affects other rights. However, a constructive step 
towards achieving universal realization of economic and social rights is the emphasis 
on minimum essential principles of subsistence rights for all, which has received 
widespread support, particularly within the UN. 18
The universality of human rights has been also challenged on the ground that 
human rights are a matter of national sovereignty and compatible with the right to self- 
determination. As explained in chapter two, there have been various developments 
surrounding the notion of sovereignty by which violations of human rights become a 
concern for the international community, despite being profoundly internal issues.
For some relativists, a cross-cultural approach is the solution in order for 
different peoples in this multicultural world to get along with each other. 19 They argue 
that human rights as understood in the West are not necessarily applicable to non- 
Westem societies where their philosophical basis is different and perhaps opposed; 
even if there are some basic rights upon which a group of cultures agree at the 
conceptual level, they will be implemented and manipulated according to specific 
agendas and interests. For advocates of cultural relativity, the application of one set of
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20universally accepted human rights standards necessarily requires a universal culture. 
Those advocates of a cross-cultural approach however do not offer practical 
mechanisms for reaching consensus on cross-cultural or universal standards derived 
from all cultures. The response to the relativist argument however is to employ a 
constructivist approach, as noted in chapter two, which argues that values, as social 
constructs, can be gradually diffused globally.21
Although internationally-recognized human rights emerged from Western 
conceptions, the contribution of non-Westem states to the construction of human rights 
standards (discussed later) implies the universality of those rights. Even if 
internationally-recognized human rights are Western in their origin, that is irrelevant to 
their universal substance and applicability. In the post-colonial era, all non-Westem 
societies currently live under the Western model of the nation-state. While the current 
conceptions of human rights initially emerged through a long history of struggle 
against violations by the state in European societies, what is interesting for this thesis 
is to look at the Western experience in a human-universal context, rather than within 
their culture of origin. In addition to the attractiveness of the idea of human rights to 
many people in different cultures, as human rights fundamentally aim at protecting 
human agents from abuse and oppression, the fact that all states have joined the 
modem international system and committed themselves in various ways to the 
observance of human rights substantiates, in one way or another, the universality of 
human rights.
Despite the argument that universal human rights norms do not conform with
23the extreme diversity of cultural and religious values around the world, the 
interaction between external and internal factors in a given society is likely to 
challenge traditional values and enhance the process of constructing new norms. 
However, it is wrong to assume that changing traditional values is a straightforward 
process. Revivalist and fundamentalist individuals and movements that cherish 
traditions typically resist change; when change is instigated by contact with other 
cultures, resistance becomes fiercer. The development of new norms and their 
acceptance by societies often pass through challenging, complex, slow and gradual 
processes. If history offers some examples of failure in which traditionalist, 
fundamentalist forces in society were able to obstmct forming and accepting new 
norms, it is also full of many examples of success in which societies gradually 
accepted new norms, in spite of opposing voices.
When one looks at the legal history and theory of values associated with the 
contemporary understanding of human rights, some roots of human rights could be
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detected across various cultures. Notions, such as human dignity, that underlie 
universal human rights norms are relevant to cultures outside the West,24 despite 
variations in emphasizing either the community or individual. One may view the 
writings of the French and American revolutions in the context of a formally 
articulated philosophical pattern of human rights in the modem state, rather than the 
idea of human rights itself. Human rights thus are not based on one legal theory or a 
particular legal system; they are rather based upon elements and experiences that are 
interculturally valid. Trying to claim that human rights are a product of one’s own 
religion or culture can “undermine the important function of human rights as common 
ground for a pluralism of ideologies.”25 Therefore, claims that exclusively link 
contemporary human rights to an Occidental or Christian heritage have been regarded 
as an obstacle to universalizing human rights. One can draw out that the idea of 
human rights does not simply derive from the entirety of the Western culture, knowing 
that part of that culture opposed some aspects of ‘secular’ human rights. Religious 
liberty, for example, has been an integral part of the notion of human rights, but its 
endorsement by the Catholic Church occurred as late as 1965,27 which suggests the 
secular quality of human rights. Although traditional religions have challenged few 
aspects of universal human rights, particularly regarding women’s rights,28 arguing 
that the notion of human rights is shared by various religions and philosophies likely 
contributes to the construction of a universal culture that accepts and supports the 
internationally-recognized human rights globally.
In looking at the arguments of universalists and relativists, universalists mainly 
focus on international normative universality, as expressed in the UDHR, rather than 
on absolute moral universality which may require common features of all cultures. 
Believing, for instance, in the right to be free from torture and oppression or the right 
to political participation does not imply adopting Western values or necessitate 
abandoning one’s own culture. By contrast, relativists tend to bring ethical and 
cultural components into their argument and try to link universalism with absolutism 
and ethnocentrism. Pluralism, as a major element of the notion of democracy and 
human rights that has always been acknowledged by human rights movements and 
activists, is a source of legitimizing various values of human rights in different 
cultures. Therefore, any alternative rights respectful of human dignity can be 
tolerated, even if they differ from international human rights.30 Such argument rightly 
emphasized that the universality of human rights does not mean the global imposition 
of a particular set of Western values, but instead, aims at the universal recognition of 
pluralism, by which some cultural differences become tolerable for the sake of
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building a universal culture of human rights. As universal human rights norms are 
derived from reason and shared humanity, variations in human rights standards should 
be also based on reason and respect for human dignity, rather than mere cultural 
considerations. It is also essential to know that establishing reconciliation between 
universalism and cultural and moral pluralism is inconceivable without advocating, at 
least initially, a minimalist approach to universalism.31 This approach represents an 
essential step in the construction of a universal culture of human rights.
Regardless of theories, variations of human rights’ interpretation and form 
around the world provide practical evidence in the relativity of implementing human 
rights. Although the UDHR has been viewed as a comprehensive list of desirable 
rights, conflicts exist on the limits of some rights, even within one country as seen, for 
instance, in the American debate on the right to life and the issue of abortion.32 
Moreover, the right to political participation is a suitable example in which different 
forms of such rights have been recognized.33
The current practices of human rights in Western countries show that there is 
mediation between the universal idea of human rights and one’s own culture.34 
Differences exist between American and European societies over the precise content 
and way of implementation of various rights. Despite sharing largely similar cultural 
heritages, differences can be seen, for instance, in limits of freedom of expression not 
only between American and European societies but also within European societies 
themselves. Since states of a common culture (like European, Asian or Muslim 
countries) have variations in human rights practices, culture itself may not be always 
an essential factor in determining the course of human rights. Muslim countries, as 
explained later, vary in their formal positions towards, and interpretations and 
implementations of, the international human rights standards. Although nearly all 
states members of the UN have joined one or more of the international human rights 
conventions, there have been gaps, for various reasons, between the practices of those 
states and the theoretical, universal human rights standards listed in those conventions.
There are various reasons for the rejection of the universal human rights 
standards other than the alleged cultural barriers. Holders of powers typically validate 
abusive, violative policies on a cultural basis to serve their own interests, rather than 
the welfare of their societies. Also, fostering national and cultural pride in some cases 
motivates argument for cultural relativity. For women’s rights, male dominance in 
many cultures is to blame for rejecting the norm of equality between men and women. 
To justify the persistence of traditional practices, authoritarian and patriarchal ruling 
elites present human rights as a Western plan designed to weaken traditional cultures
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and religions.36 While cultural diversity in practice is an axiomatic, the problem arises 
when holders of authority, usually male elites, transform social, cultural and political 
dominant practices into implacable internal realities.37 As adherence to human rights 
necessarily places constraints on the exercise of authority, the reluctance of those in 
power to voluntarily observe universal norms of human rights is hardly surprising. 
Moreover, non-Western cultures accuse the West of double- standards because of the 
inconsistency in dealing with violating states, which damages the legitimacy of the 
universal standards. Also, the incorporation of some new ideas within human rights 
has negatively affected the global acceptance of the universality o f human rights.
For understanding the spread of universal human rights globally, one has to take 
into account the fundamental role of human rights movements. Non-state actors have 
been utilizing various means to diffuse human rights globally. They promote and 
operate within a conviction that the idea of human rights is attractive to millions of 
ordinary people in different cultures.40 Moreover, the rise and diffusion of 
contemporary global phenomena, notably modernization and the revolution in 
information and communication technologies, have paved the road for a growing 
acceptance of human rights and provided human rights advocacy with additional 
avenues of influence. Some aspects of globalization, intentionally or unintentionally, 
have contributed to the exchange of knowledge, information on cases of abuse, and to 
the awareness about human rights. Despite arguments that reject the role of 
contemporary global phenomena, as they essentially serve the interests of the powerful 
while human rights advance the interests of the powerless,41 those phenomena have 
become a driving force for creating common ground among nations.
Critics of globalization express suspicion about the positive influence of 
globalization on human rights, viewing it as an ideological face for interests of 
powerful lobbyists, at both global and domestic levels 42 There is a growing debate on 
finding diverse approaches to counter the threats posed by globalization and reaffirm 
the potentiality of universal human rights.43 Because some aspects of globalization 
have made the protection of economic and social rights more fragile, there is an 
increased discussion over the human rights approach to globalization, in which 
globalization, as an economic process, has to be subject to moral and ethical 
considerations and respectful of international legal standards and principles including 
human rights.44 Regardless of suspicions about the real motives of the powerful 
lobbyists, this thesis argues that some aspects of globalization, particularly its relations 
to modernity and development and its mechanisms for lessening barriers among 
cultures, are likely to positively influence the universalizing of human rights. The
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contemporary globalization of economic, political and social life has resulted in a high 
level of cultural exchange and coexistence. Opening closed, authoritative societies and 
entering new markets are among the key features of the globalization possess.43 As 
discussed in chapter five, in Saudi Arabia different aspects of globalization and 
modernization have been operating as an inevitable form of pressure that works 
alongside the international, institutional influences to diffuse human rights norms and 
affirm their universality.
In summary, it should be noted that the current conception of human rights has 
evolved over time. While the process of developing universal human rights was 
initiated by Western societies, the role of non-Westem states in contributing to the 
formation of internationally-recognized human rights can not be ignored. In spite of a 
wide acceptance across cultures of some principles of human rights as being 
‘universal’, such as the right to life or the right to be protected from torture, the term 
‘universal’ has its own relativity, as defining the precise contents or the form of 
implementation of universal human rights is culturally, intellectually and politically 
controversial. Nonetheless, this thesis maintains that there is a striking cross-cultural 
consensus on many human values, particularly those rights connected with protecting 
the dignity and the well-being of individuals. Accordingly, the focus on protecting and 
empowering human agency, as the essence of universal human rights, would likely 
influence positively the acceptance of universal human rights globally across cultures.
Despite consensus at the conceptual, formal level, at which a majority of states in 
the UN has already agreed to be part of the international legally binding human rights 
arrangements, this universality is still affected by relativism at the level of 
interpretation and implementation, which may explain disagreements and variations 
among states in their human rights practices, even among culturally analogous states, 
as indicated earlier. Universality does not inevitably necessitate a complete uniformity 
or mean endorsing all Western values or adopting a Western way of life. With the 
absence of explicit limitations on what constitutes universally acceptable forms of 
implementing human rights, there is a margin for diversity in the international society 
that reflects pluralism. While the universality of human rights, as generally expressed 
in UDHR, is of central importance to this thesis, perceiving enough relativity in the 
universality of human rights so as to tolerate, to a certain extent, different forms of 
interpretation and implementation while accepting minimal hierarchical classification 
of their importance, constitutes a fundamental step towards universalizing human 
rights in practice, particularly in a country like Saudi Arabia.
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The UDHR provides guiding principles for what accepted universality means. 
When practices towards human rights are not clearly prohibited in the UDHR and do 
not generate condemnation from local or international NGOs, then such practices can 
be tolerated even if their forms differ from, or are not declared within, international 
human rights standards. For instance, the right to political participation within tribal 
societies or the right to rest and leisure (limited working hours and periodic holidays) 
in pastoral societies may take different forms than those applied in urbanized societies.
With the spread of global phenomena related to development and modernity 
and the increase of cultural exchanges around the world, the likelihood increases of 
extending globally a culture of human rights, which implies the dynamic nature of 
culture. As people from different cultures are more likely to collectively agree on 
what is wrong rather than on what is good,46 it is therefore reasonable to regard those 
rights connected with protecting the life, security and integrity of individuals as the 
heart of minimum essential levels of universalism. Given their significance to human 
rights, personal integrity rights are fully recognized in all three documents of the 
International Bill of Human Rights (UDHR, CESCR and CCPR) .47 Simultaneously, 
the focus on rights connected with securing basic needs for human agency is equally 
essential to achieve a minimum universalism.48 Achieving this minimum level of 
rights necessitates critically respecting and promoting these rights to all, without 
distinction. Although human rights represent values that are socially constructed and 
thus reflect the influence of different cultures and traditions in their construction, it 
would be difficult to argue that these minimum rights now pertain to a particular 
culture or tradition rather than reflect a universal belief.
Attaining a minimum level of rights is, in a sense, basic to protecting human 
dignity and securing necessary needs. Illustrating the complexity of the issue, 
however, is that while recognition of the need to respect human dignity and provide for 
basic needs should unite different cultures in some attachment to human rights, some 
roles that Orthodox Judaism or Islam impose on women, for instance, may seem 
oppressive to secular women, but for religious women they may be both fulfilling and 
respectful of their dignity.49 In part this raises the question of agency - how far they 
have a choice, and that may well be more a question of time than of culture but they 
may ultimately choose according to their cultural beliefs. Nevertheless, as the 
interpretations of human rights principles are, in a sense, mediated by culture and 
given that progress towards their acceptance is dependant upon cultural environments, 
this balance between a minimum universality and a minimum cultural relativity is an 
appropriate basis for examining and understanding developments towards human
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rights in Saudi Arabia. As explored in chapter seven, the increasing realization of 
Saudi women’s rights to education and work have been instrumental for the 
advancement of their rights in private and public settings.
2- Universality Versus Cultural Relativity: United Nations Debate:
The theoretical and political debate over universality is very much connected 
with the UN human rights instruments, which are declared to be universal despite 
cross-cultural variations. The UN human rights instruments have established human 
rights standards designed to guarantee an acceptable level of personal dignity based on 
universalism and the notions of equality and non-discrimination. The idea, if not the 
practice, of universal human rights has become part of worldwide consciousness since 
the adoption of the UDHR in 1948. For many states that participated in drafting the 
UDHR, there was no obvious contradiction at that point of time between endorsing an 
international document containing universal norms and neglecting observation of those 
norms domestically.50
During the drafting process of the UDHR and the subsequent human rights 
conventions, non-Western states played an active role in debating and shaping those 
documents.51 Interestingly, Western states cast about a third of the votes for the 
UDHR, while two-thirds were from non-Westem countries. Also, an average of more 
than three quarters of member-states of the UN are parties to the six principal 
international human rights conventions.53 Such facts demonstrate that the UDHR and 
the conventions represent a global view of the meaning of universal human rights, at 
least at the formal level.
Under the UDHR, exercising human rights can be subject to limitations by law 
to meet the “just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society.”54 Despite stating that rights and freedom mentioned in the 
UDHR “may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations,”55 allowing limitations based on moral considerations can be 
understood in a context of tolerating different interpretations of human rights and thus 
to be culturally relative. Furthermore, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
allows states to make reservations, while prohibiting them from making reservations 
that go against the object and purpose of the treaty.56 The purpose of granting states 
rights of limitations and reservations under international law is, inter alia, to facilitate 
member states’ compliance with the principles of international treaties, allowing them
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to make some allowance for cultural differences in their adherence to strict 
international norms.
Nevertheless, the universality and indivisibility of human rights have been 
recognized by the UN on numerous occasions and constitute fundamental parts of the 
UN doctrine on human rights.57 As explained earlier, this doctrine of universality and 
indivisibility was not challenge-free. Within the UN, there were several political and 
theoretical statements that questioned the universality and/or indivisibility of human 
rights. The 1947 AAA’s statement to the UNCHR, as indicated earlier, opposed the 
UDHR, emphasizing that standards of human rights “cannot be circumscribed by the
CO
standards of any single culture.” The tensions between civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural rights during the Cold War and afterward within the 
North-South dimension have produced divergent arguments among state-members of 
the UN over the universality and indivisibility of human rights. The 1980s and 1990s 
witnessed a reawakening of the discussion over cultural relativity. Despite tremendous 
efforts by non-Western countries during the 1993 Vienna Conference to take into 
consideration cultural and religious backgrounds in the application of human rights, it 
is obvious that the UN doctrine is based essentially on universalism, as the 1993 
Vienna Declaration, adopted by consensus, explicitly re-confirmed both the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights.59
Non-Western countries participated actively in the UN debate on the right to 
development, attempting to include this right within the framework of internationally- 
recognized human rights.60 A central issue in debate was the emphasis on linking 
development to either political and civil rights or economic and social rights.61 While 
a hierarchy of human rights exists in practice in which, for instance, protecting the 
integrity of individuals is more widely acknowledged than the right to rest and leisure, 
the controversy comes from the non-Westem states’ attempt to question theoretically 
the principle of indivisibility of human rights. The universalist argument presumes 
human rights theoretically are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, whereas 
some advocates of the right of development argue that the universality of human rights 
requires universal conditions under which human rights can be realized.62 
Accordingly, the right to development may be used to undermine universality and 
justify violations of human rights.
Within UN circles, the expansion of freedom and the respect for human rights 
are the primary end and principal means of development.63 During the 1993 Vienna 
Conference, governments of the South presented the right to development against the 
quest of the North for reaffirming the universality of human rights. A compromise
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was reached in which universality was reaffirmed with weak consideration of cultural 
particularities, and the right to development was also reaffirmed as a universal and 
inalienable human right.64 Nonetheless, the right to development is too vague to be 
considered as one of the recognizable human rights, but development itself, at least 
practically, goes hand in hand with fundamental human rights and vice versa.
The debate on the links between development and human rights has contributed 
to growing interest in the field of development research that takes into consideration 
spreading a universal culture of human rights. In recent years, the UN has adopted a 
broader perspective of development, making economic development one aspect of 
human development. The UN Development Program (UNDP) has emphasized that 
human rights and sustainable human development are inextricably linked. The 
UNDP’s vision of human development includes not only basic needs but also 
additional choices encompassing human capabilities, knowledge, human freedoms and 
rights and women’s empowerment.65 The focus on knowledge and human agency in 
the field o f development research is very much connected with the previous argument 
regarding cultural exchange and the dynamic nature of culture. Such themes arguably 
are central for the construction of a universal culture o f human rights.66
The issue of universality has been a major concern for many non-Westem 
countries around the world, particularly for Muslim countries. Because the discourse 
of human rights is carried out primarily by Western states, other cultures, particularly 
the Islamic culture, have fears of a new form of colonialism and imperialism. Also, 
given that most Muslim countries were still under colonial rule in the late 1940s and 
because only seven Muslim countries68 (out o f 56 states that participated in 
deliberating the UDHR) had the chance to influence the UDHR, one may argue that 
little opportunity for contribution by Muslim countries existed when the bases of 
universal human rights were formulated. Nonetheless, it is significant that many 
Muslim countries, after achieving their independence, endorsed the UDHR and 
subsequent conventions. All governments in the Muslim world have ratified at least 
one international human rights treaty, including the two principal covenants.69 Equally 
significant is that the positions of Muslim countries in relation to international human 
rights standards vary to the point that it is hard to distinguish the approach of those 
countries from that of non-Muslim nations. Muslim countries represent nearly the 
entire spectrum of social, economic, ideological, institutional and political 
expressions.71 Although Islam is the religion of the majority in Muslim countries, it 
would be misleading to treat the Muslim world as a uniform, monolithic region. Such
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variation emphasizes that religious values are not the only obstacles to the adoption 
and implementation of human rights in Muslim countries.
Muslim countries want all cultures to contribute to the formulation of the 
international human rights agenda. For many Muslim countries, if one culture dictates 
its views on other cultures, this leads to injustices and marginalization of other 
cultures. On the other side, Western states overlook human rights violations in 
Muslim countries due to various reasons including the fear of political Islam. As many 
states in the Western and Muslim worlds are extremely wary of granting political 
space to Islamist activists, this situation, among others, continues to provide a pretext 
for non-implementation of universal principles of human rights in many states of the 
Muslim world.73
The 1972 Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
reaffirmed the commitment to the UN Charter and to fundamental human rights in 
general, without defining a specific approach to human rights in Islam. Despite the 
agreement among member-states of the OIC to adopt, in August 1990, the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, this document is general and ambiguous on 
some universal human rights issues. At the international level, governments of 
Muslim countries have an uneven record of voting on human rights issues and on 
ratification of human rights conventions. The ambiguity of the Cairo Declaration and 
the differences in voting and ratification patterns reflect the complexity of reaching 
consensus among Muslim countries on human rights issues, which leads to the 
question of how compatible internationally-recognized human rights are with the 
mainstream interpretation of Islamic texts.
3- Political System and Human Rights: An Islamic Perspective:
As modem human rights are perceived as defining obligations of the state vis- 
a-vis vulnerable individuals and groups, it is essential to explore major aspects of how 
Islamic texts, as widely interpreted, perceive the structure of the state and the 
relationship between the ruler and the mied. Moreover, the Qur’an and the Sunnah are 
declared to be Saudi Arabia’s constitution and the sources of all laws and values 
including human rights standards. Therefore, the examination of the political system 
and human rights from an Islamic perspective, based on mainstream interpretations of 
Islamic texts, should provide a useful contribution to the thesis’s theoretical 
framework. Mainstream interpretations mean, in this thesis, those interpretations by 
classical or contemporary jurists and ulama, who generally observe in their
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interpretations established principles in the four major schools of thought in Sunni 
Islam74 and usually oppose reformist, moderate interpretations based on contextual 
understandings of the texts.
The Islamic ideal political system was developed on the experience o f the 
Prophet Muhammad and his four caliphs who succeeded the Prophet in leading the 
Muslim community. The first four caliphs were elected through shura (consultation) 
without being blood relatives to the Prophet. The Prophet and his companions were . 
“overwhelmingly against privilege by descent, by birth, by status, by wealth, or even 
by race, and insist that rank and honour are determined only by piety and merit in 
Islam.” Based on well-established principles of egalitarianism and consultation, one 
might deduce that an Islamic political system could be a republic and should not be a 
monarchy.76 Opposed to tribal thinking, the Islamic tenet is also strongly against 
hereditary privileges of all kinds, including, in principle, the institution of monarchy.77  ^
Exploring the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (individuals and the 
state) is central to any investigation of human rights. Due to the linkage between the 
decision-making process in any political system and the protection of human rights, 
one should note that the public affairs of the Muslim ummah (nation), according to 
Islamic texts, should be arranged primarily through shura. Choosing the ruler must 
take place through bay’ah (an oath of allegiance) by members of the public in the 
Muslim ummah. As it is practically impossible for all Muslims to themselves perform 
the bay’ah to the ruler, classical jurists approved a form of representation in which 
some influential people (ahlul hali wal aqd) were bestowed a right to carry out the 
bay’ah on behalf of the ummah™ Although the Q ur’an and Sunnah do not contain 
comprehensive descriptions of ways of practicing power, Islamic texts have approved 
a clear principle that individuals of Muslim ummah are the holders of authority of 
public affairs. The ummah is the source of authority, and its individuals have rights to 
choose the ruler and ‘duties’ to hold him to account on his deeds.79 According to a 
widely accepted notion in classical Sunni Islam, validly selecting a leader should take 
place through a bay’ah to a specific caliph nominated by the Muslim ummah. 
However, when the leadership is achieved by force, many jurists accept recognizing 
such a status quo and giving a bay’ah to the victor in the interest of maintaining 
stability,80 although the act of achieving power by force is universally condemned.81 
The controversial approval of the ruler’s authority, even if he obtains control by force 
has practically marginalized the people’s role in public affairs and negatively affected 
their political and civil rights; people are obligated to follow the ruler as long as he can 
justify his rule on Islamic grounds. Nonetheless, the essence o f bay’ah represents
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some sort of social contract and expression of popular will; Sunnis are generally 
known for the consensus doctrine (ijma), as they believe in the infallibility of the 
community.
Islam, as a social and political system, puts paramount emphasis on the rule of 
law, equality and social justice,83 which influences the protection of human rights. The 
Qur'an and Sunnah primarily contain general ethical, social principles, and the 
detailed instructions of the shari’ah took shape during the first three centuries of 
Islamic history. Shari'ah itself is not homogenous; its interpretation and application 
are influenced by various cultural, historical and sectarian differences. Therefore, 
some Muslim thinkers call for critical evaluation of the shari'ah and for opening up the 
door of ijtihad (an independent opinion using both reason and knowledge of Islamic 
sources), which presents a source of new legal interpretations.84
Despite the existence of arguments supportive of absolutism and hierarchy, 
Islam also provides bases for liberty and equality. Conservative ulama believe that 
democracy and constitutionalism contradict Islam, arguing that such notions involve 
secularism and human legislative power whilst Islamic laws are unchangeable.85 
Nevertheless, some reformist ulama are in favour of the adoption of democracy and 
constitutionalism, believing that there is no fatal conflict between political freedom
O/T
and the shari'ah. Based on the Islamic principle of the oneness of God (tawhid), the 
absolute sovereignty of God makes any human hierarchy unworkable, as all humans 
are identical before Allah.87 Moreover, as the term khilafah involves the connotations 
of successor and representation and given the interpretation that every human being is 
identified as a vice regent (caliph) of God on earth,88 advocates of Islamic democracy 
argue that the political system of Islam should be based on participation and 
representation that are rooted in Islamic tradition. This perspective has been also 
affirmed by longstanding Islamic concepts of consultation (shura), consensus (ijma), 
independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad) and differences (ikhtilaf), which have 
been viewed as an effective basis for Islamic democracy and constitutionalism. 
Another notion central to the liberal interpretation is the concept of public interest 
(maslaha) rooted in the Islamic jurisprudence, suggesting a ruling system that best 
serves the public good: “a system which may change over time and place. . . ” .90 
Although such an argument may not fit into a Western-defined democracy, it presents 
the basis for a political system that is comparable to, and compatible with, the global 
trends of contemporary political systems.
Islam, like other religions and cultures,91 contains various and broad 
interpretations about its inherent ‘human rights’ norms. Until recent times, Muslim
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scholars had not dealt with human rights as a specific set of issues, but rather in the 
context of various subjects: marital law, criminal law, economic law, moral standards 
and other subjects.92 In the Arabic language, the idea of right and the concept of 
obligation are a source of possible confusion. Rights (huqooq) and obligations 
(wajibat) in Islamic teaching are reciprocal. The entitlements of an individual are 
balanced by his/her obligations; an obligation upon one party is a right to the other. 
The Qur ’an, for instance, refers to the duty of Muslims to provide basic necessities to 
the poor as a right of the poor.94
It is clear that certain rights in Islam are articulated as obligations and duties of 
individuals and not as rights of individuals in the traditional Western sense. According 
to Islamic jurisprudence, duties or obligations are divided into two broad categories: 
huqooq Allah (rights of Allah) and huqooq al-ibad (rights of people). Huqooq Allah 
are the rights of, or obligations due to, Allah, which include various rituals of worship. 
Huqooq al-ibad are those rights of, or obligations due to, the people and other 
creatures. There are two types of rights provided under huqooq al-ibad. The first are 
legal enforceable rights, whereas the second type consists of those rights that are not 
subject to direct enforcement by the state, which may be termed as moral rights.95
Thus, the crucial feature of human rights in Islam is that they form obligations 
connected with Allah and obtain their validity from this link, as opposed to secular 
liberal notions of human rights. Unlike Islam, the distinction between Caesar’s and 
God’s in Christian thought allowed the existence and the development of natural 
rights.96 Consequently, the main divergence between Western and Islamic traditions is 
the basis of human rights. Furthermore, human rights as universally understood are 
largely compatible with the concepts of individualism and rights, whereas in Islam 
the conception of rights is based on duties/obligations owed to Allah or to the 
community. Another distinction between the two conceptions is that Islam seeks to 
achieve respect for human rights primarily through calling upon individuals to respect 
human rights and meet their obligations, linking the call with rewards or punishments 
from Allah in the hereafter life, although that does not disqualify the possibility of 
creating provisions of certain safeguards based on ethical and legal principles stated in 
the Qur’an and Sunnah.
In addition to conceptual variations, there are specific differences between 
mainstream interpretations of Islamic texts and international human rights, mainly 
equality of men and women, changing one’s religion, non-Muslim citizens, capital and 
corporal punishments and slavery. Because of such divergences, the presence of a 
human rights discourse in Islam has been questioned. However, numerous Western
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scholars generally endorse the view that Islam reflects a strong concern for human 
good and human dignity, whilst rejecting the existence of human rights in Islam 
equivalent to those rights expressed in international human rights instruments." As 
was the case with premodem Christianity, Islamic laws, as traditionally and textually 
interpreted, include elements incompatible with modem notions of human rights. 
Nevertheless, accepting that Islamic texts contain the seeds for creating progressive 
versions of Islamic human rights is a positive step towards gradually bringing human 
rights in Islam closer to the internationally-recognized human rights standards.
Muslim scholars differ over whether the shari'ah is static, or dynamic and 
receptive to notions such as human rights, demonstrating that the shari'ah is differently 
interpreted and implying that it is a malleable concept susceptible to positive changes. 
In contemporary studies on the subject, traditional conservative, neo-conservative and 
reformist approaches have endorsed in principle the notion of universal human rights. 
However, traditional conservatives tend to interpret textually human rights strictly 
within the classic Islamic jurisprudence and make reservations to, or omit, rights 
deemed to be against Islam, 100 whereas some ulama endorsed the notions of 
democracy and human rights, but still offered conservative opinions. 101 Muslim 
reformers, however, advocate the legitimatization of the internationally-recognized 
human rights through reinterpreting the shari'ah sources. They draw on contextual 
interpretations of Islamic texts and emphasize the original meaning of the shari ’ah as a 
‘path’, rather than a detailed legal code, arguing that traditional ulama have overlooked 
using the inherent dynamism and flexibility of the shari'ah, asserting that progress 
appears to be the philosophy of the Qur’an} 02
To gradually overcome variations and reduce the gap between international and 
traditional Islamic human rights, some liberal Muslim reformers affirm the necessity to 
promote reinterpreting Islamic texts and the recovery of ijtihad, employing contextual 
analysis of the texts. Also, the Islamic traditional principle of jalb al-maslaha wa 
daf’a al-mafsadah (bringing interests and preventing potential negative impacts), 
authorizes the ulama to issue fatwas and the ruler to initiate regulations in the public 
interest in accordance with the surrounding circumstances. 104 The Muslims’ belief that 
Islam is a suitable way of life regardless of time and place suggests that Islamic legal 
doctrine was intended to find its evolutionary course by applying the principle of 
ijtihad to serve the public interests. Given that Islamic texts are susceptible to 
interpretations, modem Muslim thinkers believe that the spirit of Islam does not 
contradict modem human rights standards. 105
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There is a growing tendency among liberal and pragmatic Muslim scholars to 
reinterpret the Islamic sources in ways that closely harmonize the shari’ah with 
international human rights principles. It is widely believed that promoting human 
rights by putting forward alternative interpretations of Islamic sources is more likely to 
achieve a positive outcome than rejecting the shari’a h ' 06 bearing in mind that 
substantial proportions of people in the Muslim world sympathize with trends that are 
connected with the framework of Islam. Those people however may not regard the 
shari’ah as static, but the ulama, who can reinterpret the Islamic sources, could 
influence significantly people’s perspectives on such issues. For many Muslims, 
linking contemporary human rights with Islamic sources empowers their meaning and 
impact, “just as rooting the rights of the UDHR in the Bible gives them a special 
meaning and force to Christians.” 107
The idea of absolute equal rights among individuals regardless of gender, 
religion or social status is unknown to the traditional shari'ah. There are three groups 
of people who are deemed to be inferior under certain provisions of the shari'ah: non- 
Muslims, slaves and women. While the legal status of non-Muslims and slaves are 
subject to change, women are the only group that must remain forever in its 
established legal status as women. 109 Nevertheless, the spread of Western influence in 
the Muslim world on the one hand and the malleable quality of Islamic texts and their 
receptive nature to re-interpretation on the other, have begat significant changes and 
developments to the three groups in various ways. 110
In looking at the political system and human right from an Islamic perspective, 
one should note that the situation in classical Islamic civilization (approximately from 
the seventh to fifteen century) was better than elsewhere despite some inequalities 
recognized by Islam. The argument that Islamic texts reflect a strong concern for 
human good and human dignity does not mean the mainstream interpretation of human 
rights in Islam is compatible with international human rights. It should be noted, 
however, that Islam has been wrongly perceived in the West as a static phenomenon, 
which is against modernity, democracy and human rights and is retrogressive. This 
attitude has been boosted by different factors including the prevailing tendency among 
traditional ulama to emphasize closing the door of interpretation (ijtihad) and a 
reluctance to reform the shari'ah.xu Also, human rights violations and injustices 
happening in the Muslim world have uplifted such attitudes. However, the perception 
of what constitutes Islamic norms varies widely, depending on one’s perception of 
Islam, as seen, e.g., in the wide range of ideas among Muslims about democracy and 
elections. Therefore, Islam does not by itself generate despotism, violence and
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violations of human rights in the Muslim world; they are rather the result of endemic 
political, social and traditional cultures. Despite theoretical differences and thorny 
areas of conflict between Western and Islamic concepts, reinterpretation of the Islamic 
texts could lessen the degree of incompatibility. Throughout history, cultures 
generally evolve in the light of new experiences and needs, whilst changes usually 
occur over a long time frame.
4- Political System and Human Rights: A Wahhabi Perspective:
The reform movement (da'wah)113 of Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab (1703- 
1791) was primarily concerned with the purity of the Islamic faith and the eradication 
of popular practices that are inconsistent with the established rituals clearly defined in 
the Islamic texts.114 Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab focused on the Islamic principle 
that there is only one God, and that God does not share his power with anyone. Thus, 
popular practices, such as visiting shrines or recognizing power of an imam, are clearly 
un-Islamic and strongly condemned in Wahhabi beliefs. From these Unitarian and 
purity principles, Wahhabis sometimes refer to themselves as ahl al-tawhid (the people 
of oneness), but prefer to be called simply Muslims. They label their movement as 
da’wahat Ash-Sheikh (the call of sheikh Ibn Abdulwahhab) or al-da'wah al- 
salafiyah AS (the call for imitating the earliest generations of Muslims) while their 
detractors referred to them as ‘Wahhabis’, which has pejorative and negative 
connotations.116 Nevertheless, because the terms ‘Wahhabis’ and ‘Wahhabism’ are 
commonly used in various literatures, in the works of Muslim and non-Muslim alike, 
to identify the followers of Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab and his creed, both words 
have been used throughout this thesis.
The significance of Wahhabism is not the idea of a unitary God because this 
principle goes to the heart of Islam; it is rather enforcing a particular understanding of 
this principle upon Muslim communities. In 1744, Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud and 
Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab swore a traditional oath in which they promised to work 
together to establish a state run according to Islamic principles as interpreted in 
Wahhabism. Waging wars to eradicate ritual malpractices became sanctioned under 
Wahhabism.
Wahhabis are known for their literal interpretation of what constitutes right 
behaviour according to the Qur’an and Sunnah. Critics of Wahhabism describe its 
interpretation as exclusivist, intolerant and bigoted; Wahhabism therefore has become 
a synonym for any intolerant movements, whether within the Islamic faith or in any
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other faiths.117 Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahhab was greatly inspired by the work of a 
Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taimiyah (1263-1328), whose perspectives are generally regarded 
as strict and conservative.118 Wahhabism has made the Hanbali School dominant in 
the Arabian Peninsula, after a successful military movement based on the Saudi- 
Wahhabi religio-political alliance. Following the Hanbali legal School,119 the 
Wahhabi conservative ulama accept the authority of the Q ur’an and Sunnah. 
Nonetheless, despite the important principle in Hanbali thought which indicates that 
things are assumed to be allowable unless first proved otherwise, Wahhabi ulama tend 
to restrict re-interpretation of the Q ur’an and Sunnah in regard to issues clearly settled 
by the early jurists, given Wahhabism’s emphasis on the revival of the Salafiyah creed, 
which calls for imitating the earliest Muslims in every aspect of life.120 This makes 
Wahhabi tenets rigorous and leaves little room for ijtihad. By inclining to minimize 
re-interpretation, Wahhabism is at odds with the Muslim reformation movement of the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which reinterpretation of the Islamic sources 
was sought in order to conform with standards existing in the West, most notably 
standards relating to gender relations and participatory democracy. Whereas a wide 
scope for re-interpretation remains for Wahhabi jurists in areas not decided by the 
early jurists, many Saudi ulama tend to take conservative, culturally influenced 
positions in relation to new issues.
According to Wahhabi perspectives, the ruler’s primary role is to ensure that 
the Islamic community lives in conformity with the shari’ah. Based on an orthodox 
Sunni tradition, Wahhabism emphasized the importance o f respecting and supporting 
the ruler, even if he is unjust and oppressive, as long as he does not reject Islam. In the 
Wahhabi idea of the state, power is legitimate no matter how it may have been seized, 
and obedience to whoever is in power is obligatory.121 State-appointed ulama go 
further in addressing this issue by depicting any criticism of the ruler as a sin that may 
lead to anarchy, turmoil and revolt.122 Like most Islamic movements, the Wahhabi 
instruction to obey the ruler, to respond to his call for war (jihad), and to pay him zakat 
(Islamic tax) provided the conditions for state formation under Saudi leadership. Such 
tradition has provided a theoretical basis for absolutism “whereby the seizure of power 
is purported to be sanctioned by Allah and disobedience is almost equivalent to 
heresy.”123
The objective o f the Wahhabi-Saudi state is to revive the ritual and conceptual 
clarity of Islam, focusing on the elimination of ritual malpractices relating to the 
oneness of Allah. In today’s Saudi Arabia, religion and the state still need each other. 
Religion, as interpreted by Wahhabis, needs the support of state power for its spread
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and maintenance, and the state is in need of religion to socially bolster its power.124 
However, the influence of traditional Wahhabism, as opposed to mainstream Islam, in 
running the Saudi state is evidently in decline. Unlike the previous Wahhabi-Saudi 
jihadi state, military campaigns under the leadership of King Abdulaziz (1902-1953), 
the founder of modem Saudi Arabia, were not aimed at spreading Wahhabism, despite 
using Wahhabi slogans, but rather at re-establishing the Al-Sa’ud rule.
The transition from an expansionist, revolutionary Wahhabi movement that ran 
the state, to an official Wahhabism controlled by the state, has weakened the role of 
the ulama, as indicated briefly in chapter one. King Abdulaziz’s renunciation of the 
title of imam to proclaim himself as King, the first ever in the Saudi dynasty, was a 
sign of moving away from Islamic, Wahhabi leadership patterns. By abandoning the 
Wahhabi religio-political title of imam, the Saudi mle has moved towards a more 
official secularization at least in the title.125 Nevertheless, Saudi mlers esteem their 
Islamic credentials as custodians of the two mosques and they consider the support of 
the ulama critical; consequently the ulama remain an important component of the 
ruling class.
In today’s Saudi Arabia, it is incorrect to put all ulama and activists, in relation 
to their views on the structure of the political system or on human rights, in one basket 
as conservative, traditionalist or fundamentalist Wahhabis. They rather represent 
views within a wide spectrum: from both the Sunni and Shiite traditions, inside and 
outside the government, and traditionalists, fundamentalists, reformists and liberals. 
Nevertheless, the majority of ulama are conservative traditionalists, and their views on 
human rights are based on literal and textual understanding of the shari'ah sources. 
The ulama within the official religious establishment are mostly conservatives not only 
religiously but also socially and politically, and their interpretations of the shari’ah 
sources have been in harmony with government views on all political questions and on 
most social issues. In the name of preserving Islam and maintaining the security of the 
state, the official ulama strongly opposed constitutionalism and some human rights, 
particularly those rights related to women.126 The ulama believe that Muslims do not 
need international human rights since they already have the shari’ah\ they do however 
accept international human rights as long as those rights are not in conflict with the 
shari’ah}21
Human rights trends in Saudi Arabia are not limited to those of the official 
ulama. There are growing opinions expressed by Saudi activists who advocate 
reformist views on politics and human rights. These groups mostly adopt an Islamic 
framework for reform and, directly or indirectly, criticize some official policies and
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social practices including those related to human rights.128 While members of these 
groups seemingly have many things in common, particularly their reference to Islam 
and the need for reform, they stand between sharply opposed positions within the 
Islamic spectrum, from conservatives and reformists to modernists. In recent years, 
there are indications that reformist voices are gaining greater acceptance by many 
segments in society, as argued in chapter four. Finally, there is a growing trend in 
which secular and liberal views on human, particularly women’s, rights are 
expressed. The majority of this group work in the media, universities and high 
public positions and are typically highly educated ‘Westernized’ people. Their 
positions and qualifications give them the potential to influence and reshape the 
current understanding of politics and human rights.
Wahhabism’s interpretations of the Q ur’an and Sunnah have been influenced 
by the surrounding political and social environment. Local traditions regulate the 
behaviour of individuals and of society as a whole. In the heart of the Arabian 
Peninsula where Wahhabism originated, familial obligations and social traditions have 
been influential, affecting perspectives on issues like the political system’s structure 
and human rights norms. Wahhabism has sanctioned several traditional practices 
related to the hegemony of dynasties and patriarchies in society, as will be discussed 
later in chapters four and seven.
5- Universality of Human Rights: A Saudi Perspective:
Saudi Arabia was among participant states that drafted the UDHR, a 
fundamental step in universalizing human rights at the official level. When the UDHR 
was under discussion, Saudi Arabia’s representative to the UN made several 
statements and comments, opposing elements of the UDHR. He objected mainly to 
the ideas of religious liberty and of absolute gender equality, as will be detailed later in 
chapter six. While his views were contradictory to what are known as universal 
human rights, they were seen as consistent with mainstream interpretations of Islamic 
texts. More precisely, Saudi Arabia’s position concerning the UDHR was largely 
derived from conservative and traditional tendencies within Wahhabism, rather than 
from collective, reformist frameworks based on Islamic sources. Saudi Arabia was not 
joined by any Islamic governments when it abstained during the voting on the UDHR 
in 1948, but that does not disqualify some elements of conflict between the UDHR 
and Islam, as noted earlier. Despite its abstention, Saudi Arabia has not made any 
formal declaration o f objection to the UDHR.133 On the contrary, Saudi Arabia
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supported the adoption of the principal international human rights conventions with the 
exception of its abstention on the CEDAW voting, as explained in chapter six.
Saudi Arabia has been participating in and cooperating with the existing 
mechanisms of the UN human rights system. It has endorsed the universality of 
human rights in general terms, whilst calling into question the universality of some of 
the declared human rights standards. On several occasions, Saudi Arabia expressed its 
acceptance of international human rights norms as long as they did not go against its 
interpretations of the shari'ahu4 The central argument made by countries like Saudi 
Arabia is that rights, such as freedom of expression and association or the right to 
political participation, make little sense provided that most citizens are comfortable 
with the existing domestic structures. King Fahad (1982-2005) once declared that the 
democratic system that is predominant in the world is not appropriate for the peoples 
who live in this region and free elections are not in keeping with the structure of 
Islam.135
In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia ratified four major human rights conventions. 
Unlike the UDHR, conventions create legally binding law on the ratifying states. 
However, Saudi Arabia legally limited the effect of these conventions through 
reservations, thereby precluding its compliance with certain provisions, particularly 
those contrary to its interpretations of the sharVah. By becoming part of the 
international legally binding arrangements, Saudi Arabia officially has moved a step 
further in recognizing the universality of human rights.
Because of its central importance to the legitimacy of the Saudi state, Saudi 
officials typically reaffirm adherence to the shari ’ah and maintain that human rights in 
Islam are universal by nature.136 Yet successful human rights protection, Saudi Arabia 
argues, should be based on relativity in application of human rights norms, “taking into 
consideration differences in the natures of societies, their customs, traditions and 
beliefs.” Universality of human rights, for the Saudi government, can be enriched 
through regional declarations and agreements. The 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam is seen as supplementary and supportive of the international endeavour 
in the field of human rights.138
Unlike the Cairo Declaration which was essentially based on Islam, the revised 
Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted by the Arab League states in May 2004, has 
referred to international standards as enshrined in the UN human rights documents.139 
However the Arab Charter is affected by conservative orientations, particularly in its 
provisions concerning women. Similarly to the Cairo declaration, the Arab Charter 
has missed some rights and freedoms which are recognized internationally. Also, there
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are some provisions in the Charter which are not in harmony with international 
standards, although many rights contained in the two documents are mostly consistent 
with universal human rights. 140 Saudi Arabia has signed the Charter, while a few Arab 
countries have ratified it. 141
Saudi Arabia generally endorsed, particularly at the UN forums, the 
international human rights efforts and mechanisms and confirmed its keen interest and 
commitment to the cause of human rights but, despite declaring that it would protect 
the human rights of its citizens in accordance with the shari ’ah, 142 it has avoided 
clarifying precisely what Islamic human rights are. As seen in the variations of 
positions across the range of both ulama and governments in the Muslim world and in 
the wide range of perspectives of Saudi ulama and activists, one can clearly affirm that 
there is no single and definitive interpretation of Islamic human rights principles. With 
such differences, Saudi Arabia’s vague position on the universality of the 
internationally-recognized human rights may reflect its long vision, as the shari’ah 
remains malleable to accommodate further norms.
In Saudi Arabia, there is an overlap between religious values and traditional 
norms, as distinguished in the next chapter. The issue of legal entitlement of human 
rights as universally understood is a recent phenomenon in the Kingdom. Both the 
people and the government view Islam and local traditions as determinants of human 
rights standards. Under such circumstances, Saudi Arabia remains skeptical about the 
universality of human rights, because universal human rights standards contain 
elements that contradict both Islamic and traditional values as perceived in the 
Kingdom.
Conclusion:
There is a general consensus that certain human rights concepts have a 
universal validity. In the contemporary world, many principles of human rights have 
formally, verbally and conceptually gained international recognition and a near- 
universal consensus, in spite of disagreement on some human rights issues, such as 
their ideological basis, the individual versus community, rights versus duties or the 
interpretation of the content of each right. Given the argument that the roots for 
respecting and protecting human dignity have existed in various cultures and with the 
fact that member-states of the UN have officially endorsed international human rights 
standards, cultural relativity appears to be insignificant at the conceptual level, 
particularly in relation to basic human rights. People from different cultures are likely
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to accept the argument that human rights in the first place aims at protecting integrity 
rights and providing basic human needs; these rights thus have a striking cross-cultural 
consensus. While acknowledging that human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interrelated, this chapter argues that emphasizing a minimalist approach to 
universality, which focuses on protecting and empowering human agency, provides 
useful instruments in the construction of a universal culture of human rights.
Cultural relativity is part of the world of reality, which explains the gap 
between theory and practice, even among countries of similar culture. The variations 
in observing universal human rights norms existed not only in Islamic and developing 
countries but also in the West. Differences are noticeable in the application of some 
human rights between American and European societies, as seen, for instance, in the 
limits of the freedom of expression. Culture itself however may not be always an 
essential factor in determining the course of human rights. Other factors in the 
political and social environment can be identified; among them is the desire of holders 
of power in authoritarian and/or patriarchal societies to maintain their dominance, 
utilizing, inter alia, cultural and religious arguments.
The mainstream interpretations of Islamic texts are inconsistent with some 
aspects of universal human rights. Those interpretations however are impacted by the 
surrounding environments; various cultural, traditional and sectarian differences have 
influenced interpretations of Islamic texts, as seen in the considerable variations 
among Muslim countries and ulama in their positions towards human rights issues. 
While Islamic texts, according to mainstream interpretations, recognize some norms 
that are incompatible with the internationally-recognized human rights, this chapter 
argues that the nature of Islamic texts allows a process of reinterpretation by which the 
degree of incompatibility could be lessened, given the linkage between interpretation 
and the surrounding environment. As argued earlier, cultural and religious values are 
not immune from change, notably if change is precipitated by contact with other 
cultures. The spread of global phenomena, including modernization, communication 
and information technologies and transnational human rights movements, have 
resulted in unprecedented wide scale increases in cultural exchange, which indicate the 
dynamic nature of culture.
In Saudi Arabia, practices of human rights are mainly guided by a mixture of 
traditional values and religious interpretations, despite some developments towards 
internationally-recognized human rights standards. The society has been influenced by 
the increasingly-open environment, which explains the various orientations in, and the 
growing debate on, human and women’s rights and suggests that traditional and
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religious values are undergoing a process of change. Such a proposition leads to the 
question of what are the factors affecting human rights in the Kingdom and their 
developments. For the purpose of examining the influence of the UN human rights 
system in the development of human rights in Saudi Arabia, the next two chapters 
explore major internal and external factors that influence human rights in Saudi 
Arabia, whereas Saudi Arabia’s response to influence from the UN human rights 
system is dealt with in a separate chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAUDI
ARABIA
Introduction:
State compliance with international human rights standards, as promoted by the 
UN human rights system, varies from one country to another. Domestic characteristics of 
states constitute conditioning variables that determine the extent of international human 
rights influences on state behaviour. It is, therefore, essential to investigate major 
endogenous and exogenous dimensions affecting developments of human rights in Saudi 
Arabia and its adherence to international human rights norms. At first glance, it might » 
seem that domestic factors matter more than international factors in determining state 
compliance with internationally-recognized human rights norms, but this conventional, 
general assumption will be examined in the case of Saudi Arabia throughout this thesis.
The central question in this chapter focuses on the extent to which developments in 
human rights, particularly women’s rights, in Saudi Arabia can be related to internal 
factors. This thesis accepts the argument that internal and external factors affecting social 
phenomenon such as human rights always overlap to such an extent that it is difficult to 
separate them in practice. In other words, the extent of influence of a particular form of 
external pressure depends on certain internal circumstances. Therefore, evaluating 
accurately the influence of external factors (in the next chapter) is not an easy task without 
understanding domestic realities and circumstances. While attempting to focus on the 
domestic factors alone, this chapter also serves as a preface for the next two chapters 
which will discuss the external factors.
In this chapter, four broad domestic factors are identified. The first is domestic 
structure, referring to the dominant institutions in the state and society, which comprises 
mainly, at the governmental level, the Royal Diwan1 (council), the Council of Ministers, 
Majlis Al-Shura, the Council of Senior Ulama and the legal system. At the social, civil 
level, the discussion includes the institutions of civil society and the means available to 
the Saudi people to influence laws and policies related to human rights. The second factor 
examined is the degree of compatibility or congruence between international human rights
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norms and the widespread domestic beliefs and values of Saudis. In considering this 
factor, various changes and developments that affect Saudi beliefs and traditions are 
presented, including the role of education and the exposure to foreign ideas and cultures 
by foreigners, the media and the Internet.
Thirdly, the chapter looks at the role of major political crises and events. Crises 
are mostly associated with both the rise of opposition voices and the state’s adoption of 
new policies, which eventually affect, positively or negatively, human rights. Crises often 
lead to the creation of political climates in which change and reform are likely to take 
place and be accepted. In Saudi Arabia, a few crises occurring during the last five decades 
motivated the government to adopt new policies and reforms, or at least to promise to 
make reform. Although the crises discussed combine domestic, regional and international 
elements, the focus is on their domestic dimensions and influence on human rights. This 
section examines: the crisis of internal power struggle combined with external threat in the 
1960s; fne siege of the Grand Mosque of Makkah in 1979; the Gulf War Crisis in 1990; 
and the 11 September attacks and the war on terrorism within and outside the Kingdom.
Public opinion in Saudi Arabia constitutes a growing factor within the domestic 
domain of influence. The fourth section therefore examines the relationship and 
interaction between public opinion and the recent changes in policies related to women’s 
rights, given that the rights and the status of Saudi women are of central importance to the 
thesis. How Saudi Arabia has responded to influences arising from its interaction with the 
UN human rights system and from becoming part of the international legal arrangements 
is, to an extent, related to how the Saudi people perceive human rights norms and to their 
views on factors affecting changes in those norms. Accordingly, this section also explores 
through an opinion survey on how the Saudi people perceive human rights and their views 
about factors affecting the growing calls to increase the role of women in public life and 
adopting policies that aim at protecting and promoting women’s rights.
1- Domestic Structure:
The effects of various forms of international influences depend, to an extent, on 
state’s domestic structures. Major political institutions of the state, the nature of civil 
society and the ways in which state and society are linked and how they interact are 
essential components of domestic structure,3 which will be explored here.
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In Saudi Arabia, the current domestic structure of the state is linked to Islamic, 
Wahhabi perspectives, which were discussed earlier, and to the traditions and customs of 
the Saudi people. The central institution of the state is the monarchy, and the monarch is 
both the chief of state and the head of government. The Basic Law of Governance 
adopted in 19924 declared that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by sons and grandsons of 
King Abdulaziz and that the Q ur’an and the Sunnah are the country’s Constitution.5 Prior 
to the development of huge oil revenue, legitimacy of the Saudi state was only derived 
from Islam and the enforcement of the shari ’ah. The current Saudi political system is to a 
large extent the one shaped by King Faisal (1964-1975), where the King enjoys 
unqualified power, but where the support of the ulama is essential in upholding the 
legitimacy of the King’s rule. Although the King’s powers are still theoretically limited 
within the bounds of the shari'ah, the monarch’s position has grown stronger compared to 
the ulama since the foundation of the modem Saudi state, as explained later. The increase 
of power in the hands of a few people in the state and the decrease in the ulama"'s 
authority have affected the process of formulating laws and policies, including those 
concerning human rights.
In the process of decision-making, the two primary executive offices of the 
monarchy currently are the Royal Diwan of the King and the Diwan of the Crown Prince, 
and both have principal advisors in different fields. Laws and decisions by the 
government must be approved by Royal decrees normally after discussion with close 
advisors in the Diwans and/or in the Council of Ministers. In both Diwans, the King and 
the Crown Prince hold regular majlises (public audience) in which citizens are provided 
with an opportunity to make personal appeals for redress of grievances or for assistance in 
private matters. Explaining complaints and presenting written petitions6 are well- 
established customary practices. As prescribed by law, all citizens and non-citizens have 
access to the two main majlises or others that are held by other princes and top officials. 
This form of freedom of expression, common in tribal environments, is widely publicized 
by the government, despite its deficiencies in range (as essentially oriented to private 
matters) and in numbers as only limited numbers of people can be accommodated. In 
addition to emphasizing the image of members of the royal family as problem solvers, this 
form of ‘desert democracy’ provides in most cases a beneficial means for the victims of 
human rights abuses to gain justice.
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In comparing the Saudi political system to other systems, the Council of Ministers 
could be regarded as the formal executive branch of government. It functions as a 
regulatory authority, and resolutions by the Council must be ratified by royal decree in 
order to become laws.8 Since its establishment in 1953, the Council, appointed and 
responsible to the King, has advised on the formulation of general policy and directed the 
activities of the growing bureaucracy. In 1993, King Fahad announced reforms regarding 
the Council, including term limitations of four years and regulations to prohibit conflict of 
interest for ministers and other high-level officials.9 However, the Council still has no 
power separate from the King who must approve all its decisions, in his capacity as prime 
minister. Although the real power remains in the hands of the royal family, the 
government has managed to use capable technocrats at various levels who have an 
influence in the decision-making process. While the Council is the formal body for 
decision-making, purposeful debate of decisions is restrained, given the authority of the 
King and other influential princes. Major decisions of the Council are usually decided by 
the King typically after discussion with some advisors, in private or informal session at 
the Royal Diwan.10
As noted in chapter one, Majlis Al-Shura represents a formalization and 
institutionalization of the Islamic, traditional system of consultation.11 In addition to the 
gradual expansion of its membership from 60 in 1992 to 150 members in 2005, the powers 
vested in Majlis Al-Shura have also gradually expanded and its methods of conduct have 
progressively diversified. In early 2002, women started to participate in the Majlis as 
consultants, and by November 2003 the Majlis's recorded sessions were televised. In 
December 2003, the Majlis was provided with new powers including proposing new laws 
or amendments without seeking permission from the King.13 Some ministers addressed 
Majlis Al-Shura and provided responses to questions posed by its members, in an attempt 
to illustrate the Majlis's investigative role. While Majlis Al-Shura is still seen by critics as 
a toothless institution, others may regard it as a step towards greater participation in 
decision-making. However, the nature of the appointment of the members provides the 
government with considerable influence on the Majlis performance. The continued 
absence of independence and the lack of its genuine supervisory powers have also allowed 
the government to maintain power beyond public accountability, which has negative 
effects on the protection of people’s rights.
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Compared to other influential groups, the official and unofficial ulama generally 
have considerable influence over state policies and constitute integral parts of the 
domestic structures. The ulama used to perform important roles, as an ‘interest group’ 
operating as a part of civil society. However, the growth of modem state structures taking 
place since the early 1960s has weakened their role. The senior ulama do not operate 
independently anymore but in the framework of state-controlled and funded institutions. s 
In most cases, the ulama collaborate with the state and often play the role of defending, or 
silently accepting, government policies. Beside their influence on the executive and 
legislative branches, the ulama have considerable power in the judiciary and the legal 
system in general. Looking at the structure and nature of the judicial system provides 
useful information about the means available for protecting and promoting human rights 
in Saudi Arabia. The Council of Senior Ulama, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, the 
Board of Grievances and the Ministry of Justice collectively form the judicial branch of 
government. However, each institution has its own functions and formation.
As noted earlier, the sources of the legal system are in the country’s Constitution, 
which are the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Despite the fact that these two theoretically form 
the umbrella for the legitimacy of all laws that are passed, traditional customs and values 
influence the way in which Islamic texts are being interpreted, as discussed earlier in 
chapter three. The legal system is founded on the books of Islamic jurisprudence based 
largely on the Hanbali School, although judges have an absolute freedom to conclude 
their judgments based on ijtihad. Shari'ah courts exercise jurisdiction over all criminal or 
civil cases that have not been expressly assigned to other tribunals. As prescribed by law, 
various levels and bodies within the judiciary enjoy in practice a reasonable degree of 
independence, which is important for the protection of human rights.
Equally essential to human rights is the process of initiating laws applied within 
the judicial system. Laws in Saudi Arabia consist of two parts: the shari 'ah rules; and 
regulations (ianzimah).14 The legal system of the Kingdom is generally based on the 
shari'ah, although several modem codes have been introduced to regulate the functions of 
modem society and deemed to be compatible with the shari 'ah. Disputes in areas such as 
commerce, labour, customs, taxes and banking are held before specialized legal 
commissions or tribunals, which are formed outside the Ministry of Justice and are 
administratively independent from it, including the Board of Grievances and the labour 
and commercial tribunals, as indicated in chapter one. In addition, as a way for seeking
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justice, access to high officials and the right to present directly petitions are well- 
established Saudi traditions.
Despite the existence of several judicial institutions and the clearly prescribed 
independence of the judiciary, the legal system in the Kingdom is frequently targeted by 
human rights activists for the lack of protection for individuals against unfair trials. With 
the exception of cases concerning influential individuals or political activities, judges have 
a reasonable level of independence in cases where ordinary persons are charged with 
typical criminal acts. As noted in chapter one, the three laws of 2002 revising judicial and 
securities practices were meant to develop greater transparency in the administration of 
justice and the maintenance of due-process rights.
Domestic structures in the Kingdom are not clear regarding the notions of 
separation of powers or the provision of checks and balances among branches of the 
government. Saudi structures are largely shaped by social norms in which the society 
values highly privacy, patron-client relations and the tradition of informal, personal links. 
Accordingly, the monarchy, as a fundamental feature in the political structure, is 
characterized by personal favouritism and patronage relations. Informal and non- 
institutional processes of discussion and consensus-building remain important elements of 
the political structure, although attempts have already been made to institutionalize this 
process through the establishment of institutions and the passage of laws. While such 
political developments can be seen as gradual trends towards a more open political 
system, the Kingdom has not yet allowed all social interest groups to operate freely.
The numbers of organized and semi-independent ‘interest groups’ have been on 
the rise. As they are regarded as forerunners of a civil society in the Kingdom,15 those 
interest or pressure groups work to advance their interests and to protect their rights 
through attempts to influence governmental policies. With the exception of traditional 
means, civil society does not have the opportunity to influence institutionally the 
government’s decisions. However, the government traditionally takes public opinion into 
consideration on important issues through wide networks of informal information 
gathering on “any societal item that may have political connotation.”16
Merchant communities, as an interest group, have formed well-structured 
chambers of commerce and are able to have an impact on commercial policies. Moving 
beyond traditional links based on tribal or regional identities, chambers of commerce have 
allowed common interests to develop among their members. The Council of Saudi
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Chambers of Commerce and Industry is an important umbrella organization that helps to 
mediate between Saudi society, particularly businessmen, and the state.
Following the 2000 announcement to allow the establishment of national human 
rights NGO, the NHRA was formed in March 2004, consisting of 31 male and 10 female 
members. The NHRA supposedly upholds the basic rights guaranteed to the citizens by 
the shari ’ah and other regulations. It includes a special panel to monitor violations of 
women’s rights and redress injustices inflicted on women. As reported, the NHRA issues 
periodical reports on the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia and works towards
• 17implementing international human rights conventions ratified by Saudi Arabia. 
Dismissing doubts on the NHRA’s independence, the Council of Ministers issued a 
statement ensuring the independence of the NHRA with authority to deal with all matters 
related to human rights.18 Despite the close association of its members with the 
government,19 NHRA was given a margin of freedom to observe the conduct of some 
governmental agencies and to comment on some problems related to human rights.
Welfare organizations and charitable institutions form interest groups that are 
Islamically motivated. These groups mainly seek, through continued contacts with the 
state, to provide services for segments of the public and to strengthen conservative beliefs 
and traditional values. Furthermore, the number of scientific and professional societies 
has increased recently; they operate semi-independently to serve the scientific and 
professional interests of those groups. More importantly, other civil organizations were 
allowed in recent years to operate in fields connected with public policies and human 
rights, including the Saudi Journalists Association (SJA), the NHRA and labour 
committees in large companies. Declared to be independent, it remains to be seen to what 
extent such organizations will influence the process of decision-making, although they are 
highly likely to function as advisory bodies in their fields, rather than pressure groups in a 
democratic sense. While such bodies could be regarded as seeds that have the potential of 
a functioning civil society, it is premature to conclude that civil society organizations have 
already operated freely or achieved great influences on policy-making. The nature of the 
Saudi political system dictates bringing the organizations of civil society under control, as 
they have the potential, when they operate freely, to challenge the government.
In summary, in the light of existing structures of various branches, rights of 
citizens are shaped by tribal and traditional political cultures promoted by different circles 
in the state and society. The current domestic structures, even with the afore-mentioned
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reformist steps, reflect moves towards formal institutionalization and development of an 
old process of consultation and tribal leadership, rather than the introduction of a genuine 
process of democratization, although these steps could be seen as seeds for prospective 
political pluralism in the long run. The links between the state institutions and the society 
indicate limitations of influence of the latter on the former. Accordingly, there is little 
reason to believe that developments of human rights, particularly women’s rights, in the 
Kingdom are correlated merely to developments in the domestic structure of the Saudi 
political system. This conclusion evidently tends to support the view that domestic factors 
alone, let alone one factor, do not convincingly explain developments towards human 
rights in Saudi Arabia.
Resistance to major reforms in the state institutions is based to some extent on the 
fragility of the political structure. Cautious reforms are caused by fear that reform may 
lead to dissolution, similar to what happened in the Soviet Union. For the government, 
any loosening of authority would accelerate the Kingdom’s fissionable tendencies/ 1 Due 
to the high security concerns, all state institutions are designed to ensure stability and to 
give priority to security over all other issues including the maintenance of human rights. 
While the issue of women’s rights may appear as a social and cultural matter that is 
unrelated to the stability or security of the state, its relations to the dominant traditionalist 
views among conservative Saudis gives the issue of women a political dimension. As 
promoting women’s rights and a culture of tolerance in the Kingdom became a political 
goal to dismantle fundamentalist trends, security concerns of the state have intersected 
with the promotion of particular human rights.
2- Cultural Congruence:
As indicated in the theoretical framework, promoting human rights norms is likely 
to have more impact at the domestic level if the domestic social understandings fit those 
norms. In other words, the level of international impact depends on the level of domestic 
‘normative fit’ .22 While international human rights norms are not closely compatible with 
the Islamic beliefs and traditional Arabic values prevailing in Saudi society, there have 
been growing signs that suggest that Saudi society is undergoing a process of socio­
cultural transformation.
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In addition to the paramount role of Islam, Arabic traditions and tribal customs 
play an essential part of Saudi political and social life, in which blood relationships are so 
important. Prior to the time when Saudi Arabia was the recipient of huge oil revenues, life 
in the Kingdom was hard and society revolved around the tribe or the community, work 
and the mosque. Few Saudis then had knowledge of the outside world. However, 
although the Saudi culture is still overwhelmingly Islamic and traditional, the process of 
urbanization and modernization and the introduction of education have affected Saudi 
society. Modernity, which has emerged over centuries in Europe, has existed in the 
Kingdom for only few decades. Saudi Arabia has witnessed an internationally 
unprecedented pace of change in the physical and intellectual environments, leading to 
economic, social and political upheavals that necessitate reforms. Presently, the Kingdom 
is highly urbanized with 79.7 percent of its people living in urban areas.23 Physical and 
non-physical changes surrounding Saudi society naturally lead to changes, albeit limited 
so far, in their values and traditions. Change is also likely to beget more change, but the 
question remains whether this change has moved Saudi culture closer to compatibility 
with the international human rights values.
Education has been a major vehicle for the transmission of new values into Saudi 
society. The availability of a variety of educational choices and curriculum changes 
aiming to achieve compatibility with local and international demands have substantially 
increased the potential for more influences on socio-cultural values. One of the major 
objectives of education in the Kingdom is to deal with technological changes and rapid 
developments in social and economic fields. In the last four decades, the literacy rate for 
Saudi males and females has risen dramatically. In 1970, the literacy rate was 15 percent 
for men and 2 percent for women.24 In recent statistics, the illiteracy rate in the year 2003 
is 16.9 percent (7.77% for male and 25.68 for female).25 This sharp drop in the illiteracy 
rate would normally lead to the unsettling of taken-for-granted ideas that existed in an 
illiterate society.
Although the educational system has generally reflected conservative trends and is 
never fully separated from its Islamic roots, hundreds of thousands of Saudi students have 
studied abroad, mostly in Western universities, bringing with them new ideas and different 
values. It is widely acknowledged that the education which will lead to employment 
prospects involves knowledge of English. The ability to speak fluent English has become 
a sign of privilege, not only economically but also socially. It is commonly argued that
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learning languages is not a matter of mastering vocabularies and grammatical structures 
only, but also involves getting to know the culture of the language. In addition, many 
non-Saudi nationals participated, as teachers coming mainly from Arab countries, in 
educating Saudi citizens. Since the establishment of modem educational institutions, after 
the Ministry of Education was set up in 1954, foreigners mainly from Egypt and Jordan 
have taught different subjects in public schools and universities, including religious topics. 
Therefore, education has played a role in importing new ideas into society through 
studying abroad, learning foreign languages, or being taught by non-Saudi teachers.
The Saudi society is heavily exposed to foreign cultures by numerous means, but 
especially by face-to-face contacts. Because travelling abroad is an option available to the 
majority of Saudis, it is perhaps hard to find a Saudi under the age of 45 who never travels 
abroad, whether for study, business, tourism or even seeking medical treatment. For 
example, more than a million Saudis have lived or studied in the US alone. While closer 
contacts with other cultures may reinforce the national identity and strengthen one’s 
feelings of his/her own culture, the influences absorbed while travelling abroad can not 
be underestimated in their affect on people’s views in many material and non-material 
aspects. Travelling abroad usually, but not necessarily, promotes pragmatic perspectives 
and increases tolerance of other cultures.
Saudis also are accustomed to seeing and interacting with people from all over the 
world in their own country; more than a quarter of the population of Saudi Arabia are 
foreigners. According to the 2004 statistics, there are more than six million foreign 
residents, constituting more than 27 percent of the population.29 The greatest number of 
foreigners comes from Asian countries as well as Arabic-speaking countries, in addition to 
hundreds of thousands of Westerners. Furthermore, there are about three million 
foreigners who work in domestic jobs such as maids, drivers and servants. In Saudi 
homes, servants and maids are given, in most cases, exclusive responsibility for raising 
children. The new Saudi generation therefore is subjected to the influence of foreign 
maids who have some of the responsibility of raising this generation and potentially of 
injecting it with new ideas.
Among the most important aspects effecting change in cultural values in today’s 
world of globalization and modernization is the revolution in information technologies, 
particularly the Internet and satellite television channels. Both technologies have provided 
peoples in closed, conservative, societies with great opportunities to expand their
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knowledge about themselves and about others. Equally, they both pose threats and 
challenges to authoritarian governments and to conservative, traditional customs. In Saudi 
Arabia, access to satellite television is available to most people, providing viewers with 
hundreds of free-to-air television channels. In spite of many religious fatwas prohibiting 
the use of satellite dishes and the 1994 royal edict banning their sale, according to some
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estimates about 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s households have satellite receivers.
The growth in installation of satellite dishes in the Kingdom occurred in the early 
1990s, whereas Internet access to the Saudi public began in early 1999. For the Internet, 
the Saudi government realized its importance for the process of modernization and its 
benefits for the economy. Nevertheless, in granting the Saudi public unrestricted access to 
the Internet, the implications of its influence on social values and political trends created 
concerns for the government. Therefore, the government adopted various measures for 
controlling access to the Internet, including the creation of a centralized Internet unit by 
which all traffic was routed through one main proxy which facilitated the blocking and 
filtering of undesirable sites. However, given the decentralized nature of the Internet, 
Saudis go around the official proxy and the blocking and monitoring mechanisms by 
following a few simple technical steps.
According to some sources, the estimated number of Internet users in Saudi Arabia 
has jumped from 200,000 in 2000 to more than 2.5 million users in mid 2005. 69 percent 
of users are between 16-35 years old and more than 60 percent of the total users are 
female. This increasing demand, especially among Saudi youths, to obtain access to the 
Internet would lead to widening the impact of the Internet on domestic values and to 
creating a new culture that has the potential to change the current understanding, among 
other things, of human rights standards. More than 50 percent of the Saudi population is 
below the age of 20, and only 17.2 percent are above the age of 40.34 The new generation 
is increasingly influenced by various internal and external factors, including new 
information technologies, satellite television and the Internet. Internet experiences among 
young Saudis have the potential to broaden their knowledge and stimulate their critical 
thinking, which is regarded as an essential pre-requisite for the process of changing 
norms. The Internet has been playing a role in changing perceptions about values and 
beliefs, particularly norms relating to the rights and the status of Saudi women, as more 
than 60 percent of Internet users are females.35
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In looking at viewers’ participation in programs aired by Arabic satellite channels 
and at writers and browsers visiting Internet forums (montadayat) and chat rooms, it is 
noticeable that most of the participants come from Saudi Arabia. With such beyond- 
censorship technologies, Saudis have become accustomed to view, and freely interact 
with, debate about various political, economic and socio-religious questions. However, 
the main use of both vehicles of globalization (the Internet and satellite television) by 
Saudis is not the engagement of discussion about political or social issues, but 
entertainment and dating.
Technologies available to Saudis therefore contribute to the breaking down of 
barriers in Saudi society and to accelerating the process of cultural transformation from a 
purely traditional, tribal life into a modernized, sophisticated society. The result is that 
traditional economic, political and religious behavioural standards have come under 
increasing pressure within the Kingdom, causing new social trends which accept or 
positively welcome change, development or reform of some pre-existing social and 
political standards.
Saudi Arabia has maintained that its policies are intended to modernize and 
develop the county while preserving its traditions and values. It is politically expedient to 
stress that the modernization process could occur without changing the traditional value 
system of the society. However, some Saudi human rights activists have criticized trends 
that emphasize particularities of the Saudi people, arguing that such emphasis has 
deepened people’s ignorance of their human rights.38 Such activists also argued that 
violations of human rights, such as torture, arbitrary arrest or confiscation of passports, 
deserve condemnation by the standards of every culture and religion. This emerging 
trend among segments of Saudi intellectuals could contribute to decreasing differences 
between international and local perspectives in relation to human rights.
Being exposed to various types of cultural effects, Saudi youth has different ideas, 
values and attitudes than their parents. The gap between the generations is easily 
noticeable and probably widening, despite the existence of fundamentalist trends among 
some in society. However, even among the most ardent reformists, there is virtually no 
declared desire to abandon Islamic beliefs and values, but there is a growing debate on 
what Islamic values are. Saudis are now questioning whether some practices pertaining to 
women are based on Islamic teachings or traditional and tribal values, as explained in 
chapter seven. As a result of educational and economic changes as well as exposure to
109
wider cultural perspectives, frustration at constraints placed on females by the 
patriarchally dominated society is increasing.40
Political developments may take the direction of revolution, as previously seen in 
several political systems around the world. Accordingly, political structure can be subject 
to change in short periods of time, whereas evolutionary changes in traditions and customs 
usually occur over longer periods of time. Domestic, cultural factors thus play a role both 
in preserving traditions and values and accelerating the pace of their change. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, influences of, and changes caused by, urbanization, development, 
education, exposure to foreign cultures and new communication technologies have already 
had consequences, especially on traditional notions that are not explicitly prescribed in the 
Islamic sources. For example, some social structures and relations have changed in the 
last few decades. Traditional family structures have transformed from an extended family 
living in one house to a nuclear family unit, and the autonomy of the individual has 
increased. Some acts, previously considered socially shameful, have been redefined in 
urbanized segments of society, such as the limits of women’s veiling, their interaction 
with men and their role in public life.41 Eventually, there is a high likelihood of these 
factors having an even more profound impact on Saudi traditions and customs. However, 
it is risky to conclude that traditional notions, beliefs and values have already changed to 
the extent in which near, let alone complete, congruency between international norms and 
domestic values already exists. Nevertheless, exposure to foreign cultural influences is 
evidently on the rise despite some resistance, giving potential to encourage genuine 
reforms in the long term.
3- The Effects of Crises:
Crises often beget a state’s adoption of new policies. In a time of crisis, states 
undertake measures which may affect human rights, positively or negatively. More 
importantly, crises are associated with fuelling opposition groups and individuals with 
courage to pressure governments for change and reform. While security concerns in the 
time of crises could lead to a deterioration in fundamental freedoms and expand and 
justify oppression, crises can be used as vehicles to forge a broader consensus to press 
governments for reform. In this section, identifying major political crises and events that 
have occurred in the Kingdom, along with the historical circumstances associated with
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them, would contribute to an understanding of developments and changes in human rights 
in Saudi Arabia.
Because of the importance of Saudi Arabia to the stability of the Gulf region and 
to the world economy, any crisis in the Kingdom is likely to have regional and 
international impact. The crises/events discussed below thus are not entirely domestic. 
However, the focus is on the domestic dimensions of the crises, attempting to evaluate the 
significance of these events on measures, reforms or demands for changes that were 
associated with such crises.
In the last fifty years, Saudi Arabia has gone through four major crises in which 
the government had to take action that, directly or indirectly, affected the situation of 
human rights. As a consequence of these crises, there have been various vague promises 
of reform, but the government has fulfilled only those promises that gained popular 
momentum. Government policies initiated in response to political crises/events are not 
necessarily welcome by the public or democratically desirable, as they usually centre on 
the state’s survival in the first place. The clash between the secularizing influences of 
modernization and the rejection of secular trends by Islamists in Saudi society has led to a 
great deal of political tension over the years. All crises in contemporary Saudi Arabia are 
very much connected with such clashes. Consequently, the formulation of programs of 
cautious, limited reform by the government has largely been in response to events.
A- The Crisis of Internal Power Struggle Combined with External Threat in 
the 1960s:
During late 1950s and the 1960s, a political crisis took place between King Sa’ud 
and his half-brother Crown Prince Faisal on the one hand, and between King Faisal and 
President Nasser of Egypt on the other. Secular Arab nationalism and anti-imperialist 
slogans, led by Nasser, swept the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s and resulted in 
several coups; in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and later in Yemen. Nasser’s criticism focused on the 
nature of the closed, traditional political system of Saudi Arabia and on some practices 
related to human rights, like the legitimization of slavery. The popularity of Nasser and 
his ideas reached segments of Saudi society, including some members of the royal 
family.42
The period between 1958 and 1962 witnessed a critical political crisis within the 
royal family,43 dividing its members over the fitness of King Sa’ud as a ruler and 
concerning a reform movement promoted by Prince Talal and other like-minded princes
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and citizens.44 While progressive views among some princes called for popular support in 
the form of representative government as a better safeguard for the political system, 
conservative princes believed that the best solution was to create a centralized economic 
and political system.45 That period was rich in discussion on, and calls for, important 
political reforms. These included progressive views on various issues such as slavery, 
freedom of speech and assembly, and the formation of a constitutional, democratic 
government.46 Those issues were new in Saudi society and mostly connected with the 
civil and political rights of the Saudi people.
In June 1960, a group of princes, known as the ‘free princes’, along with some 
educated citizens, submitted a proposal to King Sa’ud for constitutional reform, proposing 
an elected body with legislative powers, a limited monarchy and a draft of a constitution 
which would bring Saudi Arabia closer to a constitutional monarchy.47 The agenda of 
those reformist voices included some measures for the protection of human rights, 
including freedom of thought, speech and assembly and rights to set up political 
organizations and trade unions and to strike and hold demonstrations.48 Seeking to 
strengthen his rule, King Sa’ud allied himself with the ‘free princes’ and responded 
partially to their pressure by forming a government in late 1960 which included liberal 
princes and Arab nationalists.49 In December 1960, the Council of Ministers reportedly 
approved the creation of a partially-elected national council and the drafting of a 
constitution, but this report was denied three days later.50
King Sa’ud was criticized for the inclusion of Arab nationalists in his cabinet and 
for his economic mismanagement. Moreover, the Americans had suspicions about King 
Sa’ud’s decision to give increased influence to Arab nationalists because of their anti- 
Western attitudes. Under such circumstances, the royal family led by Crown Prince Faisal 
decided to depose King Sa’ud with the support of the ulama and the approbation of the 
West.51 In an atmosphere of inter-family power struggle and external threat posed by 
Nasser’s anti-monarchy campaigns, King Faisal introduced a political reform package 
known as the Ten-Point Program, arguably responding to calls for reform by President 
Kennedy, especially with regard to outlawing slavery. Besides promising the 
promulgation of a constitution, Faisal’s Ten-Point Program called for the establishment of 
Majlis Al-Shura, an extension of municipal elections to other parts of the country, an 
independent council for the judiciary, ‘limited’ freedom of expression, abolition of slavery 
and the establishment of health, education and social welfare systems.53
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A form of electoral process had existed earlier, as a part of public life in the Hejaz 
region, to elect members of Majlis Al-Shura, municipal councils and some commercially- 
based societies.54 Between 1926 and 1963, municipal elections took place on a regular 
basis in some cities, mainly in Makkah and Jeddah. In response to the crisis, King Faisal 
extended municipal elections to other provinces including the capital Al-Riyadh. 
However, the results of the 1963 municipal elections were disregarded, following the 
government’s announcement that new elections would be held based on the revised 
rules.55 It took fourteen years to introduce the new laws, by which the Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs was created in 1977. It is worth noting that the new laws 
strengthen the authority of the government by allowing only half of the members of 
municipal councils to be elected, whereas the second half are to be appointed by the 
Minister of Municipal Affairs.56 Articles related to elections in the 1977 Municipalities 
and Villages Law remained deactivated until 2003, when the government announced its 
intention to hold municipal elections within one year.57
Given the evaporation of Nasser’s influence and threat, which increased the sense 
of stability among Saudi elites, and with petrodollars pouring into the Kingdom’s treasury 
since the 1970s, thoughts of political reforms including the re-instalment of Majlis Al- 
Shura or municipal elections were pushed aside. The re-establishment of Majlis Al-Shura, 
the promulgation of the constitution in 1992, and to re-activation of municipal councils in 
2003 were introduced to fulfil previous promises.
Instead of focusing on civil and political rights, King Faisal concentrated on the 
economic and social aspects of his Ten-Point program. His introduction of women’s 
education and television in the 1960s were the most controversial aspects of his social 
modernization, in which force was used against conservative protesters to implement such 
innovative projects. Given that Saudi Arabia’s disadvantage in the use of mass media was 
exploited by President Nasser and his Arab-nationalism propaganda, King Faisal 
developed radio facilities and initiated television broadcasting to strengthen domestic 
unity and promote Islamic trends in the face of secular and communist perspectives that
CO
posed a threat to the Saudi state. Although the Saudi media was meant, among other 
things, to reinforce prevailing social norms and cultural traditions, it had the effect of 
raising awareness among Saudis of the outside world, materially and culturally, and of 
contributing to public pressure for change.59 Similarly, the most important social reform 
implemented by King Faisal was his introduction of women’s education in the early
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1960s. Since then, the role of Saudi women has been gradually changing, leading to an 
improvement in their rights, as discussed later.
In recognition of their essential role for the state legitimacy, King Faisal allowed 
the ulama to impose some of their strict Islamic interpretations on the public, which 
resulted in placing greater restriction on their rights. Under security concerns caused by 
this crisis, King Faisal’s reign allegedly witnessed violations of the human rights of 
dissidents and domestic opponents.60 Furthermore, freedoms of opinion and expression 
were severely restricted in the name of Islam and the maintaining of national unity. King 
Faisal’s vision was to focus on economic and social rights, and he considered political and 
civil rights to be a threat to the security of the state led by the royal family. Nonetheless, 
modernization and education during his rule were accepted as essential for raising living 
standards of the Saudis and for generating an influence on their traditional values.
B- The Siege of the Grand Mosque in 1979:
Accommodation between tradition (the old) and modernity (the new) was the
comer stone of King Faisal’s reform program, by which he thought it possible to combine 
peacefully the two likely-conflicting concepts. King Faisal’s social progressive program 
did not go unchallenged, and eventually led to a crisis. The backbone of Al-Sa’ud rule 
rests heavily on the religion of Islam as interpreted by the ulama. The King was shrewd 
enough to utilize the prominent ulama and made them a controlled-part of the state, 
establishing religious institutions run by appointed ulama. The actual threat occurred 
from a group influenced in their interpretation of Islam by the Ikhwan movement that 
challenged the rule of King Abdulaziz in 1926.
In November 1979, a Saudi Muslim fundamentalist group61 led by Juhaiman Al- 
Otaibi occupied the Great Mosque in Makkah, accusing the Saudi government of material 
and moral corruption and calling for its overthrow. Like the Ikhwan movement, the Al- 
Otaibi group rejected both close relations with the West and the authority of the state- 
controlled ulama with its monopoly in interpreting Islam.62 Action by the Al-Otaibi group 
was a reaction to foreign influences and Western lifestyle which had begun to emerge in 
the Kingdom from the early 1960s, including changes related to women such as their 
education, employment and their appearance unveiled on television.
Influenced by the 1979 Iranian revolution and responding to Khomaini’s call on 
Shiite minorities in the Gulf region to claim their rights, Saudi Shiites in the east province
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attempted to celebrate publicly their traditional commemoration of the death of Hussein, 
grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, a Shiite practice that was banned by the government. 
While police forces were confronting the uprising in Makkah, units from the National 
Guard engaged with Shiite celebrators to stop them from publicly celebrating the 
commemoration, which resulted in riots in several Shiite towns in which at least twenty 
were reportedly killed.63 The human rights of Shiite minorities were subjected to further 
violations and limitations as a result of this event. At the same time, activities of the 
Shiite minorities increased, demanding respect for their rights.
The government drew several lessons from the Al-Otaibi insurgence on how to 
balance modernization and tradition. Following the Grand Mosque siege, the religious 
establishment was flattered and indulged and the powers of the Organization for the 
Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (OPVPV) were increased. Moreover, police 
surveillance on both Shiite and Sunni fundamentalists has grown since the events of 1979, 
which negatively affected the human rights of those individuals. The government 
response to this event was to pacify public attitudes towards Juhaiman’s insurrection by 
putting renewed energy into the restrictions on foreign influences and on women, 
empowering conservative trends in women’s education and employment, and limiting 
their appearance on television, as indicated later in chapter seven. Furthermore, in 1980, 
King Khalid emphasized his attachment to the principle of shura and ordered a review of 
the shura regulations in preparation to re-establish Majlis Al-Shura,64
As a result of this crisis and to strengthen stability of the state, the government 
indirectly promoted religious practices and attempted to avoid provocation of 
fundamentalist opposition by allowing them to impose the Islamic ‘Wahhabi’ moral code 
on the public. The status of personal freedoms and women’s rights thus deteriorated. 
While this crisis increased the margin of freedoms to, and the activities of, religiously- 
oriented circles, it contributed to furthering limitations on progressive, liberal groups in 
Saudi society.
C-The Crisis of the 1990-1991 Gulf War:
This crisis paved the way for several changes in political and social spheres. It led
some Saudis to question the military, economic and political structures in their country 
and the measures available to protect their rights. The presence of hundreds of thousands 
of foreign forces, including tens of thousands of Western women, posed a major problem
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to the Saudi authorities, which were apprehensive about making the forces acceptable in 
the conservative Saudi environment.65 In the post Gulf War era, some religious scholars, 
academics and Western-educated figures alike have articulated the need for reform and 
sent open letters to the King demanding, among other things, a consultative council, as 
well as openness and transparency in the political process. The government received, in 
1991 and 1992, petitions from Neo-Islamists (Al-Sahwah Al-Islamiyah) and others.66 
However, opposition came mainly from Islamist circles which gained some public support 
for their cause. They were initially critical of the government’s decision to invite Western 
troops to defend the Kingdom and implicitly questioned its ambiguous relationship with 
the West. Later, they demanded that the ulama should play a greater role in all 
governmental agencies, raising several reform points in their March 1991 petition and 
the July 1992 prolonged petition,68 in which the Islamists articulated their socio-political 
critique of the government. The theme of both petitions was to Islamize all government 
policies and to improve social justice, demanding the respect of human rights as defined 
by the shari'ah and the independence of the judiciary.69 Unsurprisingly, the Council of 
Senior Ulama issued a fatwa denouncing the circulation of the petitions as an un-Islamic 
method of offering advice to the ruler and accusing those who prepared them with ill 
intentions.70
The milestone in the activities of the Islamically-oriented rights’ advocates was the 
establishment of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) in May 
1993. According to the brief declaration of the founders, the general purpose of the 
committee is to help to lift injustices, support the oppressed and defend the rights laid 
down in the Islmaic shari ’ah for mankind, inviting the public to provide information on 
cases related to injustice. The statement mainly consisted of some ahadeeith (sayings by 
the Prophet Mohammed) that call for lifting injustices, without details on what shari’ah 
rights are. The Council of Senior Ulama denounced the establishment of the CDLR and 
the use of foreign media, explaining that shari ’ah courts are available to all to solve all 
kinds of injustice.73 Following the fatwa , the government dismissed the founders from 
their jobs, closed their private businesses and confiscated their passports. Police raided 
the founders’ homes and offices, and some of them were arrested for several weeks for 
questioning.74
Unlike the 1979 fundamentalist movement, Islamist leaders of the early 1990s 
movement used Islamic language to articulate public grievances that related to the current
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circumstance felt by the Saudi people, including a mild economic recession and flaws in 
social justice.75 Reflecting some visible social, economic and political problems, those 
leaders grounded their criticism and resentment on basis of the violation of the legitimate 
rights of the people, inefficient economic management, and lack of attention to strategic 
planning.
Since the Gulf War, issues of rights and reforms have been increasingly attracting 
the attention of various segments of Saudi society. Faced with public manifestations of 
discontent, the government introduced during the first half of the 1990s a reform package 
that went hand in hand with the augmentation of state control over activities of suspected
76dissidents. At the tactical level, the government, with the support of the official ulama, 
responded to the opposition through intimidations and arrest campaigns accompanied by 
restriction of movement and the banning of preaching, meetings and all independent 
activities. At the political organizational level, the government passed laws to clarify its 
political structures and established several governmental bodies to institutionalize the 
process of consultation and to regulate Islamic activities,77 thereby ensuring government 
control and supervision of activities that promote Islamic trends.
The 1992 reform package included the creation of Majlis Al-Shura and the 
promulgation of the Basic Law of Governance and the Law of Provinces. As noted in 
chapter one, the Basic Law of Governance contains provisions on human rights. The main 
objectives of the two strategies - introducing reform combined with suppressing 
influential dissidents -  were to deflate internal and external pressures and to ensure the 
retention of the existing distribution of political power. This reform package cannot be 
considered as a revolution in the political process; rather it reaffirmed and formalized the 
tradition. In his speech about the reform, King Fahad referred to shari ’ah sources and the 
Arabic/Saudi traditions as being the basis of such reform. While these reform measures
o  1
are seen by some as “merely symbolic steps that changed little” and left the royal 
family’s power basically undiminished, what is relevant here is that the government 
responded to domestic and international circumstances caused by, and associated with, the 
Gulf War crisis. The government’s response to this crisis left a mix of influences, both 
positive and negative, on human rights.
In the aftermath of this crisis, the issue of the people’s rights was central in the 
debate, as expressed from both liberal and Islamic perspectives. Similar to its responses to 
previous crises, the government tried to maintain traditional, religious values by partially
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appeasing the religious establishment, while their hold on absolute power was generally 
intact, despite some structural reforms. While being mostly nominal, in an absolute 
monarchy these reforms could be considered as progressive steps towards the 
institutionalization of the state. With the codification of some human rights standards, 
such reforms could be also viewed as positive steps that could eventually lead to greater 
developments towards human rights. On the other hand, all forms of independent 
activities following the Gulf crisis were controlled and the margin of freedom of 
expression was narrowed, which negatively affected human rights. However, despite 
deterioration of the rights of suspected dissidents, by using information technologies, 
opposition activists have broken the silence and have thus helped to increase public 
awareness of problems in the economic, social and political life of the Kingdom.
D- The 11 September 2001 Attacks and their Aftermath:
0-1
The tragic attacks of 11 September, and the events occurring in their aftermath, 
constitute the most significant crisis to have tremendous influence on Saudi Arabia. Since 
the attacks, in which Saudi citizens were extensively involved, the Kingdom has been 
struggling with external and internal demands for change. Its religious-political system 
has been under unprecedented outside media and scholarly attention, largely accusing the 
country of being a terrorist-breeding ground. Domestically, the media started questioning 
some practices promoted by the ulama. Saudi dissidents and many like-minded reformists 
view the 11 September attacks “as an opportunity to intensify the push for political, social 
and educational change.”84 The suicide bombings in Riyadh in May 2003 convinced the 
government to re-consider its position in relation to reform. Since the 11 September 
attacks, Saudi Arabia has witnessed extraordinary, intensive internal formal and informal 
debates on issues related to political, religious and social life including human rights.
The 11 September attacks and their aftermath have produced a great momentum 
for reform in the Kingdom. By placing limitations on, and firm control over, the religious 
establishment, the role of the ulama and their conservative views decreased, and the calls 
for reforms by domestic reformists and exogenous activists dramatically increased. 
Furthermore, the involvement of some Saudi activists in Al-Qaida made Western 
governments no longer able to maintain their traditional position of turning a blind eye to
o r
Saudi Arabia’s domestic issues.
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In relation to freedom of expression, Saudi reformists were generally allowed to 
articulate their views, not only in religious and social arenas but also in some political 
spheres. Prior to this crisis, writing or publicly demanding elections was considered to be 
an offence. Ulama who were imprisoned for their political views in the early 1990s are 
now tolerated and have taken part in government-sponsored national dialogue meetings. 
The May 2003 events galvanized public debate, and discussions on religious intolerance 
became a common topic for many articles and editorials in Saudi newspapers. While 
state-controlled media avoided discussing linkages between violence and the closed nature 
of the political system, Saudi reform activists noted that the causes of extremist violence 
included “the delay in adopting radical reform and the absence of popular participation in 
the decision-making process.”86 In 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah received more than five 
petitions from variously-oriented and reform-minded groups, urging the government to 
take action towards genuine political and social reforms including the establishment of 
constitutional monarchy based on elected institutions and the separation of powers.
Under such a climate, and as the Kingdom confronts several social and economic
oo
challenges, calls for reform could be articulated and circulated, in most cases. These 
challenges, among other factors, have generated loud voices for reforms and created a 
common ground for all variously-oriented reformists, which resulted in increasing 
pressure on the government. Issues such as the need for transparency and accountability 
in the state’s financial affairs, promoting social justice and protecting human rights 
including women’s rights are increasingly pointed out in public by some Saudis as root 
problems. Consequently, several developments have taken place towards economic, 
social-religious and political reforms including in the area of human rights, particularly 
women’s rights.
The agenda of the petitions presented to the government are clearly connected in 
many ways with human rights and fundamental freedoms. The petitions urged the 
government to reform various aspects in political, social and economic life including 
public elections, social justice, civil rights, an independent and reformed judiciary, the 
creation of human rights institutions and freedom of speech, assembly and association. 
Unlike demands for reform of the early 1990s which intended to Islamize the state 
institutions and policies and attempted to challenge the royal family; the current reform 
movement has aligned itself with the government and framed its demands on the basis of 
modernizing the state structure through a ‘social contract’ that is consistent with general
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Islamic principles.90 While the package of reforms proposed was designed within an 
ambiguous framework of the shari’ah, it sought to improve the situation of human rights 
and to bring it closer to what has been recognized internationally. The reformists 
advocated expanding public participation through an election for a Majlis Al-Shura, 
enjoying real legislative and oversight powers and the establishment of civil society 
institutions.91 While reformists may vary in their detailed understanding of the agenda, 
both sides of the reform spectrum affirmed the need to tackle financial corruption92 and 
the abuse of official powers. Reformers from both the liberal and Islamist camps are 
committed to preserving the monarchy and have called for state-led reform, despite their 
suggestions to establish institutions to curb the powers of ruling family.
In response to these events, the government reacted in various ways, including 
recognition of the legitimacy and necessity of reform. Restrictions on the media and on 
public forums to address socio-cultural issues were lifted. The Saudi media has subjected 
socio-cultural problems and customs to an unusual level of open discussion, criticizing 
several aspects of the status quo in society and in some governmental agencies. Topics 
such äs the educational system, religious curriculums, poverty, unemployment, human 
rights, the treatment of foreign workers, the rights of women and several social 
problems/customs have become familiar to Saudis in their own media.
Regarded as the head of the reformist wing within the royal family, King Abdullah 
on numerous occasions stressed the need for reform, advocating the relaxation of 
restrictions on public debate.94 He debated various issues with reformers, including 
promoting transparency, expanding the margin o f freedom of expression, and holding 
elections.95 Top officials on several occasions have stressed the need for reform and that 
the Kingdom has to proceed with dialogue and to introduce changes in its political and 
social life.96 While generally welcoming reform in broad terms and praising the reform 
project, the government did not respond to the actual content of the reformers’ agenda. 
The government showed an interest in controlling public debate about reforms by 
establishing the King Abdulaziz Centre for National Dialogue (KACND) in mid 2003 and 
in containing independent activities by allowing the creation of the NHRA in March 2004, 
while acting firmly against independent reform advocates who refused to refrain from 
calling for genuine reforms.
The establishment of the KACND was to sponsor and organize sessions in which 
prominent individuals coming from different backgrounds would meet and discuss
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designated topics of national interest.97 It is meant to be a semi-official forum for the 
exchange of ideas and the promotion of pluralism. The significance of the these sessions 
comes not only from the participation of various Islamic sects’ representatives and people 
with secular and liberal orientations, but also from the reasonable margin of freedom to 
discuss issues related to the set agenda of each session. Recommendations concluded in
• q qsessions were formally presented to the King. Some recommendations reflected concern 
over human rights issues and contained demands for more freedoms and a wider margin of 
public participation in the decision-making process.99
Within the right to fair, open trial, three independent reformists appeared in August 
2004 before a judge in open court hearing. Following their calls to reform the Kingdom’s 
political and religious life, the defendants were charged with sowing dissent, creating 
political instability, circulating leaflets and using foreign media to incite people against 
the government.100 While the court sessions subsequently became closed, the event is 
significant because trials are normally held entirely behind closed doors. This open 
political court, in its early sessions, was the first public trial of its kind and marks a new 
step, as political prisoners are usually detained without trial. In this trial, lawyers were 
permitted to defend political activists, and representatives of local and international media 
were allowed to cover the trial. Despite their limited effects on the eventual imprisonment 
of the accused,101 these developments indicate a change in how the Saudi authorities 
handle those arrested for political activism.
In a similar event, a Saudi academic was sentenced in September 2004 to five 
years imprisonment, following his comments on Aljazeera television in April 2004. He 
was found guilty of sowing sedition and inciting disobedience to the ruler. Ironically, the 
same person had earlier spent almost eight years (1995-2002) in prison without trial. In 
the post 11 September era, the government no longer feels able to accept the consequences 
of the imprisonment of prominent figures without bringing them to trial. For ordinary 
citizens, the series of bombings in the Kingdom reportedly engendered a severe 
deterioration of the rights of suspected militants, including detention without trial. Some 
Saudi activists, therefore, called on the government to respect the rule of law when 
detaining suspected terrorists and to stop encroaching on people’s basic freedoms in the
109name of fighting terrorism.
In deflecting internal and external criticism, the government handled calls for 
political reform with a deeply cautious attitude and much suspicion, while tolerating and
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encouraging talks about socio-cultural issues, including the role of women. Critics 
diminish the importance of political reform initiatives implemented or promised by the 
government in the absence of an influential civil society.103 They assert that the 
government reacted to demands for reform in an ad hoc context, in which ostensible steps 
were taken temporizing current situations. Despite speculation about reform steps, such as 
partial municipal elections, the creation of NHRA or KACND, as being “gimmicks meant 
to co-opt critics and project a more acceptable face of the regime...”104, these steps could 
help in forming more consensus and a wider momentum to pressure the government for 
genuine reforms.
Unlike previous crises in which the government responded with greater adherence 
to the shari’ah and local traditions, the current calls for reform and the government’s 
actions are connected more with patriotic identities and national interests. At the official 
level, greater attention has been given to strengthen patriotic identities by various means 
including media focus on this issue. At the unofficial level, activists from different 
backgrounds have formed a new constituency made up of Islamists and liberals, Sunnis 
and Shiites that emphasize patriotic identities and national interests in their arguments. As 
articulated in their joint petitions, the new Tslamo-liberal’105 trend has focused on both 
political and social reforms, which include progressive views on human rights. Within 
human rights, this post 11 September movement has started questioning some human and 
women’s rights practices guarded by a mixture of Islamic and traditional values.
Whereas the government has lifted restrictions on the media and the public to 
address socio-cultural issues, it has evidently continued to restrict public discussion on 
problems related to the political system and to overlook some forms of corruption. It 
appears that the government’s intention is to control and sponsor activities so as to guide a 
slow, cautious process of reform, targeting first and foremost socio-cultural trends. The 
government’s action against independent voices is seen by one Western observer as 
exposing the limits of its commitment to comprehensive or genuine reforms.106 
Nonetheless, since the 11 September attacks, the government has adopted several 
measures and introduced reformative steps, which aim at greater protection of human 
rights. These measures and developments have an impact on human rights practices and 
were designed to influence public opinion, particularly in relation to women’s rights, as 
explained in the next section.
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4. Domestic Public Opinion:
There is commonly a linkage between public opinion and human rights practices in 
any given country. In Saudi Arabia, the issue of women’s rights and their public role has 
been an open topic for discussion in recent years. The government has adopted policies 
towards expanding the role of women in public life, and officials have been sending 
various implicit and explicit messages to the public to influence their perceptions on this 
issue. The Saudi media has been used to raise public awareness of the need for increasing 
the role played by women in society and the importance of protecting and promoting 
women’s rights. The Saudi ulama, intellectuals from diverse backgrounds and the general 
public alike have shown an interest in debating these issues. Such official and non-official 
efforts and debates have an influence on, and have been also constrained by, public 
opinion. Accordingly, it is essential to look at changes in the role of public opinion in 
Saudi Arabia and explore briefly factors affecting its formation.
To explore further aspects of the public debate on human and women’s rights, the 
second part of this section summarizes the results of a survey conducted in early 2006, 
whereas the details of the survey are contained in Appendices I and II. Consisting of 
fourteen questions, the survey aimed at serving the central objectives of the thesis by 
asking direct and indirect questions about attitudes towards human rights in Saudi Arabia, 
the influence of the UN human rights system and the changes in the role and the rights of 
Saudi women. The crucial objective of the survey was to examine the Saudi people’s 
perceptions of human rights in the Kingdom in general and of factors affecting the recent 
developments in, and the mounting discussions about, the role and the rights of Saudi 
women in particular. As the UN human rights system comprises one side of the triangular 
dimension of the thesis topic, Saudis’ perspectives on the influence of the UN human 
rights system in changes related to women have provided an important contribution to the 
central question of the thesis.
A. The Role of Public Opinion:
The formation of public opinion and public policies involves a mixture of 
complex, overlapping internal and external factors. It is therefore a problematic question 
whether public opinion affects government policies more than government policies affect 
public opinion, or vice versa. However, officials who were appointed or achieved their
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positions through familial or other succession would not necessarily feel the need to
I A*7
please the public, compared to elected officials who usually listen to their constituents.
There are various levels of interaction among the people, the media, and public 
policies. Domestic public opinion usually, though not necessarily, plays an influential 
role in formulating policies, particularly policies connected with social norms and values. 
Alternatively, various forms of influence affect public attitudes towards social and 
political issues, including human rights. Unlike the traditionally state-control media, 
modem forms of media and communication technologies, such as the Internet and satellite 
television, have been playing a new role in shaping public opinion in Saudi Arabia, as 
well as in other parts of the world.
In addition to international factors, public opinion in Saudi Arabia is shaped by 
diverse domestic influences, including governmental policies, education, different types of 
media and influential groups such as the ulama, intellectuals, heads of leading families, 
and tribal leaders. Given the nature of the Saudi political system, officials typically utilize 
all available means in attempting to influence public opinion. Simultaneously, public 
policies in the Kingdom are formulated on the basis of various factors including public 
opinion. Accordingly, there is an interaction between public opinion and public policies, 
and surveys provide an essential mechanism for measuring and analyzing public opinion 
and providing a better understanding of the reciprocal relationship between the two.
Media coverage of public opinion about various political and social issues is 
uncommon in Saudi Arabia, and the rarely conducted surveys go largely unreported. 
Nevertheless, there have been particular academic studies in which Saudi public opinion 
on some social issues was reported and examined. 108
In Saudi Arabia, the Internet has become an increasing contributor in the 
formulation of public opinion, as critical and sensitive political and social, local or 
international, news first appears on Internet news forums. 109 Public access to the Internet 
has allowed people to be more aware of the outside world and to be able to read, write and 
interact with critical perspectives of their society and their government. Encouraged by 
the anonymous nature of the Internet and the ease of overriding blocking mechanisms 
imposed by the government, the Saudi public is able to express, more freely, its opinion 
about social and political issues. The outlet of expression provided by the Internet has the 
potential to influence people’s attitudes about various issues, including human and 
women’s rights. 110 Therefore, it has been commonly argued that Internet bulletin boards
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and forums (montadayat) have been greatly influencing public opinion in Saudi Arabia 
and becoming an increasing source of news and commentaries.111 A recent study on the 
impact of the Internet on Saudi female attitudes indicates that the Internet has influenced 
those females who participated in the study in several ways, essentially by stimulating 
their critical thinking and changing their previous perceptions. For instance, the 
Internet has contributed to changing their views on the superiority of the Saudi culture and 
encouraged them to become rebellious against some cultural and religious values such as 
studying abroad without mahram (guardian). As the Internet provides an encouraging 
element for critical thinking, there is considerable potential for perspective transformation 
and changes in public opinion about various issues, including human rights. As noted
in chapter seven, recent surveys found a notable rise in the ranking of women’s 
rights among issues facing Saudi Arabia.114
Individuals with higher education qualifications typically play a more influential 
roie in shaping public opinion, given their leading positions in political and social lives in 
most societies. In a country like Saudi Arabia, holders of educational qualifications from 
Western universities usually have better opportunities to influence public opinion. Highly 
educated persons are typically active in promoting new trends that may challenge 
established social norms or political orientations. In the Kingdom, the majority of 
government officials and leaders of public opinion either hold postgraduate degrees or 
have studied abroad or both in most cases. In looking at the educational qualifications of 
most influential figures, one notes that many of them have postgraduate degrees obtained 
from Western universities, particularly journalists, university professors, Majlis Al- 
Shura's members, and high-ranking public servants.
One of the most important issues related to the role of public opinion is its 
potential to make an effective contribution to the formulation of human rights policies. 
Norms of human rights involve not only social values observable by individuals but also 
those measures enshrined in official rules. The formulation of public policies that lay 
down standards for human rights is usually influenced by various, complex, and 
interrelated internal and external considerations of which public opinion is only one. For 
instance, the decision to outlaw slavery in Saudi Arabia in the early 1960s was largely 
based on external considerations, rather than on domestic public opinion against such 
practice.115 A contrary example is the maintenance of the religiously-based laws of 
corporal punishments, which are presumably supported by widespread public opinion,
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despite some lessening in their application.116 Therefore, it is risky to generalize about the 
role of public opinion in relation to human rights as a whole.
People’s awareness of the need to promote human rights is a factor that may 
strengthen the effect of public opinion in the process of human rights policy-making. 
However, despite some progress, the Saudi public has a limited awareness and knowledge 
about human rights, as internationally promoted, and the complexities surrounding 
domestic and international factors that may stimulate changes in human rights. This 
assumption is supported by the survey conducted for this thesis (discussed below), in 
which Saudis were asked about various issues related to human and women’s rights in 
Saudi Arabia, including factors affecting the recent trends in the provision of rights and in 
the role of women.
B. The Survey: General Findings:
Within the limitations of the survey and its methodology (discussed in Appendix 
I), the age group ‘between 20-40 years’ constitutes the largest age group in the sample. 
Since the other two age groups comprised a small segment of the respondents, they may 
not be fully representative. Nevertheless, the age group ‘between 20-40 years’ represents 
the current generation of educated and better-informed Saudis. It provides the 
perspectives of an important segment of society that has the potential to influence the next 
generation, while still being subject to exposure to a variety of influences. As the age 
group ‘above 40 years’ has witnessed sweeping transformations in material life and 
several changes in social norms and traditional customs, the age groups ‘between 20-40 
years’ and ‘less than 20 years’ are likely to experience additional changes in social norms 
and political orientations, which likely would influence the situation of human rights. The 
results showed that the age group ‘less than 20 years’ has been mostly inclined to 
conservative opinions about human rights, possibly linked to the influence of various 
conservative views from their parents, schools or mosques. However, as the youngest 
group, this particular age group could perhaps have greater potential to be influenced by 
the ongoing processes of change.
While the difference between male and female was insignificant at the overall 
level, women however tended, in some questions, to be more conservative than men in 
their views about human rights. This slight variation may be interpreted as a consequence 
of the greater freedoms available to men compared to women. Men in Saudi society are
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more likely than women to be exposed to varying new forms of influence. As explained 
in chapter seven, Saudi men usually have better access to information and enjoy more 
freedom of association and movement, which allows them to be more knowledgeable 
about public issues such as human rights and their international dimensions. In general, 
males have an interest in infusing females with conservativism as a means to protect both 
their honour and their superior position.
Postgraduates and overseas-educated Saudis constitute only a minority in society 
at large, and the survey sample reflects this (22.1 percent of the sample). Nonetheless, for 
reasons already noted, they could be more influential in relation to developing political, 
economic and social policies, including human rights, than those who lack such 
qualifications and/or positions. Thus, findings pertaining to highly educated, including 
overseas educated, respondents should be seen as a focal point in the general findings.
Despite their occasional* significance, age and sex were generally insignificant 
factors in determining respondents’ perceptions on human rights and factors affecting 
women’s rights in the Kingdom. By contrast, whether or not participants have been 
educated abroad and, to a lesser extent, their levels of education have significantly 
affected their attitudes.
A large number of the study samples deemed that domestic traditions are part of 
the picture when looking at human rights standards that are currently observed and applied 
in the Kingdom. As shown in the data description and analysis (Appendix II, question 5), 
the younger the age and the lower the education level, the more likely it is that they are led 
to believe that human rights standards are drawn from the shari ’ah only. However, the 
overall result clearly indicated that there is significant belief in the involvement of 
domestic traditions into human rights standards in Saudi Arabia, as the majority of 
participants (82.7 percent) have included domestic traditions within the sources of the 
current standards of human rights. Given the involvement of domestic traditions when 
assessing human rights standards in the Kingdom, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
Saudis may be more likely to tolerate changes in human rights standards, embodying these 
traditions, than changes that may go against the shari ’ah.
The general results indicated that a sizeable proportion of participants (37.9 
percent) was not content with human rights standards as observed in the Kingdom. As 
previously noted, statistical data revealed a significant link between being educated abroad 
and, to a lesser extent, holding postgraduate degrees and those negative perceptions about
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the current human rights standards. This dissatisfaction with the current human rights 
standards might suggest that some changes in human rights norms are likely to be 
accepted and perhaps welcomed by a significant proportion of the Saudi elite.
In looking at perceptions regarding the closely related statements, respondents 
changed their opinions about whether human rights standards in Saudi Arabia are at a 
satisfactory level when these standards were presented in comparison with neighbouring 
countries. This suggests that linking human rights standards to a particular regional and 
related cultural context could affect perceptions about these standards.
Nearly half of the survey respondents (46.6 percent) believed that issues of human 
rights have received increasing attention from the government, compared to 40.3 percent 
who agreed that the Saudi public has been increasingly attentive to human rights. 
Although the difference is insignificant, detailed statistical data (Appendix II, questions 8 
and 9) indicated that the level and place of education were significant in influencing 
respondents’ perceptions about the attention given to human rights. With presumed 
limited pressure from the public, the understanding about the role of international 
influence in motivating the government’s attention to human rights may increase.
People’s knowledge and positive perceptions about the LIN human rights system 
and international human rights instruments may possibly empower the role of the UN 
human rights system in influencing the situation of human rights in any given country. 
Governments are likely to respond positively to influences wielded by the UN human 
rights system when the public are aware of, and have positive attitudes towards, the UN 
human rights system. Yet slightly under 40 percent (39.1) of respondents knew that Saudi 
Arabia is party to some of the international human rights instruments, whereas 
approximately half (48.9 percent) responded with a ‘do not know’ answer. On 
perceptions of the influence of CEDAW, the first convention specifically on women’s 
right acceded to by Saudi Arabia, over a third (34.5 percent) answered T do not know’ or 
simply avoided answering the question. In general, questions that contained a specific 
reference to the UN efforts on human rights or to Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the UN 
human rights system at large had the most ‘do not know’ answers. Such results could be 
seen as a reflection of limited publicity about Saudi Arabia’s accession to international 
human rights treaties. This may support the argument that ignorance about the contents of 
those questions indicates a limitation of the UN human rights system in reaching large 
segments of the Saudi public and in empowering public opinion.
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The three related statements about internal and external factors affecting the recent 
trends on women’s rights are considered as a backbone of the survey and a core issue 
when interpreting the data. Their results contributed to the establishment of a better 
understanding of public perceptions on the social and political dynamics revolving around 
the issue of women’s rights and their role in society. That recent developments of 
women’s rights were influenced by international factors represents the most accepted 
statement in the survey, (Appendix II, questions 11 -A, B and C) with the highest degree of 
agreement (72.5 percent). This suggests it is reasonable to argue that international factors 
may have been important in recent trends to give women in Saudi Arabia more rights and 
to expand their public role.
In attempting to clarify respondents’ perceptions about the influence of the UN 
human rights system, CEDAW was included in the three related statements as 
representative of the efforts everted by the UN human rights system in the field of 
women’s rights. As about 40 percent of respondents disagreed that recent trends on 
women’s rights are linked to Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW, an evident correlation 
between the two is difficult to establish. This may imply that the Saudi people by and 
large have not observed a direct influence of CEDAW on public debate and reformative 
steps concerning women’s rights.
The survey sought to see how far the effects of international human rights 
instruments on joining states were seen as positive. The result was inconclusive because 
what is positive differs according to the respondent’s starting point. Even conservatives 
who agree that international human rights instruments were influential probably would 
disagree with the statement that the influence is positive, because they typically believe 
that the effects of international human rights instruments are negative. On the other hand, 
advocates of change are likely to consider that effect as providing a positive outcome.
According to the survey results, a large number of Saudis believe that international 
influences and pressures have more impact on women’s rights than domestic factors 
relevant to the media and education. Nonetheless, the weight given to the direct influence 
of the UN human rights system is insignificant, as a bulk of the study samples indicated a 
lack of knowledge about the UN human rights system and Saudi Arabia’s engagement 
with it.
Conclusion:
Resulting from a growing consensus for reform, and public and official recognition 
of its benefits, Saudi Arabia is witnessing changes, including in the field of human rights. 
It appears that those who aspire for greater freedom and openness within the Islamic 
framework are on the increase, especially in the last few years, at the expense of those 
who cherished tradition and static fundamentalism. However, the question posed here is 
whether those changes taking place in the Kingdom are merely the result of domestic-level 
factors, or whether they are connected somehow to international circumstances that help to 
build up the momentum for such change. It is realistic to conclude that domestic factors 
do not completely explain changes taking place in the Kingdom. Because of the nature of 
human rights as a comprehensive concept comprising political, social and economic 
aspects, and due to the overlap between domestic and international factors, it is 
problematic to assess accurately, in isolation from the international influences, the extent 
to which internal factors affected the situation of human rights in the Kingdom.
It appears that neither the current domestic structure nor the present cultural 
congruence would allow the occurrence of profound changes in human rights practices at 
this stage in time. However, influences and pressures associated with the domestic crisis 
following the 11 September attacks, along with its international and domestic 
implications, helped forge a powerful movement supportive of reform in its general sense. 
After being closed for centuries, Saudi Arabia’s openness to the outside world has 
undoubtedly compelled the government, as well as the society as whole, to start changing 
their views about practices related to human rights. Domestic factors broadly appear to 
matter more in engendering direct and effective pressures, but international variables 
certainly facilitate and empower the internal pressure for reform. Steps taken by the 
government following the 11 September attacks indicated that external pressure has been 
given greater weight, especially in relation to restricting and monitoring of Islamic 
activities, changing school curriculums and lifting restrictions on the media in regard to 
socio-cultural issues. In this context, it is interesting to note that some government 
officials maintain that while the government is very keen for reform, Saudi people restrain 
the process of reform, which may explain the slow, cautious steps towards reform. 
However, if this argument is correct, then why is the government so keen for reform under
130
particular circumstances? External considerations can conceivably explain the 
government’s keenness for reform.
Since the founding of the contemporary Saudi state, dissident groups have 
periodically pressured the government to make concessions, without any genuine success. 
However, when such internal pressures coincide with external pressures, the likelihood of 
achieving more concessions is undoubtedly greater. Factors such as the nature of the 
Saudi political system, the importance of Saudi Arabia to the world economy, as well as to 
the Muslim world, and the strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West, 
particularly with the US, necessitate the Saudi government to take external considerations 
seriously.
There are different signs, including those views expressed in the survey, that 
clearly suggest that Saudis are undergoing a process of change in their perspectives on 
human rights in general and women’s rights in particular. Also, the influence of public 
opinion on public policy is increasingly on the rise, given the new, various means 
available to the Saudi people for expressing their opinions with greater freedom compared 
to decades ago. Nonetheless, public opinion in Saudi Arabia was affected by a variety of 
internal and external influences, including the substantial government influence.
The survey’s general results suggest some possible potential for further changes in 
human rights in Saudi Arabia. As evidenced, most respondents are dissatisfied about 
human rights as observed currently in the Kingdom, agreed that the government is paying 
an increasing attention towards human rights, agreed with the statements regarding the 
recent trends to improve women’s rights, and believed that domestic traditions are among 
the sources of human rights standards in Saudi Arabia. The general results also support 
the view that studying abroad and, to lesser extent, holding postgraduate degrees are 
significant factors in determining Saudis’ perspectives about human rights and the role of 
international versus internal factors. According to most respondents, there has been a 
significant link between international factors, rather than domestic factors, and the recent 
trends to protect and promote the rights of women in Saudi Arabia and to increase their 
public role. Although respondents gave lesser weight to CEDAW and to the UN human 
rights system at large, the overall results support the hypothesis that international factors 
play an important role in affecting human rights, and women’s rights in particular, in the 
Kingdom.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAUDI
ARABIA
Introduction:
The ultimate goal of the contemporary human rights movement is to establish 
universal norms and to extend them to all societies. The dilemma of human rights centres 
on the need to accommodate all societies while also challenging other forms of authorities, 
notably state authority. The concept of human rights is simultaneously local and global, 
because it enables and elicits international scrutiny of local conditions. The protection of 
human rights in any given country depends on the interplay of society and state with 
internationally-recognized normative standards and on domestic and global forces 
committed to their implementation.1 Therefore, examining international-level factors 
affecting human rights in Saudi Arabia is essential to understanding the dynamic of 
human rights in the Kingdom. However, the question posed here is what are the relevant 
international factors and what is the extent of their influence on developments of human 
rights in the Kingdom?
The influence of the UN human rights mechanisms constitutes only one of several 
forms of influences propelling Saudi Arabia to respond positively to the demands for 
reform. The focus of this chapter is on examining other international factors and their 
influence on human rights in Saudi Arabia. The aim is to enlarge the understanding of the 
relationship between developments of human rights, particularly women’s rights, in Saudi 
Arabia and its engagement with the UN human rights system.
Saudi Arabia enjoys special importance internationally because of its unique 
association with the Islamic religion and its oil wealth. As the world’s largest oil 
producer, and its importance in stabilizing the international oil market and economy, 
domestic stability in the Kingdom concerns many countries in the world. As a result, 
powerful states typically attempt, directly or indirectly, to influence Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic policies in order to strengthen the country’s stability. Due to the security 
circumstances in the Kingdom following the 11 September attacks, which have amplified 
concerns over Saudi Arabia’s stability, various forms of international influence and
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pressure have increased. With the perceived necessity felt by powerful states to increase 
the intensity of their influence on Saudi Arabia, the correlation between developments in 
human and women’s rights and external factors will probably increase. The first section, 
therefore, examines influences of foreign states on domestic policies, particularly in 
relation to human rights issues. Such influences for improving human rights come either 
from powerful states for example the USA and EU member-states, or indirectly from 
neighbouring countries that have already adopted progressive policies in the human rights’ 
domain.
Influence and pressure exerted by international human rights NGOs to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms have unquestionably gained momentum in the 
last few decades. Transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations, as a part of 
the international human rights regime, typically attempt to influence states to abide by 
international human rights norms, either by attempting to lobby state officials directly for 
policy change or by mobilizing pressures from other states and multilateral institutions. 
Various forms of exogenous influence contribute to crystallizing new policies and 
reformative steps in Saudi Arabia, with the aim of, among other things, promoting human 
rights. It is, therefore, essential to discuss the influence of international human rights 
NGOs, particularly given that in recent years they have paid greater attention to human 
rights in Saudi Arabia.
As indicated in the theoretical chapters, various material and immaterial aspects of 
globalization, modernization and development could play a role in universalizing human 
rights norms through a process of socialization and learning. In this context, Saudi Arabia 
has been exposed to waves of global cultural trends and calls for further political 
openness. The Kingdom has also been affected by international economic influences for 
an open market combined with Saudi Arabia’s desire for domestic economic stability and 
integration in global capital markets. Such realities have chiefly pushed the Kingdom to 
seriously consider reforms, mainly within economic spheres, but which may impact 
human rights. Extraneous cultural influences absorbed through the various global 
information and communications technologies have permanently changed the traditional 
lifestyle in Saudi Arabia. The third section, thus, explores how globalization, along with 
modernization, could affect human rights in Saudi Arabia.
Governments have a genuine interest in gaining legitimacy and respect, not only 
from their own citizens but also from international audiences and international media.
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Both governments and NGOs normally make use of the international media to serve their 
interests and goals. Through the utilization of naming and shaming to urge abusing states 
to comply, media coverage of abuses and oppression has played a significant role in 
advancing the human rights cause in several situations in different parts of the world. 
Finally, therefore, this chapter examines the effects of international media and 
international public opinion on human rights in Saudi Arabia.
1- The Role of Foreign States:
Since its establishment early in the twentieth century, Saudi Arabia has relied on 
foreign powers for political and military support. Great Britain played a cardinal role 
during the Kingdom’s unification,2 when King Abdulaziz received financial and military
3
assistance from the British in fighting his rival sheikhdoms within the Arabian Peninsula. 
In the 1915 treaty with Britain, King Abdulaziz agreed to concessions to the British 
including refraining from entering into relations with other countries without consultation 
with Britain, in return for recognition and protection of his rule and financial assistance.4 
British Foreign Affairs documents indicate that Britain ended economic aid to Saudi 
Arabia in 1946. The annual report of that year also noted the Kingdom’s dependence on 
US financial assistance as well.5
Upon signing a concession agreement with an American oil company (Standard 
Oil of California) in May 1933, Saudi Arabia started receiving money in the form of loans 
for more than two decades, despite the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in late 
1939, because the terms of the agreement were disadvantageous to Saudi Arabia.6 Given 
its nature, the agreement included no security protection as the second party was a private 
company seeking profit. However, with the huge oil reserves discovered in Saudi Arabia 
and with oil becoming a global source of power during and following the Second World 
War, the security of Saudi Arabia became a vital part of US interests. The basic equation 
of Saudi-US relations was that in return for preferential, unconstrained access to Saudi oil, 
the US will provide protection to the Kingdom against foreign threat.7 For the US, Saudi 
Arabia, as the world’s largest oil exporter, the host for some of the most sophisticated 
military bases available to the US in the Middle East, and the largest market in the region 
for US goods and services especially arms, has long been a vital strategic ally in the 
region.
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Due to this development, many conservative, radical salafis, as well as some Saudi 
liberal intellectuals, believe that the role of the US is effective not only in shaping many 
Saudi foreign and some domestic policies, but also in the survival of Saudi Arabia against 
external threats. Moreover, several academic studies have associated the longevity of the 
Saudi political system with primarily international factors.9 Accordingly, the 
contemporary rulers of the Kingdom are seen by some Saudis as collaborators with the US 
from which they derive their security and continuity.10 Popular resentment among Saudis 
against the US is partially caused by the US’s long standing turning of a blind eye to what 
are widely seen as human rights abuses carried out by Saudi authorities, although other, 
and more important, reasons contribute to these hostile feelings.
In exchange for Saudi Arabia’s cooperation and assistance in oil production and 
pricing and for purchasing US military equipment and training, the US did not question 
the domestic politics of the Saudi government.11 The issue of human rights violations and 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms never formed part of the official bilateral discussions 
between Saudi Arabia and the US. With the exception of its annual human rights report, *> 
US administrations have traditionally avoided public criticism of the Kingdom’s human 
rights record or the nature of its political system. Saudi domestic issues remained for 
decades outside the interest of all US administrations, avoiding what might be considered 
as interference in internal matters. However, this line of US foreign policy towards its 
close ally has changed since the 11 September attacks.
One of the major developments following the 11 September attacks is the growing  ^
realization in the US and elsewhere that domestic conditions throughout the Middle East, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, are of significant concern as a major cause of radicalization. 
Empowering women is seen as critical not only in promoting democracy and development 
but also in defeating terrorism. Based on the conviction that resentful and repressed % 
citizens are susceptible to extremist ideology, President George W. Bush pledged to re­
structure radically America’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, promising to spread 
democracy and emphasizing concepts such as the rule of law, limits on state power, free 
speech, women rights and religious tolerance.13 Some members in the Bush 
administration have commented critically and demonstrated concern about several 
political, social and religious practices within the Kingdom. This new criticism comes 
particularly from the network of so-called neo-conservatives and Christian rights activists 
joined by the Zionist left,14 who have had major influence on Bush’s foreign policies. .
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While generally urging the Saudi government to liberalize and democratize political and 
social life in the Kingdom, American criticism mainly focused on cracking down on 
Islamic charities and changing the school curricula. The Saudi government responded 
positively to such criticism by reviewing and correcting the most objectionable features of 
its school curricula and restricting and closely monitoring Islamic charities. In addition to 
unifying most boys and girls’ curricula, the Saudi Ministry of Education deleted some 
topics from the Islamic curriculum including a chapter about al-wala’a wal bara’a 
principle.15
Nevertheless, officials in the Bush administration generally refrained from harsh or 
open criticism, whilst privately raising some serious concerns about domestic issues.16 
Rather, US officials publicly in general used an encouraging language when talking about 
reforms in Saudi Arabia. US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that “it is up to the 
Saudis to decide how they wish to transform their society”, but noted that while the US 
would not dictate change, the US would like to “be able to influence how such reforms are 
going to be introduced as some of them could be better than others.” Carefully 
commenting on the Saudi announcement to hold partial municipal elections, US President 
George Bush indirectly called on the Saudi government “to give the Saudi people a greater
t o
role in their own society.” During his visit to the Kingdom in January 2004, former US 
President Bill Clinton urged the Kingdom to embrace reform, noting the impossibility of 
resisting the wind of change.19 Such comments by US officials on domestic policies 
disclose an increasing influence by foreign states on human rights in Saudi Arabia.
In March 2004, Saudi authorities arrested a group of reformists, who had signed 
petitions calling for peaceful political, social and economic reforms as detailed in the 
previous chapter. The US State Department’s spokesman Adam Ereli condemned the 
detention as “inconsistent with the kind of forward progress that reform-minded people 
are looking for”20 and described it as “regrettable” and a “step backward”,21 especially 
following initiatives disclosed by the Kingdom to expand people’s participation in 
decision-making. During a meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, US Secretary of State
99Colin Powell also expressed concern over the detentions.
The detained reformers were preparing a statement undermining the recently 
formed NHRA, accusing it as being appointed body, and complaining about the Saudi 
authorities’ neglect of their request to license a human rights NGO. The Saudi authorities 
rejected the US criticism over its arrest of the activists, considering their arrest as internal
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affairs.23 As the three reformists appeared initially before a judge in open court hearing, 
this remarkable and unprecedented step in the Kingdom’s judicial system was welcomed 
by the US administration.24 However, after a judicial order to close this first ever open 
trial, the US government called upon the Saudi authorities to reopen the trial and to
25recognize the right of freedom of expression.
The nature of the relationship with Saudi Arabia became not only an issue in 
which members of Congress discussed the US relationship with the Kingdom and 
introduced a draft of an accountability act,26 but also an electoral issue in the US 
presidential election in late 2004. The Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John 
Kerry, criticized the Bush administration for its close relationship with Saudi Arabia and 
warned that Americans “will not do business as usual with Saudi Arabia.” Furthermore, 
personal and financial relations between the Saudi royal family and the Bush family were 
criticized in the media and in widely purchased books/raising further suspicions about the
9 0
nature of the longstanding US-Saudi alliance.
In early 2004, the US administration leaked news about an initiative designed to 
promote political, social and cultural, and economic reforms in the Middle East. The 
initiative and its recommendations were formulated on the basis of the Middle East 
Initiative (a US State Department plan launched in December 2002) and the UN Arab 
Human Development Reports of 2002 and 2003. The main proposition underlying the 
initiative was that the growth in the “region’s pool of politically and economically 
disenfranchised individuals”30 increases extremism and terrorism. This proposition cited 
the three ‘deficits’ identified in the UN Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 and 
2003 - freedom, knowledge and empowerment of women -  as among causes of the current 
conditions in the region.31 Inspired by the 1975 Helsinki accords, the potential influence 
of the US sponsored Broader Middle East and North African Initiative (BMEI) has 
increased after its adoption by the Group of Eight Industrial Nations at their June 2004 
summit.32
According to US officials, the initiative was introduced in response to growing 
regional voices calling for reform in the Middle East.33 From the US perspective, the 
initiative is based on the belief that the primary pillars of democracy -  such as 
representative legislature, an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and a free 
market -  are “suitable for all people and compatible with any society, though they may not 
look exactly the same or function in exactly the same way.”34 Although the initiative was
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designed to support reform plans and to offer assistance for activities aiming at increasing 
opportunities and freedom for the peoples in the region, it was not clear how these 
activities would be financed.35 Therefore, it is likely that the initial objective of the 
initiative is to pressure governments in the region,36 including the Saudi government, to 
enact previously announced reforms. Officials in Arab states, particularly in Saudi 
Arabia, reacted negatively to the initiative and criticized it as interference in internal 
affairs. In looking at the initiative and the circumstances surrounding its introduction 
and adoption, Saudi Arabia is considered as the focal point due to its alleged links with 
extremism and terrorism.
It is worth noting that monitoring and commenting on human rights practices, in 
all countries of the world including Saudi Arabia, is undertaken by various agencies in the 
US government. Since the mid 1970s when human rights were formally incorporated into 
US foreign policy, the US has attempted to hold governments accountable to their 
obligations under universal human rights norms and international human rights 
conventions. The US State Department releases two major annual reports: the Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices and the International Religious Freedom Report, 
covering 196 countries in the 2002 reports. The US Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent federal agency established under the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), gives recommendations on 
international religious freedom to the executive branch and Congress including specific 
policy recommendations on ‘countries of particular concern’ (CPC). According to the 
IRFA of 1998, to simply designate a severe violator of religious freedom as CPC is not 
sufficient action. The CPC designation carries an obligation that one or more of certain 
actions specified in Section 405 of the IRFA be taken unless the President determines that 
pre-existing sanctions are adequate or otherwise waives the requirement.
The US annual reports, as a watchdog mechanism, have been used as a means to 
assist the implementation of US foreign policy and the promotion of its interests all over 
the world. Although such reports have criticized violations of human rights in Saudi 
Arabia, concerns expressed in the reports over human rights practices in the Kingdom had 
not been publicly raised by US administrations. Since 1999, USCIRF has been pressing 
for CPC status for Saudi Arabia. Caused mainly by its linkage with extremism and 
terrorism, Saudi Arabia was finally listed as CPC in the 2004 report on religious freedom. 
Despite being symbolic, the designation of Saudi Arabia as CPC is an unusual public
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rebuke by the US that could, at least in principal, lead to future sanctions against the 
Kingdom. Some analysts rightly pointed out that this step is to warn Saudi Arabia that 
America will not overlook, as previously, behaviours deemed to be unacceptable,40 
especially when it comes to practices believed to be causing Islamic militancy. In July 
2006, an agreement was struck between Saudi Arabia and the US State Department by 
which the Kingdom will introduce further laws and policies to curb abuses of religious 
freedom and to spread a culture of tolerance towards non-Muslims.41
With the exception of influences and pressures related to combating terrorism, 
which may include some aspect of promoting human rights such as targeting intolerance 
and expanding the role of women in public life, the close and special relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and the US ensures that pressure on the Kingdom over human rights will 
arguably remain minimal. Realizing the high price of instability in the Kingdom, some 
Westerners argue that the Saudi monarchy is the ‘lesser evil’ and therefore preferable to 
what they believe is the only alternative; a conservative Wahhabi government.*2 It is 
justifiable to argue that Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with the US, especially in oil policy 
and major arms contracts, has made the Kingdom largely immune from any genuine US 
pressure in relation to its human rights record. However, this does not deny that the US 
has been extending its influence through diplomatic means such as negotiation and 
persuasion, notably increasing after the 11 September attacks.
In another form of influence coming from neighbouring states, the US invasion of 
neighbouring Iraq put more pressure on Saudi Arabia to embark on a series of steps 
towards reform. The decision to establish a National Dialogue Centre came after the US 
invasion in order, inter alia, to strengthen the national front against any potential spill-over 
threats or Shiite uprising and also to absorb dissatisfaction arising from what is seen as 
discrimination against minorities in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of the real US intentions in 
invading Iraqi, that the US was actively promoting democracy in Iraq raised awareness of 
the need for reform in the Kingdom. Some liberal Saudis think that pressure from the US 
administration on Saudi Arabia might have been the cause of tentative moves towards 
reform taken in the last few years.43
In a surprise move, in January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah launched an initiative 
calling for major reforms in the Arab world, even while the Kingdom itself has one of the 
world’s most conservative political systems. Following the US Middle East Initiative of 
December 2002 and the UN Arab Human Development Report of 2002, the Saudi
146
initiative appears to be a response to intense American pressure on governments in the 
region, especially Saudi Arabia. For the Saudi government, the proposal for reform was 
designed to affirm self-motivated reform and escape public perception that reformative 
steps taken in the Kingdom are the result of submission to international pressures. The 
Saudi initiative was later discussed and adopted by Arab leaders at the Arab summit in 
2004.
In addition to intensified US influences and pressures, political liberalization in 
Gulf States and in other Arab countries have left Saudi Arabia looking isolated as one of 
the last fortresses of traditional rule. Despite being authoritarian political systems by 
international standards, many governments in the region have incorporated major 
democratic elements. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
Arab monarchies have already moved to become constitutional monarchies.44 In 1995 
there was a coup in Qatar, followed in 1999-2000 by the deaths of the elderly heads of 
state of Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Syria. Changes of "heads of state have brought a 
new approach to governance and human rights in those countries. Reforms in most 
neighbouring countries have led to increased political and economic opportunities for their 
peoples and resulted in an improvement of policies leading to greater protection of their 
rights, including the rights of women.43 In most Gulf States, the margin of freedom and 
the participation of citizens and women have been widening.
Changes under way in neighbouring countries of a similar political system 
indirectly, but noticeably, influence the situation in Saudi Arabia. For instance, voters in 
both Bahrain and Qatar have recently approved new constitutions by referendum. Also, 
Kuwaitis, Qataris, Jordanians and Moroccans can elect their representatives in 
parliaments. Saudi activists have called upon the government to broaden the citizens’ role 
in public life, as has been the case in monarchical political systems in Jordan and 
Bahrain.46 Being similar to other Arab monarchies, especially members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), has inspired some Saudis to demand changes in their social 
and political life and to put more pressure on the Saudi government to reform its current 
structures and policies.
In response to the increasing calls for reform and after the US initiative for the 
Greater Middle East,47 Arab leaders agreed at the Arab League Summit, May 2004 in 
Tunis, to sign a document calling for reform entitled ‘Pledge of Accord and Solidarity’ 
and adopted the revised ‘Arab Charter on Human Rights’.48 Unlike previous summits
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since the Arab League’s creation in 1945, Arab leaders for the first time declared their 
commitment to implement the organization’s decision. While the leaders agreed and 
signed a pledge to implement the decisions contained in the document, analysts question if 
the document would have any significance knowing that its implementation was left 
largely up to the individual countries.49 The document called on members to foster 
democratic practices, broaden participation in political and public life, strengthen the role 
o f civil society and expand the role of women.50 Both the US and the Arab leaders believe 
that reforms are essential to the security and the development of the region, but Arab 
leaders rejected the idea that the call for reform was forged under outside pressure.51
Under the assumption that the influence of foreign states in the Kingdom’s 
domestic affairs can be very effective, international human rights NGOs lobby powerful 
states to press Saudi Arabia to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Furthermore, those NGOS regularly urge multilateral institutions, such as the UNCHR, to 
take decisions and actions against accused governments and to pressure them to change 
abusive practices. Within this context, the EU group became accustomed, in their 
statements at the UNCHR annual session, to criticize the violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in several countries including Saudi Arabia.53
In viewing the consequences of foreign states’ influences on, and involvement in, 
promoting human rights in Saudi Arabia in general and women’s rights in particular, it is 
worth noting that the outcomes to date have been insignificant in substance. Due to their 
substantial economic interests in Saudi Arabia, influential Western states have largely 
marginalized the issue of human rights practices in Saudi Arabia for economic and 
political gains. For a long time, foreign states confined their forms of pressure to 
occasional statements and periodical reports about human rights practices all over the 
world, including Saudi Arabia. Conversely, Saudi Arabia succeeded in promoting the 
view that its stability necessitated maintaining cultural particularities. Nonetheless, the 11 
September events have unsettled the US strategy concerning domestic issues in the 
Kingdom. As discussed earlier, US strategy now focuses on pressuring and encouraging 
changes that would reduce or eliminate radicalism, which involves promotion of some 
human rights including the spread of tolerance and strengthening the role of women in 
public life. US pressure on the Kingdom has centred mainly on social change, which 
naturally takes time for its consequences to materialize. If foreign states’ pressure and
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encouragement continue and intensify, the chances for greater reforms, and larger 
developments towards human rights, would likely increase.
The influence of neighbouring states on human rights in Saudi Arabia is best seen 
in the context of socialization. Despite being limited, political reforms and social 
developments relating to human rights in neighbouring countries, especially the GCC 
states, are likely to play a more significant role in stimulating changes at grassroots of the 
Saudi society than reforms taking place in other parts of the world. Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, established in 2003 a governmental human rights body, following in the 
footsteps of nine Middle Eastern states that have created similar institutions during the last 
ten years.54 Compared to direct pressure, this indirect influence may not be noticeable, but 
changes undertaken in peer neighbouring states with analogous cultures and similar 
political systems are likely to be infectious and profound in the long run.
2- Non-Governmental Organizations:
Self-appointed international NGOs have played a part in constraining the absolute 
sovereignty of nation-states and are able to raise responses from world opinion through 
advocacy of their causes. Although overwhelmingly Western, those NGOs can be 
regarded as the kernel of a global civil society, and new communication technologies have 
played a major role in making civil society visible in some fields.55 Much of the 
conceptual authority and the political strength of NGOs comes from their funding sources 
in the West; many international NGOs however have been commonly known for their 
independence and non-affiliation. To maintain their credibility, international NGOs 
always try to ensure that their agendas, and any authority they may have, are not being 
directed in covert ways by funding sources. In authoritarian political systems, activities of 
local NGOs that receive funds from foreign states or international NGOs are met with 
suspicion from their host governments.56
As indicated in the earlier theoretical discussion, the central importance of 
international human rights NGOs is their ability to contribute to the protection and 
promotion of human rights through, inter alia, challenging and pressuring governments as 
well as by boosting social interests and raising public awareness of human rights. 
International NGOs enjoy more flexibility in exerting political and diplomatic influence 
than formal international institutions such as the UN.57 International human rights NGOs,
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mainly Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), have gained 
worldwide reputations, and criticism of them is often dismissed as an attack on the values 
of human rights themselves. Pressure brought by human rights NGOs raises the
perceived costs of repressive action against a regime’s opponents and compels 
governmental officials to take human rights more seriously. Citizens of an oppressive 
state are less able to protect their own rights than those of states which are more respectful 
of those rights. Human rights NGOs, thus, make oppressed individuals or groups feel they 
are not entirely isolated, which encourages them to promote their cause.
International human rights NGOs operate on the conviction that bringing abuses 
out into the light of day is the most powerful weapon in curbing such actions. 
Accordingly, those NGOs utilize various forms of publicity in seeking to achieve their 
objective of protecting human rights. Publishing annual monitoring reports, distributing 
press releases to the international media, participating in multilateral forums such as the 
UN and its organs, launching campaigns on specific issues or directed at particular 
governments, calling on the concerned regimes to take actions, calling on other 
governments to formally consider human rights in their foreign policy, mobilizing 
domestic and international public opinion, and offering assistance to local human rights 
groups are all among the wide range of activities used by international human rights 
NGOs to pressure governments to take actions and reform their policies.
International human rights NGOs have played a significant influence in numerous 
countries, but what is less obvious is the extent of their influence in Saudi Arabia. The 
Kingdom has been cited by several international human rights monitoring organizations 
and groups for its alleged failure to respect a number of basic human rights. International 
human rights NGOs are often harsh critics of the Saudis’ treatment of women and the 
Kingdom’s judicial system and of the use of cruel punishments, including amputations 
and public beheadings.59 They have consequently been attempting to influence the 
situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia by using various methods of pressure and 
influence.
Because of the alleged widespread abuses in many Arab, Middle Eastern countries, 
some international NGOs have in recent years designated departments committed to this 
region.60 Pressures on Arab countries by those NGOs would also influence Saudi Arabia, 
especially when pressure renders changes in those countries. Also, such NGOs have been 
assisting Arab human rights activists, including Saudi activists, and inspiring their
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activities. Since the early 1990s, Saudi human rights activists have been contacting 
international NGOs to serve their cause. Saudi activists typically report the arrests of 
reformers and cases of abuse to international NGOs, and to world media, seeking to press 
for their release.61 Despite presumed differences on the definition of human rights, Saudi 
dissidents and political activists and international human rights NGOs have mutual 
interests in ending what is seen as abusive practices in Saudi Arabia, at which a level of 
contact and cooperation has been established. When the British government attempted in 
the mid 1990s to deport a Saudi Islamist dissident in response to pressure by Saudi 
Arabia, human rights NGOs were able to play a role in reminding the British of their 
obligations arising from international and domestic laws and in blocking the deportation.
Using another method to press Saudi Arabia to do more for protecting human 
rights, NGOs call upon powerful Western states to pressure Saudi Arabia to respect 
fundamental human rights,63 as indicated earlier. They routinely call on governments 
dealing with the Kingdom to formally note the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia as 
part of their foreign policy.64 Following their role in reporting numerous cases of abuses 
over several years in the Kingdom, these NGOs successfully pushed for the consideration 
of the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia under the confidential 1503 procedure, 
which is discussed later in chapter six.
International human rights NGOs have extended their calls to companies operating 
in Saudi Arabia to incorporate human rights issues into their risk control and risk 
management analysis, aiming to place more pressure on Saudi Arabia for the sake of 
protecting human rights. In this regard, Amnesty International (AI) produced documents 
on the business climate in Saudi Arabia, highlighting ways in which internal 
developments and changing relations between Saudi authorities and foreign companies 
could potentially facilitate improvements in human rights observance and outlining ways 
in which foreign businesses operating in the Kingdom can exert positive influences on 
human rights.65 Moreover, because of segregated dining areas in Western chain 
restaurants and cafes in Saudi Arabia and their discriminatory hiring policies, some 
Western activists and feminist NGOs are calling on all concerned civil groups and 
individuals to protest against sex discrimination, accusing US companies operating in 
Saudi Arabia of promoting sex apartheid and calling for an end of those companies’ 
discriminatory practices in Saudi Arabia.66
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Calling on foreign states and companies to advocate protection of human rights in 
Saudi Arabia may combine various efforts to stimulate eventually changes of policies in a 
pro human rights direction. This lobbying comes mainly in the context of the naming and 
shaming of countries accused of human rights violation, under which countries are 
pressured to alter their policies in order to save their international respect and reputation 
(as discussed later), beside the threat of possible sanctions by companies or states.
In March 2000, IA launched a global campaign targeting human rights practices in 
Saudi Arabia, aiming at exposing the Kingdom’s human rights policies, particularly in 
regard to judicial procedures. Consisting of various statements, publications and 
demonstrations, the campaign is the first ever international campaign about human rights 
in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom, however, dismissed the campaign as an attack on Islamic 
principles. While its substantive impact was insignificant, the campaign immediately 
succeeded in provoking the Saudi and international media to engage in discussion about 
human rights in the Kingdom and in motivating Saudi officials to make statements on 
human rights. As the campaign targeted a large audience, it contributed to boosting 
awareness about the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia.
Despite the argument that NGOs provide a credible voice that could educate the 
public about issues of importance and move citizens to act in certain ways, international 
human rights NGOs have had limited success in educating the Saudi people about human 
rights, let alone mobilizing them. Unsurprisingly, the Saudi government, like many 
governments, had reacted negatively to the augmented role of NGOs in what has been 
labelled as a global civil society and to their increased involvement in international 
multilateral institutions.
Prior to the 11 September attacks, Saudi Arabia did not respond to requests by 
international human rights NGOs to visit the Kingdom and to discuss human rights 
practices. However, under various forms of influence, Saudi Arabia responded positively 
to requests by HRW to visit the Kingdom, and the first ever visit by international human 
rights NGOs took place in early 2003, followed by another visit in November 2006. Saudi 
Arabia felt bound to discuss with the HRW delegation issues of human rights, and allowed 
the delegation to visit prisons,67 in an attempt to improve the Kingdom’s international 
image. Despite this step, the long-standing taboo on scrutinizing and reporting human 
rights abuses to international NGOs remains effective.
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International human rights NGOs have been conducting various activities to 
influence human rights in Saudi Arabia, including publicizing abuses through reporting 
and campaigns, mobilizing pressures from states, multilateral institutions, the media and 
the public at large and soliciting meetings and discussions with Saudi officials. The 
independence of those NGOs gives their activities credibility, which contributes to 
enlarging their influence. In looking at developments taking place in the Kingdom, 
international NGOs were, along with other factors, able to make a contribution, when they 
made Saudi Arabia re-consider its strategy in how to deal with pressure for change in the 
field of human rights. However, it is hard to establish that their influence by itself is 
significant, given the overlapping nature among various external and internal factors. 
Their influence however is an integral, essential part of an array of factors that have 
contributed to Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the socialization and learning process.
3- Globalization and Modernization:
As discussed in the previous chapters, the process of globalization has been 
connected with both modernization and technological change. It is commonly argued that 
globalization also constitutes technological and social phenomena in which both 
technology and civil society should play an essential role in development and
z o
modernization. Within this notion, globalization involves the diffusion of concepts 
linked to capitalism and values of democratization and liberalism. The international 
revolution in information technologies, particularly the Internet and satellite television, 
has been a significant and constructive instrument in the diffusion process.
As illustrated in the chapter four, Saudis have been under the influence of 
modernization and the global information technologies. Given the earlier noted growth in 
Internet use in Saudi Arabia and the tremendous expansion in viewing foreign satellite 
televisions, cultural and traditional values, especially those related to the treatment of 
women, are encountering unprecedented challenges by exterior influences. Furthermore, 
modernization and development, which are associated with material and immaterial 
changes, has been posing significant threat to Saudi traditions and cultural values.
With the massive capabilities available to Western powers not only to expand their 
political and economic dominance but also their cultural influence, social traditions and 
cultural values in many parts of the world became a sphere of influence of Western
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culture. Despite the perception that local cultures are the last frontier of global change, 
extraneous traditions and ways of life are penetrating indigenous societies and changing 
their traditional, cultural concepts, including newly defined concepts such as human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Within this connection, Saudis increasingly imitate Western 
lifestyles and are under the influence of further cultural penetration. Not limited to Saudi 
Arabia, there is also resentment and fear of the globalization process, which has 
challenged traditional modes of thinking and thus provoked impulsive reactions not only 
to Western influence but also to changes that come with globalization. Nevertheless, 
resistance to globalization is not comprehensive since the government and segments in the 
society are seeking to enjoy the benefits offered by globalization.69 Like most societies, 
there are opposing reactions in Saudi Arabia towards globalization between those who 
want to maintain the status quo and those who believe that globalization is a beneficial 
driving force for change and reform.
Economic, political and cultural aspects of globalization have started to change the 
environment in which the Saudi government functions. This new atmosphere has offered 
the poorly-structured civil society in the Kingdom new tools, particularly the earlier noted 
communication technologies. Moreover, given the influence of the global environment in 
which nearly 60 percent of UN members have made major amendments to their 
constitutions or adopted new constitutions during the 1990s,70 Saudi Arabia promulgated 
in 1992 its Basic Law of Governance which defines the country’s political system and 
outlines its structure, including its role in protecting human rights. Similarly, international 
considerations have partly motivated several countries in the Middle East region, 
including Saudi Arabia, to establish governmental human rights institutions nominally
71designed to assist implementation of internationally-recognized human rights norms. 
For economic motives, Saudi Arabia sought to join the globalized market under the 
umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, Saudi Arabia has not only 
adjusted its trade regulations and standards, but also made adjustments relating to its legal 
system, inter alia, to meet WTO requirements. It is increasingly recognized that human 
rights violations threatening the safety and security of individuals are likely to contribute 
to social instability, eventually negatively affecting the investment climate. Therefore, 
improving the Saudi legal system is indeed linked to both the creation of a proper 
investment climate and to the protection of human rights.
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Saudi Arabia submitted an application to join the WTO in mid 1993, but it took 
more than twelve years to convince the members that all aspects of Saudi trade and legal 
regimes are in conformity with WTO. The rapid pace of globalization risks leaving Saudi 
Arabia behind unless the pace of change in the Kingdom is accelerated. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia has promulgated a considerable number of new legislative acts to reform both the 
national economy and the administration of justice and improve its standards in both fields 
to meet international requirements.73 As indicated in chapter one, several developments in 
Saudi Arabia’s judicial system have taken place since the mid 1990s. Reforms in this area 
included creating institutions, such as the Board of Investigation and Public Prosecution, 
and the issuance of the three laws: the Code of Judicial Procedure, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, and the Code of Practice for Lawyers. Unlike economic reforms that are 
directly connected with the Kingdom’s desire to join the WTO, legal reforms are 
associated with the process of globalization in its comprehensive meaning, which includes 
improving transparency in the judicial process and eliminating the socially accepted and 
widely practiced patronage relations, commonly known as wastah, which usually impede 
transparency and serving justice.74
One of the ways to improve people’s economic rights and to promote their rights 
to work is to offer education that would give individuals opportunities to compete in the 
globalized economy. Saudi Arabia is facing multi-level problems related to its 
educational system. To address the Kingdom’s socio-economical problems, attempts to 
reform the education have been undertaken to provide the workforce market with skilled 
Saudis to replace the large number of foreign workers. Aiming also to enlarge the 
involvement of women, spending on technical education and vocational training has 
dramatically increased, by which vocational colleges and centres will increase capacity by 
250 percent in the next seven years.
Saudi women, as an integral part of the human resources necessary for economic 
growth and competition in the globalized world, constitute a small portion of the 
workforce (approximately 5 percent), as explained later in chapter seven. In light of the 
local and global economic challenges facing the Kingdom, the Saudi government has 
realized the need to initiate new measures and promote progressive views that would help 
to encourage greater participation of women in the economy. Restrictions on women 
running their own businesses were eased, as seen, for instance, in the recently established
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women’s sections in the Ministry of Commerce and in some regional chambers of 
commerce.
The global role of multinational institutions has been to increase the unification of 
regulations and the promotion of common international standards. In doing this, 
international financial and cultural institutions have been attempting to incorporate human 
rights in their agendas.76 According to the agendas of multilateral institutions such as the 
WTO, IMF and World Bank, economic reforms necessitate greater transparency and 
accountability, clearer regulations, good governance and social and political reforms 
including wider public participation.77 Inequalities among people in access to the 
prerequisites o f economic growth (such as education, knowledge and an independent 
judiciary) facilitate violations of human rights. According to the World Bank, human 
rights can be better guaranteed only when a judicial system functions as a strong, 
accessible and independent institution and once a parliament is effectively able to
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oversight and check decisions by the executive branch. ° Development and good 
governance also contribute to the protection of and improvement in human rights. Saudi 
Arabia thus has been influenced by the emergence of such a global atmosphere, as 
changes in policies related to decentralization, development and good governance have 
been undertaken in many countries with the assistance of international institutions. The 
Saudi government has worked with the international institutions to incorporate 
decentralization into development and governance programs.80 Such cooperation has the 
potential to eventually impact positively human rights in Saudi Arabia and indicates a 
level of willingness within elites to engage in a process of learning and socialization with 
international actors.
Economically, Saudi Arabia has realized the need to reduce state involvement in 
the economy and to open up its market. Therefore, the government has taken major 
economic steps, despite resistance within some circles in society and in the government as
Q 1
well. Several measures within a political, cultural and economic context have been 
implemented, including the creation of governmental institutions such as the Supreme 
Tourism Authority, the Board of Investigation and Public Prosecution, the licensing of 
non-govemmental bodies such as labour committees and the NHRA, and the re­
structuring of laws in areas such as the criminal law, press and publication law, and 
foreign investment law. However, such moves towards economic reform are much more 
substantial than reforms in areas outside the economy.
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In reaction to cultural influences associated with globalization, many Saudis, 
officials and non-officials, argue that their culture can not accept many notions coming 
into Saudi Arabia through globalization, believing that the cultural invasion will lead to 
the disintegration of identity and the spirit of the Islamic, Arabic and Saudi culture. A 
survey conducted among Saudi youth showed a high degree of awareness of threats posed 
by cultural invasion in the era of globalization. Advocating Islamic teachings and the 
maintenance of traditions, conservative Saudis consider the cultural aspects of 
globalization an unjustifiable threat to the diversity of global multiculturalism. Saudi 
Arabia contends that globalization should not be a source of hegemony and the imposition 
of concepts and values unilaterally on other societies.84 Despite many clearly articulated 
arguments against cultural globalization, which is mostly perceived as a synonym of 
Westernization, there are Saudi voices who attempt to harmonize some cultural aspects of 
globalization, such as the notion of acquaintance and shared values among nations, human 
rights and freedoms of worship and expression, with the tenets of Islam. J
What is interesting in the issue of globalization and modernization is the extent to 
which it could influence Saudi Arabia’s norms and values relevant to human rights. The 
rapid and continuous economic, technological, social and political intrusion of Western 
and other foreign cultures into Saudi Arabia may, eventually, put the domestic cultural 
norms in jeopardy. Although Saudi conservatives associate globalization with 
Westernization and thus warn the public against cultural invasion and call for the
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preservation of the Islamic, Saudi local culture, such efforts may not be sufficient to stop 
the ongoing inflow of Western socio-economic views and lifestyle. Globalization along 
with modernization have already affected some aspects of Saudis’ life and contributed to 
changes in some religious and societal characteristics in Saudi society, particularly norms 
connected with women and their participation in public life and in economic activities. As 
global media networks and communication technologies have enabled dominant Western 
powers to reach the whole globe, information barriers have already fallen, and neither the 
Saudi government nor its people are able to censor or control the influx of information. 
Nonetheless, despite some changes, the resistance to foreign cultural penetration is still 
generally strong, but it is likely to weaken gradually, especially among younger 
generations.
Following Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO in late 2005, numerous changes 
are expected to take place within and outside the economy. What is connected to human
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rights is that joining the WTO would subject some domestic policies to international 
scrutiny, particularly the legal system. Moreover, joining the WTO would help to open 
the country more to the outside world and improve transparency and good governance in 
the Kingdom.87 These would be seen as signs of potential positive change in the area of 
human rights, including women’s women. For instance, given the increasing demands for 
women to enter the workforce, the process of reshaping traditional perspectives on the role 
of women are likely to further their independence and contribute to advancing their rights.
In looking at the influences of globalization and modernization on human rights in 
Saudi Arabia, influences have been contributing to motivating Saudis towards greater 
engagement in a process of socialization and learning about human rights, including 
women’s rights. Saudi Arabia has witnessed several developments concerning human 
rights since the submission of its application to join the WTO in 1993. It would be 
inaccurate, however, to link such developments to the influence of globalization and 
modernization alone. Rather, the process of globalization, along with modernization in its 
various material and immaterial aspects, has played a role, along with other factors, in 
encouraging Saudi Arabia to reform its policies and institutions.
4- International Media and Public Opinion:
The advances in communications of the past century, especially in the last twenty 
years, have ushered in a world in which the news media play a dominant role, including 
shaping perspectives on the legitimacy of regimes. Governments in general seek to secure 
legitimacy, not only within their own society but also on the international arena, through 
the media. In contemporary world politics, adherence to human rights norms has become 
coupled with a state’s political legitimacy and image. Therefore, internationally 
publicizing human rights abuses shames any accused government, questions its 
legitimacy, undermines its international respect and damages its world image. This 
explains why governments can no longer afford silence towards any criticism by the 
international media. In order for criticized governments to secure both domestic and 
international legitimacy, they have been forced to respond to criticisms of publicized 
human rights abuses.
International media, which shapes and sometimes creates public opinion, has been 
largely dominated by Western states. Powerful states that have great influence through
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international media may draw violating states into dialogue on human rights. China is a 
good example in which the international media was used by the US, among other means, 
to induce the Chinese leaders to engage in discussion about their record of human rights.88
International public opinion often interacts with trends of the international media, 
which is a crucial vehicle for publicizing human rights abuses. Since governments seek 
international political legitimacy and strive for international respect, both the media and 
public opinion at the international level play a considerable role in affecting domestic 
policies. Public opinion in Western countries, and the media as well, can effectively 
pressure their governments to take a certain course of action, including in the field of 
foreign policy. Thus, governments of developing countries take into their calculations 
trends in public opinion and the media of hegemonic states. Following the 11 September 
attacks, which led to the downgrading of the Saudi Arabian image mainly in the US, the 
Saudi government sponsored a well funded media campaign to bolster its image, not only 
among decision makers but also at the public level. As part of its public relations outreach 
efforts, Saudi Arabia has attempted to articulate to a US and international audience the 
measures that are being implemented in the war on terrorism and the steps taken to change 
practices that restrict fundamental human rights.
In Saudi Arabia, public perceptions of domestic and international issues are 
increasingly formed by the media outside Saudi Arabia, rather than by the government- 
controlled press. About 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s households have access to satellite 
television channels.90 As Saudis have access to a great variety of both Western and 
Arabic satellite channels, some influential Saudi businessmen have become heavily 
involved in investing in satellite televisions and in the migrant Arabic press. Conscious of 
the effectiveness of outside media, the Saudis now control a great deal of the private 
Arabic media and have power over a giant empire of Arabic press and satellite channels, 
not only financially but also by controlling its contents.
Saudi Arabia has showed a high level of sensitivity towards adverse media 
coverage or publications. Saudis traditionally used their money and lucrative contracts 
with Western companies to contain criticism of human rights violations in the Kingdom. 
When, for example, the BBC broadcast in 1996 a programme on human rights violations 
in the Kingdom, Orbit (Saudi-owned satellite Television Company based in Rome) 
immediately terminated the BBC contract to provide an Arabic news service.91 In an 
attempt to stop airing a film called ‘Death of a Princess’ in the UK and the US in 1980, the
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Saudi government exerted all kinds of pressure, and the company responsible for making 
the film was asked by British businesses and MPs not to show it.92
Saudi Arabia traditionally keeps a tight rein on the entry of international media 
agents into the Kingdom and allows only carefully chosen reporters and journalists. 
However, the tight restrictions on international media agents were eased after the 11 
September attacks; consequently, their visits to the Kingdom have increased significantly. 
Yet, despite allowing them into the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia typically attempts to control
93their movements by providing escorts and cautiously selecting their interviewees. 
Nevertheless, the arrival of international media agents in the Kingdom has had a 
disruptive impact on the degree of control over the news climate, and local events and 
some Saudis’ informal comments no longer go unreported internationally. For example, 
when the Saudi authorities arrested several pro-reform activists in March 2004, the 
international media covered the event, criticizing strongly the government action.94 
Agents on international media were able to interview some Saudi activists, gaining, 
among other things, their perspectives on local events and policies.
The reporting of events, including those related to human rights abuse, could 
create a particular international public opinion that influences government’s decisions. 
Whilst some of the arrested reformers have been released after agreeing to avoid signing 
further petitions calling for reform nor talk to international media reporters, the trial of the 
three reformists who refused to refrain from calling for reform was covered by the 
international media worldwide.95 Knowing the effects of international media in applying 
pressure on the Saudi government, reform activists shrewdly utilized international media 
in their campaign. The government thus accused the reformists of, among other things, 
contacting international media, acknowledging implicitly the influence of international 
media. Various forms of pressure, including by the international media, eventually led to 
the release of the three reformists in August 2005.
As the international media and international public opinion contribute to shaping 
perspectives about Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy, and because the Kingdom seeks to gain 
respect at the international level, it is legitimate to conclude that they both constitute a 
form of international influence that have an effect on formulating some domestic policies 
and decisions including those related to human rights. As illustrated, the international 
media utilizes mechanisms of shaming and publicizing human rights violations in the 
Kingdom. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the international media and public
160
opinion play a role in encouraging and impelling Saudi Arabia to engage in the process of 
socialization.
Conclusion:
Continued outside support, pressure and influence are unquestionably crucial in 
translating into reality statements of intention by the Saudi government about reforms. 
However, because the Saudi public perceive changes in values and traditions as a 
‘Western’ agenda on one hand, and as the Saudi government is mindful to be seen as the 
source of all policies on the other, Saudi officials typically stress that all steps taken 
towards reform are not the result of external pressure. In May 2003, King Fahad pledged 
to expand reforms, stating that “we reject interference in our internal affairs from any side 
and under any pretext ... [and] are keen on undertaking self-assessment of our internal 
affairs with the aim to reform.”5'6 Also, after removing materials believed to be offensive 
to other religions and chapters about jihad  and non-Muslims from Saudi curriculums, 
officials of the Education Ministry denied that Saudi Arabia had revamped its teaching 
program in the face of Western pressure.97 While this customary strong tone of denial 
reflects sensitivity among Saudis not wishing to be seen as responding to external 
influences, it might imply reacting to these influences.
Following the recent increased consciousness internationally of human rights 
issues, concern about Saudi Arabia’s human rights record has evidently intensified. From 
the whole range of factors determining Saudi government policy today, there is a clear 
sign that international factors now have more potential to influence government choices 
than at any time in the recent past. Recent international circumstances have changed the 
mentality of Saudis towards change, suggesting that various forms of international 
influence and pressure are considered as the primary reasons behind the Saudi government 
and people’s renunciation of certain aspects of the status quo amidst the desire for reform.
Reform of political, educational and economic systems in Saudi Arabia are not 
only necessary to meet serious, foreseeable challenges internally, but also to improve the 
relationship between the Kingdom and the rest of the world. Various forms of external 
pressure and influence, particularly by influential states, have pushed the Saudi 
government to respond by amending some domestic policies, mainly concerning outside
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cultures and religions, by encouraging tolerance of minorities and improving the treatment 
of women.
Some forms of external influence can be effective in the short term, especially in 
the case of sanctions or intervention, but when international efforts include strategies for 
strengthening local capacity, raising public and official awareness and shaming and 
publicizing human rights violations, a sustainable protection for human rights is more 
likely to eventuate. Accordingly, each form of influence that comprises a long-term vision 
can lead to a gradual, but lasting, improvement in human rights protection.
As such, international factors have contributed, to a large extent, to the 
reorientation of domestic human rights policy in a pro-human rights direction. Since those 
factors tend to overlap and interact with internal factors, it is difficult to single out one 
form of influence as the sole explanation of developments towards human rights taking 
place in Saudi Arabia. However, those factors have collectively provided essential 
contributions in encouraging Saudi officials and people to engage in a process of 
socialization and learning about human rights.
162
ENDNOTES (CHAPTER FIVE)
1 For a similar argument in much broader context, see Oran Young, “Compliance in the International 
System”, in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, eds. Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and 
Saul H. Mendlovitz, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 99-109.
2 Several books have illustrated the nature and dimensions of the relationship between King Abdulaziz and 
the British. See, for instance, Mohammed A. Sa’ed, breatania wa ibn saod: al alaqat al siyasiyah wa
ta 'theroha ala al moshkilah al falastiniyah [Britain and Ibn Saud: Political Relations and Their Effects on 
the Palestinian Problem] (London: Dar Aljazeerah for Publication, 1982), Jan Michele Forkieh, al saodiyah 
al diktatoriyah al mahmeyah [Saudi Arabia: Protectorate Dictatorship] (Paris: Midwest Press, 1989) and 
Haifa Al-Angari, The Struggle for Power in Arabia: Ibn Saud, Hussein and Great Britain 1914-1924 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).
3 In an interview in Aljazeera channel in July 2003, Prince Talal Ibn Abdulaziz acknowledged that his 
father, King Abdulaziz, received financial assistance from Britain during the unification period and 
emphasized that the received assistance is the context of normal aid from powerful states to poor, newly 
emerging states, whether through loans or donations.
4 For the text of the treaty, see [in Arabic] alharamain.com, “itifaqiyat darin: aljazeerah mahmiyah 
britaniyah” [Darin’s Treaty: the Peninsula is a British Protectorate], viewed on line at 
<http://www.alharamain.eom/text/kotob/4txt/l/4.htm> accessed 22 December 2004. For more details on Ibn 
Sa’ud’s relations with Britain during that period, see, for instance, Al-Angari, The Struggle for Power in 
Arabia, 145-149 and Alexei Vassiliev, The History o f Saudi Arabia (New York, New York University Press, 
2000) 237-283.
5 For more details, see Najdat Safwat, aljazeerah al arabiyah f i  al watha ’q al britaniyah [Arabian 
Peninsula in British Documents] (London: Al-Saqi Books, 2000) 621-627.
6 For the terms of the agreement, see Vassiliev, The History o f Saudi Arabia, 316-317.
7 In coordination with the British government and US and British oil companies, but without the knowledge 
of Saudi rulers, President Harry Truman approved a detailed plan to store explosives near oil fields by which
011 installations and refineries would be blown up in the event of an imminent Soviet invasion. Shibley 
Telhami, Fiona Hill, et al., “Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter? Differing Perspectives on the Kingdom and Its 
Oil”, Foreign Affairs (November/December 2002), viewed on line at
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faresponsel0002/shibley-telhami-fiona-hill/does-saudi-arabia-still- 
matter-differing-perspectives-on-the-kingdom-and-its-oil.html> accessed 17 May 2004.
8 Madawi Al-Rasheed (a senior lecturer in social anthropology at King’s college, University of London, an 
author of books and articles on Saudi history, and frequent commentator on Saudi affairs) indicated that one 
of the reasons behind the survival of the Saudi political system is its reliance on, and alliance with, the 
United States for its security. See, e.g., Madawi Al-Rasheed, ma ’zeg al islah f i  al saodiyah f i  al qan al hadi 
wa al ishreen [Reform’s Dilemma in Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century] (Beirut: Dar Al-Sagi, 2005) 165-169.
9 See, for instance, F. Gregory Gause III, “The Persistence of Monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula: A 
Comparative Analysis”, in Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge o f Modernity, ed. Joseph Kostiner 
(Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2000) 167-186.
10 Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: the Challenge of the New Generation in Saudi Arabia, (London, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 2000) 118-119.
, 11 See Hume Horan, “Saudi Arabia: A Successful Anomaly (So Far)”, The American Enterprise (September 
2003), viewed on line at <http://www.taemag.com/issues/articlelD018196/article_detail.asp> accessed 5 
December 2003.
12 It is worth noting that such view comes from the US congressman Tom Lantos, who is the co-chair of the 
congressional human rights caucus. See, Tom Lantos, “Discrimination Against Women and the Roots of 
Global Terrorism”, Human Rights 29:3 (2002) 7-9.
13 Tamara Cofman Wittes, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism”, Policy Review 125:3 (June 2004), viewed on 
line at <http://www.policyreview.org/jun04/wittes_print.html> accessed 29 November 2004.
14 Chas W. Freeman, Jr., “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign and Domestic Dilemmas”, Middle East Policy Council 
(September 2002), viewed on line at <http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/whats/sacomments.asp> accessed 6 
November 2004.
15 The principle of al-wala ’a wal bara ’a lays emphasis on the universal loyalty among Muslims and the 
absolute renunciation by Muslims of non-Muslims. For more details on changes in Saudi schools’ 
curriculums, see the following: “Declaration About Changing the Curriculums”, signed by 156 Saudi 
conservative scholars, professors, public servants and teachers, presented to the Second Session of the 
National Dialogue Held in December 2003, the Declaration was viewed on line at
163
<http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/doc/2004/02/article02_18.shtml> accessed 27 June 2004, Muhammad 
Al-Saif, “li awal marah fi al saoudiyah: al tollab wa talibat fi manhaj wahid wa loghah wa hidah” [First 
Time in Saudi Arabia: Boys and Girls Students Having One Curriculum and Addressed in One Language], 
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 20 September 2003,4 and Norah Al-Hajri, “Al-Rasheed yad’ao ila tanshi’at al tollab ala 
taqabul al a’akhar” [Al-Rasheed Calls for Raising Student To Accept Others], Al-Watan, 21 December
2003, 7.
16 International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself’, (14 July 2004), 8.
17 BBC News, “Powell Says Reform Saudi’s Choice”, 14 December 2002, viewed on line at 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/2575747.stm> accessed 30 August 2004.
18 BBC News, “Saudi Council’s Powers Expanded”, 30 November 2003, viewed on line at 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/3251126.stm> accessed 15 August 2004.
19 Dominick Evans, “Clinton yansah al saodiyah biadam moharabat tayyar al tageyar” [Clinton Advised 
Saudi Arabia not to Resist the Influx of Change], Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 20 January 2004, 1.
20 CBS News, “Saudi Reformers Silenced, Released”, 21 March 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/29/world/main596614.shtml> accessed 5 October 2004.
21 ArabicNews.Com, “Washington Describes Saudi Arabia Detention of Reformers as regretted”, 18 March
2004, viewed on line at <http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/040318/200403181 l.html> 
accessed 30 August 2004.
22 See, for instance, Muosa Ibn Marwi, “wazeer al kharijiayh al amreki yatamassak bi mokif beladeh min al 
motakaleen” [US State Secretary Maintains his Country’s Position in Relation to the Detainees], Al-Watan, 
20 March 2004, 1 and CBS News, “Saudi Reformers Silenced, Released”, 21 March 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/29/world/main596614.shtml> accessed 5 October 2004.
23 BBC News, “Saudis Criticise UN Reform Plan”, 22 May 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/ff/-/l/hi/world/middle_east/3555957.stm> accessed 18 August 2004.
24 Barry Schweid (Associated Press Diplomatic Writer), “Feds Want Saudi Advocate Trial Reopen”, Herald 
Sun, 5 October 2004, viewed on line at
<http://www.heraldsun.com/tools/printfriendly.cfm?storyID=529525> accessed 6 October 2004.
25 Ibid.
26 See International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself’, (14 July 2004), 8.
27 Senator John Kerry’s speech in Seattle in 27 May 2004. Quoted in Ashraf Fahim, “John Kerry’s Saudi 
Sucker Punch”, Asia Times, 12 June 2004, 7.
28 In addition to the well-known film 9/11 Fahrenheit on the relationship between families of Al-Sa’ud and 
Bush, see, for example, the book of Graig Unger, House o f Bush, House o f Saud: The Secret Relationship 
Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties (New York: Scribner, 2004).
29 The US Greater Middle East initiative was scheduled to be announced at the G8 Summit hosted by 
President George W. Bush at the Sea Island in June 2004, but leaked news on the initiative were 
published/reported in the media in February 2004. See, Al-Hayat newspaper, 19 February 2004, 1.
30 A quote from the initiative appeared in Robert Looney, “The Broader Middle East Initiative: 
Requirements for Success in the Gulf’, Strategic Insights 8:3 (August 2004), viewed on line at 
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/aug/looneyAUG04.pdf> accessed 29 December 2004.
31 For more details see, e.g., Wittes, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism”, Policy Review 125:3 (June 2004).
32 The Broader Middle East and North African Initiative (BMEI), adopted by G8, is a later version of the 
US Broader Middle East and North African Initiative (GMEI).
33 A statement by Alan Larson, under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 2 June 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://www.state.gOv/e/rls/rm/2004/33060pf.htm> accessed 30 August 2004.
34 Ibid.
35 Looney, “The Broader Middle East Initiative: Requirements for Success in the Gulf’.
36 The initiative covers the twenty-two nations of the Arab League, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.
37 Prince Sa’ud Al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, commented on the initiative by saying: “those behind 
these plans ignore the fact that our Arab people have cultures rooted deep in history and that we are able to 
handle our own affairs.” His comments were widely reported. See, for instance, BBC, “Saudis Criticise US 
Reform Plan”.
38 For more information, see US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 
<http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/> and <http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/hr/> both accessed 5 October 2004.
164
39 For more detail on the IRFA and legislations related to the US Commission on International Religious 
Freedom’s activities, visit <http://www.uscirf.gov/about/authorizinglegislation.html> accessed 6 October 
2004.
40 BBC News, “US Blasts Saudi ‘Religious Curbs’”, 15 September 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/americas/3660458.stm> accessed 20 September 2004.
41 See, for instance, Sarah Zylstra, “One ‘Major Step”, Christianity Today Magazine, October 2006, viewed 
on line at <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/october/13.30.html> accessed 9 November 2006.
42 See, for instance, Daniel Pipes, “Support the Lesser Evil”, The Australian, 31 May 2004, 7.
43 See, Ed O’Loughlin, “Saudi Arabia Sees Bush Victory as Lesser of Two Evils”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 29 October 2004, viewed on line at
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/10/28/109866791439.html> accessed 30 October 2004.
44 For more on Arab monarchies, see Michael Herb, “Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World”, The 
Middle East Journal, 58:3 (2004) 367-385.
45 For example, Morocco and Egypt have adopted new family laws that protect the rights of women.
46 BBC News, “Saudi Petition for Speedy Reform”, 23 December 2003, viewed on line at 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/middle_east/3344655.stm> accessed 15 August 2004.
47 The US Secretary of State said he was encouraged “by reforms in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Morocco, 
and Saudi Arabia could follow their example...” BBC news, “Powell Says Reform Saudi’s Choice”.
48 Details and documents of the Arab League Summit (22-23 May 2004 in Tunis) were viewed on line at 
<http://www.arabsummit.tn> accessed 25 October 2004.
49 See, Neil MacFaquhar, “Arab Leaders Adopt Agenda Endorsing Some Change”, The New York Times, 24 
May 2004, viewed on line at
<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA061EFD3C5A0C778EDDAC0894DC404482> accessed 
26 October 2004.
50 See the summit’s document, “Pledge of Accord and Solidarity”, viewed on line at 
<http://www.arabsummit.tn/ar/document.html> accessed 25 October 2004.
51 See, for example, comments by the Tunisian foreign minister during the May 2004 Summit in Tunisia, 
which were reported by the media, including Al-Watan, 24 May 2004, 1.
52 Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Allies Must End Human Rights Silence”, 19 December 2001, 
viewed on line at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/saudialliesl218.htm> accessed 21 July 2004.
53 See, for instance, UN document, E/CN.4/2004/SR.21 of 1 April 2004, UNCHR 60th Session (2004), 
“Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World”, 6.
54 For more details about national human rights institutions in the Middle East, see Sonia Cardenas and 
Andrew Flibbert, “National Human Rights Institutions in the Middle East”, The Middle East Journal 59:3 
(2005)411-237.
55 See, for instance, Karen Mundy and Lynn Murphy, “Transnational Advocacy, Global Civil Society? 
Emerging Evidence From the Field of Education”, Swaraj. Org
<http://www.swaraj.org/shikshantar/activities/_transnational.html> (December 2000) accessed 20 December 
2004.
56 See detailed report about foreign funds to local NGOs in Al-Majalah (Arabic Magazine), “fakh al 
tamweel al ajnabi: al musa’adat muqabil al ma’alumat” [The Trap of Foreign Funds: Aids in Exchange for 
Information], Al-Majallah, 19-25 June 2005, 15-24.
57 Axel Honneth, “Is Universalism a Moral Trap? The Presuppositions and Limits of Politics of Human 
Rights”, in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz- 
Bachmann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) 175.
58 See, for more details, the works of Darren Hawkins, such as his book International Human Rights and 
Authoritarian Rule in Chile (Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 2002) and his paper, “the Domestic Impact 
of International Human rights Norms”, a paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International 
Studies Association, Chicago (February 2001), viewed on line at 
<http://www.isanet.org/archive/hawkins.html> accessed 19 April 2004.
59 See, for example, Amnesty International, Annual Report (2003): Saudi Arabia, viewed on line at 
<http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/2004-sau-summary-eng> accessed 2 December 2004 and 
Human Rights Watch, World Report (2003): Saudi Arabia, 472-481.
60 Human Rights Watch, for example, has a division for the Middle East and North Africa.
61 Sa’ad Al-Faqiah, head of a Saudi opposition group (Movement of Islamic Reform in Arabia) operating 
from London, reported that he leaked the news of Muhammed Al-Mas’ari’s arrest in 1993 to international 
human rights NGOs hours after the arrest. His Comments were Broadcast on the radio of the Movement of 
Islamic Reform in Arabia’ Radio, 16 December 2005.
165
62 Muhammad Al-Mas’ari is the spokesman of the banned CDLR and currently the secretary-general of the 
Islamic Tajdeed (Renewal) Organization.
63 Human Rights Watch, “Saudi Arabia: Allies Must End Human Rights Silence”.
64 In its annual report, Human Rights Watch discusses Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United Nations and 
with the United States under a subtitle named “the Role of the International Community”.
65 See, for example, Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia Business Briefing”, (London: Amnesty 
International UK Business Group, 2000), this publication was viewed on line at 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/business/pubs/saudibusiness.pdf> accessed 3 October 2004.
66 See, for instance, Feminist Majority Foundation, “US Companies Promote Gender Apartheid in Saudi 
Arabia”, Feminist. Org, <http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/printnews.asp?id=6074> (15 January 
2002) accessed 28 December 2004 and Tom Lantos, “Discrimination Against Women and the Roots of 
Global Terrorism”, Human Rights 29:3 (2002) 7-9.
67 The visits were reported in the Saudi newspapers. See, for instance, Saudi Press Agency, “Al-Sheikh 
Meets with Megalli”, Arab News, 23 January 2003, 1, Osamah Al-Nassar, “ibn humaid yastaqbil mas’ool fi 
hoqooq al insan” [Ibn Humaid Received an official of Human Rights] Al-jazirah, 28 January 2003, 2, 
Matoog Al-Shareef, “’human watch’ yaltaqi adha’a al shura wa al hay’ah wa al jawazat” [‘Human Watch” 
Meets Al-Shura Members and Passports’ Authority], Okaz, 27 November 2006, 7 and Ra’id Al-Qubaisi, 
“Al-Akkass yastaqbil wafd munazamat hoqooq al insan” [Al-Akkas Received a Delegation of a Human 
Rights Organization], Al-jazirah, 3 December 2006, 5.
68 See, for instance, Amr Abdulkareem, al awlamah: a ’alam thalith ala abwab karn jaded [Globalisation: 
The Third World Approaching New Century] (Cairo: Al-Ma’rifah Press, 1999) 35-43.
69 For more details on pro and con of globalization in Arab world, see Bakir Al-Najjar, al arab wa al 
awlamah: al makawif wa attahadiyat [Arabs and Globalization: Fears and Challenges] (Cairo: Al-Neal 
Publisher, 1999) 12-13.
70 Ford Jolyon, “The Age of Constitutions”, Seminar at the Australian National University, National Europe 
Centre, 5 May 2004.
71 For more details about the role of international factors in the creation of national human rights institutions 
in the Middle East, see Sonia Cardenas and Andrew Flibbert, “National Human Rights Institutions in the 
Middle East”, The Middle East Journal 59:3 (2005) 411-237.
72 Paul C. Pangalangan, “Sweatshops and International Labor Standards: Globalizing Market, Localizing 
Norms”, in Globalization and Human Rights, ed. Alison Brysk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002)98-101.
73 Economic reforms implemented in the Kingdom encompassed several fields, including privatization, 
foreign investment, insurance, financial markets, taxation, combating money laundering and anti-corruption 
measures.
74 For more details, see Yousef Makki, “al indimam li monadamant al tijarah al alamiyah: al mahatheer wa 
al afaq” [Joining the WTO: Misfortunes and Horizons], arabrenewal.com,
<http://www.arabrenewal.com/index.php?rd=AI&AI0=10703> (16 October 2005) accessed 16 December 
2005 and Alarabiya TV, “al qada’a al saoudi ba’da al indimam li monadamant al tijarah al dawliyah” [The 
Saudi Judiciary After Joining the WTO], aired 2 January 2006, transcript was viewed on line at 
<http://www.alarabiya.net/Articles/2006/01/04/20071 .htm> accessed 6 January 2006.
75 For the budget of the General Organization of Technical Education and Vocational Training 
(GOTEVOT), see Saudi Arabia (official document) “mizaniyat al mu’assasah lil sanawat al khams al 
akhirah” [Budget of GOTEVOT for the last Five Years], Viewed on line at
<http://www.gotevot.edu.sa/gotevot/statistic/1425-1426/Budget_in_GOTEVOT_last_Five_Years.pdf> 
accessed 15 January 2006. For the inclusion of women in GOTEVOT’s activities, see Naif Al-Zahim, “Al- 
Gafis: itlaq 24 kulliyah tikaniayah lil banat bi mokhrajat tatanasab ma’a tabi’atihen” [Al-Ghafis: 
Inauguration of 24 Technical Colleges for Girls Teaching Fields Suitable to Their Nature], Al-Riyadh, 3 
April 2005, 3.
76 See, for instance, Jonathon Fox, “Transnational Civil Society Campaigns and the World Bank Inspection 
Panel”, in Globalization and Human Rights, ed. Alison Brysk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002) 171,196.
77 There are various publications by these institutions, pointing out the necessity for, inter alia, promoting 
human rights and political reforms in order to achieve economic growth and be integrated into the global 
economy. See, for instance, World Bank, “Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank”, 
(1998), viewed on line at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/hrtext.pdf>, accessed 6 October 
2004, Michel Camdessus, “Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World”, International 
Monetary Fund (1998), viewed on line at <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/050898.HTM>
166
accessed 7 October 2004 and Alassane D. Ouattara, “The Political Dimensions of Economic Reforms— 
Conditions for Successful Adjustment”, International Monetary Fund (1999), viewed on line at 
<http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1999/061099.HTM> accessed 10 October 2004.
78 See, for instance, World Bank, “Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank”.
79 Ibid.
80 UN document, “Saudi Arabia: Decentralization and Urban Management”, December 2002, UN 
Development Program, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, viewed on line at 
<http://www.pogar.org/countries/saudi/decentralization.html> accessed 19 June 2004.
81 See Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters The 21st Century: Building True Wealth Versus Over­
dependence on Petroleum and the State (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002) 
6- 8.
82 Othman Al-Amer, “as’ilat al hi war al fikri al watani al rabi” [Questions for the Fourth National Dialogue 
Session], Al-Jazirah, 6 December 2004, 11.
83 See, for instance, Imam M. Imam, “mo’tamar Makkah yohather min al tadakholat al ajnabiyah fi 
khososiyat al umah al islamiyah” [Makkah Conference Warns Against Foreign Intervention in the 
Particularities of the Islamic Nation], Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 28 January 2004, 17.
84 Saudi Arabia (official document), Saudi Arabia’s Statement delivered by Torki Bin Muhammad Bin Saud 
Al-Kabeer at the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 March 2004.
85 See, for instance, Abdulaziz Al-Segeri, “al awlamah al siyasiyah: nadrah tarikhiyah” [Political 
Globalisation: A Historical View], Al-Jazirah, 29 December 2005, 25.
86 Abdulaziz Ibn Baz, “kaifa nuharib al gazo al thaqafi al garbi" [How We Battle Western Cultural 
Invasion], IbnBaz.Org <http://www.binbaz.org.sa/displayprint.asp?f=Bz00151 .htm&print=on> (January 
1984) accessed 15 December 2004.
87 See a brief study by Ibrahim Al-Taweel, “indhman al mamlakah al arabiyah al saodiyah li monadhamat 
al tijarah al a ’alamiyah wa a ’atharoh [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Accession to the WTO and its Impact]”, 
Al-Haramain Islamic Information Centre, 10 October 2004, viewed on line at 
<http://haramaincenter.co.Uk/text/drasat/10/l.htm> accessed 2 November 2004.
88 For more details, see R. Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle Over 
Human Rights in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 258.
89 Telhami, Hill, et al., “Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter?”.
90 See, for instance, Quds Press International, “dirasah: mushahidow ‘aljazeera’ wa ‘alarabiya’ akthar bi 
khmsat adhaf min ‘alhura’” [Study: Viewers o f ‘Aljazeera’ and ‘Alarabiyah’ are Five Times More than 
‘Alhura’s], 9 September 2004, viewed on line at <http://www.qudspress.com/data/aspx/dl3/7273.aspx> 
accessed 21 May 2006 and Nail Al-Jubeir, “Saudi Arabia Seeks to Change Image”, WishTV.com, 19 
October 2004, transcript was viewed on line at
<http://www.wishtv.com/global/story.asp?s=2450712&ClientType> accessed 23 December 2004.
91 Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia Business Briefing”.
92 For lengthy detail on the controversial film ‘Death of a Princess’, refer to Frontline TV show, “Death of a 
Princess”, 5 May 2005, transcript was viewed on line at
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/princess/etc/script.html> accessed 15 July 2006 and also 
Sa’id Aburish, The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall o f The House o f Saud (New York: St. Martin's 
Griffin, 1996) 80-81.
93 See Paul McGeough, “Inside the ‘Garden of Evil’”, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 October 2002, viewed in 
line at <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/04/1033538770724.html> accessed 6 October 2002.
94 See, for instance, Elizabeth Rubin, “The World; A Saudi Response on Reform: Round Up the Usual 
Dissidents”, The New York Times, 21 March 2004, viewed on line at
<http://www.nytimes.eom/2004/03/2 l/weekinreview/21rubi.html?ei=5007&en=d9a9eacd5f81f64a&ex= 139 
5205200&adxnnl=l&partnei^USERLAND&adxnnlx> accessed 26 October 2004.
95 News about the event were reported by Abdullah Al Shihri, an Associated Press writer, and published in 
several newspapers and other news networks.
96 The statement was circulated by the Saudi Press Agency in 26 May 2003 to news agencies and then 
quoted in several local and international newspapers. See, for instance, Isa Mubarak, “Saudi Poll Heralds 
First Timid Step to Reform”, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 October 2003, 10.
97 Abdullah Al-Shihri (Associated Press Writer), “Saudis: Fanatic May Not Be Teachers”, Herald Sun, 7 
September 2004, 7.
167
CHAPTER SIX
SAUDI ARABIA’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM
Introduction:
As previously indicated, the influence of the UN human rights mechanisms along 
with its relevant agencies constituted only one of several forms of influences propelling 
Saudi Arabia to response to demands for reform. After discussing major internal and 
external factors in earlier chapters, it is now appropriate to identify the main aspects of 
Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the UN human rights system since the late 1940s, including 
its position in relation to human rights issues discussed at the UN. It is central to this 
thesis to scrutinize Saudi Arabia’s engagement in, and interaction with, the UN human 
rights system and how that has influenced the situation of human rights in general and 
women’s rights in particular.
When the UN was established in 1945, Saudi Arabia was among the fifty-one 
original members who participated in the process of founding the UN and drafting its 
Charter.1 As a state-member in the UN during the formative years of establishing human 
rights conventions and declarations, Saudi Arabia had engaged in debates over some 
articles and statements, which reflected the Kingdom’s perspectives on human rights 
issues. With the exception of the Kingdom’s abstention during the voting to approve the 
UDHR in 1948, other aspects of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the UN human rights 
system have not yet been fully explored or critically examined.
When historically and critically reviewing how the Kingdom has interacted with 
and engaged in the UN human rights system, it is possible to identify two distinctive 
phases. Phase one involves the Kingdom’s activities in the process of debating and 
adopting principal international human rights documents, commencing in the late 1940s 
up to the early 1990s. The first section in this chapter, thus, examines mainly Saudi 
Arabia’s position during the deliberation and adoption of the UDHR and the other six 
major international conventions on human rights, namely the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (CCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
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Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Following the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the 
pattern of Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN human rights system has changed from 
merely endorsing international human rights instruments by casting its vote in favour of 
most resolutions that had created those instruments to becoming more involved in the 
activities of the UN human rights system, including ratifying human rights treaties. 
Therefore, the second section explores several aspects of the Kingdom’s involvement 
during the second phase (from the early 1990s to 2006), including its ratifications of 
human rights instruments and its interactions with various UN human rights mechanisms 
and bodies.
In the final section, this chapter briefly analyzes fne characteristics of each phase 
and identifies the circumstances under which Saudi Arabia had changed its behaviour of 
engagement in the UN human rights system. It also assesses whether changes taking 
place in the Kingdom since the early 1990s have any correlation with influences exerted 
by the UN human rights system.
1): Phase One (from the late 1940s to the early 1990s):
The UDHR is one of three pillars that lay down the international human rights 
standards. The other two are the 1966 CESCR and CCPR. Together, these three 
documents are known as the ‘International Bill of Rights’ because they have established 
the foundations for international human rights standards. While the CCPR and CESCR 
are legally binding treaties, the UDHR is considered an initial, primary declaratory 
statement designed to broadly establish benchmarks for the international community to 
observe certain standards of human rights.
Although Saudi Arabia was not one of the eighteen members of the UNCHR who 
drafted the initial text of the UDHR, the Kingdom’s representative to the UN participated 
intensively in the two-month debate and deliberation among all delegates to the UN 
General Assembly's (UNGA) Third Committee. Subsequently, the amended text of the 
declaration was referred to UNGA plenary for approval. On 10 December 1948, the
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UDHR was adopted and proclaimed by UNGA resolution 217 (III), without dissenting 
vote. The final voting result was 48 states were in favour and 8 states, among them Saudi 
Arabia, abstained. It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim country to 
abstain during the UDHR voting, and the other abstaining states were mostly communist 
states (the Soviet Union, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) 
and South Africa.
Contrary to perceptions that the countries with majority Muslim populations were 
not active in the formulation of the UDHR and the two covenants, Saudi Arabia, along 
with other Muslim countries, was actively involved in the debate and discussions over the 
UDHR and the proposed covenant at the UNGA’s Third Committee. UN records show 
that Jamil Al-Baroody,4 Saudi Arabia’s representative to the UN, energetically 
participated in discussions and was able to attract the attention of other states delegates by 
his articulate statements and vigorous arguments.
Al-Baroody’s argument recorded in UN documents revealed that Saudi Arabia’s 
abstention from the UNGA vote was due to its objections to Article 16 and Article 18 of 
the UDHR. Article 16, which deals with marriage and the family, declares that “men and 
women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the 
right to marry...” It also establishes the necessity of consent for marriage and equal rights 
in marriage. Saudi Arabia therefore expressed concerns regarding this Article, namely the 
age of marriage, sex equality in the marriage and banning limitations on marriage due to 
nationality or religion.
The notion of unspecified sex equality in the UDHR was objected to by Saudi 
Arabia and some other states as well. Article 16 of the UDHR states that men and women 
are “entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and as its dissolution.” 
Although the Kingdom’s opposition was not surprising since patriarchal elements in Saudi 
society are recognizable, the Saudi opposition was nevertheless not based explicitly on the 
maintenance of male superiority. Instead, its opposition was based on the argument that 
the authors of the drafted text had based too much on the standards recognized by the 
Western civilization and ignored the heritage of more ancient civilizations.5 The Saudi 
amendment to Article 16 proposed that men and women are “entitled to the full rights as 
defined in the marriage laws of their countries”,6 but the proposed amendment was 
rejected by most delegates because it would undermine the notion of universal human 
rights. UN records on the debate over Article 16 indicate that the Saudi representative
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argued that “it was not for the Committee to proclaim the superiority of one civilization 
over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the countries in the world.”7 In 
voicing his opinions, Al-Baroody pointed out that a Muslim woman could own, inherit 
and dispose of property, and that in the event of a divorce, she was entitled to a pre­
determined indemnity.
The second concern in Article 16 focused on the phrase that accorded marriage 
rights to men and women ‘of full age’, which Al-Baroody argued did not incorporate the 
notion of physiological development and proposed a replacement phrase ‘legal 
matrimonial age’ for legal age for marriage.8 As explained later in chapter seven, the age 
of marriage in mainstream Islamic jurisprudence is linked to physical signs by which a 
person reaches the age of maturity. Subsequently, Al-Baroody endorsed a substitute 
phrase ‘mature age’ proposed by Syria, in deference to objections raised by other 
delegations, which was unsuccessful.
Thirdly, as Article 16 clearly prohibits limitations in marriage due to race, 
nationality or religion, Saudi Arabia unsuccessfully attempted to amend such prohibition 
because a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry non-Muslim. Also, according to Saudi 
national law, neither male or female are allowed to marry a non-Saudi without obtaining a 
permit from the government. In order to limit provisions on sex equality in marriage, the 
issue of ‘full age’ and the banning of limitations on marriage due to nationality or religion, 
Al-Baroody’s proposals attempted to define or limit the stipulations by subjecting 
marriage rights mentioned in Article 16 to national laws. However, the result was that 
Saudi’s proposal for amendment on Article 16 failed by a large majority.
Saudi Arabia’s objection to Article 18 of the UDHR, which sought to establish the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, was also not surprising given the religious 
basis of the newly re-established Saudi state. The draft text prepared by the drafting 
committee of this article stated that “this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” While 
supporting the statement that “every one has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion”, Saudi Arabia principally objected to the provision of the right to change 
one’s religion and proposed to delete the phrase from the article.9 During the debate on 
this article, Al-Baroody expressed his surprise at the article’s elaboration on the right to 
change one’s religion even though it was not the only freedom that the article sought to
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guarantee. He did not focus on the Islamic context to ground his arguments on the fact 
that apostasy is forbidden in most Islamic jurisprudence’s schools of thought. Instead, he 
used technical grounds to argue, pointing out that drafters of the article left other freedoms 
with less emphasis than the freedom of religion and that the UNCHR has consulted 
religious NGOs but without any participants from Islamic countries.10 Furthermore, he 
argued that such inclination towards religion had resulted in crusades and religious wars, 
stating that “throughout history missionaries (he did not specify any religion) had often 
abused their rights by becoming the forerunners of a political intervention, and there were 
many instances where peoples had been drawn into murderous conflict by the 
missionaries’ efforts to convert them.”11
In most of his arguments, Jamil Al-Baroody did not focus on points of Islamic 
theology, though he was representing a country known for its Islamic, Wahhabi, 
conservatism. However, when he refrained from voting for the UDHR, it was likely that 
his decision to abstain was based on consideration of Wahhabi perspectives, especially in 
regard to the right to change one’s religion and issues of sex equality. In this respect, 
Saudi Arabia was the only country using frequently cultural and occasionally religious 
grounds to challenge the universality of some details in the UDHR.12
Criticisms made by Al-Baroody of the authors of UDHR because they “for the 
most part, taken into consideration only the standards recognized by Western civilization” 
and towards the UNCHR when he said “it was not for the Commission to proclaim the 
superiority of one civilization over all others...”13 reflected his advocacy of cultural 
relativity and fear of cultural colonialism. While the UDHR is principally tied to the 
notion of reason and conscience, Al-Baroody argued that the words ‘dignity and rights’ 
used in Article 1 “were ambiguous and had different meanings in different countries.”14 
He expressed his wish to avoid both metaphysical questions and words that would be 
subject to different interpretations and suggested that the text of Article 1 should state: 
“equality and freedom being the ultimate Human goal, all men should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”15
After the vote on the UDHR had been taken, many delegations exercised their 
rights to explain their votes or their reasons for abstention, but Saudi Arabia did not give 
an explanation for its abstention. Although Saudi Arabia abstained from the voting, it had 
cast its vote in favour of most articles in the UDHR. That most abstaining states were 
communist and Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim country, may undermine attempts to
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link Saudi Arabia’s abstention with a general understanding of the teachings of Islam. 
Furthermore, the position of Saudi Arabia in relation to the six major human rights 
treaties, as discussed later, has weakened any correlation of Saudi Arabia’s abstention to 
Islam. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to establish a linkage between Saudi Arabia’s 
argument and abstention during the UDHR voting and its understanding of Islam as 
envisaged by strict Wahhabism. Furthermore, if Wahhabism were sincerely taken into 
consideration, Saudi Arabia would vote against the UDHR. It is thus interesting to note 
that Saudi Arabia’s changing, and sometimes ambiguous, positions in relation to 
international human rights standards and instruments implies pragmatism of the Saudi 
government and reflects the malleability of the shari 'ah.
Because of its declaratory, unbinding nature, it took only two years (1946-1948) to 
finalize and adopt the UDHR. The negotiations of the two legally binding covenants 
(CESCR and CCPR) continued for more than sixteen years (1949-1966). During this 
period, Saudi Arabia was actively involved in debate and discussion over proposed 
articles in the two covenants. The two covenants are generally based on principles stated 
in the UDHR, which resulted in a reiteration of some of the arguments mainly on sex 
equality and the freedom of religion, by Saudi Arabia and other states, during the 
negotiation of the two covenants.
The first issue encountered in the formulation of a binding human rights treaty was 
whether to have one covenant or two. The question of socio-economic rights vis-ä-vis 
civil and political rights was introduced early in the UNGA Third Committee’s debate 
during drafting process of the UDHR text. After lengthy two-year debate over whether to 
separate socio-economic rights from civil and political rights, the UNGA Third 
Committee, by a vote of 29 to 21 with 6 abstentions, agreed to set up two separate 
instruments, dealing respectively with civil and political rights, and economic, social and 
cultural rights. Saudi Arabia, along with other states, was supportive of constructing one 
legal document with an expansion of articles to include rights to social security, education, 
free choice of employment and an adequate standard of living. Jamil Al-Baroody 
expressed serious reservations about splitting the covenants and regarded the separation as 
“artificial and arbitrary” given the interconnection and interdependent nature of human 
rights.16 He went on in following sessions with his critical view when he described the 
UNGA decision to draft two covenants as “a grave error.”17
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One of the critical issues brought to the debate on the CESCR and CCPR was the 
right to self-determination. Many delegates from Islamic and/or third world countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, were adamant that the peoples in non-self governing territories 
should enjoy the same rights as those in independent sovereign states, which include the 
right to self-determination. Saudi Arabia, and some other states, opposed the proposal by 
Western states that the responsibility of colonial powers to fully implement the covenants 
in their overseas colonies be limited. This was sometimes known as the ‘colonial 
clause’. This proposal was opposed by many delegates who described it as contrary to 
the UN Charter, which was based on the principle of equality of human rights.19
The proposal for the clause was buried at the UNGA Third Committee’s 1950 
session, when Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan successfully pushed for the passage of a 
resolution which called for the UNCHR to ensure that the right of self-determination for 
non-self governing territories were included. At a UNGA plenary session in 1951, Al- 
Baroody made a passionate, lengthy statement supporting the inclusion of an article 
affirming the right to self-determination. However, it was not until the 1955 session that 
the disputed article of self-determination was finally approved, by a vote of 33 to 12 with 
13 abstentions. As a result, ‘Article 1’ of both covenants with identical wording has 
been included to guarantee the right to self-determination.
When the draft of Article 18 of the CCPR, which is based on Article 18 of the 
UDHR regarding the right to change religion, was brought before the UNGA Third 
Committee for discussion, Saudi Arabia’s representative urged that the phrase should be 
deleted. While avoiding referring to Islamic teachings on the subject, he cautiously 
notified the meeting of possible consequences of such provision in the Muslim world. He 
also repeated what he had said during the UDHR deliberation on how missionaries had 
often abused their rights and how such a right could promote proselytism. Al-Baroody 
had drawn the UNGA’s attention on several occasions to the point that Article 18 would 
give preferential treatment to missionary religions, affirming that Islam “had never 
engaged in systematic proselytizing.” Therefore, he called for a deletion of the words 
“freedom to maintain or to change his religion...”.23 Following a prolonged debate, the 
Third Committee approved an amendment to Article 18, by a vote of 54 to 0, with 15 
abstentions among them Saudi Arabia,24 in which the controversial phrase ‘freedom to 
change’ became ‘freedom to have or to adopt’ in the finally approved text of Article 18 of 
the CCPR.
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Article 3 of both the CCPR and the CESCR has been designated to guarantee 
equality of men and women with respect to the rights set forth in both covenants. Also, 
Article 23 of the CCPR is on the protection of family and marriage and has an explicit 
confirmation of the equality of rights of spouses and of the age of marriage. The term 
‘full age’ in Article 16 of the UDHR, which had caused an extended debate in 1948, was 
changed to ‘marriageable age’ in the CCPR. The UNCHR, of which Saudi Arabia was 
not a member, approved this change. Furthermore, the UNCHR decided to remove a 
controversial phrase ‘without limitation due to race, religion or nationality’ from the draft 
text of this article.
Arguments by Saudi Arabia’s representative during the UNGA meetings to discuss 
the text of the two covenants mirrored concerns over some issues. In the end, however, 
Saudi Arabia showed its support for the two legally binding covenants when it voted in 
favour of the CCPR arid the CESCR. Prior to final endorsement, the UNGA Third 
Committee unanimously approved the draft texts of the two covenants. At the UNGA 
Plenary meeting on 16 December 1966, both the CCPR and the CESCR were 
unanimously adopted with no abstentions. At the same meeting, Saudi Arabia was 
among the 38 abstaining states during the UNGA voting on the Optional Protocol to the 
CCPR,27 which enabled the UNCHR to receive and consider communications from 
individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any rights set forth in the CCPR.
Prior to the approval of the two covenants, the CERD was adopted by the UNGA 
resolution 2106A (XX) of 21 December 1965. Saudi Arabia was among the states that 
voted for the adoption of the CERD. The debate on, and the complications of, CERD 
were not as controversial as the two covenants, and its adoption was by a vote of 106 to 0
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against with 1 abstention.
During the first stage of interaction with the UN human rights system, Saudi 
Arabia had ratified some international treaties that were part of the UN efforts to combat 
different forms of discrimination. Although Saudi Arabia abolished slavery in the early
291960s, under international pressure mainly from President John Kennedy and the UN, 
the Kingdom ratified the Slavery Convention of 1926 on 5 July 1973.30 In June 1978, 
Saudi Arabia came closer to the legally-binding labour rights standards when it ratified, at 
once, four international labour conventions; namely the International Labour Convention 
No. 29 of 1930 concerning forced labour,31 International Labour Convention No. 100 of 
1951 concerning equality of opportunity and treatment of men and women, International
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Labour Convention No. 105 of 1957 concerning abolition of forced labour, and 
International Labour Convention No. I l l  of 1958 concerning discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.34
CEDAW was drafted in the second half of the 1970s. UN records, at both the 
UNGA Plenary and Third Committee meetings in which all states are participant 
members, showed diminishing participation by Saudi representatives. Saudi Arabia did 
not actively engage in the debate during the drafting process, and its participation was 
seen mostly in voting on the CEDAW text amendments and articles. In most cases, the 
Kingdom abstained from voting, except if the proposed amendment would limit the scope
t r
of text, such as voting to delete the phrase ‘in all its forms’ from Article 2.
When the final text of CEDAW was presented for approval before the UNGA 
Third Committee, Saudi Arabia abstained along with another 13 states. Ten days later, the 
CEDAW was adopted by UNGA resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 through a roll 
call vote of 130 to 0 with 10 abstentions (and 10 absents). Saudi Arabia w'as among those 
who abstained from the voting. The abstaining states were Bahrain, Brazil, Comoros,
i / r
Haiti, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Senegal.
The UNGA Third Committee unanimously approved CAT, and later CAT was 
adopted without a vote by UNGA resolution 39/46 at the UNGA Plenary meeting on 10 
December 1984.37 Similarly, the CRC was also adopted without a vote on 10 November 
1989. The two conventions are considered the most universally accepted human rights 
documents. Saudi Arabia’s engagement during the debate over the text of these two 
conventions was limited to casting its vote mostly in favour of articles, while abstaining 
from voting on articles that establish procedures for monitoring or arbitration.
Interesting in this historical review of Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the UN 
human rights system are some noticeable aspects of Saudi interaction. As a founding 
member state of the UN, Saudi Arabia engaged from the early days in discussions over 
human rights. The Kingdom actively participated in the debate over the creation of the 
international human rights conventions, especially during the deliberations of the 
international bill of rights (UDHR, CESCR and CCPR). Secondly, despite its widely 
known abstention on the UDHR voting, the Kingdom’s pattern of voting clearly showed 
that it did not vote against human rights treaties. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia 
demonstrated its support for the international human rights project when it approved 
(without vote) or voted for international human rights conventions with the exception of
33
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its abstention on the CEDAW voting. Finally, UN records revealed that Saudi Arabia 
during Al-Baroody’s era had played a vigorous and active role in discussing and arguing 
over various human rights issues.
2): Phase Two (from the early 1990s to 2006):
This stage has witnessed various developments not only in Saudi Arabia’s 
behaviour towards the UN human rights system but also in the world as whole. The end 
of the Cold War, the Gulf War in 1991, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
War on terrorism have had profound impacts around the world and particularly on Saudi 
Arabia. Since the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia has taken unprecedented steps towards more 
engagement in the UN human rights system. Saudi Arabia became responsive to inquiries 
by the UNCHR Special Rapporteurs and by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights.39 More importantly, Saudi Arabia has joined, during this 
period, the international human rights legal arrangements. Consequently, Saudi Arabia 
has become legally subject to limitations and guidelines set forth by those four treaties.
A- Being Part of the International Legal Human Rights Arrangements:
Saudi Arabia’s first move to accede to the legally binding international human 
rights treaties was its accession to the CRC in January 1996. However, its accession to the 
CRC was conditioned with a generalized reservation that Saudi Arabia shall not be bound 
by articles of the CRC where they may conflict with provisions of Islamic law.40 In 
accordance with Article 44 of the CRC, Saudi Arabia has to submit periodical reports on 
measures adopted that give effect to rights recognized by the CRC. The Kingdom’s initial 
report was due in 1998, two years after accession to the convention, but was not submitted 
till March 2000.
In January 2001, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee) 
considered the initial report of Saudi Arabia.41 After welcoming a number of 
developments in the Kingdom related to human rights, the Committee found the report to 
be “essentially legalistic and does not provide a self-critical evaluation of the prevailing 
situation of the exercise of children's rights in the country.”42 The Committee observed 
that the narrow interpretations of Islamic texts by the Saudi authorities are obstructing the 
enjoyment of many human rights protected under CRC and expressed, inter alia, concerns
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that persons under 18 could be prosecuted and punished for crimes in the same manner as 
adults. Furthermore, some of its main concerns were that the broad and imprecise nature 
of reservations potentially negated convention provisions, and that despite the policies laid 
out, there was a significant gap between theory and practice. The Committee also 
observed that rights recognized by the CRC were still not reflected in the basic laws; there 
was a lack of systematic data collection and planning and a low level of awareness among 
public and professionals working with children.43
During meetings with the Committee in February 2002, Saudi Arabia responded to 
some of the comments made on its initial report. The all-male delegation defended the 
report referring to the shari ’ah which “protected children and guaranteed respect for their 
rights.”44 Members in the Saudi delegation also said “Islam gave children a privileged 
position and viewed the family as the basic unit of society and the natural environment in 
which every child should grow up and develop.”45 They reiterated the policies, measures 
and institutions of the Kingdom that have been developed in line with fne convention and 
noted that customary practices derived from popular traditions rather than from the 
shari’ah still existed which might be considered discriminatory. They informed the 
Committee that public awareness campaigns were being carried out in order to eliminate 
such practices.46
One year later, subsequent to its accession to the CRC, Saudi Arabia acceded to 
the CAT in September 1997, with two specific reservations, namely not recognizing the 
jurisdiction of the Committee as provided in Article 20 and not being bound by the 
provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 30, as indicated earlier in chapter one. In line with 
the requirements of the convention, Saudi Arabia submitted its initial report (due in 1998) 
in February 2001. The report started with an introduction in which the Kingdom generally 
endorsed the UDHR and consequent human rights covenants, conventions and protocols, 
noting that the shari’ah guaranteed human rights and subsequently listing how the 
convention’s articles are incorporated into Saudi laws. The initial Saudi report presented 
numerous laws relevant to the Convention, including the law prohibiting torture during 
investigations, which stipulates that “confessions should result from thorough and careful 
investigation without torture.”47 During meetings of the Committee against Torture (the 
Committee) with a Saudi delegation to discuss the initial report, one of the Kingdom’s 
representatives said his delegation felt the Committee’s questions reflected its lack of 
understanding of Saudi Arabia and ignorance of the fact that the Qur ’an and the Sunnah
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were the constitution, which cannot be amended.48 The delegation defended the use of 
corporal punishments for certain crimes as dictates of the Qur'an and said that these 
sanctions could neither be abrogated nor amended since they emanated from God, and the 
state was bound to refrain from taking any decision that ran counter to shari'ah. Using 
technical, legal grounds to defend the application of corporal punishments, the delegation 
argued that those sanctions are not forms of torture according to the meaning of Article 1 
of CAT, which excluded pain arising from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.49
In its concluding remarks, the Committee welcomed positive aspects, including the 
competence of the Board of Grievances to hear allegations of violations of human rights, 
but expressed concern over a number of matters, particularly the allegations of prolonged 
pre-trial detention of some individuals and the “sentencing to, and imposition of, corporal 
punishments by judicial and administrative authorities, including, in particular, flogging 
and amputation of limbs, that are not in conformity with the Convention.”50 The 
Committee made several recommendations to the Kingdom to implement, including 
clearly incorporating the crime of torture into Saudi domestic law and re-examination of 
corporal punishments, which are, in the Committee view, in breach of the Convention.
Pursuant to its obligations under the CAT, the Saudi government announced in 
March 2000 the establishment of a committee to investigate allegations of torture. 51 
Also, as indicated earlier in chapter four, the newly adopted Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which came into force in May 2002, addresses some of Saudi Arabia's obligations under 
the CAT by specifying legal procedures and due-process rights.
In addition to its accession to CAT on 27 September 1997, Saudi Arabia acceded 
to the CERT) on the same date, with a general reservation declaring that Saudi Arabia will 
implement the provisions of the Convention as long as they are not in conflict with 
precepts of the shari'ah. Also, the Kingdom made a specific reservation as not to be 
bound by Article 22 concerning referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.52 
Under the Convention, Saudi Arabia was required to submit initial and second periodic 
reports in October 1998 and 2000 respectively. However, it submitted both reports as one 
document in August 2001, which outlined the legal framework in which the convention 
will be upheld in Saudi Arabia. The Committee of the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (the Committee) reviewed Saudi Arabia’s report in March 2003 and noted 
some positive aspects of reforms in the field of human rights in the Kingdom, including 
the enactment of new codes related to the judicial system and that Saudi Arabia will soon
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accede to the CCPR and CESCR.54 Furthermore, the Committee expressed in 19 points its 
concerns and recommendations, which include that "guarantees of non-discrimination laid 
down in law, without mechanism to monitor their application, do not on their own ensure 
the enjoyment of non-discrimination.”55 The Committee also noted that Saudi Arabia's 
report did not provide sufficient information on the difficulties that affected CERD’s full 
implementation and on the government’s efforts to promote racial tolerance in fields such 
as school curricula and public information campaigns.
Saudi Arabia has repeatedly declared in its statements before the UNCHR that 
Islamic law contains a comprehensive system of human rights, which rejects racial 
discrimination. At the application level, it stated that the necessary legal and 
administrative reforms to fulfil the Kingdom’s obligations under relevant international 
treaties, including CERD, have been implemented.56
In September 2000, Saudi Arabia acceded to the CEDAW, with a general 
reservation that it would not be obliged to observe the terms that were contrary to Islam. 
Also, it would not be bound by Article 29 (1), concerning bringing disputes with other 
states to the International Court of Justice. The second specific reservation was that Saudi 
Arabia will not be bound by Article 9 (2), which grants women equal rights with men in 
respect to the nationality of their children.57 Saudi Arabia, like other countries acceding 
the Convention, is legally bound to put the Convention’s provisions into practice. Parties 
are also committed to submit reports, at least every four years, on measures they have 
taken to comply with their treaty obligations. However, so far Saudi Arabia has not 
submitted its initial report, which was due in October 2001.58 (More details are presented 
in the following chapters on women’s rights).
Saudi Arabia increasingly pursues its objective to more fully be a part of the 
international legal and institutional system and not limited only to the area of human 
rights. The Kingdom has shown interest in joining other international institutional 
arrangements since the establishment of the UN, but of direct interest to this thesis are 
those arrangements relevant to human rights. As indicated earlier, earlier moves to join 
international institutional arrangements included Saudi Arabia’s ratifications of the 1970s 
of international conventions related to eradicating slavery and protecting labour rights.
From 1993, Saudi Arabia was an applicant for participation in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), up to its admission in 2006. Seeking to join the WTO has added to 
pressure to open up the political and economic systems in the Kingdom. Although the
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WTO is principally a multilateral trade system with no capacity to interpret, apply, or 
enforce other treaties, the human rights aspects of trade cover a wide range of moral, 
ethical, political, social and legal issues.59 Human rights could be therefore considered an 
indirect connection with the facilitation of trade liberalization.60 As discussed in chapter 
five, the requirements for joining the WTO have encouraged Saudi Arabia to fulfil 
conditions set for joining the WTO, within which some aspects of human rights have been 
positively influenced. In another move to participate more fully in existing international 
arrangements, Majlis Al-Shura applied for membership in the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU), but it was not until April 2003 that the Majlis Al-Shura was admitted as a member 
in the IPU after the granting of a greater legislative role to the Majlis Al-Shura and a larger 
participatory role to women in it.
B- Saudi Arabia’s interactions with the UN Human Rights System:
□ The 1503 Procedure:
One of the most significant events contributing to Saudi Arabia’s increased 
interaction with the UN human rights system was the consideration of the situation of 
human rights in the Kingdom under the confidential 1503 procedure from 1995 to 1999.61 
Under this procedure, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (the Sub-Commission) is authorized to investigate communications (complaints) 
that appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human 
rights and to refer them to the Commission. Being the main subsidiary body of the 
UNCHR, the Sub-Commission is also charged with performing other functions including 
undertaking studies and making recommendations to the UNCHR on various matters 
concerning human rights.
In the early 1990s, the sub-commission received information from some 
individuals and groups that had persuaded it, beginning in 1995, to consider the situation 
of human rights in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s human rights record became the subject, 
for the first time, of scrutiny under the 1503 procedure. According to the rules of the 1503 
procedure, it is up to the sub-Commission whether or not to refer the matter the UNCHR, 
which would, if it decided to do so, mean ending confidentiality and opening the door for 
passing a resolution on the matter.
Saudi Arabia took the matter seriously while the details of complaints were still in 
the confidential stage. Taking into consideration the consequences of the possible passage
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of a resolution condemning violations of human rights in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom had 
to re-examine its strategies in dealing with the UN human rights system. Responding to 
these communications, which were presumably related to the lack of justice safeguards in 
the Saudi judicial system, the Kingdom provided the Sub-Commission with detailed 
documents on some specific cases of alleged human rights violations and also on Saudi 
Arabia’s judicial system. At its 1999 session, the UNCHR decided to discontinue that 
consideration.62 The confidential nature of the procedure means that the Sub-Commission 
does not publicly explain the reasons for its decisions. However, the UK government, in 
its 1999 annual report on human rights, stated that the UN Sub-Commission “concluded 
that Saudi Arabia had responded sufficiently to complaints about human rights violations, 
including about its judicial system.” The report continued “the Commission expressed 
appreciation for the progress achieved by Saudi Arabia, including its increased willingness 
to work with the Commission and other human rights organizations and mechanisms.”64
a Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups:
Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN human rights system has seen an 
increasing sense of accountability not limited only to providing detailed answers to 
queries posed by international bodies such as the Sub-Committee, but also including 
providing answers to, and responding positively to requests by, the UNCHR Special 
Rapporteurs and Working Groups on various subjects. Since the early 1990s, numerous 
UNCHR Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups on various themes had questioned 
some of Saudi Arabia’s human rights policies and investigated some cases of alleged 
human rights abuses. In all UN documents reviewed by the researcher,65 Saudi Arabia 
had provided information, with delay sometimes, to those inquiries or concerns 
transmitted by the UNCHR Special Rapporteurs or Working Groups. Regardless of the 
significance of such inquiries on the substance of each issue, this process of interaction 
with the UN human rights system signifies a formal level of response about the conduct of 
the Saudi authorities.
One of the earliest inquiries during this period was when UNCHR Special 
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Mr. Angelo Ribeiro, received information in 1993 
that Shiite Muslims in the Kingdom were discriminated against and attacked. When these 
allegations were brought to the attention of the Saudi government, its response was that it 
had the prerogative to ignore what it perceived as derogatory allegations that were
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unfounded. This is because, it argued, all Saudi citizens are Muslims and that such 
allegations stemmed from political motivations to disturb law and order.66 Four years 
later, the UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Mr. Abdelatif Amro, 
received a comprehensive reply from Saudi Arabia on the treatment of non-Muslim and 
Shiite Muslims in the Kingdom, with detailed information on shari ’ah laws in this regard. 
In his report to the 1997 UNGA session, the Special Rapporteur thanked the Saudi 
authorities for their detailed response and welcomed and valued their firm intention to 
cooperate with him and with all human rights bodies. It is worth noting that the human 
rights of Shiites have been improving since the 1994 agreement between the government 
and Saudi Shiite leaders who were then living in exile.
In 1995, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention passed on questions to the 
Saudi government regarding several individuals (Sunni Islamists) who were allegedly 
subjected to arbitrary detention. Decision No 48/1995 (Saudi Arabia) adopted in 
December 1995 by that Working Group noted with appreciation the information 
forwarded by the Kingdom within 90 days of the transmittal of the Working Group’s 
letter. Despite the provided information, the decision by the Working Group declared the 
detention of those individuals to be arbitrary in accordance with international human 
rights instruments.68
The above-mentioned present only few examples of Saudi Arabia’s interactions 
with the UNCHR Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups, but the most significant 
event in this regard was Saudi Arabia’s consent to a request by the UNCHR Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Mr. Dato P. Cumaraswamy, to 
visit the Kingdom on a fact-finding mission. Saudi Arabia announced, in its statement 
before the 2000 UNCHR session, that the Kingdom duly notified Mr. Cumaraswamy of a 
positive reply to his request to visit the Kingdom.69
In the light of information related to allegedly unfair trials, access to lawyers and 
an apparent lack of transparency in the judicial process in Saudi Arabia, the first ever- 
official visit to Saudi Arabia by a UNCHR special rapporteur took place in October 2002. 
Mr. Cumaraswamy met with senior officials and examined law, policy and practice in the 
Kingdom’s administration of justice. At the end of his mission, he held a press conference 
noting that the justice system is “currently in a stage of transition” and that the Kingdom 
lacks "a culture of legal representation in the courts but this may soon be rectified.”70 He
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also said Saudi Arabia had shown “the utmost cooperation” and that he “was given the 
opportunity to meet whomever he wanted and visit any place he desired.”71
In his report submitted to the 2003 UNCHR session, Mr. Cumaraswamy pointed 
out that the legal system in the Kingdom has been the subject of reform in the last decade 
and highlighted the independence of the judiciary in the Saudi legal system. However, 
he made several recommendations for improvements to the judicial system including the 
need to improve transparency by making more information available to the public, and 
privately to the involved parties, about the legal processes. The Special Rapporteur 
encouraged the offering of training on human rights laws to officials through OHCHR 
technical assistance programs. In several parts of his report, he was critical of the absence 
of females from the judicial system and urged the Saudi government to make the judiciary 
more representative by allowing women to be lawyers and even judges, knowing that 
approximately 50 percent of graduates in the sharVah law are women.
a UN Bodies and Saudi Arabia’s Membership:
Saudi Arabia’s participation in the works of the UN mostly remained in forums at 
which all members of the UN were represented during the first phase (late 1940s-early 
1990s).74 Realizing the benefits of becoming more involved in the UN human rights 
mechanisms, Saudi Arabia has taken moves towards obtaining membership in various UN 
human rights arrangements. While the Kingdom’s interest in seeking membership in 
various UN bodies had started to change from the early 1980s, when it became a member 
of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in early 1980s (1981-1983), that 
interest has largely intensified since the mid 1990s. Saudi Arabia was able to acquire 
membership of ECOSOC in late 1990s (1999-2001 and 2003-2005). Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia succeed in becoming a member of some subsidiary bodies of ECOSOC including 
the Commission on Sustainable Development (1996-1998 and 2003-2005), Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), and 
the Governing Council of the UN Human Settlements Programme (2004-2007).
A noteworthy step towards direct involvement in the activities of the UN human 
rights system was Saudi Arabia’s nomination, for the first time, to membership of the 
UNCHR. Saudi Arabia was able to secure a seat with a landslide majority vote in the 
2000 election. Since 2001, Saudi Arabia has become a member in the Commission and 
was able to win another three-year term at the 2003 election.75 Following the creation of
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the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006, which has replaced the highly politicized 
UNCHR, Saudi Arabia obtained the required votes and gained a seat for a third three-year 
term in the new Council.
Within this connection, Saudi Arabia has made since the mid 1990s several 
nominations to posts in UN agencies related to human rights and social activities. Those 
nominations reflect the Kingdom’s new interest in becoming more involved in 
international arrangements. The most notable event was the nomination in 1999 of Dr. 
Ghazi Al-Qusaibi77 for the post of Director General of the UN Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Practices of human rights in the Kingdom were an 
issue for the Saudi candidate during the campaign, at which he confirmed his full 
commitment to human rights according to the UNESCO standards. However, Al- 
Qusaibi did not succeed in obtaining the necessary votes to win that post in the November 
1999 election.
Following its accession to the CRC in 1996, Saudi Arabia nominated Dr. Torahim 
Al-Sheddi79 to the membership of the UN Committee of the Rights of the Child. 
Although the nomination was unsuccessful in the first attempt, Al-Sheddi attained the 
necessary votes to become a member of that Committee in 2001. He was re-nominated
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for the 2003 election and retained his membership for another term.
In January 2001, Dr. Thoraya Obaid became the executive director of the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA), when the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed her to 
this position. She is the first Saudi national to head a UN agency, and her achievement 
was widely publicized in the Saudi media. In April 2001, she was received by several top 
officials, including the King and the Crown Prince. Despite appointees to this position 
requiring to show they have worked towards and advocated notions such as sex equality, 
Saudi Arabia responded to her appointment as an achievement by all Saudi women.
C- Major Aspects of Saudi Arabia’s interactions with the UN Human Rights 
System:
Saudi Arabia regularly attends UN conferences, sessions and meetings related to 
human rights and delivers statements at these forums. Its statements naturally convey the 
Kingdom’s positions towards debated issues and signify its level of involvement and 
engagement in the international human rights system. Therefore, it is appropriate to
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explore major actions reflecting that engagement and the principal elements in Saudi 
Arabia’s statements at various UN human rights forums.
The first major engagement during this stage was Saudi Arabia’s participation with 
a high-level delegation82 in the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 
June 1993. In its statement before the Conference, the Kingdom pointed out its adherence
83to Islamic values that furnish mankind with guarantees of rights and freedoms. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia alluded to the cultural relativity of human rights when it called 
to “take into consideration differences in the natures of societies, their customs, traditions 
and beliefs” in order to address international problems involving violations of human 
rights. However, Saudi Arabia joined other states in the international community in 
adopting by consensus the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, in which the 
universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights have been reaffirmed 
and stating that the “promotion of protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of 
the international community.”85
It is interesting to note that most statements delivered by Saudi Arabia contained 
two visible elements: a reference to Islam; and a signal of the need to take cultural and 
social considerations into account when applying universal human rights norms as defined 
by international human rights instruments. Saudi Arabia has refrained from unequivocally 
rejecting universally-recognized standards of human rights, but always calls, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, for the need to take into consideration diversity of cultures in the 
world. As was the case in Saudi Arabia’s statement in the Vienna Conference, Saudi 
Arabia noted in an address before the UNGA Third Committee in December 1996 that the 
shari ’ah guarantees for Saudi citizens all rights included in the UDHR and called for a 
need to take into consideration various cultural and social particularities of a diverse
oz:
world. Similarly, Crown Prince Abdullah, in his speech at the UN Millennium Summit 
in September 2000 and after endorsing UN efforts in the field of human rights, pointed at 
an Islamic perception of the origin of human rights, in which human rights are seen as a 
gift from Allah. He also plainly expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of one culture 
trying to impose its own views on others and stated “it is absurd to impose on an
07
individual or a society rights that are alien to its beliefs or principles.”
Saudi Arabia was among those, mainly developing and under-developing, 
countries who place a great emphasis on the right to development. Through its statements 
at UN sessions and meetings, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its support to the right of
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development. It displayed its efforts in assisting developing and least-developed countries 
for the realization of that right.88 While supporting countries’ right to development, Saudi 
Arabia stressed the importance of allowing counties to choose their own models of 
development, “without being put under pressure to conform to specific modes of 
thoughts.”89
3): Saudi Arabia and the UN Human Rights System: Analysis and 
Comparison:
In order to understand why Saudi Arabia has changed its pattem of engagement in 
the UN human rights system, from a limited involvement during the first phase to a 
tendency to be part of the international human rights arrangements during the second 
phase, it is essential to identify major aspects of international political dynamics during 
the first period compared with the second period. Moreover, it is equally important to 
examine and compare the domestic changes that have urged Saudi Arabia to take a 
different approach in dealing with the UN human rights system.
Prior to the 1990s, two opposing ideologies during the Cold War shaped 
discussions about most international issues, including human rights. Disagreement over 
the equality of human rights, however, lessened by the end of the Cold War and was 
followed by reaffirmation of the indivisibility of human rights in the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration. Another aspect of the period subsequent to 1990 has been the growing 
attention given to human rights. While the issue of human rights was part of the 
ideological conflict between West and East camps, the importance of human rights has 
increased internationally following the end of the Cold War. Although international 
human rights instruments, such as the two covenants, were adopted as early as mid 1960s, 
it took more than ten years for them to come into force, while other instruments entered 
into force in the late 1980s. Thus, the construction of the core legally-binding 
international human rights treaties was completed just before the end of the first phase; the 
CRC was adopted in November 1989 and came into force in September 1990.
At the domestic level, the issue of human rights received negligible attention 
among Saudis during the first stage. Reviewing what was in the Saudi media during that 
period revealed that neither the government nor the people showed an interest in 
discussing human rights as such. Ideological matters such as Islamism, communism, and
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liberalism and political questions such as the conflicts in Palestine or Afghanistan 
preoccupied public and intellectual lives. However, a variety of international and national 
circumstances have changed the ways of approaching some issues in Saudi Arabia, 
including human rights.
One of the most remarkable phenomena of the second phase was the revolution in 
information technologies, as the increased flow of information has become a contributing 
factor in protecting human rights and advancing the process of awareness and learning. 
Saudi Arabia, like other states, came to realize that the possibility of subjecting state 
conduct to domestic or international publicity or scrutiny has increased substantially. On 
the other hand, human rights governmental and non-governmental bodies and activists, 
including the UN, have become more aware of the details of human rights situations all 
over the world and have further means to communicate with states and peoples about 
human rights. Another aspect of the second phase was the Gulf War of 1991, an 
international event that had tangible consequences to the region, and had a major impact 
on Saudis’ thinking about themselves and the world around them. As indicated in chapter 
four, political, social and economic issues in Saudi Arabia became a focus of the world 
media that was now able to reach the Saudi public. In addition to questioning political 
and social policies, the Saudi public started to examine the taken-for-granted notion of 
being able to preserve a unique, closed country and to maintain a balance between 
modernity and tradition. The ramifications associated with the 1991 Gulf War coincided 
with an unprecedented flow of information into, and out of, the Kingdom, which 
highlighted various political and social concerns in Saudi Arabia including the shortage of 
safeguards for human rights and the lack of freedoms as envisaged by international human 
rights standards.
When reviewing Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the activities of the UN human 
rights system and its voting pattern during the formative era of international human rights 
standards, it is worth noting that, despite its rare abstentions, Saudi Arabia cast its vote in 
favour of nearly all resolutions that have constructed the international human rights 
treaties’ system. However, Saudi Arabia’s abstention during the UNGA voting to approve 
the UDHR has notably led some critics to generalize about the Saudi position in relation 
to the international human rights project. Contrary to an assumption that Saudi Arabia 
opposed or was disengaged from the human rights project, Saudi Arabia was represented
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by an eloquent diplomat who participated actively and forcefully in UN debates leading to 
the creation of the principal international human rights documents and institutions.90
It has been argued that the refusal of the Saudi Arabian representative to the UN to 
vote for the UDHR might be interpreted as rationalizing existing hierarchies and 
oppression through the exploitation of Islam.91 Nevertheless, what is unambiguous is that 
Saudi Arabia avoided approving articles, declarations or treaties that were deemed to be 
clearly contrary to its interpretation of Islam or breaching its sovereignty. While always 
avoiding opposing explicitly internationally-recognized human rights standards, Saudi 
Arabia has constantly been a believer and promoter of a form of cultural relativity that 
would allow the Kingdom to disregard those standards deemed contradictory to its 
understanding of the shari ’ah.
Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has been relatively active in debates over a 
variety of political and social issues presented before the UN bodies, the formative period 
witnessed only the endorsement of international human rights conventions without making 
any legal commitment to implement international human rights standards. During the first 
period (from the later 1940s to the early 1990s), Saudi Arabia showed little interest in 
seeking membership in various UN committees, and its participation was limited to UN 
bodies in which all states are members. That position, however, has changed, as the 
Kingdom became more involved in the activities of the UN human rights system since the 
early 1990s.
The submission of reports by Saudi Arabia to watchdog committees within the 
international human rights treaties’ system, however, was a significant event. Saudi 
Arabia redefined its perception of the notion of sovereignty, when its internal conduct 
become subject to questioning by international bodies. Saudi delegations that participated 
in discussing the country reports with treaties committees have confirmed that comments 
and recommendations on Saudi Arabia’s reports would be taken seriously by their
92government.
Conclusion:
For Saudi Arabia, the purpose of engaging in the UN human rights system was to 
attempt to influence the outcome of that system, especially working to prevent possible 
moves that may cause shaming, or give publicity to what might be considered as human
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rights violations in the Kingdom. Also, the Kingdom has a genuine interest in 
demonstrating to the rest of the world that human rights as observed in Saudi Arabia are 
not only in accordance with the shari’ah but also compatible with, or at least not in 
violation of, the internationally-recognized human rights standards. As reviewed in this 
chapter, Saudi Arabia’s engagement in, and interaction with, the UN human rights system 
has increased since 1990s, but what is important is to look at such involvement as a 
primary step in the process of socializing Saudi Arabia into human rights.
As discussed in previous chapters, several developments in the Kingdom related to 
human rights have taken place in recent years, notably the establishment of institutions 
and the passage of laws that aimed to offer more protection of human rights. With yet 
minor changes in the substance, such moves constitute crucial steps in the construction of 
a course of action that may change the situation of human rights substantially in the long 
term. Apart from the real outcome of such steps, the question posed here is to what extent 
such developments can be attributed to influences by UN human rights system. The 
general reservations expressed by the Kingdom when it joined the international legally 
binding arrangements are among the factors explaining the absence of any short-term 
impact from the UN human rights system. Nevertheless, although influences from the UN 
human rights system appeared to be insignificant prior to the Kingdom’s late involvement, 
since the early 1990s, it is likely to have had more positive impacts over the years in the 
context of the process of socialization, awareness and learning. Significantly, the UN 
human rights system has provided the necessary conditions, by codifying human rights 
principles through its universal declarations and conventions, for empowering and 
legitimizing other forms of influence.
By becoming part of the international legal arrangements, it added another factor 
to other circumstances that influenced positively the situation of human rights in Saudi 
Arabia, at least at the structural level of institutions and laws. The following chapters will 
explore women’s rights as a case study in this thesis, in order to provide a clearer 
understanding of the correlation between the UN human rights system and developments 
in women’s rights in the Kingdom.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
(PART I)
Women in Saudi Arabia and Factors Affecting their Status
Introduction:
There are various reasons for selecting women’s rights in Saudi Arabia as a case 
study, in an attempt to examine more specifically the extent to which developments of 
human rights in Saudi Arabia have been influenced by the UN human rights system. In 
looking at debates on human rights in Saudi Arabia, the status of women in the Kingdom 
is recognized as one of the most central and controversial human rights issues at both 
domestic and international levels.
Based on the theoretical foundations of this thesis, positive changes in compliance 
with, and diffusion of, international human rights norms, particularly those rights related 
to societal dynamics, can be better understood in the context of a process of socialization. 
As women’s rights are closely connected with the social aspects of Saudi life, they 
provide a case study that is strongly relevant to the theoretical framework. Moreover, 
issues related to developments in women’s affairs in the Kingdom have received 
considerable attention from the public and the government as well as from external actors. 
Unlike other issues of human rights, there are substantial volumes of literature on the 
status of women in Islam and on the role of women in Saudi society. Violations and 
restrictions of the rights of women, either by governmental policies or social practices, are 
not subject to denial, unlike other human rights violations, as Saudis at official and public 
levels openly consider such ‘restrictions’ as a part of Islamic values and local traditions.
The progress of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia is surely linked to various changes 
in the political, economic and social environments in the Kingdom, without excluding the 
importance of the worldwide atmosphere. However, identifying the extent to which such 
developments have been influenced, or could be influenced, by factors other than the UN 
human rights system is both fundamental and instrumental in answering the central 
question of this thesis. This chapter, therefore, not only explores the status of women in
194
Saudi Arabia but also examines internal and external circumstances that have influenced 
women’s rights.
The chapter is concerned with two fundamental questions; what is the status of 
women in Saudi Arabia; and to what extent factors other than the UN human rights system 
have influenced the changed situation of Saudi women? Saudi Arabia’s position on 
woman’s issues has been often associated with both Islamic views and local traditions. In 
order to explore the status of women in Saudi Arabia, two essential issues closely 
connected to the Saudi social and political climate have to be addressed. The religion of 
Islam and the traditions and customs of Arabs are both important components of Saudi 
society. Therefore, the chapter investigates the status of women in Islam as stated in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah and interpreted in the shari’ah. It also identifies, in the second 
section, perspectives on women in the Arab, tribal culture in general and the current Saudi 
culture in particular.
Following exploration of these two fundamental issues, the third section examines 
the status of women in Saudi Arabia, including their right to education, their right to work 
and the political climate that has influenced developments in their rights. Being 
instrumental in the realization of other rights, women’s rights to education and work have 
been particularly contentious because they are connected with women’s mobility and in 
empowering their role in private and public settings. It is therefore crucial to explore 
developments related to women’s education and employment and their influence on the 
role played by Saudi women. Moreover, it is essential to examine some of the political 
turbulences, which have impacted upon the political climate and ultimately the status of 
women in Saudi society. Finally, it is essential to look briefly at new developments on 
women occurring during the last few years in order to realize the extent to which their 
rights have been expanded.
1. Islam and the Status of Women:
A common external criticism is that Saudi women are prevented from developing 
their own personality and are tied to housework and the care of their children. Saudi 
women are largely portrayed as second-class citizens who are controlled by their male 
guardians. Saudi Arabia applies strict sex segregation, and in public women are required 
to wear an abaya (black robe) covering them from head to toe. Such practices pertaining
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to women are allegedly ascribed to Islam, particularly the conservative Wahhabi 
interpretations of Islam. Saudi Arabia, thus, advances the view that criticism of human 
rights practices in the Kingdom, including women’s rights, corresponds to an attack on 
Islamic laws. 1 The question then is whether Islamic texts support the restrictions imposed 
on women in Saudi Arabia.
Fourteen centuries ago, Islam developed a highly respected position for women 
and provided them fair and just treatment. Until fairly recent times, the status of women 
according to the Qur’an and Sunnah was progressive and civilized when compared to 
women’s position in other cultures. Despite the contemporary image of Wahhabism as 
being misogynist, the writings and the life of Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahhab did show 
some interactions with women reflecting general concern for, and recognition of, their 
role.2 His intellectual works are almost entirely dedicated to the concept of tawheed 
(oneness of God), leaving no defined perspectives on social issues such as the status of 
women.3
To comprehend the status of women in Islam, one has to distinguish three levels of 
analysis: the status of women as imbedded in the Qur’an and Sunnah, the status of women 
in shari’ah as illustrated by various generations of male ulama, and the practices of 
Muslim communities throughout Islamic history in relation to women. The position of 
women in Islam is subjected to various interpretations among different Islamic schools of 
thought, which may imply adaptability of the shari’ah to some women’s matters.4 While 
a few aspects of Islamic principles regarding women clearly prescribed in the Qur ’an and 
Sunnah are incompatible with the universally-recognized human rights standards, some 
discriminatory practices in the Muslim world, reflecting cultural and social considerations, 
have been erroneously associated with Islam. It is therefore important to differentiate 
practices that are based on cultural particularities and those prescribed in the Islamic texts.
In several Qur’anic verses, women are mentioned along with men.5 One verse 
emphasizes that men and women are created from one soul, referring to equality in human 
dignity and before God.6 The Qur ’an plainly states that both Adam and Eve were victims 
of seduction, but clearly it was Adam who went astray.7 Women are presented in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah as speakers in religious and political settings for their own rights. 
The Q ur’an assigned women and men with political, social and economic duties and 
bestowed both with equal rights in general.9 The Prophet reportedly said “women are the
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partners of men”,10 implying equally shared responsibilities and obligations for the 
welfare of the Muslim community.
The general rule in the Qur’an confirms, in principle, that men and women enjoy 
equal rights, but those rights are not necessarily absolutely identical. Islamic texts 
emphasize respecting and protecting women, by which women receive favourable 
treatment. Among the Prophet’s last commandments before his death was his call upon 
his companions to take good care of women, stating “you have rights over your women 
and they have rights over you.”11
Islamic sources acknowledge several rights for women that are comparable in 
many aspects with women’s rights as recognized by the UN human rights system. The 
rights of women to own and run independently their own businesses are guaranteed in 
Islam. According to the Qur’an and Sunnah, women have full right to control their 
possessions, with complete segregation of property between a man and his wife. The 
retention of a woman’s name and property after marriage is considered an indication of 
women’s liberation and independence. Women enjoy equal rights to men in taking part in 
social and religious activities, such as attending prayers in mosques or visiting relatives 
and neighbours. Politically, both women and men pledged their allegiances {bay’ah) to 
the Prophet as full participants in Muslim community.12 Both have equal rights to 
participate in public affairs, including politics.13 During the early days of Islam, women 
used to argue with the Prophet or his caliphs over decisions concerning the whole Muslim 
community.14 Moreover, the emigration of Muslim women with the Prophet, their 
participation in combat,15 and more importantly the engagement of Aisha (the Prophet’s 
favourite wife) in political activities were an unambiguous endorsement of the right of 
women to take part in the political life of the Muslim community.
Although the Qur 'an and Sunnah contain several references to notions of equality 
between men and women not only before Allah but also in some aspects of life, there are 
two conspicuous principles that have major impact on the status of women in the Muslim 
World. Based on culturally-influenced interpretations of Islamic texts by male ulama, the 
prevailing understanding of the two principles have established a set of women’s rights 
that are contrary to the internationally-recognized women’s rights standards.
The concept of guardianship {qiwamah), in which men enjoy authority over 
women, has been well established in the Islamic faith. The meaning of verse (4:34) of the 
Qur’an according to one translation states that “men are the protectors and the maintainers
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of women because Allah has made one of them to excel the other, and because they spend 
(to support them) from their means.” 16 The variations in translating this verse reflect the 
controversy surrounding the accurate meaning of qiwamah. However, the general 
understanding among ulama of this verse is that the man is the guardian of the woman, as 
being the maintainer, caretaker and leader who disciplines her if she deviates. The 
superiority of men, according to most interpretations of this verse, does not mean 
diminishing woman’s personality or depriving her of her rights. 17 Qiwamah is justified in 
shari’ah because men are obligated to support women financially and are better in 
executing certain tasks, especially those involving physical strength. For conservative 
ulama, women are disqualified from holding positions of leadership, despite controversy
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in linking some positions with leadership, such as the position of judges. While the 
notion of qiwamah is shared by other Islamic schools of thought, it has been 
overwhelmingly emphasized anfong prominent Saudi ulama. They have underlined that 
subordination of women to their male guardians in all major decisions involving taking a 
role in activities outside the home is in submission to God’s rules. 19
Influenced by cultural traditions, the concept of qiwamah was extended to claim 
that men are mentally, as well as physically, superior to women. The Prophet addressed a 
group of women by saying “..Oh women. I wonder from what I saw from you how such 
irrational and religious-imperfect persons were capable of defeating someone of 
understanding...” This statement by the Prophet was in the context of praising women, 
but one of the audience asked the Prophet about the meaning of being imperfect rationally 
and religiously. He explained that the irrationality of women is exemplified in the fact 
that the testimony of one man equals, in some cases, two women. Religiously, women’s 
biological condition of menstruation, during which religious duties of prayer and fasting 
are suspended, disables them from practicing complete religious observance. Whereas 
this hadith proved that Islam has recognized specific biological, physical and 
psychological differences between men and women, it has been misunderstood or misused 
to justify oppressive social practices related to women.22
Wahhabis emphasized qiwamah by promoting the idea that women are naturally 
deficient in exercising rationality and wisdom (lack of aql ‘reason’) and religious 
observance (lack of deen ‘religion’). Accordingly, women’s psychological character, said 
to be naturally inclined to emotion, undermines their capacity to make rational and wise 
decisions. The Prophet called upon women to accompany a mahram (male relative with
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whom marriage is prohibited) when travelling from one place to another that requires 
staying over night.23 Based on a mal-interpretation of that rule, Saudi authorities routinely 
impose on a woman intending to travel alone a request to obtain permission from her 
walie al-amr (guardian).
It has been documented that the Prophet and his four caliphs consulted women 
before taking decisions pertaining to public life, which legitimizes the involvement of 
women in public affairs.24 Nonetheless, the general understanding of the concept of 
qiwamah in Arab society has placed limitations on the rights of women in both private and 
public spheres. Although Aisha was involved in religious and political activities, the 
extent of female participation in the public affairs has been a source of controversy among 
the ulama. The participation of Aisha in the first civil war in the Muslim community is 
the most illustrious and contentious example of women’s involvement in politics in the 
history of Islam. The Sunni school has had a difficult task defending her participation, 
but she has been identified in the Sunni dogma as the most important of the female elite in 
Islam and the mother of believers. Despite her controversial participation in politics, her 
political and intellectual interactions with male Muslims could be interpreted as a 
contextual approval of women’s participation in the affairs of the Islamic ummah. 
Regardless of theoretical debate among the ulama about the public role of women, in 
practice there were few positive cases throughout Islamic history in which women played, 
directly or indirectly, an important part in politics mostly behind the scenes.27
In addition to the qiwamah, the notion of veiling {hijab) has implications for the 
role of women. In Islam, women are required to cover themselves modestly, leaving a 
margin for interpreting the limits and the requirements of veiling. Some conservative 
ulama strictly defined the veiling of women to include covering their faces and regarded 
maintaining seclusion of women from men as a part of the hijab notion. This view of the 
hijab is arguably based on mixing local traditions with the Islamic demand for modest 
dress. Despite the controversial arguments in defining the hijab, women and men did 
interact during the time of the Prophet and his four caliphs. Islamic texts do not prohibit 
women from mixing and interacting with men, as long as they behave modestly and with 
decency. In looking at the status of women throughout the history of Islam, it is safe to 
conclude that rigid or official segregation between women and men in public life was not 
practiced.
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Islamic texts have, indeed, called upon women to be modest in their appearance. 
In reality, the confines of women veiling vary from one country to another and from one 
community to another within the Muslim world. In Saudi Arabia, the issue of hijab, along 
with its ramifications for enforced sex segregation and limitations on the movement of 
women and their role in public life, has been of great concern among the ulama. The 
specific code of hijab is not only required, but also enforced on women “with regimental 
inflexibility.” 30 Saudi ulama rationalized strict hijab rules and sex segregation as 
preventing fitnah (seduction). Traditionally, women are responsible for fitnah, and that 
view has been given significance especially by conservative ulama.31 In addition to the 
requirement of concealing the face and body, the voice of woman, according to some 
Wahhabi ulama, could be considered an awrah (private part) and a source of fitnah, as it 
has the potential to be sexually provocative.32 However, the ideology of imposing a 
restriction on women not to raiseTheir voice, even to a level that could be heard by a male 
guest in the house, is evidently linked to traditional Arab culture, as discussed later. In 
practice, some Saudi families observe moderate standards in defining the extent of hijab 
and sex separation, including the restriction on women’s voices. There are also slight 
differences in hijab's shape and degrees of coverage within Saudi Arabia based on 
regional differentiations and social stratifications.
Whereas the Islamic principles of qiwamah and hijab provide the general context 
for inequality between men and women, there are other laws that are clearly inconsistent 
with the concepts of non-discrimination and equality between men and women. Within 
family law, the power to divorce is principally at the man’s disposal, while the woman 
either can retain the power to divorce as a condition in the marriage contract or file for 
divorce at the court. Defending what seems a discriminatory practice, it has been argued 
that the power to divorce, as a critical decision, has been designated to men, as women’s 
emotional nature would easily lead them, in a state of anger, to unwisely take a decision to 
divorce.33 Therefore, men have easier procedures to divorce than those available to 
women.
Polygamy is one of the most notorious aspects related to women’s rights in Islam 
when discussed on the international stage. It was a common practice in pre-Islamic times, 
with flexibility on the number of wives, but the Qur’an has limited the number to four 
wives. The practice of polygamy has not only been limited and conditioned, but the 
Qur’an has also implicitly called for monogamy.34 Regardless of the wealth of the wife,
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the husband is totally responsible to provide financial support for his family. By virtue of 
their spending and in recognition of their assumed rationality, the Qur’an gave men 
advantages in exercising more control over the institution of marriage. For the survival of 
marriage, the husband is allowed to discipline his wife in the case of disobedience and 
may, in certain circumstances, punish the wife.
In addition to the upper hand given to men within marriage, the Qur ’an has also 
prescribed, according to mainstream interpretations, two uneven laws in the area of the 
administration of justice. In some common cases,36 inheritance laws give a female half of 
the male’s share, as in the common case in which a son receives double of a daughter’s 
share.37 The ulama justify this partial inequality by unequal financial responsibilities in 
which a male carries out the burden. However, an overview of all inheritance cases in the 
Islamic legal system reveals that a male receives double the female’s share only in 13.33 
percent of cases,38 whereas the female gets either the equivalent share or more than the 
man’s share in most cases. It is worth noting that the Qur’an has specified clear-cut 
shares for females,' not only to promote the position of women but also to safeguard their 
interests, given the widespread discriminatory practices against women in the pre-Islamic 
era.
The second law in which the woman is treated differently relates to testimony in 
the courts. According to the Qur’an, the testimony of two women, in specific situations 
involving trade or loans transactions, is equivalent of that of a man.40 The general rule is 
that the testimony of both sexes is equal in Islamic jurisprudence, although the weight of 
testimony, in some cases, is determined by circumstantial knowledge41 as one sex, a man 
or woman, might be more knowledgeable than the opposite sex about certain matters.42 
Regardless of the physical, natural or circumstantial differences between women and men 
used for its justification, discrimination in inheritance and testimony laws, although 
limited, has been unambiguously stated in the Q ur’an and thus is incompatible with the 
internationally-recognized women’s rights standards.
In looking at how Islam characterizes the status of women, this study argues that 
the Qur’an and Sunnah, in essence, recognize equality between women and men. The two 
sources have generally liberated women and approved their independence. However, as is 
the case in many cultures and in various fields, males have dominated the process of 
interpretation of Islamic texts. Despite the progressive general principle of equality stated 
in the texts, two exceptions occur which give favourable treatment to either men or
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women. For example, the task of motherhood is greatly respected and regarded with 
nobility when compared to fatherhood.43 Furthermore, the wife has an advantage 
financially over her husband, as he is enjoined to provide support for the family regardless 
of how wealthy the wife is. The other exception, by which women are disadvantaged, can 
be classified into two categories. There are a few discriminatory practices against women 
based on textual assurance in the Qur ’an such as inheritance laws, which appear resistant 
to change through overtly contextual re-interpretation. The second category involves 
several discriminatory practices and rules that are based on an interpretive understanding 
of Islamic texts which are influenced by traditional customs and tribal values. For 
example, the previously illustrated verse, in which men were given qiwamah over women, 
could be reinterpreted and its scope framed in favour of other verses that emphasize 
equality. Also, rules covering women’s access to divorce or the limits on polygamy can 
be subject to modification arid limitations through the exercise of ijtihad and 
reinterpretation.44
With all the debate over how shari’ah perceives women, it has been acceptably 
argued that the shari ’ah is a flexible mechanism adaptable to changing needs and cultural 
understanding.45 The various juristic schools and their different rules about women 
indicate the large leeway within legislation drawn from Islamic authoritative texts. As 
indicated in chapter three, the principle that Islam is a suitable system irrespective of time 
and place and the traditional approach of (jalb al-maslahah wa da f’a al-mafsadah) both 
entail flexibility in interpreting Islamic texts.46 Progressive understanding of Islamic texts 
according to current circumstances on one hand and taking measures to eliminate existing 
oppressive traditional customs on the other can align women’s rights in a Muslim country 
like Saudi Arabia to more closely resemble the internationally-recognized women’s rights 
standards. While both religious values and social traditions are malleable and subject to 
reinterpretation and challenge by the changing realities of daily life, it is arguably Arab 
culture that has the more negative impact on the empowerment of women than Islamic 
culture.47
It is axiomatic that religious practices have been subjected to the influence of 
traditional values. In looking at the position and appearance of women in several Muslim 
communities belonging to various cultural settings, it is evident that women have been 
treated differently. Some practices related to women, undoubtedly, have been culturally
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determined. Accordingly, in order to understand and evaluate the status of Saudi women, 
it is necessary to explore Arab-Saudi traditions regarding women.
2. Arab Traditions and the Status of Women:
With the exception of changes that have taken place in the last few decades, 
communities in most parts of Saudi Arabia constitute pure examples of Arab culture and 
traditions. Unlike other communities in other Arab world countries, Saudi society has 
never been under the influence of colonizing powers. A low level of human and 
commercial exchange with other societies physically isolated large segments of Saudi 
society. Intellectually, the previously existing high level of illiteracy among the Saudi 
people contributed to the preservation of Arab customs and traditions.
Social relations and political dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula orbit around tribal 
and familial structures. The honour of each family is essentially dependent on women 
behaving with modesty and chastity. Values of chastity and sexual modesty applied to 
women were not only part of protecting the honour of the family but also became a 
fulfilment to religious obligations as well. Keeping women, including their voices, away 
from strange men by enforcing sex segregation and hijab is a mechanism to maintain 
women’s sexual chastity.48 A woman therefore carries the burden of maintaining the 
honour of her family and tribe at large and is expected to avoid shameful acts and abide 
strictly by her male guardians’ orders.
Both the ulama and the public commonly justify practices related to women on 
religious and rational grounds. As explained earlier, a woman’s psychological and 
physical characteristics and her natural inclination to emotion have been argued as reasons 
for undermining women’s capacity to make rational and wise decisions and for restricting 
her movement or work. In addition to citing textual substantiations from the Qur ’an and 
Sunnah, changes in social practices related to the treatment and the status of women have 
also been challenged on the ground that they are against the laws of human nature.49
A fundamental aspect of Arab life is that tribal and familial descent is drawn 
through the male line. Patriarchal leadership is typical within the family, with the father 
making all major decisions, especially those involving the activities of family members 
outside the home. From the wider perspective, a male tribal leader has the right to take 
decisions on behalf of his subjects, with responsibilities for their welfare. Social and
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political relations are usually based on consideration of superior-subordinate relations, in 
which wives are the servants of their husbands and tribal members are the servants of their 
sheikhs.50
In these predominantly patriarchal societies, male and female are perceived as 
different kinds of human beings, “with complementary, not competing roles in society.” 51 
Women’s role in society was limited because they were constrained by their psychological 
and physical characteristics. Accordingly, the traditional place for woman is at home with 
her children. A woman is therefore responsible for looking after her husband, children, 
and the daily routine of cooking for members in the family and cleaning the house and 
keeping it in good order.
The wife was considered as the property of her husband during the pre-Islamic 
period. When a man died, his male relatives used to have the right to do whatever they 
wanted with his wife, but the Qur’an plainly banned this practice.53 The birth of a female 
child was not welcomed, simply because of the value attached to the male and his role in 
protecting the family and dealing with the community. The honour and the name of the 
family usually passed to sons, and they bore the responsibility for maintaining the honour 
and welfare of the family. During the pre-Islamic era, men in some Arabian tribes used to 
bury their newly bom daughters alive to avoid the burden of supporting and protecting 
them in a very harsh, insecure environment.54 However, the practice of female infanticide 
was condemned and completely banned in the Q ur’an .55
Despite some social restrictions on their movements, women traditionally attend 
classes or rituals in which men are present. Some Arab women worked in fields 
dominated by men, such as teaching or taking a role in military conflicts. As early as the 
seventh century, the Arab way of life in some parts of Arabia gradually shifted from a 
nomadic mode of existence to a more settled and sophisticated urban style, which assisted 
in advancing the role of women. In most parts of Saudi Arabia, urbanization and 
modernization are mostly recent phenomena and insufficient time has elapsed for their 
occurrence to change effectively Saudi attitudes towards women.
Wealth plays an essential part in enforcing sex segregation by enabling Saudis to 
provide separate buildings or areas, not only at a public level like workplaces and 
educational institutions, but also in private settings as well. The extended family used to 
include several married male relatives living in one house, which allowed a degree of 
interaction between opposite sexes who were not necessarily closely related (not
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mahram). With the increase of income, most Saudis now live as a single-family unit, and 
interaction between male and female has thus decreased.
The institution of marriage is not only a bond between two individuals but also a 
tie between two families, clans or tribes. In Arabian culture, when a daughter gets 
married, it means her family has lost a member, but when a son gets married, his family 
has gained a member. Because a divorced woman is shunned by society and becomes 
subject to scandalous rumours and gossip, a wife is expected to tolerate her husband’s ill- 
treatment and solve her problems within her house. An ‘impatient’ woman traditionally 
attempts to seek justice within her own family. However, the traditional silence about 
violence against women has been broken. In August 2004, the publicity of the story of a 
Saudi television presenter, who was beaten nearly to death by her husband, was 
unprecedented in the traditional Saudi society. It was not only her courageous decision to 
go public with her problem but also that permission was given for the media to cover her 
story that caused unusual public discussion about domestic violence that otherwise goes 
unnoticed. As discussed later, this event, along with other factors, has contributed to 
changes in the public atmosphere in which the problem of domestic violence can be 
openly discussed.
In Arab-Saudi culture, the husband is expected to look after the well-being of his 
wife (wives). The wife, or a female relative such as sisters or daughters, is customarily 
consulted in the affairs of the home and the children, while the man appears to make the 
final decisions. Despite patriarchal control on the surface in public and private, the 
woman (normally the wife or the mother) in Saudi culture has concealed matriarchal 
authority that reaches beyond simple consultation on decisions that affect all members of 
the family. While variation exists from one region or family to another, behind the scenes 
Saudi women generally exert an element of power.
Although Arab-Saudi culture has been under the influence of several factors and 
despite changes in some practices affecting the status of women, the situation of women in 
Saudi Arabia is still influenced by Arab traditional customs. As explained in the next 
section, there have been several developments in the status of women in the Kingdom that 
work against traditional values. Nonetheless, some social customs are still robustly 
guarded, which have prevented the adoption of new progressive laws and the 
reinterpretation of Islamic texts.
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3. Saudi Arabia and the Status of Women:
Developments of human rights in general and women’s rights in particular have 
been influenced by several internal and external factors including those that were 
discussed in chapters four and five. It was noted earlier that Islam and tradition remain the 
main focus of identity among the majority of Saudi people.56 The first question relates to 
what kind of Islam and what sort of traditions determine their view on women. As also 
noted, Saudis generally rely on the Hanbali, Wahhabi interpretations of Islamic texts. 
These interpretations represent strongly lines of conservative orthodox thought in Islam. 
The alliance of the ulama with political rulers has made the subject of women a field of 
manoeuvre between the two sources of power, but for the most part it was left as a sphere 
of influence for the ulama. Equally important is that religious interpretations of the 
position of women are greatly influenced by traditions and customs prevailing for 
centuries in the Arabian Peninsula. Both Islamic beliefs and traditional customs regarding 
the status of women have noticeably impeded a definite cultural congruence between 
Saudi values on women and the internationally-recognized women’s rights standards.
The previous discussions on the relationship between Islam and traditions on one 
hand and the status of women on the other have illustrated that several discriminatory 
practices and laws against women are based on culturally-influenced understanding of 
Islamic texts. In Saudi Arabia, the shari ’ah and traditional values represent two integrated 
pillars influencing practices related to the treatment of women. With this mixture between 
Islam and traditions, disassociating certain practices from the shari’ah and considering 
them as cultural issues embodies a primary, but fundamental, step towards change.
Taking into consideration the prominent role of Islam in the state and society of 
Saudi Arabia, changes in norms associated with social and cultural, as opposed to 
religious, practices are likely to be less resisted and probably accepted eventually. For 
example, some Saudis opposed women’s education in the early 1960s on religious 
grounds, but as illustrated later, women’s education became religiously justified and 
socially accepted following a government campaign supported by the religious 
establishment. Less than two decades after introducing women’s education, almost half of 
university graduates are female. Similarly, there have recently been changes in 
perspectives regarding some women’s issues such as their right to work, the job 
opportunities available to women, and their right to drive. As indicated later, driving cars
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by women was officially prohibited in 1991 based on religious fatwa, but in 2005 in an 
important progressive step officials and some ulama named social obstacles, as opposed to 
religious ones, as the reason for banning women from driving.
Since the establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932, no segment of society has been 
subjected to more intensive debates than the role of women in society and in the 
development process. Any observer will notice that Saudi society has shown an obvious 
concern, and perhaps an obsession, about the subject of women. Due to the fact that the 
issue of women has been at the centre of struggles among various circles of power in the 
Kingdom, especially between the ulama and the state, women have been greatly affected. 
The extent and the concept of women’s rights and responsibilities have been equally 
controversial between the two opposing streams in society: the so-called liberals or 
moderates and the conservatives. With such controversy, the Basic Law of Governance 
(the constitution) is silent on the rights of women despite stipulating some other human 
rights.57
Internationally, almost every report and study reviewed by the researcher on 
human rights in the Kingdom has commented upon the role and the rights of Saudi 
women. In recent years, Saudi women’s rights have received unprecedented attention 
from the international media. Human rights reports, studies or statements about Saudi 
Arabia issued by foreign states, think tanks, international institutions or NGOs have 
increasingly focused on the rights of Saudi women. The US Department of State’s reports 
on human rights practices is a suitable example, showing increased focus on women’s 
rights in Saudi Arabia. In the 2004 report about Saudi Arabia, the word 
woman/women/female has been mentioned 127 times, compared with 62 times in the
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1996 report. In the later part of the 1990s, the advancement of women’s rights was 
given central priority in US human rights foreign policy;59 the US focus on domestic 
issues in Saudi Arabia, including women’s issues, has increased following the 11 
September attacks. Furthermore, a recent study on women’s rights in several Middle 
Eastern and North African countries ranked Saudi Arabia at the bottom, registering the 
lowest score in all categories in the study, with an average of 1.26 out of 5.60 It referred to 
Saudi Arabia as the only country in the region that has no constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection for females.61 Also, Saudi women were portrayed in some international 
media as being harshly oppressed by society and mentally and physically tortured by their
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husbands. Nonetheless, there are recent surveys that showed a notable increase in the 
ranking of women’s rights among issues facing the country.63
In Saudi, tribal culture, honour of the family is closely connected to a woman’s 
chastity, as indicated earlier. Protecting women and preserving honour are two sides of 
one coin. In a male-dominated environment, a direct means to protect their honour is to 
limit and control the movement of women. Therefore, women’s education and work, 
which necessitate mobility outside the home, preoccupied the great magnitude of 
discussions on the rights of women in Saudi Arabia. Based on culturally-influenced 
understandings of Islam, the woman is enjoined to behave modestly in public by wearing 
clothes that cover her from head to toe. While men in practice enforce the norms of 
veiling on their women, both women and men generally view the veiling as a religious 
command, and any infringement of this code may render punishment from Allah.64 Part 
of that is connected to the Saudis’ respect for privacy, especially when it comes to women, 
whose privacy is deemed inviolate. Also, a woman traditionally is raised to make a family 
and expected to give full commitment to her family home, but that has not prevented 
women in some rural and nomadic environments playing a role outside the home. With 
modernity and development, women have been offered increasing opportunities in both 
education and employment.
Liberals and moderates in the Kingdom have been pushing for more progress in 
women’s education, work, and mobility, while conservative forces attempt to make any 
changes in these fields compatible to the prevalent understanding of Islam in the country 
and well-suited to traditional customs. Conservative ulama, inside and outside of the 
official establishment, have been placing the issue of women as a particular symbol of 
maintaining Islamic values. Fearful of Western influences associated with modernization 
and development, Saudi ulama have been increasingly concerned in their fatwas with 
hijab and ikhtilat (mixing between women and men). Consequently, more limitations on 
women’s education, work, and mobility have been declared and enforced, such as the ban 
on women driving or sex segregation in public areas. While many of their fatwas serve as 
statements of principle intended to influence both public perceptions and government 
policies, their opinions on some issues have been institutionalized as laws because the 
state’s legitimacy relies heavily on displaying its commitment to Islam.
As indicated earlier, rising wealth has permitted Saudis, who were under the 
influence of conservative revivalism, to further women’s seclusion by providing
62
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segregated public and private spaces. Also, with modernization and state expansion, 
restrictions that were observed as a matter of cultural understanding have become 
institutionalized as laws enforceable by the state agencies,65 as was the case, for example, 
in the 1991 ban on women driving. Also, as early as 1958,66 attaining permission from a 
mahram has become a lawful, enforceable requirement for a woman intending to utilize 
public services, such as travelling abroad or giving birth in a hospital. Moreover, specific 
arrangements were introduced to enforce proper clothing and appearance codes for both 
men and women.67
A. Women’s Right to Education:
During the 1950s, there were intensive debates in newspapers and among some 
elite about the right of women to education. In the 1970s, the question of the role of 
women in development and their right to work outside the home generated intensive 
discussions, which infuriated some conservatives in Saudi society. ' Starting in the 1990s 
and intensifying by the beginning of the new millennium, new trends in discussion of 
women’s mobility and identity have emerged, ranging from the woman’s right to drive a 
car to calls to lift the ban on women travelling abroad without consent from a mahram.
Prior to 1956, women’s education in the Kingdom was limited and always related 
to religious and classical learning. The earliest step to establish modem institutions for 
female education was when Princess Iffat, King Faisal’s wife, quietly opened the first 
private school for girls in Jeddah in 1956. Public education for Saudi females was 
nonexistent until the 1960s, when King Faisal introduced formal female education as an 
important part of his Ten-Points Program for reform and development. Following the 
opening of public schools for girls, some Saudis rioted and demonstrated against girls’ 
education, and forces were sent to keep schools open in the Qassim region. King Faisal 
was able to convince prominent religious figures, and later, the public of the need for 
female education.69
While education for women in general had been opposed, the concerns focused not 
on education itself but on women going about in public and on the content and the 
subjects of female education. Islamic teachings clearly promote education for all. Those 
who had an objection to female public education argued that allowing women to go to 
schools could open the door for them mixing with men, which is deemed to be a breach of 
woman’s morality. Public education, in their ideology, could lead to exposure to risks for
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women’s safety or morality and would bring foreign influence to domestic values and
70moral standards through non-Saudi female teachers.
Despite such objections, the government’s decision on women’s education was
• • 7 1backed by the religious establishment and justified in religious provisions. One of the 
distinguishing features of female education in the Kingdom is its sex-based separation, as 
instructed by the ulama. Accordingly, laws were passed prohibiting the mixing between 
boys and girls at all levels, except at kindergarten.72 The ulama's approval of public 
education for girls was also conditioned by keeping curriculums and administration under 
conservative inspection.73 Until 2002, a separate institution administered women’s 
education, and its educational policies have been influenced by conservative ulama.74 
Following a fire in a girls’ elementary school in March 2002, a decision was taken to 
dissolve the General Presidency of Girls’ Education and to incorporate female education 
into the Ministry of Education, abolishing segregation in education at the administrative 
level and partially restricting the influence of conservatives on female education. By late 
2005, most men occupying executive and administrative positions related to girls’
75education within the Ministry of Education were replaced by women.
Economic upheaval arising from the increased income from oil has contributed to 
several changes in Saudi society, including the spread of education. It has been argued 
that education served to enforce conservative inclinations in Saudi society. While this 
may be true within some segments of society, the increased opportunities for education, 
especially for women, have played major roles in changing several aspects of life in the 
Kingdom. Education has been a prime area of progress for women, through which they 
have made gains in other spheres. It has increased women’s negotiating power within the 
family, and young Saudi women have become less ready to give unrestrained authority to 
men. New trends towards education, within the Kingdom and abroad, and changes in 
lifestyle have had a significant impact in challenging many of the traditional social 
practices, including those related to the status of women, and have paved the way to an 
expansion of both education and employment opportunities. In a recent move, a private 
college in the Kingdom has begun to offer new fields of study for women such as law and 
engineering. Despite the still-existing limitations on subjects available to women in 
public education, female education has been gradually opening up new options. The 
General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training, for instance,
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announced in April 2005 its intention to open 24 technical colleges and 18 vocational 
institutes for girls.79
In the domain of public debate, female education has empowered Saudi women to 
participate in the intellectual and academic activities in the Kingdom. Many educated 
women have played a role in getting women’s concerns across to Saudi society and to the 
state authorities in particular by virtue of their abilities and skills as poets, writers, 
researchers or journalists. Whilst the extent of their influence is subject to considerable 
variation, their numbers and influence have been both on the rise and increasingly 
fortified. Women now have engaged in new fields of employment and gained further 
access that would allow them to make an impact for their cause. In the Saudi newspapers 
in the last few years, highly educated women are increasingly participating in discussions 
of public affairs and calling for the promotion of their rights and the expansion of their 
role.
The state of Saudi women has changed considerably since the opening of the first 
public girls’ school in 1960. Educated women have been playing an increasing role in 
raising the educational, health, and cultural standards of the Saudi population. 
Developments in female education have gradually resulted in a rise in female employment 
and an increase in their mobility. However, despite the fact that nearly half of university 
graduates are female, Saudi Arabia confronts a problem of under-utilization of educated 
women in the workforce, partially because of discrimination, as women have limited
o /v
options in work fields. Critics of the Saudi women’s rights record, therefore, continue 
calling for promulgation of legislation that guarantees equal rights and occupational
o  1
opportunities for women.
B. Women’s Right to Work:
One of the primary aims of girls’ education is to prepare them for work compatible 
with their nature as females, such as teaching, nursing and the medical professions.82 
Despite the fact that the Code of Labour generally provides equal rights for all Saudi
o i
workers, without discrimination, women are excluded from certain jobs that involve 
hazardous operations. Defining the limits of ‘safe’ jobs that are compatible with women’s 
‘nature’ remains a field of debate between conservative and liberal forces in the society.
While Saudi women comprise nearly half of all graduates, they constitute only a 
small proportion of the workforce - only 5 percent according to some estimates,84 which
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85would make the Kingdom’s unemployment rate for women the highest in the world. 
This discrepancy between numbers of female graduates and employees was caused by 
various factors including traditional religious and social taboos. As mentioned earlier, 
conservative ulama considered the house the appropriate place for women, where women 
are protected from all kinds of temptations. They advised that leaving the house could 
lead a woman into contact with men and may expose her honour to danger, arguing that 
such association with men or working in fields that are suitable for men is forbidden in the 
shari’ah. There are also economic reasons that make the contribution of Saudi women 
to the labour force minimal and limited. Wealth during the boom era contributed to a 
decline in women’s numbers in traditional work fields in rural and nomadic settings, such 
as farming and pasture, as hiring labour became affordable. Moreover, with the recent
problem of increasing male unemployment, it might be in the interest of the government
88to maintain the status quo in relation to social perceptions about women’s employment. 
Both religious-inspired social restrictions and economic circumstances have minimized 
work opportunities available to women and restricted the activities of most Saudi women 
to their homes and children.
Nevertheless, new circumstances have emerged and trends developed in Saudi 
society which have positively influenced female employment. The introduction of 
women’s public education was a turning point, opening new fields of employment to 
women. Women play an active role in some fields of employment, but mostly in 
segregated environments. Public and private sectors alike have been working towards 
creating more jobs for women but in separate facilities, such as all-female shopping 
centres, banks, factories and even separate sections in ministries. While separate 
education facilities or separate work environments may, in theory, provide equal 
opportunities, this trend reconfirms segregation as a social system “when segregation itself 
is a model of inequity.”
Teaching is the field in which Saudi women comprise almost half of the 
workforce.90 While women’s employment is still mostly limited to teaching, health, and 
social services, the willingness of some Saudis to allow women to work in sex-integrated 
environments, like hospitals, has been raised through education, particularly secular 
education. The recent increase in population and the rise in poverty91 in Saudi Arabia 
have predisposed, for economic reasons, public acceptance of women’s employment. 
Demands for female employment will likely grow, not only because of the desire of
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educated women for self-fulfilment, but also because of family needs for a second income. 
Because granting women a more significant role is essential for the economy, and as a part 
of Saudi Arabia’s necessary adjustments upon joining the WTO,92 more opportunities will 
be offered to women in various fields, mainly within the private sector. New fields of 
employment have already emerged such as marketing, advertising, information 
technology, hospitality industry, banking, and investment.
C. Political Climate:
The political climate in the country also influences the situation of women’s rights. 
A major political event that negatively affected women’s rights in Saudi Arabia was the 
siege of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Prior to that event, Saudi society witnessed debates 
in the newspapers about women’s issues, such as appropriate fields of education and work 
available for women.94 Saudi television typically broadcast music and programs presented 
by females. Extremists who seized the Grand Mosque condemned the government for 
allowing the intrusion of Western influences, including those related to women. To pacify 
the conservatives who shared some of the extremists’ concerns about Western ideas that 
came with modernization and development, the government favoured the religious 
establishment with greater powers regarding the public life. More importantly, 
restrictions were imposed on the role of women in public life, including their appearances 
on television. Furthermore, for various reasons including the 1979 event, the decade of 
the 1980s was a breeding ground for conservative revivalism and strict religious ideas that 
obstructed progress in the role of women.
Human rights activism in the Kingdom has increased following the 1990-1991 
Gulf War. Public discussions about human rights raised some questions about the rights 
of women. During the Gulf War, one of every three American vehicles was driven by a 
female on Saudi Arabia’s roads.95 Also, some Kuwaiti women, fleeing the Iraqi invasion, 
arrived in Saudi Arabia driving their cars.96 These events, along with other factors such as 
the media focus on the Kingdom, encouraged some women to protest and demand to be 
allowed to drive cars. In November 1990, more than 40 educated Saudi women took part 
in a demonstration by driving in Riyadh’s streets. While this event received coverage in 
the international press, the Saudi media kept silent on the matter. Following the 
confiscation of the participants’ passports and their sacking from their jobs, the Ministry 
of Interior condemned the protest and formally banned women from driving.
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Furthermore, a fatwa by senior ulam a% denounced demands for women to be able to drive 
and justified prohibition on religious grounds, as women driving “leads to many evils and 
negative consequences.”99 However, in the last few years, linking the ban on women 
driving cars to Islam has been weakened. The extent of opposition and the justification 
for banning women from driving have changed among officials, ulama and the people.100 
In a televised interview, unusual by virtue that the King was interviewed by a woman, 
King Abdullah unequivocally expressed his advocacy of the rights of women, including 
their right to drive, and referred to social obstacles, as compared to religious objections, 
for banning women from driving.101
The political culture in the Kingdom that emphasizes Islam as the national identity 
remains important for state legitimacy and self-perpetuation. Because women are 
considered a principal symbol for maintaining Islamic values, the state has left shaping 
policies that affect the rights and the role of women mainly to conservatives. The wave * 
of Islamic revivalism in the 1980s and early 1990s reinforced Islamic identity and 
contributed to a halt in the advancement of women’s rights. However, the internal and 
external anti-Islamic militant sentiments since the 11 September attacks have motivated 
the government to introduce programs that emphasize the ‘Saudi’ national identity and 
encouraged trends to improve and diversify women’s role in society.
Following the events of 11 September, discussions on issues related to women at 
various levels have noticeably flourished, and the Saudi media became openly supportive 
of women’s rights including their right to drive. Saudi officials in several occasions 
pointed out that lifting the ban on women driving is a social issue. When a member in 
Majlis Al-Shura announced in May 2005 that he would present a proposal to the Majlis for 
a gradual lifting of the ban on women driving, the Minister of Interior referred to women 
driving as “social matter to be decided by the society.”102 The Foreign Minister stated 
“we should overtake inherited opposition to women driving, as the matter is not a 
religious issue.”103 The significance of this issue is its journey from being a religious 
matter in the early 1990s to becoming a social issue by the beginning of the new 
millennium. This change in Saudi attitudes, at both official and unofficial levels, can be 
attributed to internal and external influences and considered as a step, though a small one, 
in the process of socialization.
Although the status of women in Saudi Arabia has been controversial for a long 
time, the controversy following the events of 11 September intensified since Saudi Arabia,
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along with its religious conservativism and fundamentalism, was the main focus of blame 
for the attacks. For critics, there are evident similarities in the treatment of women 
between Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan during the Taliban rule.104 At the international 
level, defeating terrorism and fundamentalism and promoting democracy and development 
are arguably connected with the empowerment of women.105 Within US foreign policy, 
women are not only “on the front lines of the battle of ideas”, but also “the battlefield 
itself.”106 Under such circumstances, international focus on Saudi conservative view of 
women has noticeably increased, which has underpinned those who advocate women’s 
rights, whether individuals or institutions, and put tremendous pressure on the Saudi 
government to ease restrictions on women and to promote their rights.
Several international figures, who visited Saudi Arabia in the last few years, 
commented on the status of Saudi women. Those figures utilized their statements to 
encourage efforts towards easing restrictions on women and increasing their opportunities 
to engage in public life. In his address to the Jeddah Economic Forum in January 2004, 
former US President Bill Clinton urged the Kingdom to embrace reform and broaden the 
role and the freedom of women, referring to the ban on women’s driving as inconsistent 
with the Prophet’s teachings.107 Also, the chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(IPU) expressed, in a press conference during his visit to the Kingdom in early 2005, his 
support and desire to see Saudi women joining the Majlis Al-Shura.m  The following 
year, two women were included in the Saudi delegation to the annual meetings of the IPU, 
but the Majlis Al-Shura's chairman denied any pressure from the IPU on this move.109 
Another example is when Elizabeth Cheney110 met with Saudi female students and praised 
the role played by Saudi women.111 Whereas the direct impact of such encouraging 
statements should not be overestimated, they contribute to a changing political atmosphere 
towards the issue of women.
In the surrounding environment, countries of the Middle East and Muslim World 
have witnessed an increase of feminist scholarship and a boost in efforts to promote 
women’s rights, particularly during the last ten years. In Saudi Arabia, silence on the 
role and the treatment of women has already been broken, as the government and some 
women’s rights activists have been taking initiatives to debate and promote the role of 
women. The role played and the rights enjoyed by women in neighbouring Arab 
countries, especially countries of similar cultural and political systems, have inspired 
women’s rights activists in the Kingdom. For example, following municipal elections in
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Kuwait and the appointment of two women to the Kuwaiti municipal council, Saudi 
women writers called for the involvement of Saudi women in municipal councils similar 
to what happened in Kuwait.
Despite the importance of Islam to the state’s legitimacy and national identity, and 
the weight given to conservativism in shaping policies that affect women’s rights, recent 
domestic and international circumstances made the Saudi government re-think its 
traditional strategy when responding to political crises caused by fundamentalist 
movements. As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia has introduced educational and cultural 
programs in which greater focus on the ‘Saudi’ national identity has been emphasized. 
The government has recognized that granting women a more significant role is essential 
for nation-building, and economists stress the need for more Saudi women in the 
workforce.114 Nonetheless, recent trends towards easing restrictions on women and 
broadening their role are not only responses to economic necessity for nation-building, but 
also reactions to a political atmosphere that has domestic and international dimensions and 
ramifications, including the earlier-noted linkage between defeating terrorism and the 
empowerment of women.
D. New Developments on Women’s Rights:
Since the late 1990s, debate about of the status of women has emerged in the local 
media, stimulated by official statements. In 1999, the Crown Prince received 
unprecedented attention from the media when he unequivocally described the Saudi 
woman as a “first class citizen [who] has rights, duties and responsibility... when we talk 
about the comprehensive development which our country is experiencing in all aspects we 
cannot ignore the role of Saudi women... and her participation in the responsibility of this 
development.”115 Women’s rights activists claim that Saudi society has been gradually 
accepting that women can enter the public domain and the number of men who oppose 
that is declining, pointing to the increasing number of women seeking employment and 
willingly engaging in public life.116
Several developments have occurred to expand the role of women in public life 
(see Appendix III). The most noticeable step was when a few female Saudi experts 
entered Majlis Al-Shura as advisors, mainly on women’s issues, and as participants in its 
formal delegation. Also, prominent Saudi women were allowed to take part in some 
regional and international activities as representatives of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, new
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fields of employment have been opened to Saudi women such as television news
presenters and reporters. In a new development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
118started, since its announcement in late 2003, recruiting Saudi women as diplomats.
In November 2001, the government decided to start issuing ID cards to women. 
Previously, women’s names were included as dependents in ‘family cards’ under their 
fathers or husbands names, without their photographs. This positive development was 
justified by eliminating fraud committed in the name of a woman and to allow women to 
“perform all their activities with ease.”119 It is worth noting that issuing a separate ID card 
for a woman is a symbolic move that is meant to undercut the notion of women’s 
dependency and the sex hierarchy that has existed in Saudi society. Since July 2005, a 
woman no longer needs her guardian’s approval to obtain an ID card, following 
criticism of that condition as being discriminatory against women.121
Regulations pertaining to municipal elections were ambiguous for women, as their 
participation as voters or even candidates was neither confirmed nor ruled out. In light of 
this ambiguity, public debate intensified on the legal and religious aspects of whether 
women have rights to vote or to be elected to public office. Some Saudi ulama expressed 
a no-objection religious opinion on women’s right to participate in elections. However, 
Saudi authorities announced in October 2004 that women would not be allowed to 
participate in the elections, naming logistical challenges and administrative barriers as the 
primary reasons. Saudi officials suggested the possibility of women’s participation in 
the next municipal elections in four years time.124
The June 2004 third national dialogue session, one of a series of symposiums 
sponsored by KACND, focused on women’s rights and their role in society. The purpose 
of this session was to reach an intellectual consensus, rather than a political one, that will 
become the basis for practical reforms regarding women. The outcome of the session was 
considered by some observers as vague and a show for media consumption, as the 
session’s recommendations avoided controversial topics. Nevertheless, that session 
marked the first time in which the issue of women’s rights has been raised and addressed 
by the government in a public forum. The Crown Prince later met with women 
participants in that session, and they submitted alternative recommendations to him, 
including giving women access to health and educational services without permission 
from a guardian and making school education mandatory for girls.126 Three months after
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that meeting, Saudi newspapers publicized that KACND is drafting a charter on women’s 
rights.127
In most recently established NGOs in Saudi Arabia, like the SJA or the NHRA, a 
few women were selected as members. Similarly, in December 2005, a Saudi female 
engineer ran in an election for the Saudi Engineers’ Syndicate and won a seat among the 
10-member board. In the private sector, one report suggests women own 40 percent of 
private wealth and thousands of businesses.128 To facilitate their involvement in the 
economy and increase their independence, women no longer need a guardian to obtain 
commercial licenses, following a decree in June 2004 that instructed government 
institutions and chambers of commerce to establish sections for women. The decree also 
stressed the need to facilitate women’s involvement in the workforce through various 
measures and called upon the public and private sectors to train women and create jobs for 
them.129
Saudi women hold 20 percent of the total invested wealth in the Kingdom, and 20 
percent of commercial licenses are issued for women.130 There are approximately 3000 
Saudi businesswomen owning more than 1500 private companies.131 These 
businesswomen have lately been playing an active role through businesswomen sections 
within the regional chambers of commerce. For the first time, several Saudi 
businesswomen, some of them unveiled, participated in the Jeddah Economic Forum and 
directly addressed, and interacted with, mainly male participants. The Forum, held in 
January 2004, received intensive media coverage and was attended by top Saudi officials, 
businessmen and some international leaders.132 As indicated earlier, Bill Clinton 
addressed the forum and advocated a broader role for Saudi women, noting the 
impossibility of resisting the wind of change.133 The participation of unveiled Saudi 
women and their mixture and interaction with men on Saudi soil provoked some ulama, 
which led the Grand Mufti to issue a statement condemning mainly the acts of those 
women.134 In early 2005, a Saudi businesswoman became the first woman to be elected to 
the board of directors of a major Saudi bank. Also, in an unprecedented step, 
businesswomen won two seats out of twelve in the 2005 Jeddah Chamber of Commerce 
elections, marking a historical event in which women publicly voted, ran for and were 
elected to office in the Kingdom.135 Although those businesswomen’s exceptional 
circumstances are due in part to their progressive and wealthy families, the moves
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themselves marked a new advancement in which Saudi women invaded a predominantly 
male domain.
In recent years, women’s public activities increased and received more attention 
from the Saudi media. Recently, princes’ wives and daughters have been increasingly 
involved in women’s public events, with growing media coverage. In December 2003, 
more than 300 Saudi women demanded, in a petition to the Crown Prince, a greater role 
for, and fewer restrictions on, women.136 In the last few years, events in which large 
groups of women attended, and participated in, activities related to human rights have 
notably increased and received extensive media coverage. For example, hundreds of 
Saudi women attended a lecture in December 2005 on ‘Women’s Rights Between the 
Shari’ah and the Society’; an event that was widely publicized and generated public 
debate.137
Undoubtedly, the laws of segregation impede Saudi women from enjoying equal 
opportunities to men in fields like employment and education. However, those laws are 
not the only area of discrimination. Saudi women also face systematic discrimination in 
laws pertaining to nationality and citizenship. The wife of a Saudi man can take Saudi 
nationality, whereas a Saudi woman, with a foreign husband, cannot pass her nationality 
on to her husband or children. Unlike discriminatory inheritance laws that are prescribed 
in the Q ur’an or segregation laws that are largely based on culturally-influenced 
interpretation of the Islamic texts, discrimination in nationality laws is essentially based 
on social considerations in which marriage should be within the tribe or extended family.
Until recently, there was also silence on the issue of parents or guardians who 
force their daughters into marriage and on the appropriate age for marriage. In a 
publicized move, the Council of the Senior Ulama issued a fatwa in April 2005
1 o o
prohibiting forced marriage and declaring that such an act is subject to punishment. 
Furthermore, Saudi newspapers revealed that the Ministry of Justice is preparing new laws 
banning the marriage of girls under the age of 14 years old.139
Conclusion:
Internal and external factors have both contributed to the existing view about 
women and to developments in their status. The position of women is connected to the 
prevailing interpretation of Islamic texts in the Kingdom and to local traditions with their
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patriarchal values. For the Saudi public, maintaining particular standards related to 
women has been regarded as the equivalent of upholding Islamic values. For better or 
worse, the issue of women has been a showground of competition between conservative 
and liberal circles, and the government has used it shrewdly to demonstrate its legitimacy 
as an Islamic state on the one hand, and the on other to distract the public from demands 
for accountability and political reforms. Recently, the government has tolerated, and 
perhaps encouraged, discussions and calls for reforms relating to the status of women, 
which are mainly connected with social and economic implications.
Political events have undoubtedly influenced women’s rights. Whereas the wave 
of Islamic revivalism in the 1980s reinforced Islamic identity and contributed to halting 
the advancement of women, the internal and external anti-Islamic militant sentiments 
since 11 September have motivated official and unofficial trends to improve and diversify 
women’s role in society. Significantly, the events of 11 September and their aftermath 
have put tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia’s political, socio-religious and educational 
systems and empowered internal and external influences, including those related to the 
advancement of women. Although political events have been negative as well as positive 
for the status of women, the possibility of backward moves has been minimized with the 
growing acceptance that empowering conservative trends is not necessarily in the interest 
of the state’s stability and also with the presumed linkage between defeating terrorism and 
the empowerment of women.
For women’s rights activists, combating a culture of stay-home wife and mother is 
very important for the advancement and the empowerment of Saudi women. The desire of 
educated women for self-fulfilment balanced with economic needs for increasingly 
nuclear families to obtain a second income are two important components to enhancing 
women’s role in society beyond their traditional tasks. It is arguably economic necessity 
that will ultimately lead to eradication of some discriminatory practices, such as the 
enforced sex segregation or the ban on women driving.140 However, change in social 
norms in a conservative society like Saudi Arabia cannot be achieved effortlessly. The 
role played by government proved to be decisive in advancing the rights of women. As 
was the case with female education, developments in women’s rights are likely to be 
initiated by the government for various reasons. Many individuals in the leadership, 
including members of the royal family, embrace progressive perspectives on women’ 
issues such as sex segregation and women’s mobility and driving.
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Discrimination against women exists in most societies to differing degrees. In 
Saudi Arabia, women still encounter various forms of discrimination and restriction. 
According to international standards, Saudi women still suffer from systematic 
discrimination in both laws and social customs. Nevertheless, developments in the last 
few years have blazed an important trail on the path towards greater realization of the 
rights of Saudi women. It is readily recognizable that women’s rights have been a 
constant theme in the debate on political, social, and legal reforms in Saudi Arabia.
Women’s education in particular has played a vital role in opening up more 
opportunities for women to realize their rights in private and public settings. Both 
education and work constitute two major components in an increasing role for women. 
The boost in women’s educational and vocational opportunities leads to the advancement 
of women’s economic and social spheres. One of the most important aspects of women’s 
education is that Saudis, even conservatives, have comprehended that female education is 
not in contradiction either with Islam or with the concept of the chastity of women or the 
dignity and honour of the family. Furthermore, educated women are more likely to press 
for the realization of their rights. New social trends, caused by various factors including 
education and access to foreign influences through satellite television and the internet, 
support progressive views about women.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
(PART II)
Saudi Arabia’s Response to Influence by The UN Human Rights System in
Relation to Women’s Rights
Introduction:
It is often argued that women’s rights can be influenced by international pressures, 
as women’s advocacy worldwide has increased remarkably and various actors have 
intensified activity at the international level regarding women’s issues, especially during 
the last two decades. 1 Under the umbrella of the UN, significant efforts have been exerted 
on women’s issues, including endorsing standards through declarations and conventions, 
organizing conferences, meetings and workshops, establishing consultative bodies and 
committees and issuing reports and publications. Such efforts have diversified in terms of 
quality and quantity, covering a wide range of activities related to the protection, 
advancement and empowerment of women such as women’s rights, education, poverty 
and health, violence against women, women in armed conflict and women in power and 
decision-making.2
The UN has adopted several conventions and covenants dealing specifically with 
the rights of women or containing provisions concerning the status of women. The UN 
human rights system has offered, through CEDAW and other conventions, a diplomatic 
and lobbying instrument that has been used by domestic and international players to press 
states parties to adhere to internationally-recognized human rights for women and to 
translate their declared commitments into policy and practice. Amongst the UN efforts to 
address the issue of women’s rights, the UN Arab Human Development Report, for 
example, cites women’s empowerment, together with education and governance, as the 
main challenge facing countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, to realize 
development. As various mechanisms of the UN have continued to press for the 
advancement of women, the question is how Saudi Arabia has been responding to such 
influence.
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This chapter is devoted to examining Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN 
human rights system in the area of women’s rights and subsequently seeks to draw 
conclusions regarding the extent to which women’s rights in the Kingdom has been 
influenced, or could be influenced, by the UN human rights system. While it is difficult to 
separate precisely the influence of the UN human rights system from other forms of 
internal and external influences, this chapter however examines various elements and 
analyze different signs that can assist in identifying the extent of its influence.
During the debate over international human rights instruments like the UDHR, 
ICCPC and the ICSECR, the rights of women were among those issues of considerable 
concern for Saudi Arabia’s representatives to the UN. Tracing the Kingdom’s 
perspectives expressed when debating women’s rights in such international documents 
and conferences is amongst the objectives of this chapter. It is equally important to 
identify Saudi Arabia’s prominent role in articulating its perspectives on human rights in 
Islam through regional and international symposiums and conferences, including the 1990 
Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, and to look at how the rights of women have 
been defined.
Saudi Arabia has recognized internationally-accepted women’s rights standards 
and acknowledged international scrutiny when it acceded to CEDAW in 2000. This step 
was a major development towards becoming legally bound by international women’s 
rights standards. However, in light of the Kingdom’s general reservation on CEDAW 
regarding the application of the shari ’ah, the earlier investigation of the status of women 
in Islam in chapter seven serves as a fundamental platform for evaluating Saudi Arabia’s 
compliance with the provisions of CEDAW. It is essential to address the question of 
whether Saudi laws related to women are compatible with CEDAW provisions, or 
whether they are an accurate representation of what is stated in the Qur’an and Sunnah 
and thus in harmony with Saudi Arabia’s general reservation on the Convention. How far 
has Saudi Arabia changed its laws to come closer to complying with CEDAW’s 
provisions? Accordingly, the second objective of this chapter is to review Saudi Arabia’s 
position in relation to CEDAW’s provisions and to UN activities for promoting women’s 
rights in general.
It is a major objective of this chapter, and partly of the thesis as a whole, to 
examine the extent to which developments in the status of women in the Kingdom can be 
attributed to influence by the UN human rights system. To establish a correlation between
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developments in the role of Saudi women and their rights with the influences exerted by 
the UN human rights system in general and the Kingdom’s accession to CEDAW in 
particular, some features related to the two variables have to be analytically evaluated. It 
is crucial to look briefly at instrumental elements including the temporal dimension 
between the two variables, how media and human rights activists utilized CEDAW at both 
domestic and international levels, how Saudi Arabia responded to its obligations under 
other UN human rights conventions, and how other factors affect Saudi women’s rights.
1. Saudi Arabia’s Position Concerning UN Activities on Women’s Rights:
Saudi Arabia participated in UN activities, including declarations, conventions and 
conferences regarding women. Exploring aspects of its participation is essential for 
identifying its positions towards issues of women’s rights.
UN efforts for the advancement of human rights in general and women’s rights in 
particular began with the passage of the UN Charter in 1945. Article 55 of the Charter not 
only established an international norm for human rights and equality, but also called upon 
the newly established international body to play a role in promoting “universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion.”4 Ruling out any distinctions based on sex exemplifies 
a foundation for the rights of women to treatment equal to men. The UN Charter is the 
most accepted universal document, and joining the UN implies an acceptance of its 
charter.
As noted earlier in chapter six, Saudi Arabia’s abstention from the UNGA voting 
on the UDHR was partly due to its objection to Article 16. The Saudi representative 
attempted unsuccessfully to define and limit the legal scope of this Article. However, in 
looking at the position adopted by Saudi Arabia in relation to rights that include women 
on the same footing with men, it is fair to say that the Kingdom did not object to several of 
the women’s rights to equality set forth in the UDHR, such as equality in political and 
civil rights (Article 2) and in economic opportunity (Article 23).
As the UDHR was the foundation of the subsequent human rights treaties, 
arguments over some issues in the UDHR reappeared among UN states members when 
deliberating those treaties. Within the context of women’s rights, Article 3 of both the 
CCPR and the CESCR has been designated to guarantee equality of men and women with
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respect to the rights set forth in both covenants. Also, Article 23 of the CCPR is devoted 
to the protection of the family and of marriage and contains an explicit confirmation of the 
equality of rights of spouses and of the age of marriage. The term ‘full age’ in Article 16 
of the UDHR, which had caused an extended debate in 1948, was changed to 
‘marriageable age’ in the CCPR. Furthermore, the controversial phrase ‘without 
limitation due to race, religion, or nationality’ was removed from the draft text of this 
article. Again, Saudi Arabia endorsed both Article 25 of the CCPR which articulates 
equality in political and civil rights and Article 7 of the CESCR that confirms women’s 
human rights to equal economic treatment. Unlike its position when voting on the UDHR, 
Saudi Arabia voted in favour of the CCPR and the CESCR.
It is essential to identify Saudi Arabia’s position in relation to UN declarations or 
conventions that specifically concern promoting equality of rights between men and 
women and eliminating discrimination against women. One of the early developments 
with respect to UN efforts to advance the status of women, and to promote and protect 
their rights, was the adoption of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. The 
Convention affirms the rights of women to participate in public life and exercise all public 
functions and upheld women’s entitlement to hold public office. On 20 December 1952, 
the UNGA adopted the Convention in its 640 (VII) resolution by a roll-call vote of 46 to 
none, with 11 abstentions.5 Saudi Arabia was among the abstaining states.6 The 
Convention has not gained popularity, and only limited numbers of countries have ratified 
it. Saudi Arabia was not among those ratifying countries.7
Based on Article 15 of the UDHR, the Convention of the Nationality of Married 
Women provided safeguards concerning the loss or acquisition of nationality by women as 
a result of marriage. In January 1956, the UNGA adopted the Convention by its 1040 (XI) 
resolution through a roll-call vote of 47 to 2, with 24 abstentions.8 Saudi Arabia did not 
attend the voting and was listed among 9 absent states.9 During the drafting process in 
which articles and amendments were approved by vote, Saudi Arabia’s representative to 
the UN took a neutral stand and abstained from voting.10 He informed the UNGA Third 
Committee that a draft of the Convention was forwarded to the Saudi government for 
instruction.11 As of February 2002, only 70 countries acceded to the Convention, and 
Saudi Arabia is not a party to this convention.12
Similarly, Saudi Arabia followed the same pattern during discussion of the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
232
Marriages. This convention was founded on the basis of Article 16 of the UDHR and 
established legal standards for marriages. With the exception of articles 4 and 8, the other 
articles of the Convention were adopted after a brief discussion at the UNGA Third 
Committee. On 10 October 1962, the UNGA Third Committee approved the Convention 
as a whole by 80 votes to 0, with 8 abstentions.13 At the UNGA, the Convention was 
adopted by Resolution 1763A (XVII) on 7 November 1962, by 92 to 0, with 7 
abstentions.14 UN documents did not record the voting of each state on this Convention,13 
although the content of the Convention indicates that Saudi Arabia was among the 
abstaining states. Saudi Arabia is not among the 49 states parties that have acceded to the 
Convention as of February 2002.16
Following the completion of the work on the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, the General Assembly 
requested the UN Economic and Social Council to ask the Commission on the Status of 
Women to review the draft Recommendation on the same subject. The Recommendation 
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages 
provided, in three principles as in its title, gave advice for each member state to adopt 
appropriate measures to give effect to such principles. Unlike the Convention, the 
Recommendation specified fifteen years as the minimum age for marriage. UN 
documents did not show active participation by the representative of Saudi Arabia in 
debating the Recommendation.17 Subsequent to the approval of the Recommendation’s 
text by the UNGA Third Committee on 6 October 1965 by 87 votes to 0, with 1 
abstention, the UNGA adopted it in Resolution 2018 (XX) by 95 votes to 0, with 2
to
abstentions on 1 November 1965. Similar to the Convention, UN documents did not 
contain the voting of each country, but it is likely that Saudi Arabia abstained from the 
voting at both the Third Committee and the UNGA Plenary Meeting, as the 
Recommendation stipulates fifteen years as the minimum age for marriage, which is 
inconsistent with Saudi laws.
With its eleven articles, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women was the first comprehensive international document concerning 
discrimination against women that provided for measures to be taken to guarantee the 
principle of equality of rights for men and women, constituting the basis of the subsequent 
international treaty on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 
Following the without-vote adoption of the Declaration text by the UNGA Third
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Committee in October 1967, the UNGA unanimously approved the Declaration by 
Resolution 2263 (XXII) of 7 November 1967.19 Saudi Arabia was among UNGA states 
members that adopted this unbinding document at the UNGA Third Committee and the 
Plenary Meeting, but UN records did not show active participation by Saudi Arabia in 
discussing this Declaration, except casting votes on debated articles. Surprisingly, no 
single statement or comment by the Saudi Arabian representatives was recorded, although
90a prolonged discussion at the UNGA Third Committee preceded the adoption.
Within the area of women’s rights in armed conflicts, the UNGA adopted the 
Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in the Emergency and Armed 
Conflict by Resolution 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. This Resolution was adopted 
by vote of 110 to 0, with 14 abstentions.21 Saudi Arabia was among states that supported 
adoption of the Declaration,22 as it is in line with Saudi Arabia’s policy of providing 
women with special status and treating them as a vulnerable group along with children.
It is essential to recall that Saudi Arabia’s representative to the UN did not actively 
engage in the debate during the drafting process of CEDAW in the 1970s, and its 
participation has been examined here essentially in the voting response on the 
convention’s draft articles and amendments. Saudi Arabia’s pattern of voting fluctuated 
between mostly neutral (abstaining from, or being absent during, the voting) or 
occasionally supporting articles of the draft convention, but rarely voting against draft 
articles. Saudi Arabia voted for adoption of the tenth and eleventh preambular paragraphs, 
regarding racism, colonialism and self-determination. It voted against paragraph (2) of 
Article 9 of the CEDAW, however, concerning granting women equal rights with men 
with respect to the nationality of their children. For the other paragraphs and articles of 
the draft convention, Saudi Arabia abstained from voting, including on the draft 
convention as a whole.23 Despite its abstention in 1979, Saudi Arabia acceded to 
CEDAW in September 2000, with a general reservation regarding the application of the 
shari’ah and two specific reservations about Article 29 (1) and Article 9 (2), as explained 
in chapter six.
While not specializing in women’s issues, some UN organs such as the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) have given continuing attention to the issue of women and made 
efforts to eradicate discrimination against women in the workplace and in education. Both 
the ILO and UNESCO have separately adopted conventions, seeking to safeguard and
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promote human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons without discrimination of 
any kind; as indicated in chapter six, Saudi Arabia has ratified some of the ILO 
conventions. On 17 August 1973, Saudi Arabia ratified the UNESCO Convention against 
Discrimination in Education,24 which was adopted by the General Conference of 
UNESCO in December 1960.
In addition to ratifying international conventions that deal with the rights of 
women, Saudi Arabia, with membership in numerous international institutions, has been 
represented at many international events devoted to the promotion of equality between 
women and men, the protection of women’s rights, and eradication of discrimination 
against them. Four world conferences on women have been convened by the UN within 
twenty years and have been instrumental in elevating the cause of women’s rights and sex 
equality to the forefront of the global agenda. The first world conference on the status of 
women was held in Mexico City to coincide with the 1975 International Women’s Year. 
The Conference, along with the UN Decade for Women (1976-1985) proclaimed by fne 
UNGA a few months later following the urging of the Conference, launched a new era in 
global efforts to promote the advancement o f women. The second world conference on 
women held in Copenhagen in 1980, celebrated international efforts following the 
adoption of CEDAW in 1979. The declaration of ‘Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for 
the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000’, adopted at the 1985 third UN world 
conference on women, provided a framework for action at the national, regional, and 
international levels to promote greater equality and opportunity for women.
Saudi Arabia was represented by low-level delegations to the first three world 
conferences on women and had limited involvement in the increasing worldwide attention 
towards promoting the advancement of women. International agenda on women did not 
receive public attention within the Saudi media during that time for various reasons. 
International issues, like the spread of atheistic Communism and the occupation of 
Palestine, distracted Saudis from engaging in debate about the international agenda on 
women. Moreover, Saudis were preoccupied in the local process of transformation to 
development and modernity. The Saudi government, for its part, did not articulate its 
support for the outcome of these conferences nor did it express condemnation or rejection 
of their contents.
Since the first UN world conference on women in the mid 1970s, activities within 
the UN on women’s issues have grown dramatically, especially since the 1990s. Dozens
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of decisions, resolutions or declarations concerning the status and the rights of women 
have been drafted and adopted by the UN. Saudi Arabia has participated in discussing 
such actions by virtue of its membership of the UN and of some bodies within the UN. In 
the majority of cases reviewed for this thesis, resolutions and declarations aimed at 
protecting women’s rights and in advancement of their roles have been adopted as a whole 
without a vote, following debate on them in the drafting process. For instance, the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was adopted without vote by 
the UNGA 48/104 resolution on 20 December 1993.25 A without-vote adoption implies 
the approval of all countries, including Saudi Arabia.
Prior to the UN International Conference on Population and Development 
(UN1CPD), which was held in Cairo in September 1994, the issue of women occupied a 
great deal of public discussion in Saudi Arabia following the Gulf War and its aftermath, 
including a demonstration by a group of women. As explained in the previous chapter, 
the demand by a number of Saudi women who protested by driving themselves in their 
cars pleased liberally-oriented circles in society but aggravated conservatives, whose 
influence was then on the rise. This event generated discussion on the status of women 
and their rights. The UNICPD’s agenda contained issues related to women such as sex 
equality and access to reproductive and sexual health services. Those topics provoked 
conservative ulama in the Kingdom, being, in their view, against the laws of Allah and the 
laws of nature. The Council of Senior Ulama issued a statement, strongly condemning the 
conference agenda as being an insult to the values of Muslims and against the laws of 
nature.26 The statement also forbade attending the UNICPD and called on states to 
boycott it. In such an atmosphere, various articles and commentaries appeared in the 
Saudi press criticizing the UNICPD’s agenda and arguing that issues like sex equality, 
abortion, homosexuality, and sex education would undermine morals and chastity in 
Muslim societies.27 In the light of public attitudes against the conference and because of 
the religious revivalist sentiment that unfolded following the 1991 Gulf War, the Saudi 
government decided not to participate in the 1994 UNICPD.
A year later, the UN Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing on 
4-14 September 1995 and attended by delegations from all over the world. It was the 
largest gathering of governments and NGO representatives ever held. Saudi Arabia was 
the only country that did not send a delegation to the conference,30 as the Council of 
Senior Ulama in a statement published in the Saudi media called on Muslim governments,
236
peoples and individuals to denounce the agenda of the Beijing Conference and to be 
cautious about its outcome.31 The Saudi Grand Mufti unequivocally stated that the 
Beijing Conference had adopted un-Islamic principles (mabadi Kufriyah), calling on all 
Muslims to boycott it and to take all necessary measures to stop this ‘immoral invasion’. 
The debate about the Beijing Conference in the Saudi Press reflected religious and 
traditional sentiment in which women’s morality and chastity were central in the 
argument.
The twenty third Special Session of the UNGA, entitled ‘Women 2000: Gender 
Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty First Century’, which took place in New 
York in June 2000, aimed at reviewing progress made in the five years after the adoption 
of the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action. Unlike the Cairo or Beijing 
conferences, the UNGA special session on women (known as Beijing+5) failed to provoke 
public debate. Saudi Arabia did not send a delegation, but instructed its permanent 
representative to the UN to participate in the session. The final document of the session 
was adopted without vote, containing further actions and initiatives to implement the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action. However, several states made statements 
explaining their position before adoption of the final document. In its explanatory 
statement, Saudi Arabia confirmed its commitment to implementation of the 
recommendation of the final document of the session in a manner that did not conflict 
with Islamic and national laws.
In relation to Saudi Arabia’s engagement in the activities of UN development 
programs for women, the UNDP started in 2001 a pilot project for Saudi professional 
women.34 Taking advantage of the development of the Internet as a medium of learning, 
the project aimed at empowering professional women and training them in the field of 
executive level management.
Regionally, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was endorsed in 1991 
by the Foreign Ministers of the OIC. With Saudi Arabia playing an influential part in 
drafting the document, the Saudi Foreign Minister presented the Cairo Declaration at the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, indicating that the application of 
human rights requires consideration in the context of the diversity of societies and 
cultures.35 Saudi Arabia has referred on several occasions to the endorsement of the Cairo
36Declaration as a document that symbolizes diversity on human rights.
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In looking at the position of the Cairo Declaration in relation to women’s rights, it 
avoided providing equality in rights regardless of sex. Instead, Article 6 establishes 
equality in ‘human dignity’ between a woman and a man and provides that the woman 
‘has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform’, specifying three rights: a 
woman’s right to legal personality, to manage and own her own property and to retain her 
name after marriage. The enjoyment of rights, such as the right to freedom of movement 
in Article 12, has been linked to the framework of the shari’ah, which may allow 
restrictions to be placed on women. Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s endorsement and 
reference to the Cairo Declaration does not clarify its position in relation to women’s 
rights, as the Declaration itself is ambiguous about rights and duties of women and vague 
on the notion of equality of rights.
Similarly, the Kingdom sponsored, directly or indirectly, a number of international 
symposiums and conferences in which human rights in Islam were discussed. In 
reviewing documents and declarations of those meetings, and what has been said about 
women’s rights in particular, it appears that they mostly reflect Saudi perspectives on 
human rights, typically using general, unspecific statements on issues which conflict with 
the internationally-recognized women’s rights standards. While sex equality is generally a 
settled issue at the international level, the final declaration of the International Symposium 
on Human Rights in Islam, held in Rome in February 2000, stated that “men and women 
are partners in all fields of life, according to their competences.”
The signing of CEDAW marked a turning point, from a legal point of view, in the 
rights of women in Saudi Arabia. Prior to its accession, Saudi Arabia’s interaction with 
the UN human rights system, particularly within the field of women’s rights, was largely 
shaped by expressing endorsement of UN proposals and participating in its activities, with 
rare abstentions and few absences. It is now useful to explore how Saudi Arabia has 
changed its policies to meet its obligations under the CEDAW.
2. Changes in the Status of Women since Saudi Arabia’s Accession to 
CEDAW:
CEDAW primarily prohibits discrimination against women on the ground of sex 
and promotes equality between women and men in all spheres of life. With its 16 
substantive articles, CEDAW defines discrimination against women and provides an
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agenda for national action to eliminate discrimination against women and to establish 
absolute equality with men.
Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW in September 2000 was conditional upon 
laws of the shari’ah having precedence over the CEDAW provisions, as indicated 
previously. Saudi Arabia, as a state party to CEDAW, has committed to taking all 
appropriate measures to achieve sex neutrality, in which all discriminatory policies and 
practices against women should be eliminated, as long as those policies or rules do not 
contradict Islam. The legality of such a general reservation is questionable, particularly 
given the problematic reconciliation between Saudi Arabia’s understanding of the 
shari ’ah and the object and the purpose of CEDAW. The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties prohibits states from making reservations that go against the object and 
purpose of the treaty. However, Saudi Arabia is not a party to this convention.
The earlier noted Harrow interpretation of Islam combined with traditional, tribal 
practices makes it possible to visualize an improvement in the status of Saudi women and 
in promoting their rights. CEDAW is undeniably significant to Saudi women, as it 
provides a legal framework obligating Saudi Arabia to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women. Although the general reservation on CEDAW bestowed 
Saudi Arabia with a legal excuse to evade some of its obligations under the Convention, 
the signing of CEDAW by the Saudi government has given human rights activists within 
and outside the Kingdom a reference to use when pressing for change.
Part I of CEDAW (Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) is related to prohibiting 
discrimination in national constitutions and legislation and affirming equality of women 
and men in all fields. It also calls upon states parties to take all appropriate measures and 
pursue every means to eliminate discrimination against women. In Saudi Arabia, there are 
several official laws and social practices based on religious rules and traditional values 
that are discriminatory against women. The constitution of Saudi Arabia remains silent 
about women’s rights, let alone establishing sex equality. National legislation does not 
establish legal equality between women and men, although partially similar policies have 
been enacted to cover both sexes in fields like education, health and employment. Since 
its accession, some developments have taken place in the Kingdom to raise awareness of 
the need for a culture in which women would be treated as partners of men and to promote 
the role of women in public life. As pointed out earlier, the rationale behind the law 
prohibiting women from driving has been re-considered. Saudis, at official and public
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levels, have become more willing to consider women driving as a social, as opposed to 
religious, issue. Activists have argued for women’s right to drive by pointing out that 
Saudi Arabia has signed international treaties on non-discrimination between sexes as 
long as the treaties are not in conflict with Islam, and driving is not.40
Despite new trends and developments aimed at granting Saudi women more rights 
and broadening their participation in public life, Saudi Arabia has not yet implemented in 
its national constitution and other relevant legislation the call of Part I of CEDAW to 
clearly prohibit discrimination against women. In addition to local traditions, Islamic 
general principles,41 such as qiwamah and hijab, and their narrow interpretation and 
traditionally-inspired application obstructed the Saudi government from adopting 
legislative measures and approving legal frameworks that would institute equality between 
men and women. It is worth noting that observing the ‘Islamic’, traditional code of 
women’s dress has been strictly enforced by Saudi authorities, compared with lenience in 
enforcing the Islamic requirement for men to be covered from waist to knee, as in the 
case, for instance, of soccer players.42 This variation in enforcing the dress code, let alone 
the discrepancy of the code itself between women and men, is considered discrimination 
under Article 1 of CEDAW.43 Although some Islamic principles can be subject to 
reinterpretation, absolute sex equality contradicts some laws that are manifestly stated in 
Islamic texts. Therefore, Saudi Arabia assumes that the avoidance of establishing equality 
between men and women in its legislation is compatible with its unspecified reservation 
on CEDAW.
Articles 7 and 8 urge states parties to grant women equal rights to participate in 
political and public life, including the right be eligible for, and to vote in, all elections, to 
take part in formulating policies and performing all public functions including those of 
non-governmental organizations, and giving women the opportunity to represent their 
governments at international level and to participate in the work of international 
organizations. In Saudi Arabia, women play a limited, constrained role in public life, with 
no means to directly influence political decisions. To a large extent this is due to social 
values prevailing in the Saudi patriarchal, tribal society, which are justified and guarded 
by strict religious interpretation. As explained earlier, Islamic texts do not prohibit 
women’s participation in public life. Muslim women, during the time of the Prophet and 
his four caliphs, took part in political activities, such as their partaking in bay’ah, 
emigration, wars and even argument with and opposition to the leadership. Accordingly,
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the shortcoming in implementing Articles 7 and 8 cannot be justified by observing the 
shari’ah and is thus regarded here as incompatible with Saudi Arabia’s general 
reservation.
Since its accession to CEDAW, the Saudi government has adopted several 
measures to expand women’s role in Saudi society. As discussed earlier, more 
educational and vocational opportunities became available to Saudi women, and their 
appearance and influence in public life are increasing, especially within the business 
community. CEDAW, and the Kingdom’s accession to it, was expressly cited in the 
debate over the participation of women in municipal elections. Public debate was 
generated when ambiguous wording of regulations applying to the rights of women to 
vote or be elected in the 2003 municipal elections were inferred as compatible with Saudi 
Arabia’s accession to CEDAW.44 Furthermore, Saudi women have gained membership in 
some local NGOs, represented the Kingdom at international forums and participated in the 
works of international organizations such as the UN.45 While there are various reasons for 
these developments, those moves themselves are considered gradual steps to fulfilling the 
Kingdom’s obligations under Articles 7 and 8 of CEDAW.
Article 9 is concerned with equality of rights in relation to nationality laws. 
Because there is nothing in Islam that prevents a woman from passing her nationality to 
her children, Saudi Arabia had to make specific reservation to Article 9 (2), which called 
upon states parties to grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of 
their children. Despite the introduction of a newly amended nationality law in mid 2004 
and recent discussions in Saudi media about this matter,46 the Saudi government is not 
ready yet to grant the children of Saudi women married to foreigners Saudi nationality 
because the lineage in the Arab culture is still considered to be strongly connected with the 
males. Saudi Arabia’s specific reservation on Article 9 (2) can be attributed mainly to 
tribal thinking about women, as its general reservation cannot be used to justify preventing 
children from acquiring their mother’s nationality.
Equality in education is stipulated in Article 10, stating that women should enjoy 
equality in education including access to the same curricula and standards, ensuring 
equality in all levels and types of education and encouraging coeducation. Whereas 
segregation in education does not necessarily mean inequality, as implied in this Article, 
Saudi women suffer some disadvantages in educational facilities, compared to men, such 
as access to libraries, shortages in teachers and limited fields of study.47 Shortages may
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occur for various, sometimes uncontrollable, reasons, but the lack of teachers and the 
limited access to libraries or to fields of studies can be connected with a traditional, 
patriarchal view that gives male education more attention than female education. 
However, as indicated in the previous chapter, there has been a recent expansion of fields 
of study available to women in Saudi educational institutions, although women are still 
not permitted to study in fields such as engineering or military matters. Article 11 
concerns equality of employment opportunities and affirms the right of women to 
maternity leave and protection during pregnancy. As with their educational status, Saudi 
women have limited access to jobs mainly due to the rule of sex-based segregation. Islam 
generally does not prevent women from education or employment, but socially influenced 
laws not only discriminate against women, they also obstruct the full realization of 
women’s rights in the field of education and employment in accordance with Articles 10 
and 11.
As explained earlier, several developments took place towards providing Saudi 
women with more educational and vocational opportunities. The passage of a new labour 
law that guarantees women’s right to work has brought the Kingdom closer to compliance 
with Article 11, despite the fact that the new law limits women’s right to work to fields 
that suit their nature.48 Saudi press have been openly and increasingly discussing various 
obstacles and problems related to women’s work, in which advocates of women’s right to 
work referred frequently to Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW and pointed towards its 
significance in guaranteeing women equal rights to men.49
Recent developments in women’s education and employment are noticeable. 
Granting women more opportunities and increasing their role has become essential, not 
only to meet Saudi Arabia’s obligations under CEDAW and to absorb international 
pressure on the issue of women, but also for the Kingdom’s progress and the improvement 
of its economy. As explained in detail earlier, the Kingdom has witnessed in the last few 
years several developments towards improving the status of women in education and 
employment. However, there is a need for more changes to achieve compliance with 
standards set forth in Articles 10 and 11.
In accordance with Article 12, Saudi women have similar health care services to 
those available to men. Yet, to gain indisputable access to maternity wards for delivery, a 
woman is typically required to provide consent from a male guardian to the hospital. 
Inconsistently with Article 13, Saudi women are disadvantaged in gaining access to
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recreational activities, sports and some aspects of cultural life. Again, hijab and its 
ramifications for segregation prevents women from enjoying equal rights in some aspects 
of economic, social and cultural life in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia justifies ignoring 
rights related to providing similar access to sporting activities, as stated in this Article and 
Article 10 (g), by observing the shari ’ah, which is consistent with its general reservation 
on CEDAW. Nonetheless, as providing separate, equal sport facilities for women is 
possible and Islamically acceptable, the existing lack of recreational facilities is likely 
related to restrictions that are based on traditional, tribal perspectives about women and 
their movement. It is noteworthy that recent years have witnessed public debate in Saudi 
newspapers about the need to initiate athletic activities suitable for women.50 Majlis Al- 
Shura approved, by majority vote, a recommendation to the Ministry of Education to 
include a sport class in girls’ public schools as part of their weekly schedule, similar to 
that applied in boys’ schools.51 Although the recommendation has not been implemented, 
such debate has ended a social taboo by questioning the inequality of opportunities 
between boys and girls to participate in sport activities and physical education.
Article 15 established the principle of equality between women and men before the 
law, giving women in civil and private matters a legal capacity identical to that of men and 
the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. It also furnished women with equal legal 
rights as men regarding their movement and residence. Islamic texts gave women full 
legal capacity with a separate financial entity and accorded to women equality before the 
law in general, with the exception of testimony and inheritance laws noted previously. 
Concerning the right to movement, the Islamic principle of qiwamah and the 
subordination of women in tribal thinking have restrained women’s free movement, as the 
woman is expected to get consent from her guardian to exercise the right of movement and 
choice of residence.
In Saudi Arabia, there are several laws that violate rights stated in Article 15. 
Most violations can be justified on shari ’ah grounds and, thus, are in line with Saudi 
Arabia’s general reservation on CEDAW. However, choosing strict interpretations of the 
shari'ah furthers the level of violation of women’s rights. Moreover, one cannot attribute 
all laws pertaining to the treatment of women in the Kingdom to the shari’ah. Influenced 
by traditional and patriarchal orientations, laws of segregation and guardianship have 
restricted the legal capacity of Saudi women including their right to movement and 
freedom to choose their residence and domicile. Banning women from travelling, without
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being accompanied by a mahram (guardian) or obtaining permission from him, is a 
restriction of the freedom of movement that is guaranteed under this Article. Since the 
time of joining CEDAW, Saudi Arabia has taken hesitant steps to enlarge the legal 
capacity of women to perform for themselves some procedures in public and private 
sectors, including allowing them to administer their businesses on an equal footing to 
men. As indicated earlier, issuing ID cards for women has advanced their independence 
in some aspects, including improving their legal capacity.
The focus of Article 16 is on eliminating discrimination against women in matters 
related to marriage and family relations and on establishing equity between women and 
men in all rights and responsibilities within the marriage institution. It also called upon 
states parties to legally specify a minimum age for marriage. There are several aspects 
within this Article that contradict mainstream interpretations of Islamic texts, either 
apparently or unequivocally. It is complicated to fully conciliate Islamic laws with the 
rights stated in this Article, especially problematic issues such as lawful polygamy for 
men, restricting Muslim women to marry only Muslim men, the requirement for the male 
guardian to validate the marriage contract and women’s unequal legal status with men in 
matters relating to marriage and divorce. While it is possible, through reinterpreting 
Islamic texts, to limit the scope of such practices and to increase conditions on them, it is 
difficult to outlaw them completely.52 The age of marriage according to most ulama is 
determined by signs of maturity rather than by age only, but some jurisprudents linked 
maturity mainly with a certain age, mostly fifteen years of age.53
In April 2005, the Saudi government issued a royal verdict announcing its 
intention to initiate a review process to revise and restructure institutions and laws 
governing the judicial system including the personal status courts, which deal with divorce 
issues, among other things.54 Procedures available for Saudi women to gain easier access 
to divorce have recently been under growing public discussion,55 as have forced or under­
aged marriages. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ulama issued a fatwa banning 
forced marriage, and the Ministry of Justice is preparing a new law to determine the age of 
marriage. Despite such minor steps, Saudi Arabia is still far behind in implementing 
rights expressed in this Article. The only refuge is its general reservation as some 
practices can arguably be justified on religious grounds.
For the first time, a Saudi female TV presenter (Ms. Mona Abu-Solaiman) was 
named as a UN Goodwill Ambassador. The UN Secretary General met with her in
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Jeddah, giving support to a broadening of the role of Saudi women in public life. A well- 
known Saudi football player was also selected as a UN Goodwill Ambassador, but while 
the UN Secretary General did not meet with him, his meeting with Abu-Solaiman was 
published in the front page of some Saudi newspapers.56 Despite being a symbolic step, 
naming a Saudi woman as a goodwill ambassador and organizing and publicizing her 
meeting with the UN Secretary General should be seen in the context of promoting the 
rights and the role of Saudi women by both the UN and the Saudi government as well. 
For the Saudi government, changing the status quo of women and responding positively to 
its obligations under CEDAW requires the highlighting and promotion of the roles played 
by prominent, successful Saudi women like Abu-Solaiman.
3. Responses of Saudi Arabia to its Obligations under CEDAW:
In order to explore the extent to which developments in Saudi women’s rights can 
be linked to Saudi Arabia’s obligations under CEDAW, one has to assess different 
features that can assist establishing a level of correlation between CEDAW’s influences 
and the development of women’s rights in the Kingdom. Given the theoretical discussion 
earlier in this thesis, UN human rights mechanisms can serve as important instruments in 
the process of socialization. Constructivist theories focus on the process of socialization 
and internalization, assuming that social learning mechanisms, rather than political 
pressure, leads states into compliance with international normative principles. By 
engaging and interacting with the UN human rights system since 1948 and joining its 
human rights legal arrangements since the mid 1990s, Saudi Arabia has become involved 
in the operation of that socialization process.
Certain elements within theories of compliance have to be utilized to understand 
the extent to which Saudi Arabia was responding to UN women’s rights influences. As 
explained in chapter two, an enforcement model of compliance may prove to be effective 
in situations of gross violations of human rights or in areas such as trade or environment 
matters. For human rights, durable compliance with norms promoted by the UN human 
rights system rests fundamentally on their acceptance and their internalization into 
governmental policy and community thinking. To achieve this relies primarily on 
mechanisms such as cooperation, persuasion and shaming to induce states to implement 
their obligations arising from joining international human rights treaties.
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The decision by the government of Saudi Arabia to become a state party to 
CEDAW was the result of various forms of influence. CEDAW and other international 
human rights treaties are the products of the UN human rights system. UN bodies and 
forums, in which Saudi Arabia is a member, have been used as a launching platform by 
international actors (states and NGOs) to urge states to join international human rights 
treaties and to adhere to international human rights standards. Saudi Arabia, as a UN state 
member, has been exposed to mechanisms of persuasion and shaming used by, or at, the 
UN human rights system. Accordingly, one cannot ignore the role played by the UN 
human rights system in making Saudi Arabia party to some international human rights 
legal arrangements, particular to CEDAW. Saudi Arabia’s engagement in, and interaction 
with, the UN human rights system was a primary' stage that contributed to its decision to 
join international human rights legal arrangements. However, becoming part of such 
arrangements is only a preliminary, but important, level of compliance in which the 
Kingdom has conditionally endorsed international treaties and provisionally accepted 
international scrutiny. It is therefore worth examining whether the recent developments in 
women’s rights in Saudi Arabia related to its responses to the UN human rights system 
and to its obligations under CEDAW.
It has been indicated in the earlier theoretical discussion (chapter two) that 
compliance with human rights treaties normally necessitates a transitional period, as 
compliance with human rights standards typically involves changes in social norms. 
Human rights treaties were designed to initiate a process that over time, sometimes 
involving long periods, would bring behaviour into greater congruence with those ideals 
embodied in the human rights treaties including CEDAW. As we have seen, 
developments in women’s rights that recently took place in the Kingdom can be linked in 
time to the period that followed Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW. This temporal 
coincidence can be misleading, as theories of compliance with human rights treaties 
suggest that changes in social norms usually occur over lengthy periods of time. In other 
words, Saudi Arabia was not necessarily responding to influences by CEDAW, but rather 
the Kingdom may have been reacting to several internal and external circumstances that 
coincided with influence by CEDAW.
Following Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW, both the media and women’s 
rights activists, within Saudi Arabia and abroad, have been using CEDAW and its 
provisions as a reference point to press for a greater role for women in the Kingdom.
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Using CEDAW as a reference reflects a level of impact and a form of pressure arising 
from international treaties and serves as a reminder of Saudi Arabia’s obligations under 
CEDAW. While referring to CEDAW does not change the reality of women’s rights in 
the Kingdom, it assists in building pressure on Saudi Arabia to implement its obligations 
under CEDAW. The traditional bi-dimensional influence of the media and women’s 
rights activists was empowered when Saudi Arabia joined CEDAW to create a triangular 
dimension of pressure.
As illustrated earlier, reformers in the Kingdom used the international media to get 
their message across to the Saudi people who largely have the benefit of access to the 
international media through traditional avenues (such as radio) and new means (such as 
the Internet). At the present time, various forms of media available to most people in the 
Kingdom, particularly the Internet and satellite televisions, provide unrestricted access to 
information about domestic, regional and international issues. Routinely, women’s rights 
activists use these media to call for the elimination of discriminatory practices related to 
the treatment of Saudi women, as part of Saudi Arabia’s obligation under CEDAW. 
However, developments that occurred in relation to the status of women in the Kingdom 
cannot be directly linked to CEDAW. While CEDAW’s direct influence is largely seen as 
limited, particularly on the substance, the Kingdom’s decision to ratify CEDAW has 
empowered other external and internal factors that seek to advance the role of women in 
the Kingdom and protect their rights.
To assess how Saudi Arabia has responded to the requirements of CEDAW, one 
has to look at the way Saudi Arabia responded to its obligations under other international 
human rights conventions. As explained earlier, Saudi Arabia acceded to four human 
rights conventions including CEDAW, with general reservations to most of them not to 
abide by provisions that contradict the shari’ah. Numerous developments, mentioned in 
previous chapters, have been introduced to bring the Kingdom closer to standards set forth 
in those conventions, whilst there are still several shortcomings beyond those required by 
the explicit shari’ah laws. At the social, grassroots level, and as required by most 
international human rights conventions and declarations, officials in the Ministry of 
Education announced the introduction of a new strategy in schools to increase awareness 
of human rights, referring to the international working plan for education on human rights, 
among other sources, as guidance in preparing this strategy.58 Moreover, in a publicized
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step to promote a culture of human rights, the Saudi Postal Authority inaugurated a 
memorial postage stamp about human rights.59
Saudi Arabia provided its initial reports on the three human rights conventions to 
which it has acceded (CRC, CERD and CAT) to illustrate its compliance with their 
provisions. It also explained practices and developments related to protecting and 
promoting human rights in the Kingdom before UN committees. For women’s rights, 
Saudi Arabia’s initial report was due in October 2001, but it has not yet been submitted. 
Unlike the other three human rights conventions, CEDAW is problematic and complex as 
it touches upon sensitive religious and social issues. Standards concerning combating 
torture, eliminating racial discrimination or protecting the rights of the child are in general 
compatible with the principles of the shari ’ah, whereas the rights of women as stated in 
CEDAW are controversial from both Islamic and traditional perspectives. Furthermore, 
pressure applied by international actors on states to ratify international human rights 
conventions is intensive, when compared to pressure on states parties to submit their 
reports on those conventions. For instance, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch exerted pressure on Saudi Arabia to ratify international human rights conventions, 
but the late submission of reports has received minor attention, although for various 
reasons not submitting reports on the scheduled time is common practice among states 
parties to human rights conventions.
The Saudi people, as represented in the survey sample discussed briefly in 
chapter four, by and large agree that international factors are effective in promoting 
changes in the status and role of women. Yet, the lack of knowledge among the study 
sample about Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the UN human rights system and their 
disagreement with linking the recent changes on women’s rights to the Kingdom’s 
accession to CEDAW reflect a weakness of association between domestic public opinion 
and the UN human rights system. This supports the argument that Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to CEDAW, as form of international influence, has not had a direct influence 
evident to the Saudi public.
In order to make a more accurate assessment as to whether Saudi Arabia is 
responding to CEDAW and the UN women’s rights mechanisms, other external and 
internal factors should be briefly reviewed. In this context, three fundamental elements 
should be identified. First, domestic or international factors are more effective when 
national security or the regime’s image is at stake. In the case of women’s rights,
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influences from international factors, including CEDAW and the UN human rights system 
as a whole, do not represent a threat to the security of the Kingdom, although they may 
relate to issues that have a negative influence on the image of Saudi Arabia. Foreign 
states, NGOs and international media utilize various mechanisms to put pressure on Saudi 
Arabia to change its pattern and policies relating to the treatment of women.
Second, traditional wisdom would suggest that domestic factors could have a more 
substantial influence, but the unequal relationship between Saudi Arabia and outside 
powers may weaken this wisdom. As explained in chapter five, Saudi Arabia’s 
dependence on outside powers to sustain its security has made the Kingdom more 
vulnerable to pressure by those powers. As promoting women’s rights serves the interests 
of Western powers, especially in combating conservative notions allegedly responsible for 
spreading fundamentalism and terrorism, recent developments related to women were 
often linked to pressure by those powers. In this context, CEDAW has been used as a 
vehicle for exercising pressure, when various actors and activists call on Saudi Arabia to 
honour its commitment by implementing CEDAW’s provisions.60
Third, today’s world makes interactions between various external and internal 
factors an inescapable reality, while interactions among various forms of international 
influence are more likely. However, in looking at how CEDAW and the UN women’s 
rights mechanisms in themselves have affected women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, it is fair 
to conclude that their influence is undoubtedly positive in the process of change, although 
it is slow and has not yet profoundly touched the substance of women’s rights in Saudi 
Arabia. In an indirect way, CEDAW has empowered other forms of influence, 
particularly international factors such as states, NGOs, and the media. Domestically, 
various liberally-oriented circles within the Saudi government and media consider 
ratifying CEDAW as a step in the right direction in advancing the role of women in Saudi 
society. Overall, the ratification of CEDAW could be seen both as a sign of change and as 
a result of ongoing processes of internal and external influences.
Conclusion:
In examining Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN human rights system within 
the area of women’s rights, one of the most noticeable conclusions is that the Kingdom 
has typically linked its position towards women to its view of the shari'ah. It is Islam,
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rather than traditions or national laws, that has been emphasized in the Kingdom’s 
response towards influences exerted by the UN mechanisms concerning women’s rights. 
Yet, some practices related to the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia are not only against 
the international human rights standards to which Saudi Arabia is legally bound to adhere, 
but also unrelated to Islam.
Saudi Arabia has referred, in its statements and arguments at UN forums, to the 
shari ’ah as the primary source of laws and policies pertaining to the rights of women. 
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s interaction with the UN human rights system has been 
shaped by avoiding explicitly stipulating what Islamic views on women are and, when 
participating in the activities of the UN human rights system, by staying away from 
openly opposing the universally-recognized women’s rights standards. Similarly, 
documents produced within the Islamic framework and/or under the sponsorship of Saudi 
Arabia have not contained a specific position that clarifies the Islamic perspective on the 
issue of women’s rights.
When Saudi Arabia acceded to CEDAW in 2000, it expressed a general 
reservation that gives its interpretation of Islam a priority over its obligation under 
CEDAW. The review of CEDAW’s articles has revealed that a level of contradiction 
existed between CEDAW and the established Islamic view about women’s roles and 
rights. However, it is an open-ended argument as how to define the Islamic view on some 
of women’s rights. The clear-cut Islamic rules on women’s rights will remain a 
controversial issue between traditionalists, conservatives, reformists and liberals 
themselves, let alone within those groups.
Adopting policies that have avoided specifying a set of norms as the Islamic 
standards of women’s rights reflects both the complexity of the issue and the shrewdness 
of the Saudi government. Taking into consideration the dominant ideology in the Saudi 
society, the Saudi government has handled cautiously and with sensitivity calls for sex 
equality and greater freedoms for women, as seen in its engagement at the UN on matters 
pertaining to women.
It is therefore legitimate to conclude that only a weak correlation between Saudi 
Arabia’s accession to CEDAW and the recent developments in the case of women’s rights 
in Saudi Arabia can be established. As Saudi Arabia expressed a general reservation not 
to be bound by CEDAW’s articles that in its view contradict Islam, the Kingdom has not 
found it difficult to evade legally whatever norms are believed to be in contradiction with
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its understanding of Islam. However, as the thesis’s argument is based on the fact that the 
issue of women’s rights fits best into a constructivist perspective, Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to CEDAW and its increasing engagement in the UN human rights system as a 
whole in recent years is a genuine factor in the process of socialization and learning. 
Recent developments in women’s rights and growing calls to increase their role in society 
are considered the product of a socialization process initiated and motivated by various 
internal and external circumstances, including CEDAW and the UN women’s rights 
mechanisms. The UN human rights system, however, has played a significant role in 
codifying principles related to the treatment of women in establishing the foundational 
bases for empowering and legitimizing other forms of influence.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the relationship between the effects of one particular 
form of external influence, the UN human rights system, on developments in human 
rights practices in Saudi Arabia, with a focus on changes in the rights and the role of 
women in the Kingdom. The UN human rights system provides primarily a conceptual 
framework and promotional mechanisms for what are known as international human 
rights standards. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been interacting with, and 
engaging in, the activities of the UN human rights system since the deliberation over 
the UDHR in the late 1940s. As illustrated, Saudi Arabia voted for most of the major 
international human rights declarations and conventions passed by the UN and has 
generally accepted in principle the universality of human rights norms, while legally 
making reservations when acceding to the internationally-recognized human rights 
conventions. Moreover, since the mid 1990s, Saudi Arabia has moved even closer to 
formal acknowledgement of the internationally-recognized human rights standards by 
ratifying four out of six international human rights conventions and become more 
involved in the activities of the UN human rights system. Furthermore, this period has 
witnessed some changes and developments in practice towards the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the Kingdom. During recent years, new laws have been 
adopted and institutions established to give effect to these developments. Whereas a 
range of other factors could be argued to have been influencing these changes, the 
central question has been to what extent such developments could be associated with 
Saudi Arabia’s engagement with the UN human rights system, rather than with these 
other factors.
The issue of women’s rights was selected as a case study for various reasons, 
including the considerable criticism leveled, mainly but not only by external actors, at 
the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia. Following the international focus on Saudi 
Arabia caused by its indirect association with the 11 September 2001 attacks and its 
subsequent involvement on the war on terrorism, the rights and the role of women in 
Saudi society have received unprecedented attention. Increasing external and internal 
criticism and influence related to women’s rights, including those influences exerted 
by the UN human rights system, have resulted in some developments and triggered 
public debate on the matter. The focus on women’s rights in this thesis has been 
aimed at establishing a more accurate understanding of the process of change in human 
rights in Saudi Arabia and to assessing the relationship between developments in
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human rights practices in Saudi Arabia and the influence of the UN human rights 
system.
Although this thesis has essentially argued that the constructivist approach, 
involving processes of socialization and learning, is a suitable theoretical framework 
for examining developments towards human rights in Saudi Arabia, constructivism 
should be seen as a supplement to rather than an alternative to the realist and liberalist 
arguments on the diffusion of human rights norms. Developments in the human rights 
field in the Kingdom, as examined in this thesis, have been associated with various 
forms of influence, pressure, persuasion and interaction. This thesis has accepted that 
the notion of modem human rights is derived mainly from human reason extrapolating 
from the laws of nature. It acknowledged that the argument that human rights in the 
first place aims at protecting the life, security and integrity of individuals is compatible 
with the theories of human, moral nature and rational laws.
Although sovereignty is acknowledged in today’s world as being increasingly 
porous, human rights remain principally within the control of national governments; 
sovereignty does still matter. Saudi Arabia, like some other countries, continues to use 
the principle of sovereignty to defend its human rights policies, but that does not mean 
the Kingdom is immune from some forms of external intervention, including 
influences exerted by the international human rights regime, involving naming and 
shaming or persuasion and encouragement.
The thesis has accepted that the UN is a principal actor in the international 
human rights regime, particularly in the processes of codification and promotion of 
international human rights norms. While accepting the significant role of internal 
factors in shaping domestic policies and producing compliance, the increasing 
complexity and interdependency of current global politics supports the argument that 
the international human rights regime, as an external factor, has gained further 
importance in influencing governments’ decisions on domestic issues. In an 
increasingly interdependent world, this thesis has emphasized that international 
influences play a significant role in the processes of socialization and learning and in 
encouraging domestic acceptance of human rights norms. However, the interactions 
between external and internal factors are influential in shaping the outcome of such 
processes.
Among the concluding observations concerning arguments on the universality 
or cultural relativity of human rights is the view that that cultural relativity appears to 
be insignificant at the conceptual level. This is apparent particularly in relation to 
basic human rights, given that, among other things, the roots for respecting and
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protecting human dignity have existed in various cultures and with the fact that 
member-states of the UN with those varied cultures have officially endorsed the 
accepted international human rights standards. In particular, those human rights 
connected with protecting the life, security and integrity of individuals and with 
providing basic human needs have a striking cross-cultural consensus. While 
acknowledging that human rights are universal, indivisible and interrelated, this thesis 
has argued that emphasizing minimalist approach to universality, which focuses on 
protecting and empowering human agency, provides useful instruments in the 
construction of universal culture of human rights. That cultural relativity exists as a 
reality explains the gap between theory and practice, even among countries of similar 
cultures. That fact clearly substantiates the view that the interpretations of human 
rights principles are, to an extent, mediated by culture and progress towards their 
acceptance is dependant upon cultural environments. In examining developments in 
the rights and role of Saudi women, the findings of this thesis have indicated that the 
pace of progress in their rights has been essentially influenced by the local cultural and 
religious environment.
In relation to the Islamic and Wahhabi traditions, the thesis found that the 
mainstream interpretations of Islamic texts, including those of Wahhabism, are 
inconsistent with some aspects of internationally-recognized human rights standards. 
The interpretations of the shari 'ah have been affected by the surrounding 
environments; various cultural, traditional and sectarian differences have influenced 
interpretations of Islamic texts, as seen in the considerable variations among Islamic 
countries and Muslim ulama in their positions on human rights issues. Nevertheless, 
this thesis argued that cultural and religious values in the Muslim world, including 
Saudi Arabia, are not immune from change, even if change is precipitated by contact 
with other cultures, given the dynamic nature of culture and the malleability of the 
shari ’ah. As demonstrated, Saudi society has been influenced by an increasingly open 
environment, which explains the various orientations and the growing debate on 
human and women’s rights. Though hitherto limited, changes occurring in Saudi 
society suggest that traditional and religious values are undergoing a process of 
change.
In examining the major internal and external factors influencing developments 
in human rights practices in the Kingdom, this thesis concluded that there was little 
reason to believe that developments of human rights in Saudi Arabia, particularly 
women’s rights, are linked merely to developments in the domestic structure of the 
Saudi political system. In assessing the degree of compatibility or congruence
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between international human rights norms and widespread domestic beliefs and values 
of Saudis, it was noted that the gap between the two is still evident, despite some 
changes in traditional and cultural values in the Kingdom. Studying major domestic 
crises and events has revealed that influences and pressures associated with domestic 
events following the 11 September attacks, along with its international and domestic 
implications, helped forge a powerful movement supportive of change. Such events 
have urged the government, as well as the society as whole, to rethink their views 
about several issues including those related to human rights. Domestic factors broadly 
appeared to matter more in engendering direct and effective pressures, but external 
factors certainly facilitated and empowered internal pressures for reform.
Influences and pressures exerted by foreign states, international human rights 
NGOs, the process of modernization and globalization, and the international media and 
public opinion have illustrated that external factors did matter in encouraging the Saudi 
government to respond positively to such influences and in empowering internal 
factors and actors to influence domestic values, including those related to human 
rights. From the range of factors determining Saudi policy today, there are clear signs 
that external factors now have more potential to influence government choices than at 
any time in the recent past. Various external political, economic and cultural 
circumstances and high levels of information exchange with the outside world have 
transformed the mentality of Saudis towards change, mainly through a process of 
socialization and learning. International influences and pressures could be thus 
considered as the primary reasons behind the renunciation by both the people and the 
government of Saudi Arabia of certain aspects of the status quo amidst the desire for 
reform. In examining internal and external factors, this thesis has found that 
international influences have contributed, to a large extent, to the reorientation of 
domestic human rights policy in a pro human rights direction. However, since those 
factors tend to overlap and interact, it is difficult to single out one form of influence as 
the sole explanation of developments towards human rights taking place in Saudi 
Arabia. While domestic activists often utilize foreign pressure, international actors 
routinely seek to encourage local efforts and enhance indigenous capacity for the 
protection of human rights. This knitted, overlapping, nature of internal and external 
factors reflect the difficulties surrounding the assessment of any one particular form of 
external influence, in this case that of the UN human rights system. Within this 
context, the role of the UN human rights system in codifying human rights principles 
through universally accepted declarations and conventions has been primarily critical
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for providing an international guide for all other forms of influence, whether internal 
or external.
Nevertheless, in examining the central question on the relationship between 
human rights in Saudi Arabia and the UN human rights system, there have been 
several aspects of this relationship that are helpful in making concluding assessments 
of the correlation between developments of human rights in the Kingdom and the 
influence of the UN human rights system. Saudi Arabia actively participated in the 
debate over the creation of the international human rights conventions, especially 
during the deliberations of the international bill of rights (UDHR, CESCR and CCPR). 
Despite its widely known abstention on the UDHR voting, the Kingdom’s pattern of 
voting clearly showed that it did not vote against any human rights treaties or 
declarations. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia demonstrated its support for the 
international human rights project when it approved (without vote) or cast its vote for 
international human rights conventions with the exception of its abstention on the 
CEDAW voting. Saudi Arabia, however, has changed its pattern of engagement in the 
UN human rights system, from a limited involvement during the period from the late 
1940s to the early 1990s to a desire to be part of the international human rights 
arrangements and to a greater substantial involvement in the activities and mechanisms 
of the UN human rights system since the second half of the 1990s.
The purpose of the increasing engagement in the UN human rights system was, 
inter alia, to attempt to influence the outcome of that system, especially working to 
prevent possible moves that may cause shaming or publicizing of practices that are 
considered as violations of internationally-recognized human rights standards. Also, 
the Kingdom has a genuine interest in demonstrating to the rest of the world that 
human rights as observed in Saudi Arabia are not only in accordance with the Islamic 
shari ’ah but also compatible with, or at least not in violation of, the internationally- 
recognized human rights standards. Given that Saudi Arabia’s engagement in, and 
interaction with, the UN human rights system has increased since the mid 1990s, this 
thesis argues that it is important to look at such involvement as a primary step in the 
process of socializing Saudi Arabia into the exercise in practice of international human 
rights principles.
There have been several developments in the Kingdom related to human rights 
in recent years, notably the establishment of institutions and the passage of laws that 
aimed to offer more protection of human rights. With as yet minor changes in 
substance, such moves constitute crucial steps in the construction of a course of action 
that may change the situation of human rights substantially in the long-term. The
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general reservations expressed by the Kingdom when it joined the legally binding 
international arrangements are among the factors explaining the absence of any short­
term impact from the UN human rights system. Nevertheless, although direct 
influences from the UN human rights system appeared to be insignificant, particularly 
prior to the Kingdom’s greater involvement since the mid 1990s, it is likely to have 
had more positive impacts over the succeeding years in the context of the process of 
socialization and learning. Significantly, the UN human rights system has provided 
the necessary conditions, through its universal declarations and conventions, for 
empowering and legitimizing other forms of influence.
Yet, overall, Saudi Arabia did not change its engagement with the UN human 
rights system as a whole because of influences by the UN human rights system alone, 
but rather because of various national and international factors including efforts by the 
UN. Nonetheless, the UN human rights system has been the foundational base for all 
other forms of influence. When Saudi Arabia joined the international legally binding 
arrangements, another factor was added to other circumstances that influenced 
positively the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia, at least at the structural level 
of institutions and laws.
The issue of women’s rights provided a practical instrument to pinpoint the 
extent of linkages between developments related to the rights and the role of women 
and the Kingdom’s engagement with the UN human rights system. In looking at 
factors determining the status and rights of Saudi women, their position is essentially 
influenced by the prevailing interpretation of Islamic texts and local traditions 
interlaced with their patriarchal values. However, changes in the status of women that 
have occurred during in the last few decades could be linked to various internal and 
external factors. Although the political events examined were negative as well as 
positive in their impacts on the status of women, the possibility of backward moves 
has been minimized with the growing conviction that empowering conservative trends 
is not necessarily in the interest of the state’s stability. Significantly, the events of 11 
September and their aftermath have put remarkable pressure on Saudi Arabia’s 
political, socio-religious and educational systems and empowered internal and external 
influences, particularly those related to the advancement of women. Domestic factors, 
including the growing educational and vocational opportunities for women, constitute 
major components leading to further developments in women’s rights. However, 
external factors, such as international women’s rights advocacy, linking development 
and the defeat of terrorism with the empowerment of women, and the rapid spread of 
cultural globalization in the era of information and new communication technologies
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have been influential in initiating changes in the status of women and socializing 
Saudis towards the acceptance of international women’s rights standards. These 
external influences typically give additional power to domestic factors/actors to 
promote new norms related to the treatment of women.
In assessing the extent of the relationship between Saudi Arabia’s interaction 
with the UN human rights system within the area of women’s rights, particularly its 
accession to CEDAW, and the recent developments of women’s rights and their 
increased public role, it was possible to indicate only a weak direct relationship 
between the two. As Saudi Arabia expressed a general reservation not to be bound by 
any of CEDAW’s articles that are viewed as contradictory to Islam, the Kingdom has 
not found it difficult to ignore legally whatever norms are believed to be in 
contradiction with its understanding of Islam. However, Saudi Arabia’s accession to 
CEDAW and its increasing engagement with the UN human rights system as a whole 
in recent years is a genuine factor in the process of socialization and learning. Recent 
developments in women’s rights practices and growing calls to increase their role in 
society are considered the product of a socialization process initiated and motivated by 
various internal and external circumstances, including CEDAW and the UN women’s 
rights mechanisms.
To make a more accurate assessment of the influence of the UN human rights 
system, the survey conducted while researching this thesis has provided important 
insights. Given that the Saudi government has been attempting to influence public 
opinion on women’s rights through various means in order to gain wider acceptance 
for its policies on the issue, the survey’s results indicated that respondents have been 
influenced by internal and external factors, including governmental policies. Despite 
the limited weight given to the UN human rights system by respondents, the overall 
results supported the hypothesis that external factors play an influential role in the 
positive developments of human rights, and women’s rights in particular, in Saudi 
Arabia. The significant correlation registered in the survey between external factors 
and the recent trends in women’s rights is best understood in the context of the 
generalized process of socialization and learning, and the specific characteristics such 
as studying abroad and, to lesser extent, holding postgraduate degrees were significant 
variables in determining Saudis’ perspectives on human and women’s rights and on the 
role of external versus internal factors.
Concluding that women’s rights in the Kingdom are not compatible with 
international standards does not mean at all that those rights are violated according to 
domestic standards. Domestic standards are based on a particular interpretation of the
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Islamic texts and reflect values of the Saudi traditions and customs. In looking at the 
findings of the case study, it was noticed that attention has grown in the last few years 
about women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, although the achieved changes were hitherto 
insignificant. With campaigns aiming to dismantle ideologies presumed to be 
associated with terrorist activities, Saudi Arabia has introduced educational and 
cultural programs in which more focus on the issue of women has been emphasized. 
Unlike traditional strategies adopted when responding to political crises or events 
caused by fundamentalist movements, recent events pushed Saudi Arabia to adopt a 
different approach in which a moderate version of Islam was promoted, including new, 
moderate views on the treatment of women.
In the final analysis, human rights cannot be protected in an effective and 
sustainable manner without developing an internal popular human rights culture and 
the local infrastructures necessary for consolidating achievements. Moreover, no 
reform process is likely to produce a positive, stable outcome without the cooperation 
of the monarchy. With the inevitable gradualness of the processes of socialization, 
developments and changes in human rights, particularly women’s rights, are likely to 
be slow for a variety of reasons, including prevailing conservative trends and the 
government’s understanding that the gradual approach is the guarantee for peaceful 
change. Socio-cultural changes are likely to be slow in order for society to adapt to 
them, but political reforms and the empowerment of the civil society can, however, 
take a quicker course. While reluctant to proceed in political reforms, the government 
is using preliminary stages of debate to test the water and see how far the government 
can push for reforms, especially in social spheres.
In spite of the formal participation in, and recognition of, the UN human rights system, 
certain internationally accepted human rights are, and perhaps will continue to be, 
violated in Saudi Arabia because they are basically inconsistent either with prevailing 
interpretations of the shari’ah or with the Saudi traditions. However, Saudi Arabia’s 
engagement with the UN human rights system plays a notable role not only in 
socializing the Kingdom within the international human rights atmosphere and pushing 
for the observation of its obligations arising from having acceded to international 
human rights arrangements; it also gives power to other external and internal factors 
and actors to influence human rights in Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudis still work 
hard to maintain certain images and preserve their traditional practices, particularly in 
relation to women, there have been growing signs indicating that the wind of change is 
too powerful to resist indefinitely.
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Appendix I
Survey on Human Rights in Saudi Arabia and The Influence of The UN 
Human Rights System: The Case Of Women’s Rights
Design1 and Methodology
The basic purpose of the survey is to explore how Saudis perceive human 
rights as observed in their country and, in particular, their attitudes towards changes 
related to women’s rights. The survey has focused, therefore, on seeking to evaluate 
attitudes about influences affecting women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Based on the 
theoretical approach of the thesis in which changes in human rights norms can be 
understood in the context of socialization and learning processes, this survey sought to 
contribute to answering the central question.
The sampling units for this survey were Saudi adult individuals. One of the 
main concerns for designing the samples were the method by which a representative 
sample can be achieved. Among the three major designs of non-probability samples 
that have been used by social scientists,2 this research project is based on convenience 
samples in which particular numbers of sampling units were selected whenever they 
are conveniently available. For the sake of achieving representative samples where 
possible, various regional, ideological and sex differences were taken into 
consideration during the process of distributing copies of the survey.
In a society like Saudi Arabia, recruiting participants and gaining their 
cooperation to reply to a survey is mostly dependant on personal contacts. Using 
common methodologies of sample designs, like randomly sending surveys by post or 
making phone calls, in the Saudi social environment would almost certainly produce a 
low response, if any at all. Therefore, this research project has employed an 
established methodology used for convenience samples in such circumstances, known 
as the ‘snowball sampling technique’ .3 Multiple copies of the survey along with an
1 The survey was fully designed and analysed by the researcher with professional assistance and advice 
from Nyree Kueter, a survey designer and analyst at the ANU Centre of Educational Development and 
Academic Methods (CEDAM). Designing the survey, drafting the questions and analysing the results 
were based on literature available in the area of research methods in the social sciences. See, for 
instance, Chava Frankfort-Nackmias and David Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992) and Michael Smithson, Statistics With Confidence (London: Sage 
Publications, 2000).
2 The three major designs of non-probability samples are convenience samples, purposive samples and 
quota samples. For more details, see Frankfort-Nackmias and Nachmias, Research Methods in the 
Social Sciences, 174-177.
3 Michael Smithson, Statistics With Confidence (London: Sage Publications, 2000) 98.
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information sheet were distributed to people known to the researcher (colleagues, 
relatives, friends and etc). Those associates were asked to hand over or to forward to 
their associates copies of the survey with an invitation to complete it. While the 
methodology of recruitment used in the research project may appear to be uncommon, 
it is a sampling design that has been academically and scientifically established.4
Methodology used in this survey to select the sampling units requires more 
samples than other forms of collecting information through commonly used surveys.5 
Although the suggested number for obtaining an acceptable result was at least 200 
samples, 235 cases were collected, while approximately double that number were 
distributed in the form of both hard and soft copies via emails. The research project 
was conducted in early 2006. It took nearly eight weeks to distribute and collect 
copies of the survey.
The survey consists of fourteen closed-ended questions and is divided into two 
sections. The first section contains four factual questions, which aid in explaining 
differences in attitudes among Saudis in relation to some classifications such as sex, 
age and education. The other section includes ten questions mostly about Saudis’ 
perceptions towards statements on human rights in general and women’s rights in 
particular. Eight out of the ten questions are drafted in the form of statements with 
multiple-choice answers. For these questions, there were six provided answers, 
ranging from an absolute agreement with the statement to an absolute disagreement, 
beside the T do not know’ answer.
Unlike those questions on attitudes, there are two questions in which the 
knowledge of respondents were tested regarding two related issues. Question five 
addresses the issue of compatibility of human rights standards as observed and applied 
in the Kingdom with three sources: shari’ah laws, domestic traditions and international 
law. In addition to the answer T do not know’, three choices of answer were provided: 
‘shari’ah laws only’, ‘shari’ah laws and domestic traditions’ and ‘shari’ah laws, 
domestic traditions and international law’. Similarly, question ten was meant to
4 There are various PhD academic theses about Saudi Arabia in which a similar sampling design was 
used. See, for instance, Sa’id Al-Orabi Al-Harthi, “The Mass Media in Saudi Arabia: Present Concept, 
Functions, Barriers and Selected Strategy for Effective use in Nation-Building and Social Awareness”, 
(PhD Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1983), Abdullah Al-Rashoud, “Satellite Broadcasting & 
National Development: Relevance to Saudi Arabia”, (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2001) 
and Salem Ali Al-Salem, “The Impact of the Internet on Saudi Arabian EFL Female’s Self-Image and 
Social Attitudes” (PhD Thesis, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2005). For more details on research 
methods, see for instance, Frankfort-Nackmias and Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences.
5 Ms. Nyree Kueter, a survey designer and analyst at the ANU Centre of Educational Development and 
Academic Methods (CEDAM), personal conversation, 18 June 2005.
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identify the knowledge of respondents on whether Saudi Arabia is a party to ‘all’, 
‘some’ or ‘none’ of the international human rights instruments.
Based on a five-point scale for measuring perceptions, the range between 
agreement and disagreement with the statements has been divided into five choices. 
To simplify identifying the nearest answer to a respondent’s attitude, each choice was 
followed by a percentage in parentheses, which indicates the extent of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement, ranging from 100 percent for absolutely agree, 75 
percent for agree, 50 percent for agreeable, 25 percent for disagree and 0 percent for 
absolutely disagree. The answer ‘agreeable’ has been analytically treated as an 
intermediate position in which participants chose an edging point between agreement 
and disagreement. Furthermore, the two answers expressing agreement have been 
considered, at the analytical level, as conveying positive attitudes towards the 
statement and vice versa. Accordingly, the answers ‘absolutely agree’ and ‘agree’ 
were thus dealt with as representing a general agreement with the statements. The 
same consideration was applied to ‘absolutely disagree’ and ‘disagree’, as both being 
considered levels of disagreement.
The inclusion of question four, regarding whether the participants have studied 
abroad, is related to the earlier argument that individuals educated at Western 
universities have the greater potential to shape public opinion and to influence the 
process of policy-making. Moreover, Western educated individuals usually have been 
exposed to alternative perceptions about human rights.
One of the features of the survey design is the drafting of two or more closely 
relevant questions. As in the case of questions six and seven, eight and nine, and 
eleven A, B and C, each of the two or three questions were intended to measure 
opinions on one issue and to make observations on changes of perceptions regarding 
that issue. Tackling one issue through asking two or three strongly related questions 
ought to provide additional explanations on the matter itself. Moreover, examination 
of data across these connected questions could contribute to establishing a better 
understanding of peoples’ attitudes toward that particular issue under investigation.
Questions included in the survey vary in their degree of relevance to the central 
question of the thesis. Nevertheless, a survey on a subject like human rights in Saudi 
Arabia is regarded as an invaluable opportunity to explore more than one angle within 
the range of the thesis topic. Being closely relevant to the case study and to the 
thesis’s central question, the eleventh question, which consists of three parts, was 
designed to elicit indications on what Saudis saw as factors stimulating changes in the
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field of women’s rights and their role in society. At the domestic level, participants 
were asked in question eleven (A) about the role played by internal factors relevant to 
media and education. Because of their importance in influencing people’s perceptions, 
media and education were included in the question as closely relevant examples of 
domestic factors.
In order to assess international influences, respondents were asked in question 
eleven (B) to evaluate international factors that have affected the recent trends on 
women’s rights. The general wording of international pressures and influences used in 
the question represents various forms of international factors, including the UN human 
rights system. Moreover, participants were asked in question eleven (C) specifically 
about the role played by CEDAW and whether the recent trends on human rights were 
related to Saudi Arabia’s accession to CEDAW.
Significantly, the UN human rights system has been mentioned indirectly in 
three questions. The information sheet has served as a preface to the survey, referring 
to human rights in Saudi Arabia, the influence of the UN human rights system, and 
Saudi women’s rights as the case study of the thesis. Question ten was designed to 
examine the knowledge of participants about whether Saudi Arabia is a party to the six 
international human rights instruments, which are the most important achievements of 
the UN for establishing sets of standards for human rights. Furthermore, unlike UN 
declarations or its broad activities on human rights, which if reported in the Saudi 
media might go unnoticed by the public, Saudi Arabia’s accession to international 
human rights instruments was a governmental decision reported in all types of local 
media. Question eleven (C) has combined the three sides of the thesis topic, the UN 
human rights system, human rights in Saudi Arabia, and women’s rights in Saudi 
Arabia, by asking participants how to assess the influence of CEDAW on women’s 
rights in Saudi Arabia. Finally, question twelve was designed to explore views about 
the influence of international human rights instruments on states parties to those 
conventions.
The preparatory statement in question twelve was designed to achieve two 
related objectives; primarily investigating perspectives on the influence of 
international human rights instruments and partially exploring perceptions about the 
positiveness of that influence. Following the collection of the samples, it was evident 
the word ‘positive’ in the statement did not serve the second purpose, as it was 
ambiguous and understood differently by the respondents. Yet, responses to the word
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‘positive’ did not affect findings related to the main objective, as explained later in 
Appendix II.
The term ‘missing values’ defines specified data as user-missing, because some 
respondents either decline to answer the question or the question does not apply to 
them and therefore they choose the answer T do not know’. Data values specified as 
user-missing are flagged for special treatment and are excluded from most 
calculations.6 Within the main level of data analysis applied here, no distinction has 
been made between the two types of missing values. However, the size of the missing 
values has been taken into consideration at the findings and assessment level.
6 More detail on the definition and the calculations of the missing values are available within the 
tutorial section at Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
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Appendix I
Survey on Human Rights in Saudi Arabia and The Influence of The UN 
Human Rights System: The Case Of Women’s Rights
Data Description and Analysis
The first four questions were meant to provide information on the 
characteristics of respondents and are dealt with only briefly here. The age was 
divided into three groups: less than twenty years old, between 20 and 40 years and 
above 40 years old. Out of the total of 235 responses, 148 (63 percent) were between 
20-40 years, 61 (26 percent) were above 40 years and 26 (11 percent) were less than 
20 years old. The age distribution with most respondents between 20 and 40 years old 
was no doubt influenced by the methodology used in distributing copies of the survey, 
which is based on social relations among different associates usually of similar age. 
Unlike the sex variable, balancing the samples among the three age categories was not 
of concern to this thesis and may not affect the general result, partially because the age 
group ‘between 20-40 years’ represents the current generation in Saudi Arabia.
The second factual question reveals the sex of respondents. A balanced result 
was achieved, with 119 (50.6 percent) sampling units being male and 115 (48.9 
percent) female. The level of education of the respondents, the third question, was 
divided into three levels: high school or below, university level and postgraduate level. 
Similar to the result of the first question, 140 (59.6 percent) respondents have ticked 
university level, whereas 52 (22.1 percent) respondents have postgraduate degrees and 
43 (18.3 percent) have selected the answer ‘high school or below’. The fourth factual 
question was intended to reveal whether or not the respondents have studied abroad. 
186 (79.1 percent) respondents have not studied abroad against 47 (20 percent) who 
ticked ‘yes’, with 2 (0.9 percent) unanswered cases.
The following substantive questions are spelled out in more detail.
Question five:
Human rights norms observed and applied currently in the Kingdom stem from and are 
compatible with:
□ Shari'ah laws only.
□ Shari'ah laws and domestic traditions.
□ Shari'ah laws, domestic traditions and international law.
□ I do not know.
The result of this question is important, given the conservative general view in 
Saudi Arabia that the shari'ah rules should be unchanged, and resistance to
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reinterpretation would be stronger with clear prescription on an issue existing in the 
Islamic texts. As Saudis (the state and perhaps most of the people) are generally 
cautious in opposing the shari ’ah, the result of this question supported the argument 
that changes in human rights norms are more achievable when the opposition to 
change is unrelated to sacred texts. The result would also suggest that public opinion 
is susceptible to governmental policies, illustrated for example in the earlier discussion 
of the shift about women’s right to drive changing from being a religious question to a 
social issue.
Table 5
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent(*)
Cumulative
Percent
Valid shari'ah laws only 34 14.5 17.3 17.3
shari'ah laws and 
domestic traditions 97 41.3 49.2 66.5
shari'ah laws, domestic 
traditions and 
international law
66 28.1 33.5 100.0
Total 197 83.8 100.0
Missing I do not know 37 15.7
System 1 .4
Total 38 16.2
Total 235 100.0
(*  ) Respondents who did not know the answer or not answer the question were excluded in this calculation.
The general result (see table 5) demonstrated that only 17.3 valid percent of 
participants singled out ‘shari'ah laws only’, while total of 82.7 percent combined the 
shari’ah laws with other elements. A cross examination of data shows that 
participants from the ‘between 20-40 years’ age group have registered 12.2 percent in 
choosing ‘shari’ah laws only’, compared to 40.9 percent from the age group ‘less than 
20 years’. The two age groups ‘between 20-40 years’ and the ‘above 40 years’ have 
registered similar results in selecting the second answer (51.2 and 50.0 percent) and 
the third answer as well (36.6 and 30.8 percent). As the age group ‘less than 20 years’ 
registered the highest in selecting the first answer and the lowest in choosing the 
second and the third answers, age is evidently a factor affecting respondents’ 
perceptions about the sources of human rights in Saudi Arabia.
Education has demonstrated to be a significant factor in changing participants’ 
views in relation to the sources of human rights, as those in the ‘high school or below’ 
category registered 42.9 percent in choosing the first answer, compared to 2.2 percent 
from the ‘postgraduate’ category. Similarly, only 7.7 percent of participants who 
studied abroad have chosen ‘shari’ah laws only’, compared to 19.9 percent of
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participants who have never studied overseas, which indicates that exposure to other 
cultures influences opinions about human rights. Given that women in Saudi society 
usually have limited opportunities for interaction with men and less chance of 
exposure to new tendencies, 21.8 percent of females picked ‘shari’ah laws’, compared 
to 12.6 percent of males. This result may reflect more conservative tendencies among 
women compared to men.
Question six:
In general, human rights standards, as observed presently in Saudi Arabia, are at satisfactory 
level.
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Exploring the degree of satisfaction of human rights standards is an objective 
for this question and the following question, but the latter is specific and within the 
context of neighbouring countries. Opposing the statement implies support for 
change in the current human rights standards in Saudi Arabia, as dissatisfaction 
represents a primary and necessary stage for change. The result (see table 6) shows 
that the number of respondents who agreed with the above statement almost equals 
those who disagreed, as the overall calculation of the valid percentage has indicated 
that 37.9 percent agreed, strongly or weakly, with the statement, while 37.5 percent 
disagreed.
Table 6
F req u en cy P ercen t
V a lid
P ercen t
C u m u la tiv e
P ercen t
V a lid  A b so lu te ly  a g ree 25 10 .6 12.3 12 .3
A g ree 5 2 22 .1 2 5 .6 3 7 .9
A g ree a b le 5 0 2 1 .3 2 4 .6 6 2 .6
D isa g r ee 3 7 1 5 .7 1 8 .2 8 0 .8
A b so lu te ly  d isa g re e 3 9 16 .6 19 .2 1 0 0 .0
T ota l 2 0 3 8 6 .4 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g  I d o  n ot k n o w 2 6 11.1
S y ste m 6 2 .6
T ota l 3 2 13 .6
T ota l 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
In the cross analysis with explanatory variables, 19.1 percent of respondents 
from the age group ‘less than 20 years’ disagreed, strongly or weakly, with the 
statement, compared to 40 percent from the ‘between 20-40 years’ age group and 
36.3 percent from the ‘above 40 years’. As the age group ‘between 20-40 years’ 
represents the current generation in the Kingdom and are likely to be influenced by 
the surrounding environment, this group scored the highest in opposing the
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Statement. There was a difference in attitudes between males and females in 
responding to the statement, with males scoring a higher percentage (40.2 percent) 
in their disagreement with the statement compared to 34.0 percent of females. This 
difference, though statistically insignificant, might be explained on various grounds 
including that women in the Saudi culture are more likely to be imbued with 
conservative ideas, as their exposure to outside influences and their interest in public 
affairs are less than those of men.
For the education variable, more than half (53.1 percent) in the 
‘postgraduate’ category disagreed with the statement, compared to 32.8 percent from 
the ‘university’ category and 31.3 percent from the category of ‘high school or 
below’. Furthermore, respondents who have studied abroad are more likely to be 
discontented with human rights standards observed in the Kingdom, as 62.8 percent 
of them articulated their disagreement with the statement (39.5 percent absolutely 
disagreed and 23.3 disagreed), whereas 29.8 percent of participants, who have never 
studied abroad, disagreed.
Question seven:
In comparison with neighbouring countries, human rights standards observed presently in 
the Kingdom are at satisfactory level.
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. a Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. a I do not know.
With the argument of cultural relativism in mind, this statement, unlike the 
previous one, placed human rights standards into a regional, cultural context. The 
general result (see table 7) indicates an increase in agreement and a decrease in 
disagreement with the statement in comparison to the previous statement in question 
six. 51.5 percent of participants generally agreed with statement, compared to 37.9 
percent of agreement for question six. Conversely, 26.5 percent of respondents 
opposed the statement, compared to 37.5 percent for question six’s statement.
With the exception of this change in attitude towards the statement, 
analyzing the result of question seven using the four factual explanatory variables 
has unveiled similar conclusions to those of question six. However, the significance 
of question seven’s result is that people’s perspectives about human rights standards 
have a propensity to vary when those standards are examined in the context of 
specific cultural or regional dimensions.
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Table 7
F req u en cy P ercen t
V a lid
P ercen t
C u m u la tiv e
P ercen t
V a lid  A b s o lu te ly  agree 39 16 .6 19.1 19.1
A g r e e 66 28.1 3 2 .4 5 1 .5
A g r e e a b le 45 19.1 2 2 .1 7 3 .5
D isa g r e e 39 16 .6 19.1 9 2 .6
A b s o lu te ly  d isa g ree 15 6 .4 7 .4 1 0 0 .0
T ota l 2 0 4 8 6 .8 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g  1 d o  n o t k n o w 21 8 .9
S y s te m 10 4 .3
T ota l 31 13 .2
T otal 23 5 1 0 0 .0
Question eight:
In the last few years, human rights in the Kingdom have received increasing attention from 
the government.
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Questions eight and nine were designed to contribute to establishing a better 
understanding of the roles played by both the Saudi government and the society and 
in assessing the attention paid by both of them towards human rights. Regarding the 
role of the Saudi government, responses to this question show that 46.6 percent of 
participants agreed, totally or moderately, with the statement, whereas 32.0 percent 
disagreed, with 21.4 percent choosing ‘agreeable’ (see table 8). This result 
demonstrates that a large percentage of respondents believe that the government has 
increased its attention towards protecting and promoting human rights, as seen in the 
recent developments of establishing institutions and introducing measures on human 
rights, which were discussed earlier in this thesis.
The cross-examination of data discloses that the age group ‘between 20-40 
years’ scored the lowest (43.9 percent) in agreeing with the statement, compared to 
59.1 percent for the ‘less than 20 years’ age group and 48.1 percent for the ‘above 
40 years’ age group. The middle age group has also registered the highest (24.6 
percent) in choosing the answer ‘agreeable’, inclining to uncertainty about the 
correctness of the statement. This middle age group are more suspicious about the 
role of the government and its attention towards human rights. For the male versus 
female, there were more females (53.0 percent) supportive, strongly or weakly, of 
the statement than males (40.2 percent). Accordingly, females are more likely to
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endorse the view that the Saudi government has been giving, in the last few years, 
increasing attention towards human rights.
Table 8
F req u en cy P ercen t
V a lid
P ercen t
C u m u la tiv e
P ercen t
V a lid  A b so lu te ly  agree 3 6 15 .3 17.5 17.5
A g ree 6 0 2 5 .5 2 9 .1 4 6 .6
A g reea b le 4 4 1 8 .7 2 1 .4 6 8 .0
D isa g ree 4 7 2 0 .0 2 2 .8 9 0 .8
A b so lu te ly  d isa g re e 19 8.1 9 .2 1 0 0 .0
T otal 2 0 6 8 7 .7 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g  I d o  n ot k n o w 2 2 9 .4
S y stem 7 3 .0
T otal 2 9 12.3
T ota l 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
Respondents from the ‘postgraduate’ category scored the lowest (24.5 
percent) in agreement and the highest (46.9 percent) in disagreement with the 
statement. Similarly, only 15.9 percent of the participants who have studied abroad 
expressed their agreement with the statement, compared to 74.5 percent of
participants who have never studied abroad. Such results indicate that respondents 
who have studied abroad and/or engaged in postgraduate studies are likely to be 
suspicious about the government’s role in protecting and promoting human rights. 
Education, thus, was influential in affecting perceptions on the extent to which new 
developments of human rights were caused by increasing attention from the 
government.
Question nine:
In the last few years, human rights in the Kingdom have received increasing attention from 
the public.
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
With a sizable percentage agreeing with the statement (40.3 percent), the 
result (see table 9) reflects increasing public attention towards human rights in Saudi 
Arabia. However, it is interesting to compare the result of this question to the 
previous one in order to find out how respondents have evaluated the government’s 
attention to human rights compared to that of the public.
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Table 9
F req u en cy P ercen t
V a lid
P ercen t
C u m u la tiv e
P ercen t
V a lid  A b so lu te ly  agree 21 8 .9 10 .0 10 .0
A g ree 6 4 2 7 .2 3 0 .3 4 0 .3
A g ree a b le 6 7 2 8 .5 3 1 .8 7 2 .0
D isa g r ee 4 7 2 0 .0 2 2 .3 9 4 .3
A b so lu te ly  d isa g ree 12 5.1 5 .7 1 0 0 .0
T ota l 211 8 9 .8 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g  I d o  n o t k n o w 19 8.1
S y stem 5 2.1
T ota l 2 4 1 0 .2
T ota l 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
The cross-examination of data reveals that 32.7 percent from the ‘above 40 
years’ age group, 29.4 percent from the ‘between 20-40 years’ and 8.7 percent from 
the ‘less than 20 years’ age group have expressed their disagreement with the 
statement. This means that the older the participants the more likely they will 
disagree with the statement. For the middle age group, 37.5 percent of them agreed 
and 29.4 percent disagreed, with 33.1 percent selecting ‘agreeable’. Despite the 
small difference between those who agreed and disagreed and with the large 
percentage selecting ‘agreeable’, the statement has received wide no-objection 
status, implying that public interest in human rights is on the rise.
Females scored higher (48.5 percent) than males (32.1 percent) in agreeing 
with the statement and vice versa, reflecting women’s status in society, as noted 
earlier. For the education variable, participants from the postgraduate category have 
showed more opposition to the statement than other educational categories. 
Furthermore, participants who studied abroad registered a slightly higher percentage 
in disagreeing with the statement. Such results convey an expression of suspicion 
about the extent to which the Saudi public are interested in issues of human rights.
Question ten:
The international community as exemplified in the United Nations has issued six major 
human rights treaties. Is Saudi Arabia party to some or all of these treaties?
□ Some □ None
□ All □ I do not know
The result indicates that a low level of knowledge about this issue (see table 
10) existed among respondents, as only 92 (39.1 percent) of them chose the correct 
answer, with 109 (46.4 percent) selecting T do not know’. As this question was
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intended to test the respondents’ knowledge, it is interesting to look at the 
characteristics of those who registered the correct answer. A cross analysis shows 
that the older the age, the more likely to select the correct answer, as getting older is 
usually associated with acquiring additional knowledge. The difference between 
men and women in selecting the correct answer is slight, as males have registered 
77.6 percent and females 75.8 percent. Education is also a factor in choosing the 
right answer, as postgraduates scored 90.6 percent correct. Also, respondents who 
have studied abroad attained a higher percentage (84.6 percent) than those who had 
never studied overseas.
T a b le  10
V a lid C u m u la tiv e
F req u en cy P ercen t P ercen t P ercen t
V a lid N o n e 7 3 .0 5 .8 5 .8
S o m e 9 2 39 .1 7 6 .7 8 2 .5
A ll 21 8 .9 17.5 1 0 0 .0
T ota l 120 51 .1 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g I d o  n ot  
k n o w
109 4 6 .4
S y stem 6 2 .6
T ota l 115 4 8 .9
T ota l 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
Question eleven (A):
To what extent do you agree that the recent trends to give the Saudi women more rights 
have been caused by (A) domestic factors relevant to media and education?
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Question eleven, comprising three parts, was designed to explore perceptions 
on factors that have stimulated the recent trends to give Saudi women more rights 
and to enhance their role in the society. Those three questions (11 A, B and C) 
constitute a backbone of the survey, as they are connected with the three sides of the 
thesis topic. The general result (see table 11-A) shows that 47.3 percent of 
respondents agreed, strongly or weakly, with the statement, whereas 24.1 percent 
opposed it, with 28.6 percent taking an intermediate stand by selecting the answer 
‘agreeable’. Such results demonstrate that domestic factors, related to education and 
development, have some influence on the status of women in Saudi Arabia, 
according to the respondents’ viewpoint. However, comparing this result to that of
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the next question about international influence is essential to assess how participants 
have evaluated domestic factors.1
Table 1-A
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Valid Absolutely agree 32 13.6 14.5 14.5
Agree 72 30.6 32.7 47.3
Agreeable 63 26.8 28.6 75.9
Disagree 29 12.3 13.2 89.1
Absolutely disagree 24 10.2 10.9 100.0
Total 220 93.6 100.0
Missing I do not know 10 4.3
System 5 2.1
Total 15 6.4
Total 235 100.0
A cross examination of data discloses that there were similarities among the 
three age groups in their positions towards the statement, although the age group 
‘above 40 years’ scored the highest percentage (52.7 percent) in agreeing with the 
statement, followed by the age group ‘less than 20 years’ with 46.2 percent and 
finally the ‘between 20-40 years’ age group with 45.3 percent. Overall, similarities 
of results of the three age groups have prevented establishing a distinctive linkage 
between one group and a particular orientation about the statement. Nevertheless, as 
32.4 percent of participants from the age group ‘between 20-40 years’ have chosen 
‘agreeable’ and 22.3 percent (the lowest) of them have disagreed, it is possible to 
conclude that this group has a more positive stand towards the statement than other 
groups.
Female respondents expressed a more positive attitude towards the statement 
than male. 51.9 percent of women agreed with the statement, compared to 43.5 
percent of men. The overall cross analysis showed that there were fewer males
1 In looking at the outcomes of questions eleven (A), (B) and (C) and analyzing jointly the variance, 
it is interesting to note that there was a significant difference between their overall results 
(F(2,272)=l7.645, P 0.001]. For the paired samples T-test, there was also significant difference 
between the means for the three questions [T(206)=6.088, PO.OOl]. Moreover, unlike the other 
explanatory variables, there was an interaction between the three questions and whether or not 
respondents had studied overseas [F(2,272)=4.026, P<025]. For the T-test, all are significant except 
for pair 3 for those who had studied abroad [T(38)=1.178, P>0.05]. The significance value has to be 
less than 0.0167 to be significant for this test because of the three comparisons per group.
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willing to subscribe to the statement, as they were reluctant to endorse domestic 
factors as being influential on the current trends to give Saudi women more rights.
For the education variable, statistics indicated that respondents with higher 
educational degrees were less likely to agree with the statement. Only 35.3 percent 
of respondents from the ‘postgraduate’ category agreed with the statement, 
compared to 46.9 percent from the ‘university’ category and 64.1 percent from the 
‘highly school or below’ category. The ‘postgraduate’ category attained the highest 
percentage (31.3 percent) in rejecting the statement.
Accordingly, respondents with higher education were less likely to accept 
that recent trends concerning women in Saudi Arabia are caused by domestic 
factors, whereas nearly half of the ‘university’ category and two third of the ‘high 
school or below’ category accept the factor of domestic variables in affecting 
women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, participants who have undertaken 
overseas education were less likely to agree with the statement; 32.6 percent of them 
disagreed with the statement, compared to 21.9 percent of participants who have 
never studied abroad.
Question eleven (B):
To what extent do you agree that the recent trends to give the Saudi women more rights 
have been caused by (B) International influences and pressures?
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Calculating the valid percentage of responses indicates that 72.5 percents of 
participants generally agreed with the statement and 14.2 percent disagreed, while 
13.3 percent considered the statement as ‘agreeable’ (see table 11-B). This result 
has strongly linked recent trends in women’s rights with international influences. It 
is worth noting that no statement in the survey has been as positively viewed as this 
statement, scoring a record in both ‘absolutely agree’ (34.1 percent) and ‘agree’ 
(38.4 percent). When comparing the result of this question to that of the previous 
question on domestic factors, it is evident that participants have stronger attitudes 
about the role played by international, rather than domestic, influences.
In the cross analysis, respondents from the age group ‘above 40 years’ 
achieved the highest percentage, as 80.8 percent of them generally approved the 
statement, while 40.4 percent absolutely agreed. The other two age groups
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registered similar percentages, as 69.4 percent of the age group ‘between 20-40 
years’ and 72.8 percent of the ‘less than 20 years’ age group generally agreed with 
the statement. Accordingly, the majority of the three age groups accepted that 
international influences affected women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. 80.2 percent of 
males generally agreed with the statement, compared to 64.6 percent of females. 
Nearly half of the males (46.8 percent) ticked ‘absolutely agree’, compared to 20.2 
percent of females.
T a b le  11l-B
V a lid C u m u la tiv e
F req u en cy P ercen t P ercen t P ercen t
V a lid  A b so lu te ly  agree 7 2 3 0 .6 34 .1 34 .1
A gree 81 3 4 .5 3 8 .4 7 2 .5
A g reea b le 28 1 1 .9 13.3 8 5 .8
D isa g ree 23 9 .8 10.9 9 6 .7
A b so lu te ly  d isa g re e 7 3 .0 3 .3 1 0 0 .0
T otal 211 8 9 .8 1 0 0 .0
M is s in g  I d o  n ot k n o w 12 5.1
S y stem 12 5.1
T otal 2 4 10 .2
T otal 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
Men are evidently more convinced that international pressures have been 
playing an influential role in instigating and guiding the recent trends to give Saudi 
women more rights and to increase their role in society. It is worth recalling the 
result of the previous question in which 51.9 percent of females agreed with the 
statement about the role of domestic factors, compared to 43.5 percent of males. 
Based on the results of the two questions (eleven A and B), males are more likely to 
believe that recent trends in women’s rights are caused by international, rather than 
domestic, influences, whereas females give more credence to internal factors.
The differences between men and women in assessing the causes of recent 
trends in women’s rights demonstrate varying opinions between the two groups. 
Regardless of the accuracy of their assessment of the influence of international 
pressures, it is understandable for Saudi men to associate the recent changes in the 
status of women to international influences, as the separation between sexes tends to 
give men better access to information and wider knowledge of public issues and 
their international dimensions. Accordingly, a less positive attitude in regard to the
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statement in question eleven (B) by females could be associated with their lack of 
knowledge about public issues and the impact of international influences upon them.
Participants with postgraduate degrees expressed the most positive attitudes, 
as 83.7 percent of them have generally agreed with the statement, whereas 
respondents from the ‘university’ category scored 68.2 percent and the ‘high school 
or below’ category scored 72.7 percent. Postgraduates have achieved the lowest 
score in sustaining the statement in the previous question, but they attained the 
highest percentage in supporting the statement of this question. Such results lead to 
the conclusion that participants with higher education degrees hold more positive 
attitudes towards the effectiveness of international influences and pressures in 
changing women’s rights and status in Saudi Arabia compared to domestic 
circumstances.
Data pertaining to whether participants have studied abroad revealed that 
88.7 percent of overseas-educated respondents generally agreed with the statement, 
compared to 68.7 percent among those who had not studied abroad. By contrast, 
results of the previous question indicated that overseas-educated participants agreed 
less with the statement in question eleven (A), reinforcing their judgement about the 
role of international factors in influencing women’s rights in the Kingdom.
Question eleven (C):
To what extent do you agree that the recent trends to give the Saudi women more rights 
have been caused by (C) Saudi Arabia's accession, in 2000, to CEDAW?
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Given the great status of CEDAW as a normative reference for women’s 
rights standards, this question would provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between the recent trends on women rights and Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to CEDAW. The general result (see table 11-C) illustrates that 31.8 
percent of respondents agreed, strongly or weakly, with the statement, whereas 39.6 
percent disagreed, with 28.6 percent choosing the intermediate answer ‘agreeable’. 
Given the limited difference between agreements and disagreements (less than 10 
percent), an evident correlation is difficult to establish between Saudi Arabia’s 
accession to CEDAW and perceptions of causes of the changes that are taking place 
in the Kingdom regarding the rights and status of women.
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T ab le  11l-C
V a lid C u m u la tiv e
F req u en cy P ercen t P ercen t P ercen t
V a lid  A b so lu te ly  agree 18 7 .7 11 .7 1 1 .7
A g ree 31 13 .2 20.1 3 1 .8
A g ree a b le 4 4 1 8 .7 2 8 .6 6 0 .4
D isa g r ee 36 15.3 2 3 .4 8 3 .8
A b so lu te ly  d isa g ree 25 1 0 .6 16 .2 1 0 0 .0
T ota l 154 6 5 .5 1 0 0 .0
M iss in g  I d o  n ot k n o w 7 4 3 1 .5
S y stem 7 3 .0
T ota l 81 3 4 .5
T otal 2 3 5 1 0 0 .0
The age group ‘above 40 years’ attained the highest (42.5 percent) in 
agreement with the statement, compared to approximately 28.0 percent from each of 
the other two age groups. It should be noted that nearly 30.0 percent from each age 
group selected the answer ‘agreeable’, which embodies a hesitant attitude towards 
the role of CEDAW on women’s rights in Saudi Arabia. For the sex variable, it is 
worth noting that males and females scored similar percentages in the five categories 
of answer. The result for men and women is approximately divided into a third each 
among agreement, disagreement, and ‘agreeable’. Yet, the overall cross analysis of 
the sex variable indicated that females have shown slightly more agreement with the 
statement than males, but this difference is statistically insignificant.
Respondents from the ‘postgraduate’ category scored the highest percentage 
in agreeing with the statement (34.2 percent) and the lowest in disagreement (36.6 
percent). As disagreement with the statement surpassed disagreement with only a 
small percentage in the three educational categories, differences among the 
categories are insignificant. Similarities of the three categories’ results prevent 
making specific judgement about the attitudes of each category. Being taught 
overseas has influenced participants’ perception about the role of CEDAW. 
Respondents who have studied abroad indicated their agreement with the statement 
(43.6 percent) compared to 30.8 percent who disagreed; 28.1 percent of respondents 
who had not studied abroad agreed and 42.1 percent disagreed with the statement.
Question twelve:
International human rights instruments have positive effects on countries that are parties to 
those instruments.
□ Absolutely agree. □ Disagree.
□ Agree. □ Absolutely disagree.
□ Agreeable. □ I do not know.
Question twelve was designed to assist in revealing how respondents evaluate 
the influence of international human rights instruments on countries that are parties to 
those instruments. Data (see table 12) shows that 36.6 percent of respondents 
generally agreed with the statement, whilst 40.6 percent disagreed. 22.9 percent of 
respondents selected the answer ‘agreeable’. As indicated earlier, the word ‘positive’ 
was interpreted differently according to respondents’ backgrounds, as some of them 
may agree that international human rights instruments could have an impact on states 
parties, but they may oppose describing that impact as positive. Accordingly, the 
overall result indicates that most respondents generally agreed that international human 
rights treaties could impose an impact, whether positive or negative, on joining states.
Table 12
Frequency Percent
V alid
Percent
Cum ulative
Percent
V alid  A b solu te ly  agree 15 6 .4 8.6 8.6
A gree 49 2 0 .9 28 .0 36.6
A greeable 4 0 17.0 22 .9 59 .4
D isagree 36 15.3 20 .6 80.0
A b solu te ly  disagree 35 14.9 20 .0 100.0
Total 175 74.5 100.0
M issing I do not know 55 2 3 .4
System 5 2.1
Total 60 25.5
Total 1 235 100 .0
Participants from the age group ‘above 40 years’ scored the lowest percentage 
in both agreement (34.7 percent) and disagreement (36.7 percent) with the statement, 
but they registered the highest percentage in selecting the answer ‘agreeable’. The age 
group ‘between 20-40 years’ obtained a similar result, with slightly higher in 
disagreement (41.3 percent), whereas the age group ‘less than 20 years’ showed a 
clearer disagreement with the statement (47.0 percent). Respondents embracing 
conservative views are likely to consider the impact of international human rights 
instruments as negative, which may explain the large percentage of disagreement 
among the ‘less than 20 years’ group. This group are still under the influence of 
conservative views, as noted earlier in chapter four.
Women recorded a higher percentage in their agreement with the statement 
(42.3 percent) compared to 32.7 percent of men, suggesting that women have more 
positive attitudes towards the statement. The educational level also has an influence 
on participants’ judgments, as the percentage of agreement varies between the
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‘postgraduate’ category (31.2 percent) and the ‘high school or below’ category (45.1 
percent). Participants from the ‘postgraduate’ category scored the highest percentage 
in choosing the answer ‘agreeable’ (31.3 percent). Although with a small variation, 
disagreement with the statement has exceeded agreement in all educational categories, 
which reflects the negative attitudes towards the statement. As indicated earlier, this 
negative attitude is partly caused by the ambiguous word ‘positive’ in the statement. 
Overseas-educated respondents registered higher percentage in agreement and lower in 
disagreement with the statement than those who had not studied abroad. Furthermore, 
34.9 percent of overseas-educated respondents chose the answer ‘agreeable’, compared 
to 18.3 percent of locally educated respondents. What should be noted here is that 
despite those who consider the impact of international human rights treaties as 
negative, and the likelihood of their opposing the statement, the agreement with the 
statement by both categories is similar; 37.2 percent of the overseas-educated and 36.6 
percent of the locally educated participants.
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Appendix 111
EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1999- 2006)
Date Event
A p ril 1999 T h e  C row n p rin ce  m a d e  a  s tro n g  sta tem en t su p p o rtiv e  o f  w o m en , say in g  th a t “ a  Saudi 
w o m an  is a first c la ss  c i t iz e n ... w h en  w e  ta lk  a b o u t th e  c o m p reh en s iv e  d ev e lo p m e n ts  in  
o u r c o u n try ... w e can  n o t ig n o re  th e  ro le  o f  S aud i w o m a n ...  an d  h e r  p a rtic ip a tio n  in th e  
resp o n sib ility  o f  th is d e v e lo p m e n t.”
J u n e  2000 Saud i A rab ia  p a rtic ip a ted  in  th e  S p ec ia l S ess io n  o f  th e  U N  G en era l A sse m b ly  “W o m en  
2000: G en d er E q u ality , D e v e lo p m e n t and  P eace  fo r  th e  2 1 st C en tu ry ”  an d  a n n o u n ced  in  its  
s ta tem en t its in ten tio n  to  acced e  th e  In te rn a tio n a l C o n v en tio n  on  th e  E lim in a tio n  o f  all 
fo rm s o f  D isc rim in a tio n  A g a in s t W o m en
S ep tem b er
2000
T h e  C row n P rin ce  a tten d ed  th e  U N  M ille n n iu m  S u m m it an d  s ig n ed  th e  In te rn a tio n a l 
C o n v en tio n  on  th e  E lim in a tio n  o f  all fo rm s o f  D isc r im in a tio n  A g a in s t W o m en
J a n u a ry
2001
2001
T h e  U N  S ecre ta ry  G en e ra l a p p o in te d  D r. T h o ra y a  O b a id  as th e  e x e cu tiv e  d ire c to r  o f  th e  
U N  P o p u la tio n  F u n d  (U N F P A ). S h e  is  th e  firs t Saudi n a tio n a l to  h e a d  a  U N  agency . 
Saud i A rab ia  re sp o n d ed  to  h e r  ap p o in tm e n t as an  a c h ie v em en t b y  all S au d i w o m en .
A p ril 2001 In a  v is it to  th e  K in g d o m , D r. T h o ray a  O b a id  w as  rece iv ed  b y  to p  o ff ic ia ls , in c lu d in g  th e  
K in g , an d  d e liv e red  a  le ttu ce  on  w o m e n ’s is su e s  a t A l-M o ltag a  S o c ie ty  (a  w o m e n ’s N G O  
in  Jed d ah ).
A p ril 2001 T h e  K in g d o m ’s firs t a ll-fe m a le  ad v e rtise m e n t a g e n c y  lau n ch e d  in  R iy ad h , a  fie ld  o f  
b u sin ess  w as trad itio n a lly  lim ite d  to  m ale .
M a y  2001 A  w o m an  (p rin cess ) w as a p p o in te d  ass is tan t u n d e r  sec re ta ry  a t th e  M in is try  o f  E d u ca tio n - 
th e  H ig h est p o sitio n  ev e r to  b e  h e ld  b y  a  S aud i w o m an  in  ch arg e  o f  g i r l ’s ed u ca tio n .
S ep tem b er
2001
T h ree  im p o rtan t law s re la te d  to  th e  ad m in is tra tio n  o f  ju s tic e  in tro d u c e d  (to  co m e  in to  fo rce  
w ith in  180 days), n a m e ly  th e  C o d e  o f  Ju d ic ia l P ro ced u re , th e  C o d e  o f  C rim in a l P ro ced u re , 
an d  th e  C o d e  o f  P rac tice  fo r  L aw y ers , b u t d isc rim in a tio n  a g a in s t w o m en  h as N O T  b een  
s tip u la ted  in  th o se  law s.
N o v em b er
2001
A  d ec is io n  w as tak en  to  is su e  ID  card s to  w o m e n . P rev io u sly  w o m en  n a m e s  w ere  
in c lu d ed  in  “ fam ily  c a rd s”  u n d e r  th e ir  fa th e rs  o r  h u sb an d s  w ith o u t th e ir  p h o to g rap h s .
J a n u a ry
2002
2002
T h e  firs t o ffic ia l in v o lv e m e n t o f  w o m en  in  th e  M a jlis  A l-S h u ra , w h en  a  g ro u p  o f  le ad in g  
fem a le  acad em ics  to o k  p a r t in  a  d iscu ss io n  w ith  m em b ers  o f  th e  C o u n c il.
M arch
2002
A  d ec is io n  w as tak en  to  d isso lv e  th e  P re s id e n c y  o f  G irls ' E d u ca tio n  an d  to  in c o rp o ra te  
fem a le  ed u ca tio n  in to  th e  M in is try  o f  E d u ca tio n , ab o lish in g  se g re g a tio n  in  e d u ca tio n  a t the  
ad m in is tra tiv e  level.
J u ly  2002 T w o  Saud i w o m en , ch o sen  b y  th e  U S  C o n su la te  in  Jed d ah , p a r tic ip a te d  in  an in te rn a tio n a l 
v is ito rs  p ro g ram  an d  m e t w ith  U S  o ffic ia ls . B o th  o f  th em  are  d e fe n d e rs  o f  w o m e n ’s r ig h ts
O cto b er
2002
T h e  firs t ev e r v is it b y  U N  ra p p o r te u r  to  th e  K in g d o m  (U N  sp ec ia l ra p p o r te u r  on  the  
in d ep en d e n ce  o f  ju d g e s  an d  lay ers). In h is  re p o r t to  U N C H R , h e  e x p re s se d  co n ce rn s  ab o u t 
th e  ab sen ce  o f  w o m en  fro m  th e  S au d i ju d ic ia l sy s tem  (as  ju d g e s  an d  law y e rs ) .
2003
J a n u a ry
2003
P etitio n  fo r n a tio n a l re fo rm  ti tle d  “T he  V is io n ”  m a iled  to  C ro w n  P rin c e  A b d u lla h  s in g ed  
b y  104 in te lle c tu a ls , a c ad em ics , an d  re fo rm  ac tiv is ts . T h is  p e titio n , in te r  a lia , c a lle d  fo r 
g re a te r  ro le  fo r  w o m en .
J a n u a ry
2003
T h e  firs t e v e r v is its  b y  an  in te rn a tio n a l h u m an  rig h ts  N G O  to o k  p la c e , d u rin g  w h ich  
v a rio u s  issu es o f  h u m an  rig h ts , in c lu d in g  w o m e n ’s r ig h ts , w ere  d is c u sse d  w ith  o ffic ia ls .
M ay
2003
A  W o m e n  In v es tm en t C e n tre  w as  estab lish ed  as p a rt o f  th e  S au d i A ra b ia n  In v es tm en t 
A u th o rity , w h ich  w as c re a te d  in  A p ril 2000 .
A u g u st
2003
A  g ro u p  o f  70  Saudi b u s in e ssw o m e n  an d  fe m a le  ex p e rts  h e ld  a w o rk sh o p  in  p rep a ra tio n  
fo r w o rk in g  p ap ers , w h ich  w ere  p re sen ted  a t th e  R iy ad h  E co n o m ic  F o ru m s (O c to b e r 2 0 0 3 )
S ep tem b er
2003
A  p e titio n  s ig n ed  b y  m o re  th an  3 5 0  in te lle c tu a ls , in c lu d in g  51 w o m en , c a ll in g  fo r  u rg e n t 
re fo rm  n o ta b ly  re c o g n itio n  o f  w o m e n ’s rig h ts .
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Septem ber
2003
P r in c e  S a ’u d  A l-F a is a l ,  th e  F o re ig n  M in is te r ,  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  th e  M in is t ry  o f  F o re ig n  
A f fa i r s  w ill  r e c r u i t  S a u d i w o m e n  a s  d ip lo m a ts .
Septem ber
2003
T h e  M in s te r  o f  E d u c a tio n  in tro d u c e d ,  f o r  th e  n e w  s c h o o l y e a r ,  u n if ie d  c u r r ic u lu m s  fo r  
b o y s  a n d  g ir ls  in  w h ic h  b o th  w e re  a d d re s s e d  j o i n t l y  ( in  o n e  la n g u a g e )  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e .
O ctober
2003
F e w  S a u d i w o m e n  p a r t ic ip a te d  a s  c o n s u l ta n ts ,  f o r  th e  s e c o n d  t im e , in  a  s e s s io n  a t M a jl i s  
A l-S h u r a .
O ctober
2003
A  S a u d i w o m a n  (p r in c e s s )  p r e s e n te d  a  p a p e r  to  th e  f i r s t  in te rn a t io n a l  h u m a n  r ig h ts  
c o n fe r e n c e  h e ld  in  S a u d i A ra b ia  u n d e r  th e  t i t l e d  o f  “ H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  T im e s  o f  P e a c e  a n d  
W a r ”
O ctober
2003
F e w  S a u d i w o m e n  to o k  p a r t  in  a  d e m o n s tr a t io n  in  R iy a d h  c a l l in g  fo r  r e fo rm , a n d  o n e  
w o m a n  r e p o r te d ly  a r r e s te d .
D ecem ber
2003
T h e  s e c o n d  s e s s io n  o f  th e  n a tio n a l  d ia lo g u e  h e ld  in  M a k k a h  u n d e r  th e  t i t le  o f  “ E x tre m is m  
a n d  M o d e rn iz a t io n :  a  C o m p re h e n s iv e  V ie w ” . T e n  w o m e n  p a r t ic ip a te d  th is  s e s s io n , o u t  o f  
6 0 .
D ecem ber
2003
M o r e  th a n  3 0 0  S a u d i w o m e n  d e m a n d e d  in  a  p e t i t io n  c a l le d  fo r  g r e a te r  ro le  to , a n d  e a s in g  
r e s t r ic t io n s  o n , w o m e n .
D ecem ber
2003
M a j l i s  A l-S h u r a  i s s u e d  a  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  to  th e  M in is t ry  o f  E d u c a tio n  to  in c lu d e  a  s p o r t  
c la s s  in  p u b l ic  g i r l s ’ s c h o o ls  a s  a  p a r t  o f  th e  w e e k ly  s c h e d u le ,  s im i la r  to  th o s e  in  b o y s ’ 
s c h o o ls .
2004
January
2004
F o r  th e  F ir s t  t im e ,  S a u d i b u s in e s s w o m e n  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  J e d d a h  E c o n o m ic  F o ru m  in  th e  
s a m e  ro o m  w ith  m e n , a n d  a  S a u d i b u s in e s s w o m a n ,  fo r  th e  f i r s t  t im e ,  a d d re s s e d  o f  m e n  
d ir e c t ly  r a th e r  th a n  b y  a  c lo s e d -c i r c u i t  te le v is io n .
February
2004
‘S a u d i W o m e n  In fo rm a tio n  C e n t r e ’ w a s  th e  f i r s t  in f o rm a t io n  c e n tr e  s p e c ia l i s e d  in  
w o m e n ’s a f fa ir s .  O p e ra t in g  a s  N G O , i t s  o b je c t iv e s  a re  to  p ro v id e  k n o w le d g e  a n d  
in f o rm a t io n  a n d  to  h e lp  S a u d i w o m e n  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  in  
p u b l ic  l i f e  a s  w h o le .
April 2004 T h e  c a s e  o f  a  S a u d i f e m a le  T V  p re s e n te r ,  w h o  w a s  s e v e r e ly  b e a te n  b y  h e r  h u s b a n d ,  w a s  
w id e ly  re p o r te d  in  th e  S a u d i m e d ia  a n d  h a s  o p e n  a  p u b l ic  d e b a te  a b o u t  v io le n c e  a g a in s t  
w o m e n .
M arch
2004
T h e  N a t io n a l  H u m a n  R ig h ts  A s s o c ia t io n  (N H R A ) , a n  N G O , w a s  fo rm e d . 10 S a u d i 
w o m e n  w e re  a m o n g  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n ’s 4 0  fo u n d in g  m e m b e r s
M ay 2004 S a u d i w o m e n  d e le g a t io n  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  a  c o n fe r e n c e  t i t l e d  “ th e  w o m a n  a n d  th e  la w ”  h e ld  
in  J o rd a n .
June 2004 A  d e c r e e  (N o . 1 2 0  o f  1 2 -4 -1 4 2 5 H )  in s t ru c te d  g o v e rn m e n t  a n d  p r iv a te  in s t i tu t io n s ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  c h a m b e r s  o f  c o m m e rc e ,  to  e s ta b l i s h  s e c t io n s  fo r  w o m e n . T h e  d e c re e  a ls o  
s t r e s s e d  o n  f a c i l i ta t in g  w o m e n ’s in v o lv e m e n t  in  th e  w o rk fo rc e  th r o u g h  v a r io u s  m e a s u re s  
a n d  c a l le d  u p o n  th e  p u b l ic  a n d  p r iv a te  s e c to r s  to  t r a in  w o m e n  a n d  c r e a te  fu r th e r  j o b s  fo r  
th e m .
June 2004 T h e  n e w ly  fo r m e d  S a u d i J o u r n a l is ts  A s s o c ia t io n  (S J A )  h e ld  e le c t io n s  to  s e le c t  its  
m e m b e r s .  T w o  w o m e n  w e re  e le c te d  a m o n g  th e  S J A ’s n in e  m e m b e rs .
June 2004 T h e  th i rd  s e s s io n  o f  th e  n a t io n a l  d ia lo g u e  h e ld  in  A l-M a d in a  u n d e r  th e  t i t le  o f  “ R ig h ts  a n d  
D u tie s  o f  W o m e n ” , w ith  h a l f  o f  th e  7 0  p a r t ic ip a n ts  w e re  w o m e n .
June 2004 C ro w n  P r in c e  A b d u l la h  Ib n  A b d u la z iz  m e t  w ith  a  d e le g a t io n  o f  w o m e n  w h o  h a d  
p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  n a t io n a l  d ia lo g u e ’s s e s s io n .
A ugust
2004
T h e  e m p lo y m e n t  o f  th e  f i r s t  S a u d i f e m a le  o f f ic e r s ,  w e a r in g  th e  o f f ic ia l  u n ifo rm  (b u t 
w i th o u t  r a n k ) ,  a t  th e  G e n e ra l  D ir e c to r a te  o f  P a s s p o r ts  in  la rg e  c i t ie s  s u c h  a s  J e d d a h  a n d  
R iy a d h .
O ctober
2004
C o n tr a r y  to  e a r l ie r  in d ic a tio n s ,  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  w o m e n  w o u ld  n o t  b e  
a l lo w e d  to  v o te  o r  s ta n d  fo r  e le c tio n  to  m u n ic ip a l  c o u n c i l s
O ctober
2004
S a u d i m e d ia  r e v e a le d  th a t  K in g  A b d u la z iz  N a t io n a l  C e n tr e  is  d r a f t in g  a  c h a r te r  fo r  
w o m e n ’s r ig h ts .
N ovem ber
2004
T h e  F ir s t  S a u d i fe m a le  a c c r e d i te d  p i lo t  w a s  e m p lo y e d  b y  th e  K in g d o m  H o ld in g  C o m p a n y , 
to  b e c o m e  th e  f i r s t  S a u d i w o m a n  to  f ly  p la n e s .  T h is  e v e n t  r e c e iv e d  w id e  p u b l ic i ty  in  th e  
S a u d i m e d ia .
D ecem ber
2004
W a je h a  A l-H u w a id e r ,  S a u d i f e m a le  jo u r n a l i s t  a n d  w o m e n ’s r ig h ts  a c tiv is t ,  w a s  a w a rd e d  
th e  2 0 0 4  P E N /N O V I B  F re e  E x p re s s io n  A w a r d  a t  th e  H a g u e  fo r  h e r  w o rk  fo r  f r e e d o m  o f  
e x p re s s io n  a n d  a d v a n c e m e n t  o f  w o m e n ’s r ig h ts .
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J a n u a r y
2 0 0 5
2005
2 0 0  w o m e n  a tte n d e d  a  le c tu re  a b o u t  h u m a n  r ig h ts  in  S a u d i A r a b ia  o rg a n iz e d  b y  th e  
w o m e n ’s c o m m it te e  a t th e  in te rn a t io n a l  I s la m ic  R e l i e f  O rg a n iz a t io n
J a n u a r y
2 0 0 5
F o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e ,  th e  M in is t ry  o f  H ig h e r  E d u c a tio n  s p o n s o re d  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  f iv e  
w o m e n  d e le g a te s  f ro m  S a u d i A ra b ia  in  a n  in te rn a t io n a l  fo r u m  o n  th e  ro le  o f  A ra b  w o m e n  
in  s c ie n c e  a n d  te c h n o lo g y .
F e b r u a r y
2 0 0 5
In  e n c o u ra g in g  c o m m e n ts  d u r in g  a  v is i t  to  S a u d i A ra b ia ,  th e  c h a ir m a n  o f  th e  In te r ­
p a r l ia m e n ta ry  U n io n  e x p re s s e d  h is  s u p p o r t  a n d  d e s i r e  to  s e e  S a u d i w o m e n  jo in in g  M a jlis  
A l-S h u r a .
M a r c h
2 0 0 5
A  p o l l ,  p u b l ic iz e d  in  S a u d i m e d ia , r e v e a le d  th a t  8 7 %  o f  S a u d is  s u p p o r t  th e  p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  
w o m e n  in  e le c tio n s .
M a r c h
2 0 0 5
S a u d i M e d ia  w a s  a l lo w e d  to  w id e ly  p u b l ic iz e  a  c a s e  o f  a n  In d o n e s ia n  m a id  w h o  w a s  
a b u s e d  b y  h e r  S a u d i sp o n s o r , w h ic h  w a s  s e e n  as  a n  im p ro v e m e n t  to  p ro te c t  th e  r ig h ts  o f  
n o n -S a u d i  w o m e n .
A p r il  2 0 0 5 T h e  G e n e ra l  O rg a n iz a t io n  fo r  T e c h n ic a l  E d u c a t io n  a n d  V o c a t io n a l  T ra in in g  a n n o u n c e d  its  
in te n tio n  to  o p e n  2 4  te c h n ic a l  c o lla g e s  a n d  18 v o c a t io n a l  in s t i tu te s  fo r  g ir ls .
A p r il  2 0 0 5 A  ro y a l  v e rd ic t  is s u e d  a p p ro v in g  th e  r e v is io n  a n d  r e s t ru c tu r e  o f  in s t i tu t io n s  a n d  la w s  
g o v e rn in g  th e  ju d i c ia l  sy s te m  in c lu d in g  th e  p e r s o n a l  s ta tu s  c o u r ts ,  w h ic h  d e a ls ,  a m o n g  
o th e r  th in g s ,  w i th  is s u e s  r e la te d  to  w o m e n  in c lu d in g  d iv o rc e .
A p r il  2 0 0 5 T h e  f i r s t  S a u d i w o m a n  p ro d u c e d  a  d o c u m e n ta ry  f i lm  t i t l e d  “w o m e n  w ith o u t  s h a d o w ” 
c o n c e rn in g  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  m e n  a n d  w o m e n  in  th e  S a u d i  so c ie ty , w h ic h  c re a te d  
d is c u s s io n s  in  th e  S a u d i m e d ia .
A p r il 2 0 0 5 A  f a t w a  b y  s e n io r  u la m a  d e c la re d  c o e rc in g  w o m e n  in to  m a r r ia g e  a s  u n - I s la m ic  a n d  s u b je c t  
to  p u n is h m e n t .
A p r il  2 0 0 5 C ro w n  P r in c e  A b d u l la h  to ld  a  F re n c h  n e w s p a p e r  ‘L e  M o n d e ’ “ D e m o c ra c y  is  p a r t  o f  o u r  
I s la m ic  f a i th ”  a n d  “ d e v e lo p m e n ts  o n  th e  ro le  o f  w o m e n  w ill  t a k e  o n ly  fe w  y e a r s ” .
A p r il 2 0 0 5 A b o u t  3 0 0  S a u d i w o m e n  a tte n d e d  th e  f i r s t  o p e n  d ia lo g u e  o n  th e  id e n t i ty  o f  S a u d i w o m e n .
M a y  2 0 0 5 C o n tr a r y  to  lo c a l  tr a d i t io n s ,  th r e e  S a u d i w o m e n  w e re  e m p lo y e d  a s  w a i t r e s s e s  in  f iv e  s ta rs  
h o te l  in  J e d d a h ;  an  e v e n t  w a s  e x te n s iv e ly  r e p o r te d  in  S a u d i m e d ia .
M a y  2 0 0 5 T h e  M in is t ry  o f  J u s t ic e  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  a  s tu d y  is  b e in g  e x e c u te d  to  a l lo w  w o m e n  to  
p r a c t ic in g  la w y e r s ,  a s  th e  C o d e  o f  P ra c t ic e  fo r  L a w y e r s  d o e s  n o t  p r e v e n t  w o m e n  fro m  
b e in g  la w y e rs .
M a y  2 0 0 5 A  m e m b e r  in  M a j l i s  A l-S h u r a  s u b m it te d  a  p ro p o s a l  to  th e  M a j l i s  to  d is c u s s  l i f t in g  th e  1991 
b a n  o n  w o m e n  d r iv in g .  T h e  p ro p o s a l  g e n e ra te d  p u b l ic  d is c u s s io n  a n d  o f f ic ia l  s ta te m e n ts  
o n  th is  is s u e .
M a y  2 0 0 5 T h e  M in is te r  o f  I n te r io r  in  a  p re s s  c o n fe r e n c e  r e f e r r e d  to  w o m e n  d r iv in g  a s  “ s o c ia l  m a t te r  
to  b e  d e c id e d  b y  th e  s o c ie ty .”
M a y  2 0 0 5 L u b n a  A l-O liy a n  w a s  s e le c te d  b y  F o rb s  m a g a z in e  a m o n g  1 0 0  p o w e r fu l  b u s in e s s w o m e n , 
a n d  a s  th e  m o s t  p o w e r fu l  b u s in e s s w o m a n  in  th e  M id d le  E a s t.
J u n e  2 0 0 5 T h e  M in is t ry  o f  L a b o u r  d e c la re d  th a t  s a le s m e n  in  w o m e n  w e a r s ’ s h o p s  h a v e  to  b e  r e p la c e d  
w ith  s a le s w o m e n  w ith in  a  y e a r .
J u n e  2 0 0 5 A  fe m a le  m e m b e r  in  th e  N H R A  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  th i rd  o f  c o m p la in t s  r e c e iv e d  d u r in g  th e  
y e a r  w a s  a b o u t  c a s e s  o f  d o m e s t ic  v io le n c e  a g a in s t  w o m e n .
J u ly  2 0 0 5 T h e  M in is t ry  o f  I n te r io r  a n n o u n c e d  th a t  w o m e n  a re  lo n g e r  r e q u i r e d  to  p ro v id e  c o n s e n t 
f ro m  th e i r  g u a rd ia n s  fo r  o b ta in in g  n a t io n a l  ID  c a rd s ,  d e c la r in g  th a t  w o m e n  a n d  m e n  e n jo y  
e q u a l r ig h t  o f  n a t io n a l i ty ,  in c lu d in g  th e  r ig h t  to  o b ta in  n a t io n a l  c a rd .
J u ly  2 0 0 5 M o re  th a n  5 0 0  S a u d i ‘c o n s e r v a t iv e ’ e d u c a te d  w o m e n  s e n t  a  p e t i t io n  to  th e  C ro w n  P r in c e , 
c a l l in g  fo r  r e f o rm  b u t  w ith in  th e  I s la m ic  s h a r i  ’a h  f r a m e w o rk .
J u ly  2 0 0 5 T h e  M in is te r  o f  L a b o u r  a n n o u n c e d  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  d ir e c to r a te  in  c h a rg e  o f  p ro te c tin g  
fo re ig n  m a id s  (m o s t ly  w o m e n )  f ro m  a b u s e  a n d  o f  p u n is h in g  a b u s e r s .
A u g u s t
2 0 0 5
A  la w  w a s  p a s s e d  ( d e c r e e  N o . 1 -7 9 3  o f  2 2 -5 - 1 4 2 6 H )  f o r  is s u in g  l ic e n s e s  to  e m p lo y  
w o m e n  in  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r s ,  c o n ta in in g  m e a s u re r s  f o r  th e i r  e m p lo y m e n t .
S e p te m b e r
2 0 0 5
T h e  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C o m m is s io n ,  a  g o v e rn m e n ta l  in s t i tu t io n ,  w a s  e s ta b l i s h e d ,  b u t  w o m e n  
w e re  n o t  in c lu d e d  in  i ts  18 m e m b e r s  g o v e rn in g  c o u n c il .
S e p te m b e r
2 0 0 5
M o re  th a n  4 0  S a u d i p ro m in e n t  w o m e n  m e t  w ith  K in g  A b d u l la h  a n d  p r e s e n te d  th e i r  v ie w s  
o n  p ro m o t in g  th e  ro le  o f  w o m e n  in  th e  S a u d i s o c ie ty .
S e p te m b e r
2 0 0 5
A  n e w  la b o u r  la w  w a s  p a s s e d , w h ic h  c o n ta in e d ,  in te r  a l ia ,  s e v e r a l  r ig h ts  r e la te d  to  
w o m e n ’s w o rk  in c lu d in g  th e i r  r ig h t  to  w o rk  in  e v e ry  f i e ld  th a t  s u i ts  th e i r  n a tu r e .
304
Septem ber
2005
F o r  th e  f ir s t  tim e , S a u d i w o m e n  w ill  b e  a b le  to  p a r t ic ip a te ,  b o th  a s  c a n d id a te s  a n d  v o te r s , 
in  J e d d a h  C h a m b e r  o f  C o m m e rc e  a n d  I n d u s try  e le c t io n s  in  N o v e m b e r .
O ctober
2005
S a u d i n e w s p a p e rs  re v e a le d  th a t  th e  M in is t ry  o f  J u s t ic e  is  p re p a r in g  n e w  la w s  b a n n in g  
m a r ry in g  g ir ls  u n d e r  th e  a g e  o f  14 y e a rs  o ld .
O ctober
2005
In  a n  in te rv ie w  w ith  U S -A B C  T V , K in g  A b d u l la h  u n e q u iv o c a l ly  e x p re s s e d  h is  a d v o c a c y  
to  th e  r ig h ts  o f  w o m e n , in c lu d in g  th e i r  r ig h t  to  d r iv e .
O ctober
2005
A  y o u n g  S a u d i fe m a le  a u th o r e d  a  f ic t io n  n o v e l  t i t le d  (T h e  G ir ls  o f  R iy a d h ) , r e f le c t in g  th e  
liv e s  o f  f o u r  S a u d i ‘l ib e r a l ’ w o m e n . T h e  N o v e l  g e n e ra te d  u n p re c e d e n te d  p u b l ic  
d is c u s s io n s  a t v a r io u s  le v e ls .
N ovem ber
2005
A f te r  an  a b s e n c e  o f  a b o u t 2 0  y e a r s ,  c in e m a  h a s  r e tu rn e d  to  S a u d i A ra b ia  w ith  a  s c r e e n in g  
o f  c a r to o n s  fo r  w o m e n  a n d  c h i ld re n .
N ovem ber
2005
A  s y m p o s iu m  a b o u t H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  E d u c a t io n a l  C u r r ic u lu m s  w a s  h e ld , in  w h ic h  m a le  
a n d  fe m a le  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  d is c u s s io n .
N ovem ber
2005
E liz a b e th  C h e n e y , U S  P r in c ip a l  D e p u ty  A s s i s ta n t  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  N e a r  E a s te rn  
A f fa i r s ,  m e t  w ith  S a u d i f e m a le  s tu d e n ts  a t  E f f a t  C o lle g e  in  J e d d a h  a n d  p r a i s e d  th e  ro le  
p la y e d  b y  S a u d i w o m e n .
N ovem ber
2005
A  S a u d i w o m a n  w a s  n a m e d , f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e ,  a s  G o o d w ill  A m b a s s a d o r  fo r  th e  U N , a n d  
th e  U N  S e c re ta ry  G e n e ra l  m e t  w ith  h e r  in  J e d d a h .
N ovem ber
2005
C u ltu r a l  C o m m it te e  o f  M a jl i s  A l - S h u r a  r e c o m m e n d e d  a llo c a tio n  o f  s p o r t  a c t iv i t ie s  s u i ta b le  
fo r  w o m e n .
N ovem ber
2005
F o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , tw o  w o m e n  w o n  tw o  s e a ts  o u t  o f  tw e lv e  in  J e d d a h  C h a m b e r  o f  
C o m m e rc e  a n d  In d u s try  e le c t io n s .
D ecem ber
2005
A  b u s in e s s w o m e n  d e le g a t io n  le d  b y  P r in c e s s  L u lu w a h  A l-F a is a l  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th e  A n n u a l 
In te rn a t io n a l  F o ru m  f o r  B u s in e s s w o m e n , h e ld  in  L o n d o n . T h e  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  th e  S a u d i 
b u s in e s s w o m e n  w e re  c o v e re d  in  th e  S a u d i m e d ia .
D ecem ber
2005
A  S a u d i fe m a le  e n g in e e r  (N a d ia  B a k h u i j i )  ru n  in  an  e le c tio n  fo r  th e  S a u d i E n g in e e r s ’ 
S y n d ic a te  a n d  w o n  a  s e a t  a m o n g  th e  10 - m e m b e r  b o a rd .
D ecem ber
2005
H u n d re d s  o f  S a u d i w o m e n  a t t e n d e d  a  le c tu r e  in  R iy a d h  e n t i t le d  ‘W o m e n ’s R ig h ts  B e tw e e n  
th e  S h a r i  ’a h  a n d  th e  S o c ie ty ’ ; a n  e v e n t  th a t  r e c e iv e d  m e d ia  c o v e ra g e  a n d  p u b l ic  d e b a te .
D ecem ber
2005
A  S a u d i f e m a le  j o c k e y  m a d e  h is to r y  w h e n  s h e  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  an  in te rn a t io n a l  to u rn a m e n t ,  
a s  th e  f i r s t  e v e r  S a u d i fe m a le  to  r e p r e s e n t  S a u d i A r a b ia  in  in te rn a t io n a l  s p o r t  a c tiv i ty
D ecem ber
2005
P r in c e  N a i f  A ra b  U n iv e r s i ty  f o r  S e c u r i ty  S c ie n c e s  o rg a n is e d ,  d u r in g  th e  y e a r ,  th r e e  c o u rs e s  
f o r  w o m e n  w o rk in g  in  s e c u r i ty  f ie ld s .
2 0 0 6
January
2006
A s  a  p a r t  th e  b u s in e s s  d e le g a t io n ,  a  f e w  S a u d i w o m e n  p a r t ic ip a te d  in  a n  o f f ic ia l  v is i t  le d  
b y  K in g  A b d u l la h  to  th r e e  A s ia n  c o u n tr ie s .
January
2006
M a j l i s  A l-S h u r a  a p p ro v e d  a  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  fo r  e s ta b l i s h in g  S u p re m e  C o u n c i l  fo r  F a m ily , 
w h ic h  m a in ly  fo r m u la te s  p u b l ic  p o l i c ie s  o n  th e  p ro te c t io n  o f  w o m e n  a n d  c h i ld r e n .  A s  
a n n o u n c e d ,  w o m e n  w ill  p la y  a  s ig n i f i c a n t  ro le  in  th is  C o u n c il .
F ebruary
2006
In  h e r  a d d re s s  to  th e  a n n u a l J e d d a h  E c o n o m ic  F o ru m , C h e r ie  B la ir ,  th e  B r i t is h  P M ’s w ife , 
a c k n o w le d g e d  s t ro n g  p ro g r e s s  in  s ta tu s  o f  w o m e n  a n d  to ld  th e  S a u d i w o m e n  to  b e  p a tie n t .
M arch
2006
T h e  to p ic  o f  F r id a y ’s s e rm o n  o f  th e  G ra n d  M o s q u e  in  M a k k a h  w a s  u n u s u a l ly  a b o u t  
w o m e n ’s r ig h ts  w ith in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  I s la m ic  s h a r i ’a h .
M arch
2006
T h e  c h a irm a n  o f  th e  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C o m m is s io n  a n n o u n c e d  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  s e c t io n  
in  th e  C o m m is s io n  th a t  d e a ls  w ith  p ro te c t in g  a n d  p ro m o tin g  w o m e n ’s r ig h ts ,  d e c la r in g  th a t  
th e  is s u e  o f  w o m e n  o c c u p ie s  s ig n i f i c a n t  p la c e  in  th e  w o rk s  o f  th e  c o m m is s io n .
M arch
2006
T h e  S a u d i m e d ia  r e p o r te d  th a t  a  S a u d i f e m a le  la w y e r  jo i n e d  th e  le g a l  te a m  to  d e f e n d  
S a d d a m  H u s s e in , a l th o u g h  S a u d i w o m e n  a re  s t i l l  u n a b le  to  e n te r  th e  lo c a l  le g a l  p ro fe s s io n .
A pril 2006 S a u d i  N e w s p a p e r s  r e v e a le d  th a t  f iv e  S a u d i f e m a le s  h a d  t r a n s s e x u a l  s u r g e ry  o v e r s e a s ,  a n d  
S a u d i  e m b a s s ie s  w e re  a l lo w e d  to  is s u e  n e w  tr a v e l  d o c u m e n ta t io n s  fo r  th e m  a s  m a le s .
A pril 2006 In  a  p u b l ic iz e d  s te p  to  p r o m o te  a  c u l tu r e  o f  h u m a n  a n d  w o m e n ’s  r ig h ts ,  th e  S a u d i P o s ta l 
A u th o r i ty  in a u g u r a te d  m e m o r ia l  p o s ta g e  s ta m p  a b o u t  h u m a n  r ig h ts .
M ay 2006 F o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , tw o  S a u d i w o m e n  w e re  in c lu d e d  in  th e  M a jl i s  A l-S h u r a  d e le g a t io n  to  th e  
a n n u a l  m e e t in g s  o f  th e  I n te r - P a r l i a m e n ta r y  U n io n  ( I P U ) ,  a n d  th e  M a j l i s  A l - S h u r a 's 
c h a ir m a n  d e n ie d  a n y  p r e s s u r e  f r o m  th e  IP U  o n  th is  s te p .
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J u ly  2006 S ev era l S aud i N ew sp ap e rs  rep o rted  th a t an  o ff ic e  fo r  th e  A rab  W o m en  F o ru m  w ill be 
o p en ed  in Jed d ah  an d  a Saudi p ro m in e n t w o m a n  w as n o m in a te d  as E x cu siv e  D irec to r fo r  
th e  b ran ch .
J u ly  2006 In a su rv ey  sp o n so red  b y  an o ffic ia l, re lig io u s ly  o r ie n te d  bod y , 88 p e rc e n t o f  a ll-fem ale  
re sp o n d e n ts  o b jec ted  liftin g  the  ban  on w o m en  d riv in g .
S ep tem b er
2006
W ith  ab sen t o f  fem ale  in  the  cu rren t fo u r-y ea r fo rm a tio n  o f  th e  H u m an  R igh ts 
C o m m iss io n ’s co u n c il, the C o m m iss io n ’s c h a irm a n  a n n o u n c e d  th a t w o m en  w o rk  in the  
co m m iss io n  in  co n su ltan cy  an d  a d m in is tra tiv e  jo b s  an d  m a y  b e  in c lu d ed  in  th e  n ex t 
fo rm a tio n  o f  th e  c o m m iss io n ’s council.
O cto b er
2006
A  la w su it filed  a g a in s t th e  Saudi au th o r o f  th e  n o v e l (T h e  G irls  o f  R iy ad h ) fo r ta rn ish in g  
th e  im a g e  o f  th e  Saudi g irls  and  ag a in s t th e  M in is try  o f  In fo rm a tio n  fo r g iv in g  th e  au th o r 
p e rm iss io n  to  d is trib u te  th e  n o v e l, w as d ro p p e d  b y  th e  B o a rd  o f  G riev an ces .
N o v em b er
2006
In a  p u b lic iz e d  ev e n t o rg an ized  b y  th e  S aud i W o m e n  In fo rm a tio n  C en tre , in  w h ich  
m o d e rn iz a tio n  v a lu es am o n g  Saud i g ir ls  w e re  an a ly z e d , a  fem a le  Saud i ac tiv is t u rg ed  
S au d i w o m en  to  b y p ass  th e ir  ch ild ish  s tag e  o f  th o u g h t.
D ecem b er
2006
A  sy m p o s iu m  w as h e ld  in  Jed d ah  u n d e r th e  t i tle  “W o rk in g  W o m en : b e tw een  R ig h ts  and  
O b lig a tio n s” , o rg an ized  b y  K h ad ijah  b in t K h o w a ild  C e n tre  fo r  B u sin essw o m en .
